Supreme Court clarifies sentencing under IPC and POCSO Act in father-daughter rape case: Gyanendra Singh vs. State of U.P. (2025)

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: March 07, 2025

Citation: 2025 INSC 335

Judges: Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta

Can a person be sentenced under both the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act for the same crime? The Supreme Court of India addressed this critical question in a recent case involving a father accused of raping his minor daughter. The Court clarified the sentencing guidelines when offenses overlap under both laws, ensuring that the punishment reflects the severity of the crime while adhering to legal principles.

In Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh v. State of U.P., the Supreme Court examined the conviction and sentencing of an appellant who was found guilty of offenses under both the IPC and the POCSO Act. The primary issue was whether the appellant’s conviction under the IPC was valid, considering the existence of the POCSO Act, a special law designed to protect children from sexual offenses.

The judgment was delivered by a bench comprising Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta.

Case Background

The case originated from an FIR lodged on October 28, 2015, by Smt. Rajani, the wife of the appellant, Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh. Rajani reported that her husband had committed sexual assault on their nine-year-old daughter (PW-2) on October 22, 2015, at their residence in Fatehpur, Uttar Pradesh. Rajani had been staying at her parental home for about two months, leaving her daughter and another son in the care of the appellant.

According to the FIR, the appellant enticed the minor victim to the rooftop of their house and committed the assault. The victim narrated the incident to her grandfather, Ram Naresh Singh (PW-3), who then informed Rajani. Following this, Rajani, accompanied by her father and father-in-law, approached the police and filed the FIR against the appellant.

The police investigation included a medical examination of the victim, conducted by Dr. Manisha Shukla (PW-4), which revealed redness over the labia minora but an intact hymen. The victim’s statement was recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, where she explicitly accused the appellant of penetrative sexual assault.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The trial court convicted the appellant under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Sections 3/4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, sentencing him to life imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 25,000. The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad affirmed this judgment, modifying the sentence to specify that the life imprisonment would extend for the remainder of the appellant’s natural life.

The appellant then filed a special leave petition before the Supreme Court, which was entertained with the notice limited to the question of sentence.

Legal Framework

The Supreme Court examined the interplay between the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, focusing on Sections 42 and 42A of the POCSO Act. These sections address the issue of overlapping offenses and the overriding effect of the POCSO Act in cases of inconsistency with other laws.

Section 42 of the POCSO Act states:

“42. Alternate punishment. — Where an act or omission constitutes an offence punishable under this Act and also under sections 166A, 354A, 354B, 354C, 354D, 370, 370A, 375, 376, [376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA, 376DB], [376E, section 509 of the Indian Penal Code or section 67B of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000)], then, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, the offender found guilty of such offence shall be liable to punishment only under this Act or under the Indian Penal Code as provides for punishment which is greater in degree.”

Section 42A of the POCSO Act states:

“42A. Act not in derogation of any other law. — The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force and, in case of any inconsistency, the provisions of this Act shall have overriding effect on the provisions of any such law to the extent of the inconsistency.”

The Court also considered Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which defines the punishment for rape:

“376. Punishment for rape. — (1) Whoever, except in the cases provided for in sub-section (2), commits rape, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment of either description for a term which [shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine]. (2) Whoever,— (a)-(e )…. (f) being a relative, guardian or teacher of, or a person in a position of trust or authority towards the woman, commits rape on such woman ; or (g)-(h)…. (i)11 commits rape, on a woman incapable of giving consent; or shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural life, and shall also be liable to fine .”

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments:

• Shri R. Balasubramanian, the learned senior counsel for the appellant, argued that the appellant should not have been convicted under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of the IPC because the alleged acts are defined as offenses in both the IPC and the POCSO Act.
• He contended that the special law (POCSO Act) should prevail over the general law (IPC) in cases of overlapping offenses.
• He relied on Section 42A of the POCSO Act, which states that the provisions of the POCSO Act have an overriding effect on any other law to the extent of inconsistency.
• He argued that since the offense under Sections 3/4 of the POCSO Act does not carry a punishment of imprisonment for life (meaning imprisonment for the remainder of a person’s natural life), the accused should only have been punished under that provision, not under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of the IPC.
• He further argued that the High Court erred in enhancing the rigor of the punishment by directing that the appellant would have to undergo life imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life without there being any appeal for enhancement of sentence.

Respondent’s Arguments:

• The learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State vehemently opposed the submissions made by the appellant’s counsel.
• He argued that the appellant was convicted for a reprehensible act of subjecting his own minor daughter to forcible sexual assault.
• He contended that the High Court was fully justified in awarding the enhanced punishment to the appellant under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of the IPC.
• He implored the Court to dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the High Court.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The moot question which requires adjudication is whether the conviction of the appellant ought to have been recorded under the IPC or whether the provisions of the Special law, i.e., Section 42A of POCSO Act, would prevail thereby, vitiating the sentence awarded to the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of IPC.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues:

Authorities

The Court considered the following authorities:

• Section 42 of the POCSO Act: The Court clarified that this section deals with the quantum of punishment, mandating that the law which prescribes the punishment of greater degree would have to be applied when an act constitutes an offence under both the IPC and the POCSO Act.
• Section 42A of the POCSO Act: The Court held that this section deals with procedural aspects and gives an overriding effect to the provisions of the POCSO Act over any other law where the two acts are inconsistent. It cannot override the scope of Section 42 of the POCSO Act.
• Section 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of the IPC: The Court noted that these provisions give the Courts discretion to award punishment for a term of minimum 10 years or imprisonment for life.
• Shiva Kumar @ Shiva @ Shivamurthy v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 817 (Supreme Court of India): The Court referred to this case to emphasize that Constitutional Courts can impose a modified or fixed-term sentence, directing that a life sentence shall be of a fixed period of more than fourteen years.
• Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala, 2024 SCC Online SC 315 (Supreme Court of India): The Court considered the issue of sentencing beyond the period of 14 years, referencing Swamy Shraddhananda v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767, and Union of India v. V. Sriharan alias Murugan, (2016) 7 SCC 1.
• Veerendra v. State of Madhya Pradesh (Supreme Court of India): The Court considered a case involving offenses under the POCSO Act and Section 376(2)(i) of the IPC, confining the life imprisonment to mean actual imprisonment for a period of 30 years, relying on Swamy Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka.
• Swamy Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 (Supreme Court of India): The Court relied on this judgment to address the judge’s dilemma in sentencing, where a case falls short of the rarest of rare category but a sentence of 14 years would be grossly disproportionate.

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• Section 42 of the POCSO Act: The Court interpreted this section as mandating the application of the law that prescribes the greater degree of punishment when an act constitutes an offense under both the IPC and the POCSO Act.
• Section 42A of the POCSO Act: The Court clarified that this section deals with procedural aspects and does not override the scope of Section 42.
• Shiva Kumar @ Shiva @ Shivamurthy v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 817: The Court used this case to support the view that Constitutional Courts can impose modified or fixed-term sentences.
• Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala, 2024 SCC Online SC 315: The Court referenced this case to address the issue of sentencing beyond the period of 14 years, emphasizing the need for proportionate penalties.
• Veerendra v. State of Madhya Pradesh: The Court cited this case to illustrate the confinement of life imprisonment to a fixed period of 30 years in cases involving the POCSO Act and Section 376(2)(i) of the IPC.
• Swamy Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767: The Court relied on this judgment to address the judge’s dilemma in sentencing, where a case falls short of the rarest of rare category but a sentence of 14 years would be grossly disproportionate.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the need to balance the severity of the crime with the appropriate application of legal provisions. The Court emphasized that while the POCSO Act is designed to protect children, it should not be interpreted in a way that undermines the IPC when the latter provides for a greater degree of punishment. The Court also considered the importance of ensuring that sentences are proportionate and just, taking into account the specific facts and circumstances of each case.

Fact:Law Ratio

Logical Reasoning

For the issue of whether the conviction should be under IPC or POCSO Act, the court’s logical reasoning can be summarized as follows:

Issue: Conviction under IPC vs. POCSO Act

Step 1: Analyze Section 42 of POCSO Act: Does the act constitute an offense under both IPC and POCSO Act?

Step 2: If yes, which law prescribes the greater degree of punishment?

Step 3: Apply the law with the greater punishment (as per Section 42).

Step 4: Analyze Section 42A of POCSO Act: Does it override Section 42?

Step 5: No, Section 42A deals with procedural aspects and does not override Section 42.

Conclusion: Conviction under both IPC and POCSO Act is justified, but sentence should be proportionate.

Key Takeaways

• When an act constitutes an offense under both the IPC and the POCSO Act, the law that prescribes the greater degree of punishment should be applied.
• Section 42A of the POCSO Act does not override Section 42, which deals with the quantum of punishment.
• Courts have the discretion to award punishment for a term of minimum 10 years or imprisonment for life under Section 376 of the IPC.
• Sentences should be proportionate and just, taking into account the specific facts and circumstances of each case.

Directions

The Supreme Court directed that the sentence of life imprisonment awarded to the accused by the trial court for the offense under Sections 3/4 of the POCSO Act shall stand revived.

For the offenses punishable under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of the IPC, the accused is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life, as awarded by the trial court, without the stipulation that the life term will enure till the natural life of the appellant, and a fine of Rs. 5,00,000/- and in default, to further undergo imprisonment of two years. Both the sentences shall run concurrently.

The fine, upon being deposited, shall be paid to the victim.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of the case is that when an act constitutes an offense under both the IPC and the POCSO Act, the law that prescribes the greater degree of punishment should be applied, and Section 42A of the POCSO Act does not override this principle. The Court also clarified that sentences should be proportionate and just, and the High Court erred in enhancing the punishment to life imprisonment for the remainder of the appellant’s natural life without justification.

Conclusion

In Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh v. State of U.P., the Supreme Court clarified the sentencing guidelines when offenses overlap under both the IPC and the POCSO Act. The Court held that the conviction under both laws was justified, but the High Court erred in enhancing the punishment to life imprisonment for the remainder of the appellant’s natural life. The Court restored the trial court’s judgment, emphasizing the need for proportionate and just sentences.