Supreme Court Clarifies Total Disablement Under Employees Compensation Act: Arjun vs. IFFCO Tokio (2022)

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: 16 February 2022
Citation: 2022 INSC 177
Judges: Justice Ajay Rastogi and Justice Abhay S. Oka
Can the loss of a limb be considered a total disablement if it prevents an employee from performing their specific job, even if they might be able to do other work? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question in a case concerning an auto-rickshaw driver who suffered a severe injury. The court had to decide whether the driver’s injury constituted a total disablement under the Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923, entitling him to full compensation. The judgment was delivered by a bench comprising Justice Ajay Rastogi and Justice Abhay S. Oka.

Case Background

On 18th February 2009, the appellant, an auto-rickshaw driver employed by the second respondent, was driving a goods carrier when he encountered a pothole. Applying the brakes to avoid the pothole, he lost control of the vehicle, causing it to overturn. As a result, the appellant suffered severe injuries, including the amputation of his right upper limb above the wrist joint. The vehicle was insured with the first respondent company.

The appellant argued that the amputation had rendered him completely unable to drive, which was his primary job, thus constituting a total disablement. He sought compensation under the Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923, claiming that he had lost his capacity to drive a vehicle due to the injury.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation initially ruled in favor of the appellant, stating that the amputation of his right upper limb rendered him unfit to drive, thus constituting total disablement. The first respondent, the insurance company, appealed this decision to the High Court.

The High Court partly allowed the appeal, modifying the disability assessment from 100% total disablement to 70% partial permanent disability. The High Court reduced the compensation amount accordingly. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the High Court erred in not considering the functional loss of his ability to work as a driver.

Legal Framework

The core legal issue revolves around the interpretation of “total disablement” as defined in clause (l) of sub-section (1) of section (2) of the Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923. The Act defines total disablement as:

“total disablement’ means such disablement, whether of a temporary or permanent nature, as incapacitates a workman for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident resulting in such disablement.”

The court also considered Section 4 of the said Act, which deals with the amount of compensation to be paid in cases of disablement.

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments:

• The appellant argued that the amputation of his right upper limb above the wrist joint rendered him completely incapable of performing his duties as a driver.
• He contended that this constituted total disablement, as defined under the Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923.
• The appellant relied on the Supreme Court judgments in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata & Anr. [(1976) 1 SCC 289] and K. Janardhan v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd [(2008) 8 SCC 518] to support his claim that the inability to perform the specific job for which he was employed constitutes total disablement.

Respondent’s Arguments:

• The respondent argued that the appellant suffered only a 40% permanent partial disability, based on the deposition of Dr. Laxmi Narayanana.
• They contended that the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation erred by considering the disability as 100% total disablement.
• The respondent also argued that they were not liable to pay compensation because the appellant did not possess a valid driving license for a commercial goods carrier. However, this argument was not considered as the respondent had not challenged the High Court’s judgment on liability.
• The respondent relied on Section 4 of the said Act to argue that the case was one of partial permanent disability.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed the following issue for consideration:

1. Whether the appellant suffered from total disablement as defined in clause (l) of sub-section (1) of section (2) of the Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

Cases:

• Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata & Anr. [(1976) 1 SCC 289] – Supreme Court of India. The court relied on this case to interpret “total disablement” as the inability to perform the work the employee was capable of at the time of the accident.
• K. Janardhan v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd [(2008) 8 SCC 518] – Supreme Court of India. This case was also cited to support the interpretation of total disablement.

Legal Provisions:

• Section 2(1)(l) of the Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923: Defines “total disablement.”
• Section 4 of the Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923: Deals with the amount of compensation to be paid in cases of disablement.

Judgment

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court’s judgment and restoring the order of the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation. The court held that the appellant’s disability should be treated as 100% total disablement, as the amputation of his right upper limb rendered him incapable of performing his job as a driver.

How each authority was viewed by the Court:

• Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata & Anr. [(1976) 1 SCC 289]: The court followed this authority, reiterating that total disablement means the incapacity to perform the work the employee was capable of at the time of the accident.
• K. Janardhan v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd [(2008) 8 SCC 518]: This authority was also followed to support the interpretation of total disablement.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily driven by the functional impact of the injury on the appellant’s ability to perform his specific job as a driver. The court emphasized the doctor’s statement that the appellant had a 100% functional loss of his right upper limb and could not perform the job of a driver. The court prioritized the functional loss over the percentage of disability as a whole, focusing on whether the appellant could perform the work he was employed to do.

Logical Reasoning:

The court rejected the argument that the appellant’s disability should be assessed as partial permanent disability, as this did not account for the specific functional loss that prevented him from performing his job. The court’s reasoning was based on the definition of total disablement under the Act and the functional impact of the injury on the appellant’s ability to work as a driver. The court also relied on the precedents set by the Supreme Court in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata & Anr. [(1976) 1 SCC 289] and K. Janardhan v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd [(2008) 8 SCC 518].

“What the doctor has stated in paragraph 5 is his opinion as regards the percentage of disability. But in paragraph 4, the doctor has clearly stated that the appellant has suffered from functional loss of 100% of the right upper limb and cannot perform the job of a driver forever due to amputation of his right upper limb.”

“The expression ‘total disablement’ has been defined in Section 2(1)(e) of the Act as follows: ‘(1) ‘total disablement’ means such disablement whether of a temporary or permanent nature, as incapacitates workman for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident resulting in such disablement.'”

“There is no dispute that the appellant suffered from disablement of permanent nature. The disablement has incapacitated him from doing the work which he was capable of doing. The said work was of driving a vehicle. Therefore, the learned Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation was right in holding that the disability of the appellant will have to be treated as 100% disability.”

Key Takeaways

• The judgment clarifies that “total disablement” under the Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923, should be assessed based on the functional impact of the injury on the employee’s ability to perform their specific job.
• Even if an employee might be capable of performing other types of work, they can be considered totally disabled if they cannot perform the work they were doing at the time of the accident.
• The court emphasized the importance of considering the doctor’s assessment of functional loss, rather than just the percentage of disability.
• This judgment may have implications for future cases involving similar injuries and claims under the Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923.

Directions

The Supreme Court directed that the appellant was entitled to withdraw the balance amount lying deposited in the High Court with interest, if any, accrued thereon.

Specific Amendments Analysis

Not Applicable

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the term “total disablement” under the Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923, should be interpreted to mean the inability of an employee to perform the specific work they were doing at the time of the accident. This clarifies the position of law and reinforces the principle that the functional impact of an injury on an employee’s ability to perform their job is paramount in determining total disablement. The court reinforced the position of law as decided in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata & Anr. [(1976) 1 SCC 289] and K. Janardhan v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd [(2008) 8 SCC 518].

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Arjun S/O. Ramanna @ Ramu v. IFFCO Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr. clarifies the interpretation of “total disablement” under the Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923. The court held that an employee who is unable to perform the specific work they were doing at the time of the accident, due to a functional loss caused by the injury, should be considered totally disabled, even if they might be capable of performing other types of work. This decision emphasizes the functional impact of the injury on the employee’s ability to perform their job as the primary factor in determining total disablement and reinforces the principles laid down in previous judgments.

Category

Parent Category: Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923
Child Category: Section 2(1)(l), Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923
Child Category: Total Disablement, Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923
Child Category: Functional Loss, Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923
Child Category: Workmen Compensation, Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923

FAQ

Q: What does “total disablement” mean under the Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923?
A: Total disablement means that an employee is unable to perform the specific work they were doing at the time of the accident due to the injury.

Q: If an employee can do other jobs, can they still be considered totally disabled?
A: Yes, if the employee cannot perform the specific job they were doing at the time of the accident, they can be considered totally disabled, even if they might be able to do other types of work.

Q: What is the importance of a doctor’s assessment in determining total disablement?
A: The doctor’s assessment of functional loss is crucial. The court will consider whether the employee has lost the ability to perform the specific functions required for their job.

Q: What should an employee do if they believe they have suffered total disablement?
A: An employee should file a claim under the Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923, and provide medical evidence supporting their claim of functional loss and inability to perform their job.