Supreme Court clarifies the term of a Muslim Member of the Bar Council in Waqf Board: Md. Firoz Ahmad Khalid vs. The State of Manipur (2025) INSC 535 (22 April 2025)

Date of the Judgment: April 22, 2025
Citation: (2025) INSC 535
Judges: M. M. Sundresh, J., Rajesh Bindal, J.

Can a Muslim member of a State Bar Council, elected to a Waqf Board, continue in that position after their Bar Council term expires? The Supreme Court of India addressed this issue in a recent case, focusing on the interpretation of the Wakf Act, 1995. The Court clarified the relationship between membership in the Bar Council and eligibility to serve on the Waqf Board. The judgment was delivered by a bench comprising Justice M. M. Sundresh and Justice Rajesh Bindal.

Case Background:

The case revolves around the appointment and subsequent challenge to a member of the Waqf Board in Manipur. Here’s a chronological account of the events:

• 26.12.2022: The Bar Council of Manipur issued a gazette notification announcing the election of Md. Firoz Ahmad Khalid (the appellant) as a member.
• 08.02.2023: The Commissioner-cum-Secretary (Minority Affairs), Government of Manipur, appointed the appellant as a member of the 7th Waqf Board Committee. This appointment was made under Section 14(1)(b)(iii) and Section 14(3) of the Wakf Act, 1995, replacing respondent No. 3, who had ceased to be a member of the Bar Council of Manipur.

Timeline:

Course of Proceedings:

Respondent No. 3, the previous member of the Waqf Board, filed Writ Petition (Civil) No. 304 of 2023 in the High Court of Manipur at Imphal. He challenged the order dated 08.02.2023, arguing that the Wakf Act, 1995, does not stipulate that a Board member must vacate their position if they cease to be a member of the Bar Council.

The Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on 23.08.2023, noting that Respondent No. 3 had lost the Bar Council election on 17.12.2022. According to Explanation II to Section 14(1)(b) of the Wakf Act, 1995, he could no longer be a member of the Board.

However, the Division Bench of the High Court, in its judgment dated 23.11.2023, overturned this decision. The Division Bench interpreted Explanation II to Section 14(1)(b) of the Wakf Act, 1995, as applying only to Members of Parliament or State Legislative Assemblies. It concluded that the Explanation did not extend to members who ceased to be Muslim members of the Bar Council. Consequently, the High Court reinstated Respondent No. 3 as a member of the Waqf Board until the completion of his term under Section 15 of the Wakf Act, 1995.

Legal Framework:

The core of the legal framework in this case is Section 14 of the Wakf Act, 1995, which outlines the composition of the Waqf Board.

Section 14(1) of the Wakf Act, 1995 states:

“14. Composition of Board. – (1) The Board for a State and the National Capital Territory of Delhi shall consist of – (a) a Chairperson; (b) one and not more than two members, as the State Government may think fit, to be elected from each of the electoral colleges consisting of – (i) Muslim Members of Parliament from the State or, as the case may be, the National Capital Territory of Delhi; (ii) Muslim Members of the State Legislature; (iii) Muslim members of the Bar Council of the concerned State or Union territory…”

Explanation II to Section 14(1)(b) of the Wakf Act, 1995 further clarifies:

“Explanation II. – For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that in case a Muslim member ceases to be a Member of Parliament from the State or National Capital Territory of Delhi as referred to in sub -clause (i) of clause (b) or ceases to be a Member of the State Legislative Assembly as required under sub -clause (ii) of clause (b), such member shall be deemed to have vacated the office of the member of the Board for the State or National Capital Territory of Delhi, as the case may be, from the date from which such member ceased to be a Member of Parliament from the State National Capital Territory of Delhi, or a Member of the State Legislative Assembly, as the case may be;”

Arguments:

The arguments presented before the Supreme Court centered on the interpretation of Section 14 of the Wakf Act, 1995, particularly Explanation II to Section 14(1)(b).

Arguments of the Appellant and the State of Manipur:

• ✓ Section 14 of the Wakf Act, 1995 is clear and unambiguous.
• ✓ Sub-section (1) mandates that the Board consist of a Chairperson and members, including Muslim Members of Parliament, State Legislative Assembly, and Bar Council.
• ✓ Explanation II clarifies that if a member ceases to be a Member of Parliament or State Legislative Assembly, they are deemed to have vacated their Board position.
• ✓ The High Court’s interpretation militates against the legislative intent of the provision.

Arguments of Respondent No. 3:

• ✓ Relied on the decisions in The State of Maharashtra vs. Shaikh Mahemud & Anr. and Shri Asif S/o . Shaukat Qureshi vs. The State of Maharashtra and Anr.
• ✓ The provision should be read as a whole, not in piecemeal.
• ✓ The legislature consciously omitted Bar Council members from Explanation II.
• ✓ Relied on the maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” arguing that the express mention of Members of Parliament and State Legislative Assembly implies the exclusion of Bar Council members.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court:

The primary issue before the Supreme Court was:

1. Whether a Muslim Member of the Bar Council of the State or the Union territory, duly elected as a Member of the Waqf Board constituted under Section 14 of the Wakf Act, 1995, can continue to hold the said position, even after the expiry of his tenure in the Bar Council.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court: “The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues”

Authorities:

The Supreme Court considered several legal provisions and precedents to arrive at its decision.

• ✓ Section 14 of the Wakf Act, 1995: The primary provision governing the composition of the Waqf Board.
• ✓ Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 2 SCC 548: This case discusses the function of an explanation in a statute.
• ✓ S. Sundaram Pillai v. Pattabiraman, (1985) 1 SCC 591: This case elaborates on the scope and effect of an explanation in statutory interpretation.
• ✓ Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Corporation Bank, (2007) 9 SCC 55: This case discusses the rules of statutory construction and the interpretation of explanations.
• ✓ Kirloskar Ferrous Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (2025) 1 SCC 695: This case further explains the role of an explanation in statutory interpretation.
• ✓ Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla, (2016) 3 SCC 619: This case discusses the principle of purposive interpretation.
• ✓ Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. v. Eastern Metals & Ferro Alloys, (2011) 11 SCC 334: This case explains the golden rule of interpretation and purposive construction.
• ✓ Asstt. Collector, Central Excise v. National Tobacco Co., (1972) 2 SCC 560: This case discusses the legal maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius.”
• ✓ Union of India v. B.C. Nawn and others, 1971 SCC OnLine Cal 180: This case further discusses the limitations of the “expressio unius est exclusio alterius” maxim.
• ✓ State of Karnataka v. Union of India, (1977) 4 SCC 608: This case provides additional context on the application of the “expressio unius est exclusio alterius” principle.
• ✓ Seaford Court Estates Ld. v. Asher [(1949) 2 K.B. 481]: This case emphasizes the judge’s role in interpreting statutes in light of social conditions and legislative intent.

Authorities Table

Judgment:

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• Section 14 of the Wakf Act, 1995: The Court interpreted this section holistically, emphasizing that the eligibility criteria for Waqf Board membership are contingent upon holding a position in Parliament, State Legislative Assembly, or Bar Council.
• Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 2 SCC 548: The Court cited this case to support the principle that the intention of the legislature is paramount, and the mere use of a label (such as “Explanation”) cannot control or deflect such intention.
• S. Sundaram Pillai v. Pattabiraman, (1985) 1 SCC 591: The Court referred to this case to highlight that an explanation is meant to clarify ambiguities in a statutory provision and should not ordinarily enlarge the scope of the original section.
• Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Corporation Bank, (2007) 9 SCC 55: This case was cited to emphasize that the court must find the true intention of the legislature when interpreting an explanation, and there is no single yardstick to decide whether an explanation is enacted to clarify ambiguity or to widen the scope of the main section.
• Kirloskar Ferrous Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (2025) 1 SCC 695: The Court relied on this case to reiterate that an explanation must be read to harmonize with and clear up any ambiguity in the main section, and it should not be construed to widen the ambit of the section.
• Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla, (2016) 3 SCC 619: The Court cited this case to support the principle of purposive interpretation, where the court attaches that meaning to the provisions which serve the purpose behind such a provision.
• Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. v. Eastern Metals & Ferro Alloys, (2011) 11 SCC 334: This case was referred to for the golden rule of interpretation, where the words of a statute are read and understood in their natural, ordinary, and popular sense, and where purposive construction is necessary.
• Asstt. Collector, Central Excise v. National Tobacco Co., (1972) 2 SCC 560: The Court cited this case to emphasize that the rule flowing from the maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius” is subservient to the basic principle that courts must endeavor to ascertain the legislative intent and purpose.
• Union of India v. B.C. Nawn and others, 1971 SCC OnLine Cal 180: This case was referred to for the principle that the maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius” is not of universal application and is to be used as a means of ascertaining the legislature’s intent where it is doubtful.
• State of Karnataka v. Union of India, (1977) 4 SCC 608: The Court cited this case to highlight that the principle of “expressio unius est exclusio alterius” should be applied with caution, and the limitations or conditions under which this principle of construction operates are frequently overlooked by those who attempt to apply it.
• Seaford Court Estates Ld. v. Asher [(1949) 2 K.B. 481]: The Court took note of Lord Denning’s words of wisdom in this case, emphasizing the judge’s role in finding the intention of Parliament and supplementing the written word to give force and life to the intention of the legislature.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?:

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the need to maintain the integrity of the legislative intent behind the Wakf Act, 1995. The Court emphasized that the eligibility criteria for Waqf Board membership are intrinsically linked to the individual’s position in Parliament, State Legislative Assembly, or Bar Council. Allowing a member to continue on the Board even after losing their position in the respective body would undermine the very basis of their eligibility.

Logical Reasoning:

Here’s a simplified flowchart of the court’s logical reasoning:

Key Takeaways:

• ✓ A Muslim member of a State Bar Council, who is elected to a Waqf Board, cannot continue to hold that position after their term in the Bar Council expires.
• ✓ The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of interpreting statutes in line with their legislative intent and purpose.
• ✓ The Court clarified that the eligibility criteria for Waqf Board membership are intrinsically linked to the individual’s position in Parliament, State Legislative Assembly, or Bar Council.

Directions:

The Supreme Court did not give any specific directions in this case.

Development of Law:

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a Muslim member of the Bar Council, who is elected to a Waqf Board, cannot continue to hold that position after their term in the Bar Council expires. This clarifies the interpretation of Section 14 of the Wakf Act, 1995, and ensures that the composition of the Waqf Board reflects the current representation of Muslims in the relevant bodies. The court **overruled** the decision rendered by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur in Shri Asif S/o Shaukat Qureshi Versus The State of Maharashtra and Anr. (Writ Petition No. 4343 of 2016) decided on 22.12.2016, as not a good law.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court’s judgment clarifies that a Muslim member of the Bar Council, elected to a Waqf Board, cannot continue in that position after their Bar Council term expires. This decision reinforces the legislative intent of the Wakf Act, 1995, ensuring that the composition of the Waqf Board is aligned with the current representation of Muslims in the relevant bodies.