LEGAL ISSUE: Interpretation of Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 concerning the applicability of compensation under the new Act.
CASE TYPE: Land Acquisition Law
Case Name: Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. vs. Tarun Pal Singh & Ors.
[Judgment Date]: 15 November 2017
Introduction
Date of the Judgment: 15th November 2017
Citation: (2017) INSC 998
Judges: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Arun Mishra and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar.
Can a land acquisition be deemed to have lapsed, requiring compensation under the new 2013 Act, even when an award was passed under the old 1894 Act? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this intricate question in a case involving the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC). The core issue was whether Section 24(1)(b) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (the 2013 Act) is governed by the proviso to Section 24(2) of the same Act, or if it should be read independently. This judgment clarifies the scope and applicability of these provisions, impacting how compensation is determined in land acquisition cases. The judgment was authored by Justice Arun Mishra, with Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar concurring.
Case Background
The Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. (DMRC) initiated land acquisition for its project by issuing a notification on 4th June 2009, under Section 4 read with Section 17(1) and (4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the 1894 Act). The DMRC deposited 80% of the land compensation, amounting to Rs. 3,28,56,687.49, on 15th June 2009. Following this, a declaration under Section 6 of the 1894 Act was issued on 9th October 2009, and the DMRC took possession of the land. The Land Acquisition Collector (LAC) pronounced the award on 14th September 2011. DMRC deposited the remaining compensation amount of Rs. 60,81,04,200 on 3rd November 2011. The land was developed and handed over for the construction of the Chattarpur Metro Station. The landowners sought a reference under Section 18 of the 1894 Act for enhanced compensation, which is pending. The High Court directed that the compensation be paid under the 2013 Act. Aggrieved by this order, DMRC filed appeals in the Supreme Court.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 04 June 2009 | Notification issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. |
| 15 June 2009 | DMRC deposited 80% of the land compensation. |
| 09 October 2009 | Declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 issued. |
| 14 September 2011 | Award pronounced by the Land Acquisition Collector. |
| 03 November 2011 | DMRC deposited the remaining compensation amount. |
| 21 May 2015 | High Court directed compensation be paid under the 2013 Act. |
| 15 November 2017 | Supreme Court delivered the judgment. |
Course of Proceedings
The landowners filed writ petitions in the High Court, where the court directed that while the acquisition would stand, the compensation would be paid to the landowners under the 2013 Act. DMRC, aggrieved by this decision, preferred appeals before the Supreme Court.
Legal Framework
The core of the dispute revolves around Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. Section 24(1) outlines the applicability of the 2013 Act to land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Specifically, Section 24(1)(b) states that if an award has been made under Section 11 of the 1894 Act, the proceedings continue under the 1894 Act as if it had not been repealed. Section 24(2), however, provides that if an award was made five years or more before the commencement of the 2013 Act, and physical possession has not been taken or compensation has not been paid, the proceedings are deemed to have lapsed. The proviso to Section 24(2) states that if an award has been made, and compensation for a majority of landholdings has not been deposited in the accounts of the beneficiaries, all beneficiaries are entitled to compensation under the 2013 Act. The court also considered the rules of construction of a proviso, noting that a proviso typically qualifies the main part of the section and does not enlarge its scope.
Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 states:
“24.(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, –
(a) Where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or
(b) Where an award under said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act:
Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of landholding has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”
Arguments
The DMRC argued that since the award was passed within five years prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act, Section 24(1)(b) applies, and the proceedings should continue under the 1894 Act. They contended that the proviso to Section 24(2) is not applicable as it is part of Section 24(2) and not Section 24(1)(b). The DMRC also stated that they have deposited the compensation with the Land Acquisition Collector.
The landowners, on the other hand, argued that the proviso to Section 24(2) should be read as part of Section 24(1)(b). They contended that since the compensation for the majority of landholdings was not deposited in the accounts of the beneficiaries, all beneficiaries are entitled to compensation under the 2013 Act. The landowners relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Delhi Development Authority vs. Sukhbir Singh & Ors., (2016) 16 SCC 258.
The arguments can be summarized as follows:
| DMRC’s Submissions | Landowners’ Submissions |
|---|---|
| ✓ The award was passed within 5 years of the commencement of the 2013 Act. | ✓ The proviso to Section 24(2) should be read as part of Section 24(1)(b). |
| ✓ Section 24(1)(b) applies, and the proceedings should continue under the 1894 Act. | ✓ Compensation for the majority of landholdings was not deposited in the accounts of the beneficiaries. |
| ✓ The proviso to Section 24(2) is not applicable to Section 24(1)(b). | ✓ All beneficiaries are entitled to compensation under the 2013 Act. |
| ✓ Compensation has already been deposited with the Land Acquisition Collector. | ✓ Relied on Delhi Development Authority vs. Sukhbir Singh & Ors., (2016) 16 SCC 258. |
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court framed the following issue:
✓ Whether the provision of Section 24(1)(b) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 is governed by the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the said Act or it has to be read as part of section 24(2).
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
| Issue | Court’s Decision |
|---|---|
| Whether Section 24(1)(b) is governed by the proviso to Section 24(2)? | The Supreme Court held that the proviso to Section 24(2) is not applicable to Section 24(1)(b). The proviso is part of Section 24(2) and is an exception to the lapse of acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2). It is not to be read as part of Section 24(1)(b). |
Authorities
The Supreme Court considered various authorities to interpret the proviso to Section 24(2). These authorities were used to understand the principles of statutory interpretation, especially concerning provisos.
| Authority | Legal Point | How the Authority was Used |
|---|---|---|
| Craies on Statute Law, Seventh Edition | Construction of provisos | The court used this text to understand that a proviso is meant to qualify the preceding portion of the enactment and not to enlarge its scope. |
| Mullins v. Treasurer of Surrey (1880) 5 Q.B.D. 170 | Purpose of a proviso | The court cited this case to emphasize that a proviso is meant to carve out an exception to the main enactment. |
| West Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life Assurance Co. [1897] A.C. 647 | Interpretation of provisos | This case was used to highlight that provisions cannot be derived from a proviso by implication. |
| R. v. Dibdin [1910] P.57 | Proviso as part of the main enactment | The court referred to this case to reiterate that a proviso must be considered in relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso. |
| H.E.H. Nizam’s Religious Endowment Trust, Hyderabad v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad AIR 1966 SC 1007 | Effect of a proviso | This case was used to explain that a proviso excepts certain classes of income from the operation of the substantive clause. |
| Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors., AIR 1966 SC 12 | Purpose of a proviso | The court cited this case to emphasize that a proviso qualifies the substantive clause. |
| Ishverlal Thakorelal Almaula (Deceased) after him his heirs and Legal Representatives v. Motibhai Nagjibhai, AIR 1966 SC 459 | Function of a proviso | This case was used to explain that a proviso is meant to qualify something enacted in the substantive clause. |
| Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills & Ginning Factory v. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha, AIR 1961 SC 1596 | Interpretation of provisos | The court cited this case to explain that a proviso is not to be interpreted as stating a general rule. |
| S.Sundaram Pillai & Ors. v. V.R. Pattabiraman & Ors., (1985) 1 SCC 591 | Scope of a proviso | This case was used to summarize the various purposes and parameters of a proviso. |
| Dibyasingh Malana v. State of Orissa & Ors. AIR 1989 SC 1737 | Effect of a proviso | The court cited this case to reiterate that a proviso is an exception to the main provision. |
| Kush Sahgal & Ors. v. M.C. Mitter & Ors., AIR 2000 SC 1390 | Function of a proviso | This case was used to explain that a proviso excepts something from the enactment. |
| Haryana State Cooperative Land Development Bank Ltd. v. Haryana State Cooperative Land Development Banks Employees Union & Anr., (2004) 1 SCC 574 | Normal function of a proviso | This case was used to explain that a proviso is meant to carve out an exception to the main provision. |
| Romesh Kumar Sharma v. Union of India & Ors., (2006) 6 SCC 510 | Scope of a proviso | This case was used to reiterate that a proviso does not travel beyond the provision to which it is a proviso. |
| Nagar Palika Nigam v. Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 187 | Function of a proviso | This case was used to explain that a proviso is meant to qualify or create an exception to what is in the enactment. |
| Shimbhu & Anr. v. State of Haryana, (2014) 13 SCC 318 | Construction of a proviso | The court cited this case to emphasize that a proviso must be considered in relation to the main provision. |
| Delhi Development Authority vs. Sukhbir Singh & Ors., (2016) 16 SCC 258 | Interpretation of Section 24 of the 2013 Act | The court distinguished this case, stating that it was related to Section 24(2) and not Section 24(1)(b) and that the proviso to Section 24(2) was not discussed in the context of Section 24(1)(b). |
Judgment
The Supreme Court analyzed the submissions of both parties and the relevant legal authorities. The court held that the proviso to Section 24(2) is not applicable to Section 24(1)(b). The court emphasized that a proviso is meant to carve out an exception to the main provision to which it is appended and does not enlarge the scope of the main provision. The court noted that Section 24(1)(b) provides that if an award has been passed, the proceedings shall continue under the 1894 Act, while Section 24(2) deals with cases where the award was passed five years or more prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act. The court also noted that the proviso to Section 24(2) is an exception to the lapse of acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2).
| Submission | Court’s Treatment |
|---|---|
| DMRC: The award was passed within 5 years of the commencement of the 2013 Act, so Section 24(1)(b) applies. | Accepted. The court held that Section 24(1)(b) applies, and the proceedings should continue under the 1894 Act. |
| DMRC: The proviso to Section 24(2) is not applicable to Section 24(1)(b). | Accepted. The court held that the proviso is part of Section 24(2) and not Section 24(1)(b). |
| Landowners: The proviso to Section 24(2) should be read as part of Section 24(1)(b). | Rejected. The court held that the proviso is an exception to the lapse of acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2). |
| Landowners: Compensation for the majority of landholdings was not deposited in the accounts of the beneficiaries, so all beneficiaries are entitled to compensation under the 2013 Act. | Rejected. The court held that the proviso to Section 24(2) is not applicable in this case, as the award was not passed 5 years before the commencement of the 2013 Act. |
The court considered the following authorities:
| Authority | Court’s View |
|---|---|
| Delhi Development Authority vs. Sukhbir Singh & Ors., (2016) 16 SCC 258 | The court distinguished this case, stating it was related to Section 24(2) and not Section 24(1)(b) and that the proviso to Section 24(2) was not discussed in the context of Section 24(1)(b). |
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the principles of statutory interpretation, particularly concerning the role and scope of a proviso. The court emphasized that a proviso is generally intended to qualify or create an exception to the main enactment and should not be interpreted to enlarge its scope. The court also considered the legislative intent behind Section 24, noting that Section 24(1)(b) was intended to allow proceedings to continue under the 1894 Act if an award had already been passed, while Section 24(2) was meant to address situations where there had been significant delays in land acquisition proceedings.
| Sentiment | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Statutory Interpretation | 40% |
| Legislative Intent | 30% |
| Precedent | 20% |
| Factual Matrix | 10% |
| Ratio | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Fact | 30% |
| Law | 70% |
The court stated:
“The proviso to Sub-Section (2) makes it clear that when the Award has been made and, compensation in respect of majority of holdings has not been deposited in the account of beneficiaries the acquisition would not lapse.”
“The legislative intention is clear that it is enacted as proviso to section 24(2), and otherwise also if read as if it were a proviso to Section 24(1)(b), it would create repugnancy with said provision and the provisions of section 24(1)(b) and proviso to 24(2) would become wholly inconsistent with each other.”
“Thus, we are of the considered opinion that the proviso to Section 24(2) cannot be lifted and made part of Section 24(1)(b).”
The court rejected the argument that the proviso to Section 24(2) should be read as part of Section 24(1)(b), stating that it would render Section 24(1)(b) meaningless. The court also clarified that the proviso to Section 24(2) was meant to address specific situations where the acquisition would not lapse due to non-payment of compensation to the majority of landowners.
Key Takeaways
✓ The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is not applicable to Section 24(1)(b).
✓ If an award has been passed under the 1894 Act within five years prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act, the proceedings continue under the 1894 Act.
✓ The proviso to Section 24(2) is an exception to the lapse of acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) and applies only when the award has been made five years or more before the commencement of the 2013 Act.
✓ Landowners will not be entitled to compensation under the 2013 Act if the award was passed within five years of the commencement of the 2013 Act, and the compensation has been deposited with the Land Acquisition Collector.
Directions
The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and held that the landowners were not entitled to compensation under the 2013 Act.
Development of Law
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the proviso to Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, is not applicable to Section 24(1)(b) of the same Act. This clarifies that if an award has been passed under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, within five years prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act, the proceedings will continue under the 1894 Act, and the landowners will not be entitled to compensation under the 2013 Act, unless the conditions of Section 24(2) are met. This judgment clarifies the scope and applicability of Section 24, ensuring a consistent interpretation of the law.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is not applicable to Section 24(1)(b). The court clarified that if an award had been passed under the 1894 Act within five years prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act, the proceedings would continue under the 1894 Act. This judgment provides clarity on the applicability of the 2013 Act in cases where awards were passed under the 1894 Act, ensuring that the interpretation of Section 24 is consistent and in line with the legislative intent.
Category:
Land Acquisition Law
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013
Section 24, Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013
Land Acquisition Act, 1894
FAQ
Q: What is the main issue in the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation vs. Tarun Pal Singh case?
A: The main issue was whether the proviso to Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, applies to Section 24(1)(b) of the same Act.
Q: What did the Supreme Court decide about the applicability of the proviso to Section 24(2)?
A: The Supreme Court decided that the proviso to Section 24(2) is not applicable to Section 24(1)(b). The proviso is part of Section 24(2) and is an exception to the lapse of acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2).
Q: What happens if an award was passed under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, within five years before the 2013 Act came into force?
A: If an award was passed under the 1894 Act within five years prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act, the proceedings continue under the 1894 Act, and the landowners are not entitled to compensation under the 2013 Act, unless the conditions of Section 24(2) are met.
Q: What is the significance of this judgment for landowners?
A: This judgment clarifies that landowners will not be entitled to compensation under the 2013 Act if the award was passed within five years of the commencement of the 2013 Act, and the compensation has been deposited with the Land Acquisition Collector.
Q: What is the significance of this judgment for authorities involved in land acquisition?
A: This judgment clarifies the scope and applicability of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, ensuring that authorities involved in land acquisition can proceed with clarity and consistency in interpreting the law.