Supreme Court clarifies the scope of anticipatory bail under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019: Rahna Jalal vs. State of Kerala (2020)

LEGAL ISSUE: Whether Section 7(c) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019 bars the grant of anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

CASE TYPE: Criminal Law

Case Name: Rahna Jalal vs. State of Kerala and Another

[Judgment Date]: 17 December 2020

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: 17 December 2020

Citation: (2020) INSC 987

Judges: Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J, Indu Malhotra, J, and Indira Banerjee, J.

Can a mother-in-law be accused of an offense under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019 if her son pronounces triple talaq? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question while also clarifying whether Section 7(c) of the Act bars the grant of anticipatory bail. This case revolves around a complaint filed by a wife against her husband and mother-in-law, alleging offenses under the Indian Penal Code and the Muslim Women Act. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court was correct in denying anticipatory bail to the mother-in-law.

The judgment was authored by Justice Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, with Justices Indu Malhotra and Indira Banerjee concurring.

Case Background

The marriage between the second respondent and the appellant’s son took place on 14 May 2016. They had a child in May 2017. On 27 August 2020, the second respondent filed a First Information Report (FIR) at North Parur Police Station, Ernakulam Rural, alleging offenses under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act 2019. The FIR stated that on 5 December 2019, the appellant’s son pronounced talaq three times at their home, and subsequently, he entered into a second marriage.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The appellant and her son initially filed an application for anticipatory bail at the High Court of Kerala. The first application was withdrawn due to improper pleadings. The second application was not pursued as there was a possibility of a settlement between the complainant and her spouse. When the settlement failed, a third application was filed, which was rejected by the High Court. The High Court did not provide any specific reasons for denying anticipatory bail to the appellant, the mother-in-law.

Legal Framework

The case primarily revolves around the interpretation of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act 2019, specifically Sections 3, 4, and 7.

• Section 3 of the Act states: “Any pronouncement of talaq by a Muslim husband upon his wife, by words, either spoken or written or in electronic form or in any other manner whatsoever, shall be void and illegal.” This section renders the pronouncement of talaq by a Muslim husband void and illegal.
• Section 4 of the Act states: “Any Muslim husband who pronounces talaq referred to in Section 3 upon his wife shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.” This section provides punishment for a Muslim husband who pronounces talaq.
• Section 7 of the Act states: “Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, – (a) an offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable, if information relating to the commission of the offence is given to an officer in charge of a police station by the married Muslim woman upon whom talaq is pronounced or any person related to her by blood or marriage; (b) an offence punishable under this Act shall be compoundable, at the instance of the married Muslim woman upon whom talaq is pronounced with the permission of the Magistrate, on such terms and conditions as he may determine; (c) no person accused of an offence punishable under this Act shall be released on bail unless the Magistrate, on an application filed by the accused and after hearing the married Muslim woman upon whom talaq is pronounced, is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for granting bail to such person.” This section deals with the cognizability, compounding, and bail provisions under the Act.

The Supreme Court also considered Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), which deals with anticipatory bail. The court had to determine whether the non-obstante clause in Section 7 of the Act overrides the provisions of Section 438 of the CrPC.

Arguments

The arguments presented by both sides are as follows:

• Appellant’s Counsel (Mr. Haris Beeran):
  • Argued that Section 7(c) of the Muslim Women Act does not expressly prohibit the court’s power to grant anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the CrPC.
  • Relied on the Kerala High Court’s judgment in Nahas v. State of Kerala (B.A. No. 9163 of 2019) to support the argument that anticipatory bail is not barred by Section 7(c).
• Respondent’s Counsel (Mr. V. Chitambaresh):
  • Submitted that Section 7(c) of the Muslim Women Act takes away the court’s power to grant anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the CrPC.

The innovativeness in the argument by the appellant’s counsel lies in their interpretation of Section 7(c) of the Act, arguing that it does not impose an absolute bar on anticipatory bail, but rather sets procedural and substantive conditions for granting bail. This approach allowed the court to reconcile the provisions of the Act with the general principles of criminal procedure.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The primary issue before the Supreme Court was:

1. Whether Section 7(c) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019 bars the power of the court to grant anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

The Supreme Court also considered a sub-issue as to whether the mother-in-law can be accused of an offence under the Act, as the offence can only be committed by a Muslim man.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues:

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

The Supreme Court analyzed how each submission made by the parties was treated:

The Supreme Court also analyzed how each authority was viewed:

• Shayara Bano v. Union of India [(2017) 9 SCC 1]: The Court acknowledged this case as the basis for the enactment of the Muslim Women Act, which aimed to protect Muslim women from the practice of triple talaq.
• Hema Mishra v. State of U.P. (2014) 4 SCC 453: The Court relied on this case to reiterate that constitutional courts have a duty to protect personal liberty and can even grant anticipatory bail despite statutory bars.
• Balchand Jain v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1976) 4 SCC 572: The Court applied the principles from this case to interpret the non-obstante clause in Section 7 of the Muslim Women Act, holding that it does not completely override the provisions of the CrPC.
• Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India and Others (2020) 4 SCC 727: The Court used this case to support the view that even when a statute explicitly bars anticipatory bail, the bar does not apply if no prima facie case is made out.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was influenced by a combination of factors, with a strong emphasis on protecting individual liberty and ensuring a fair interpretation of the law. The court emphasized that Section 7(c) of the Act does not impose an absolute bar on granting bail, but rather sets conditions that must be met. The court also highlighted that the mother-in-law could not be accused of an offence under the Act.

The ratio of Fact:Law was analyzed as follows:

The Court’s reasoning is explained below:

The court considered an alternative interpretation that Section 7(c) imposes an absolute bar on anticipatory bail, but rejected it because it would impinge on personal liberty and go against the principles of natural justice. The court emphasized that the law should be interpreted in a way that protects individual rights.

The court’s decision was that Section 7(c) does not bar anticipatory bail, and that the mother-in-law cannot be accused of an offence under the Act.

The reasons for the decision were:

• Section 7(c) does not explicitly bar anticipatory bail.
• The conditions in Section 7(c) can be met in anticipatory bail proceedings.
• The non-obstante clause in Section 7 does not completely override the provisions of the CrPC.
• The offence under the Act can only be committed by a Muslim man who pronounces talaq.
• The court has a duty to protect personal liberty.

The court quoted the following from the judgment:

“The statutory text indicates that Section 7(c) does not impose an absolute bar to the grant of bail.”

“Parliament has not overridden the provisions of Section 438 of the CrPC. There is no specific provision in Section 7(c), or elsewhere in the Act, making Section 438 inapplicable to an offence punishable under the Act.”

“A statutory exclusion of the right to access remedies for bail is construed strictly, for a purpose. Excluding access to bail as a remedy, impinges upon human liberty.”

There were no minority opinions in this judgment.

The court’s reasoning was based on a harmonious interpretation of the Muslim Women Act and the CrPC, ensuring that the right to personal liberty is protected while also adhering to the provisions of the Act.

The implications for future cases are that courts must interpret statutory provisions strictly when they impinge upon personal liberty. The ruling also clarifies that the non-obstante clause in Section 7 of the Muslim Women Act does not completely override the provisions of the CrPC.

The court did not introduce any new doctrines or legal principles but reaffirmed the importance of protecting personal liberty and the need for a harmonious interpretation of statutes.

Key Takeaways

• Section 7(c) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019 does not bar the grant of anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the CrPC.
• A mother-in-law cannot be accused of an offence under the Muslim Women Act for pronouncement of triple talaq by her son.
• Courts must interpret statutory provisions strictly when they impinge upon personal liberty.
• The non-obstante clause in Section 7 of the Act does not completely override the provisions of the CrPC.
• The court must hear the married Muslim woman before granting anticipatory bail in cases under the Act.

Directions

The Supreme Court directed that in the event of the arrest of the appellant, she shall be released on bail by the competent court, subject to her filing a personal bond of Rs 25,000. The appellant was also directed to cooperate in the course of the investigation by the Investigating Officer.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that Section 7(c) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019 does not bar the grant of anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. This clarifies the position of law and ensures that personal liberty is protected while adhering to the provisions of the Act. There is no change in the previous positions of law, but the judgment clarifies how the non-obstante clause in the Act is to be interpreted.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Rahna Jalal vs. State of Kerala clarifies that Section 7(c) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019 does not bar the grant of anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the CrPC. The court emphasized the importance of protecting personal liberty and ensuring a fair interpretation of the law. The judgment also clarifies that the mother-in-law cannot be accused of an offence under the Act. The court allowed the appeal and granted anticipatory bail to the appellant.