Supreme Court clarifies the scope of Culpable Homicide not amounting to Murder under Section 304 Part II IPC: Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther & Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra (2025) INSC 338 (07 March 2025)

Date of the Judgment: 07 March 2025
Citation: (2025) INSC 338
Judges: Abhay S. Oka, J., Ujjal Bhuyan, J.

When does an accident at a workplace become a criminal offense? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this critical question in the case of Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther & Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra. The court examined whether the unfortunate death of two workers due to electrocution while decorating a shop front constituted an offense of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The bench, comprising Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan, overturned the High Court’s decision, discharging the accused and clarifying the scope and applicability of Section 304 Part II IPC in cases of workplace accidents.

Case Background

The case revolves around an incident that occurred on 27.09.2013, at approximately 09:00 PM in Pune. Two employees, Salauddin Shaikh and Arun Sharma, working for Appellant No. 1, Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther, who was contracted for interior decoration, were decorating the front of a shop leased by M/s. Intergold Gems Private Limited, where Appellant No. 2, Nimesh Pravinchandra Shah, was the Store Operation Manager.

While working on a signboard about 12 feet above the ground using an iron ladder, both employees were electrocuted and fell, sustaining fatal injuries. They were declared dead upon arrival at the Pune Hospital and Research Centre.

Initially, accidental reports were registered under Section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). However, after more than two months, on 04.12.2013, a First Information Report (FIR No. 316/2013) was filed by Police Sub-Inspector Shri S.G. Patil at Vishrambag Police Station, Pune, against the Appellants. The FIR alleged that the Appellants failed to provide essential safety equipment such as belts, helmets, and rubber shoes to the deceased employees, despite the risky nature of their work, leading to their unnatural death.

Both Appellants were arrested on 04.12.2013 and subsequently released on the same day. Following the investigation, a chargesheet was submitted, charging the Appellants under Sections 304A, 182, and 201 read with Section 34 of the IPC.

The Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pune, reviewing the chargesheet, concluded that the case merited consideration under Section 304 Part II IPC, which pertains to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Consequently, the case was committed to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Pune, and registered as Sessions Case No. 749 of 2014.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The Appellants, Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther and Nimesh Pravinchandra Shah, sought discharge under Section 227 of the CrPC, arguing a lack of evidence linking them to the alleged offense. They contended that the FIR lacked details of their direct actions and that they were not present when the incident occurred. They also asserted the absence of negligence or intent to cause harm.

The Additional Sessions Judge, Pune, dismissed their applications on 01.04.2017, stating that the Appellants were aware of the risks involved in not providing safety gear to the employees. The Judge believed there was sufficient material to frame charges under Section 304 Part II read with Section 34 IPC.

The Appellants then appealed to the High Court of Judicature at Bombay via Criminal Revision Application No. 269 of 2017. The High Court dismissed the application on 02.11.2017, citing a strong suspicion against the Appellants and sufficient grounds to proceed with the charges.

Subsequently, the Appellants filed a Special Leave Petition (SLP(Crl.) No. 9928 of 2017) before the Supreme Court, which granted notice and stayed further proceedings in Sessions Case No. 749 of 2014 on 09.01.2018.

Legal Framework

The primary charge against the Appellants was under Section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which addresses culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Section 304 Part II IPC states:

“Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years or with fine or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death; but without any intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.”

The key ingredients for an offense under Section 304 Part II IPC are:

• ✓ The act must be culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
• ✓ The act must be done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death.
• ✓ The act must be done without any intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.

Culpable homicide is defined under Section 299 IPC:

“Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide.”

Section 300 IPC further clarifies that all culpable homicides are murders, except in specifically exempted cases. The critical element in culpable homicide is that the act must be done with the intention of causing death, causing bodily injury likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death.

Section 227 CrPC deals with discharge. What Section 227 CrPC contemplates is that if upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the judge considers that there is no sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for doing so.

Arguments

Arguments by the Appellants:

• ✓ The Trial Court and the High Court erred in rejecting the discharge applications.
• ✓ No offense under Section 304 Part II IPC or Section 304A IPC is made out.
• ✓ The electrocution was an accident, and the only allegation is the non-provision of safety equipment.
• ✓ The High Court’s observation about wooden scaffolding is unwarranted.
• ✓ No negligent or rash act was committed, and no specific overt act can be attributed to the Appellants.
• ✓ Compensation was paid to the deceased employees’ families, and support was provided to their families.

Arguments by the Respondent:

• ✓ Appellants were aware of the risks but did not provide safety equipment.
• ✓ The electric shock and fall resulted in the employees’ deaths.
• ✓ There is a strong prima facie case under Section 302 Part II IPC read with Section 34 thereof, or at least under Section 304A IPC.
• ✓ Relied on the decision in Keshub Mahindra Vs. State of M.P. [CITATION]

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

1. Whether the Trial Court and the High Court erred in rejecting the discharge applications of the appellants?
2. Whether the Appellants’ actions constitute an offense under Section 304 Part II IPC or Section 304A IPC?

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• ✓ Keshub Mahindra Vs. State of M.P. [CITATION]: The Court distinguished this case, emphasizing that the facts were poles apart from the Bhopal Gas tragedy. The Court noted that the Keshub Mahindra case involved a large-scale industrial disaster with clear evidence of negligence, whereas the present case involved an isolated accident.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

Fact:Law

Logical Reasoning

Issue: Whether the Appellants’ actions constitute an offense under Section 304 Part II IPC.

Start → Was there an intention to cause death or bodily injury? → No → Was there knowledge that the act was likely to cause death? → No → Was the act a culpable homicide not amounting to murder? → No → Conclusion: No offense under Section 304 Part II IPC.

The Supreme Court concluded that the basic ingredients for the commission of an offense under Section 304 Part II IPC were absent in the present case. The Court emphasized that there was no intention on the part of the Appellants to cause death or bodily injury, nor did they have the knowledge that their actions were likely to cause the death of the employees. The incident was deemed purely accidental.

The Court also distinguished the facts of the present case from those in Keshub Mahindra Vs. State of M.P. [CITATION], noting that the latter involved a large-scale industrial disaster with clear evidence of negligence, whereas the present case involved an isolated accident.

“Even if we take the allegation against the appellants as correct, we are afraid no prima facie case can be said to have been made out against the appellants for committing an offence under Section 304 Part II IPC.”

“From the record of the case, it is evident that there was no intention on the part of the two appellants to cause the death or cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause the death of the two deceased employees.”

“Therefore, the basic ingredients for commission of offence under Section 304 Part II IPC are absent in the present case.”

Key Takeaways

• ✓ Employers are not automatically criminally liable for workplace accidents unless there is clear evidence of intent or knowledge of the likelihood of causing death.
• ✓ The absence of safety equipment alone is not sufficient to establish an offense under Section 304 Part II IPC.
• ✓ The judgment clarifies the scope and applicability of Section 304 Part II IPC in cases of workplace accidents.

Directions

No specific directions were given by the Supreme Court in this judgment.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of the case is that for an offense to be established under Section 304 Part II IPC, there must be evidence of intention or knowledge that the act was likely to cause death. The mere occurrence of an accident, even in the absence of safety measures, does not automatically constitute an offense under this section. This judgment reinforces the importance of proving intent or knowledge in cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Trial Court and the High Court, and discharged the Appellants. The Court clarified that the absence of safety equipment alone does not constitute an offense under Section 304 Part II IPC unless there is evidence of intent or knowledge that the act was likely to cause death.