Supreme Court clarifies scope of Section 25 of the Domestic Violence Act in maintenance cases: S. Vijikumari vs. Mowneshwarachari C (2024) INSC 732 (10 September 2024)

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: 10 September 2024

Citation: 2024 INSC 732

Judges: B.V. Nagarathna, J. and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, J.

Can a maintenance order under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 be revoked based on circumstances existing before the order was passed? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this crucial question, clarifying the scope of Section 25 of the Act. This judgment settles the law regarding when and how a maintenance order can be altered, modified, or revoked, emphasizing the need for a change in circumstances *after* the initial order.

The core issue revolved around whether a husband could seek to set aside a maintenance order and reclaim previously paid amounts by claiming his wife misrepresented her employment status. The Supreme Court clarified that Section 25 of the Act allows for changes to orders only based on circumstances that arise *after* the original order was issued, not before.

The judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench comprising Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, with the opinion authored by Justice B.V. Nagarathna.

Case Background

The appellant, S. Vijikumari (wife), filed a petition under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, against her husband, Mowneshwarachari C (respondent). The Magistrate granted her Rs. 12,000 per month as maintenance and Rs. 1,00,000 as compensation on 23rd February 2015. The husband did not present any evidence during this proceeding. He filed an appeal against this order, but it was dismissed due to delay, and the order attained finality.

Subsequently, the husband filed an application under Section 25 of the Act, seeking to set aside the maintenance order, claiming his wife had misrepresented her employment status. This application was initially dismissed by the Magistrate. However, the Appellate Court allowed the husband’s appeal and remanded the matter back to the Magistrate, directing a fresh hearing with both parties presenting evidence.

The wife then filed a revision petition before the High Court, which was also dismissed. The High Court directed the Magistrate to reconsider the husband’s application without being influenced by the Appellate Court’s observations. Aggrieved by these orders, the wife appealed to the Supreme Court.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The Magistrate initially allowed the wife’s petition under Section 12 of the Act, granting maintenance and compensation. The husband’s appeal against this order was dismissed due to delay. Subsequently, the husband filed an application under Section 25 of the Act, which was initially dismissed by the Magistrate. The Appellate Court, however, reversed this decision and remanded the matter to the Magistrate for reconsideration. The High Court upheld the Appellate Court’s order, leading to the wife’s appeal to the Supreme Court.

Legal Framework

The core of this case revolves around Section 25 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. This section deals with the duration and alteration of orders passed under the Act. Specifically, sub-section (2) of Section 25 states:

“If the Magistrate, on receipt of an application from the aggrieved person or the respondent, is satisfied that there is a change in the circumstances requiring alteration, modification or revocation of any order made under this Act, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing pass such order, as he may deem appropriate.”

The Supreme Court emphasized that this provision allows for alteration, modification, or revocation of orders only when there is a change in circumstances *after* the initial order was passed. This change can be related to financial conditions or other relevant factors of either party.

The Court also referred to Section 127(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and Section 146(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, noting that the phrase “change in circumstances” has been intentionally left undefined by the legislature, allowing the Magistrate to adjudge the change based on the specific facts of each case.

Arguments

Appellant (Wife)’s Arguments:

• The application under Section 25 of the Act is not maintainable as it seeks to set aside the order dated 23.02.2015, not merely alter, modify, or revoke it.

• The respondent is seeking a return of the maintenance paid, which is not permissible under Section 25 of the Act.

• The High Court and Appellate Court erred in remanding the matter to the Magistrate.

• The application under Section 25 of the Act can only be for a change of circumstance after the order. The husband is stating a circumstance prior to the order.

Respondent (Husband)’s Arguments:

• The wife misrepresented her employment status, claiming she was unemployed when she was not, which is a ground for revoking the maintenance order.

• The Appellate Court and High Court were correct in directing the Magistrate to consider his application under Section 25 of the Act.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court addressed the following key issue:

1. Whether an application under Section 25(2) of the Act can be used to set aside an order passed under Section 12 of the Act, particularly when the applicant seeks a refund of the maintenance amount already paid?

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues

Authorities

The Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

The Court relied on Alexander Sambath Abner vs. Miron Lede, 2009 SCC OnLine Mad 2851* to emphasize that any order for alteration, modification or revocation operates prospectively and not retrospectively. The Court also referred to Section 489 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, Section 127(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 146(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, Section 125(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and Section 127 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to highlight the legislative intent behind the phrase “change in circumstances” and the powers of the Magistrate.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the interpretation of Section 25(2) of the Act. The Court emphasized that the legislative intent behind this provision was to address changes in circumstances that occur *after* an order has been passed under the Act. The Court found that allowing an application to set aside an order based on circumstances that existed before the order would be contrary to the spirit of the Act.

The Court also highlighted that the husband’s application was essentially seeking a refund of the maintenance amount, which is not permissible under Section 25(2) of the Act. The Court noted that the order dated 23.02.2015 had attained finality, and therefore, it could not be set aside retrospectively.

The court also noted that the husband had not participated in the proceedings before the learned Magistrate and had belatedly filed an appeal before the Appellate Court which was dismissed and he did not choose to assail the said order before a higher forum.

Ratio: Fact:Law

The Court’s decision was predominantly influenced by legal considerations (70%), specifically the interpretation of Section 25(2) of the Act and the legislative intent behind it. Factual aspects (30%), such as the husband’s conduct and the finality of the order, played a secondary role in the Court’s reasoning.

Logical Reasoning:

The Court’s reasoning was based on a strict interpretation of the legal provision. The Court rejected the husband’s argument that his wife’s misrepresentation was a valid ground for setting aside the order as the misrepresentation was prior to the order. The Court emphasized that any change in circumstances must occur after the initial order was passed.

The Court rejected the interpretation that Section 25(2) could be used to rectify errors or misrepresentations that occurred before the initial order was passed. The Court emphasized that such issues should have been raised during the initial proceedings or in an appeal against the original order. The Court also rejected the argument that the husband was entitled to a refund of the maintenance amount as this would amount to a retrospective application of the revocation order, which is not permissible under Section 25(2) of the Act.

The Supreme Court held that the application filed by the respondent was not maintainable under Section 25(2) of the Act. The Court set aside the orders of the High Court and the Appellate Court. The Court, however, reserved liberty to the respondent to file a fresh application under Section 25 of the Act, if so advised. The Court clarified that any revocation of the order dated 23.02.2015 could only be with effect from the date of the fresh application or as ordered by the Magistrate.

“…the exercise of jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of Section 25 of the Act cannot be for setting aside of an earlier order merely because the respondent seeks setting aside of that order, particularly when the said order has attained finality by its merger with an appellate order as in the instant case unless a case for its revocation is made out.”

“…any alteration, modification or revocation of an order passed under Section 12 of the Act owing to a change in circumstances could only be for a period ex post facto, i.e., post the period of an order being made in a petition under Section 12 of the Act and not to a period prior thereto.”

“…the prayers sought for by the respondent herein were not at all maintainable under sub-section (2) of Section 25 of the Act as they related to the period prior to 23.02.2015 when the original order was passed.”

Key Takeaways

• Section 25(2) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, allows for alteration, modification, or revocation of orders only based on changes in circumstances that occur *after* the initial order.

• An application under Section 25(2) cannot be used to set aside an order based on circumstances that existed before the order was passed.

• A party cannot seek a refund of maintenance amounts already paid under an earlier order by claiming misrepresentation or fraud prior to the order.

• Orders under the Act can be altered, modified, or revoked prospectively, not retrospectively.

• The phrase “change in circumstances” is not defined under the Act, allowing the Magistrate to adjudge the change based on the facts of each case.

Directions

The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the High Court and the Appellate Court and dismissed the husband’s application. However, the Court reserved liberty for the husband to file a fresh application under Section 25 of the Act, if so advised. The Court clarified that any revocation of the order dated 23.02.2015 could only be with effect from the date of the fresh application or as ordered by the Magistrate.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that Section 25(2) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, can only be invoked for a change in circumstances that has occurred after the initial order was passed. This clarifies that the provision cannot be used to challenge the validity of an order based on facts that existed before the order was made, nor can it be used to seek a refund of past maintenance payments. This judgment reinforces the prospective nature of alterations, modifications, or revocations of orders under the Act.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment in S. Vijikumari vs. Mowneshwarachari C clarifies the scope of Section 25 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The Court held that changes to maintenance or other orders under the Act can only be made based on circumstances that arise after the order has been passed. The judgment prevents misuse of Section 25(2) to challenge orders based on prior circumstances, ensuring that orders attain finality and that changes are only made when there is a genuine change in the situation of the parties. This decision reinforces the prospective nature of alterations, modifications or revocations of orders under the Act.