LEGAL ISSUE: Whether properties acquired through inheritance or transfer can be considered part of a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) coparcenary for partition.
CASE TYPE: Civil (Property Partition)
Case Name: Shashidhar and Others vs. Ashwini Uma Mathad and Another
[Judgment Date]: July 8, 2024
Introduction
Date of the Judgment: July 8, 2024
Citation: 2024 INSC 485
Judges: M.M. Sundresh, J. and S.V.N. Bhatti, J.
Can a property inherited by a family member be considered ancestral property available for partition among all coparceners? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question in a civil appeal concerning the partition of family properties. This case delves into the intricacies of Hindu law, specifically regarding the definition of ancestral property and the rights of coparceners within a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF). The Court had to determine whether properties acquired through inheritance or transfer could be included in the partition of ancestral properties.
Case Background
The case involves a dispute between the daughters (Respondents) of Appellant No. 1 (Shashidhar) from his first marriage with Uma, and Appellant No. 1 and his second family. The Respondents filed a suit seeking partition of the suit properties, claiming they were part of the ancestral property of the Hindu coparcenary and that they were entitled to a share in it. Appellant No. 1 contested this, stating that only some properties were ancestral, and others were self-acquired or inherited by him.
The suit properties included various residential and agricultural lands. The Respondents sought a preliminary decree to partition the properties, claiming a share in all of them. The main point of contention was whether properties acquired by Appellant No. 1 through inheritance or transfer from his mother and sister could be considered part of the ancestral coparcenary property.
Timeline:
Date | Event |
---|---|
21.07.1991 | Death of the propositus (Basavanthaiah), leaving behind Appellant No. 1, his wife Shantakka, and daughter Gayatri. |
18.02.2003 | Death of Rajeshwari, daughter of the propositus |
2003-2005 | Death of Appellant No. 1’s mother and sisters. |
2004 | Respondents filed O.S. No.73 of 2004 in the Court of the Additional Civil Judge, Hubli, for partition of suit properties. |
04.05.2005 | Gift deed executed by defendant no.2 in favour of the defendant no.4 during the pendency of the suit. |
10.02.2010 | Trial Court decreed the suit in part. |
06.12.2012 | High Court modified the judgment of the Trial Court. |
13.01.2015 | Supreme Court allowed the appeal and remanded the matter to the High Court. |
16.10.2019 | High Court modified the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. |
08.07.2024 | Supreme Court delivered the final judgment in the Civil Appeals. |
Course of Proceedings
The Trial Court partly decreed the suit, granting the Respondents a 1/6th share each in certain properties and a 1/10th share each in others. Both sides challenged this decision, leading to the filing of R.F.A. No. 3052 of 2010 by the Appellants and R.F.A. Cross-objection No.103 of 2011 by the Respondents in the High Court of Karnataka.
The High Court modified the Trial Court’s judgment, granting the Respondents a larger share in the properties. The Appellants then filed a Civil Appeal in the Supreme Court, which initially remanded the matter back to the High Court for fresh adjudication. After the remand, the High Court again modified the Trial Court’s decree, leading to the present appeals before the Supreme Court.
Legal Framework
The case primarily revolves around the concept of ancestral property and coparcenary rights under Hindu law. The core issue is whether properties acquired by a family member through inheritance or transfer can be considered part of the ancestral property available for partition among all coparceners. The relevant legal principles include:
- Hindu coparcenary: A joint family structure where members have a right to ancestral property by birth.
- Ancestral property: Property inherited from paternal ancestors, in which coparceners have a birthright.
- Self-acquired property: Property acquired by an individual through their own efforts or resources, not inherited from ancestors.
- Partition: The process of dividing joint family property among coparceners.
Arguments
Appellants’ Arguments:
- The Respondents are only entitled to a share in the ancestral properties (Sl. Nos. 1 and 5) and not in the properties acquired by Appellant No. 1 through inheritance or transfer from his mother and sisters.
- The properties in Sl. No. 2 were not part of the ancestral property but were self-acquired by the propositus and later transferred to Appellant No. 1.
- The share of Appellant No. 1 should be limited to the one-third share he inherited in the notional partition upon the death of his father and should not include the shares he received from his mother and sisters.
- The properties in Sl. Nos. 3 and 4 are also not part of the coparcenary property.
Respondents’ Arguments:
- All properties listed in the suit schedule, including Sl. No. 2, are part of the ancestral coparcenary property.
- The properties in Sl. No. 2 were mutated in the revenue records in the name of the propositus, who was the karta of the family, and therefore, they should be considered part of the ancestral property.
- The Respondents are entitled to a share in all the properties as coparceners.
Appellants’ Submissions | Respondents’ Submissions |
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Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court framed the following key issues for consideration:
- Whether the properties described in Sl. No. 2 of the suit schedule form part of the ancestral property held by the coparcenary, or are they separate and self-acquired properties of the propositus and his successors-in-interest?
- Whether the properties described in Sl. Nos. 3 and 4 of the suit schedule form part of the coparcenary property?
- To what extent should Sl. Nos. 1 and 5 be included in the share of Appellant No. 1, i.e., whether the share is limited to the share notionally acquired in the partition upon the demise of the propositus or includes the share succeeded through inheritance from his mother and sisters?
The court also considered the sub-issue of whether the Bombay School of Mitakshara is applicable to the case.
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
Issue | Court’s Decision |
---|---|
Whether Sl. No. 2 is part of ancestral property | The Court held that Sl. No. 2 is not part of the ancestral property and is excluded from partition because it was self-acquired by the propositus and later transferred to Appellant No. 1. |
Whether Sl. Nos. 3 and 4 are part of coparcenary property | The Court upheld the findings of the Trial Court and the High Court that Sl. Nos. 3 and 4 are part of the coparcenary property. |
Extent of share in Sl. Nos. 1 and 5 | The Court did not delve into the question of whether the share should be limited to the notional share or include the share succeeded through inheritance. It upheld the High Court’s decision on this aspect. |
Authorities
The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:
Authority | Court | How it was used |
---|---|---|
Gurupad Khandappa Magdum v. Hirabai Khandappa Magdum & others, (1978) 3 SCC 383 | Supreme Court of India | Distinguished. The Court held that the ratio of this case, which deals with the applicability of the Bombay School of Mitakshara, was not applicable to the present facts due to lack of pleadings and evidence. |
Additional Commissioner of Income Tax v. M. Karthikeyan, (1994) Supp (2) SCC 112 | Supreme Court of India | Distinguished. The Court held that the ratio of this case was not applicable to the present facts. |
Shyam Narayan Prasad v. Krishna Prasad & others, (2018) 7 SCC 646 | Supreme Court of India | Distinguished. The Court held that the ratio of this case was not applicable to the present facts. |
State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Rao Sham Rao Deshmukh & others, (1985) 2 SCC 321 | Supreme Court of India | Relied upon by the Respondents to argue that a female member does not cease to be a member of the family on the death of a male member. However, the Court did not apply this principle to the extent of including the inherited properties in the partition. |
Judgment
Submission | Court’s Treatment |
---|---|
Appellants’ claim that Respondents are only entitled to a share in Sl. Nos. 1 and 5. | Partially Accepted. The Court agreed that Sl. No. 2 should be excluded but upheld the High Court’s decision on Sl. Nos. 1 and 5. |
Appellants’ claim that Sl. No. 2 is not part of the ancestral property. | Accepted. The Court held that Sl. No. 2 was self-acquired and excluded it from the partition. |
Appellants’ claim that Sl. Nos. 3 and 4 are not part of the coparcenary property. | Rejected. The Court upheld the findings of the Trial Court and the High Court that Sl. Nos. 3 and 4 are part of the coparcenary property. |
Respondents’ claim that all properties are part of the ancestral coparcenary. | Partially Rejected. The Court agreed that Sl. Nos. 1, 3, 4, and 5 are part of the coparcenary but excluded Sl. No. 2. |
How each authority was viewed by the Court?
- The Court distinguished Gurupad Khandappa Magdum v. Hirabai Khandappa Magdum & others [(1978) 3 SCC 383], stating that the case was not applicable due to lack of pleadings and evidence on the applicability of the Bombay School of Mitakshara.
- Similarly, Additional Commissioner of Income Tax v. M. Karthikeyan [(1994) Supp (2) SCC 112] and Shyam Narayan Prasad v. Krishna Prasad & others [(2018) 7 SCC 646] were also distinguished as not applicable to the facts of the case.
- The Court considered State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Rao Sham Rao Deshmukh & others [(1985) 2 SCC 321], but did not apply it to include the inherited properties in the partition.
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the following factors:
- The lack of adequate pleadings and evidence by the Respondents to prove that Sl. No. 2 was part of the ancestral property.
- The clear flow of title of Sl. No. 2, which showed that it was self-acquired by the propositus and later transferred to Appellant No. 1.
- The findings of fact by the Trial Court and the High Court regarding Sl. Nos. 3 and 4, which were affirmed by the Supreme Court.
- The Court’s reluctance to remand the case again, given that it had already been remanded once.
Sentiment | Percentage |
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Lack of Pleadings and Evidence for Sl. No. 2 | 40% |
Clear Flow of Title for Sl. No. 2 | 30% |
Affirmation of Findings on Sl. Nos. 3 and 4 | 20% |
Reluctance to Remand | 10% |
Fact:Law Ratio
Category | Percentage |
---|---|
Fact (Consideration of factual aspects) | 60% |
Law (Legal considerations) | 40% |
The Court’s reasoning was based on a combination of factual analysis and legal principles. The factual analysis focused on the ownership and transfer of properties, while the legal principles focused on the definition of ancestral property and coparcenary rights.
Key Takeaways
- Properties acquired through inheritance or transfer may not automatically be considered part of the ancestral coparcenary property.
- Clear pleadings and evidence are crucial to establish the nature of properties in partition suits.
- The Court emphasized the importance of the flow of title in determining whether a property is ancestral or self-acquired.
- The Supreme Court is reluctant to remand cases again, especially when the matter has already been remanded once.
Directions
The Supreme Court modified the preliminary decree by excluding Sl. No. 2 from partition. The preliminary decree was confirmed for Sl. Nos. 1, 3, 4, and 5.
Specific Amendments Analysis
Not applicable, as the judgment did not discuss any specific amendments.
Development of Law
The ratio decidendi of the case is that properties acquired through inheritance or transfer are not automatically considered part of the ancestral coparcenary property. This judgment clarifies the distinction between inherited and ancestral properties in the context of partition suits. There was no major change in the previous position of law, but the court emphasized the need to prove that the properties are ancestral.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s judgment in Shashidhar vs. Ashwini Uma Mathad clarifies that not all properties held by a family are automatically considered ancestral. Properties acquired through inheritance or transfer must be proven to be part of the ancestral coparcenary property through clear pleadings and evidence. The Court excluded Sl. No. 2 from partition, confirming that it was self-acquired by the propositus and later transferred to Appellant No. 1. The Court upheld the High Court’s decision regarding Sl. Nos. 1, 3, 4, and 5. This judgment underscores the importance of establishing the nature of properties in partition suits and the need for clear evidence to support claims of ancestral property.