Date of the Judgment: 21 February 2019
Citation: [Not Available in Source]
Judges: N. V. Ramana, J., Deepak Gupta, J., Indira Banerjee, J. (Majority Opinion by Indira Banerjee, J.)
Can a death sentence be commuted to life imprisonment even in cases of heinous crimes against children? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this critical question in a case involving the rape and murder of a five-year-old girl. The court, while upholding the conviction, commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment, emphasizing the importance of considering mitigating circumstances and the possibility of reformation.
The Supreme Court bench, comprising Justices N.V. Ramana, Deepak Gupta, and Indira Banerjee, delivered the judgment, with Justice Banerjee authoring the majority opinion. This case highlights the nuanced approach the court takes when dealing with capital punishment, especially in light of the “rarest of rare” doctrine.
Case Background
The case revolves around the tragic death of a five-year-old girl in Koparigaon, Maharashtra. The complainant and his wife, who resided in a tenement with their three children, used to leave their children at home while they went to work. On January 22, 2013, the complainant’s wife returned home around 2:00 PM and found her youngest daughter missing. After a frantic search, the victim was found lying nude and still in front of their door at around 2:30 AM on January 23, 2013.
The victim was taken to the hospital, where she was declared “brought dead.” The complainant noticed injuries on the victim’s body, including redness on her shoulders and thighs and lacerations in her vagina and anus. A post-mortem examination revealed that the cause of death was asphyxia due to smothering, associated with head injuries and sexual assault.
The accused-appellant, Dattatraya @ Datta Ambo Rokade, who lived in the same building, was unemployed and often stayed at home alone during the day. The prosecution alleged that on January 22, 2013, the accused-appellant took the victim to his house, raped her, committed unnatural sexual intercourse, and smothered her, leading to her death.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| January 22, 2013 | Victim goes missing from her home in Koparigaon. |
| January 22, 2013, 2:00 PM | Victim’s mother returns home and finds her daughter missing. |
| January 23, 2013, 2:30 AM | Victim found dead in front of her home. |
| January 23, 2013 | Post-mortem examination conducted on the victim. |
| January 23, 2013, 7:15 PM | Panchnama of the place where the victim was found is recorded. |
| January 24, 2013 | Accused-appellant’s son suspects his father’s involvement. |
| January 24, 2013, 7:30 PM | Accused-appellant’s wife finds him tense and asks him to see a doctor. |
| January 25, 2013 | Accused-appellant is arrested. |
| January 25, 2013 | Search of the accused-appellant’s house is conducted. |
| January 26, 2013 | Accused-appellant makes a statement leading to the recovery of the victim’s clothes. |
| January 27, 2013 | Witnesses identify the accused-appellant in a test identification parade. |
| January 29, 2013 | Blood samples of the accused-appellant are collected. |
| June 6-7, 2013 | Trial court convicts the accused-appellant. |
| March 21, 24, 25, 2014 | Bombay High Court confirms the conviction and death sentence. |
| February 21, 2019 | Supreme Court commutes the death sentence to life imprisonment. |
Course of Proceedings
The Trial Court convicted the accused-appellant under Sections 363, 364, 367, 302, 201, 376, 376(2)(f), and 377 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), as well as under Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO). The Trial Court sentenced the accused-appellant to death for the offense under Section 302 of the IPC.
The High Court of Judicature at Bombay upheld the conviction and death sentence, with a minor modification of setting aside the conviction under Section 376 simpliciter of the IPC. The accused-appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Legal Framework
The Supreme Court considered the following legal provisions:
- Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC): This section deals with the punishment for murder.
“Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.” - Sections 363, 364, 367 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC): These sections deal with kidnapping, abduction, and related offenses.
- Sections 376, 376(2)(f), 377 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC): These sections deal with rape and unnatural sexual offenses.
- Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC): This section deals with causing disappearance of evidence of an offence, or giving false information to screen offender.
- Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO): These sections deal with offenses of sexual assault and aggravated sexual assault against children.
- Section 235(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC): This section mandates that the judge must hear the accused on the question of sentence after conviction.
“If the accused is convicted, the Judge shall, unless he proceeds in accordance with the provisions of section 360, hear the accused on the question of sentence, and then pass sentence on him according to law.”
The court also referred to the principle established in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684, which states that the death penalty should only be imposed in the “rarest of rare” cases, and that life imprisonment is the rule.
Arguments
The arguments presented before the Supreme Court are summarized below:
Arguments on behalf of the Accused-Appellant:
- The case did not qualify as one of the “rarest of rare” cases warranting the death penalty.
- The accused-appellant was not effectively defended during the trial and appeal.
- The hearing on the quantum of sentence under Section 235(2) of the CrPC was not effective.
- The trial court did not consider mitigating circumstances or the possibility of reformation.
- The accused-appellant was not given an opportunity to file an affidavit placing mitigating circumstances on record.
- There was no finding that there was no alternative to the death sentence.
- The trial court did not consider the possibility of reformation or rehabilitation of the accused-appellant.
- The accused-appellant argued that there was no reason to believe he would be a continuing threat to society if not executed.
Arguments on behalf of the State:
- The crime was heinous and committed with extreme depravity, justifying the death penalty.
- There were no mitigating circumstances to warrant a lesser sentence.
The accused-appellant argued that the forensic evidence was not conclusive and that the witnesses were unreliable. The State, however, contended that the forensic evidence, coupled with the extra-judicial confession to the wife, established the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
Submissions Table
| Main Submission | Accused-Appellant’s Sub-Submissions | State’s Sub-Submissions |
|---|---|---|
| Nature of the Case |
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| Legal Representation |
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| Mitigating Factors |
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| Threat to Society |
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Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court considered the following issues:
- Whether the case fell under the category of the “rarest of rare” cases, justifying the death penalty.
- Whether the accused-appellant was effectively defended before the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court.
- Whether the hearing given to the accused-appellant under Section 235(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the quantum of sentence was an effective hearing.
- Whether the Trial Court considered mitigating circumstances for imposition of a lesser sentence and the possibility of reformation or rehabilitation of the accused-appellant.
- Whether the death sentence imposed on the accused-appellant for offenses under Section 302 should be confirmed or be commuted to life sentence.
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
The following table demonstrates how the Court dealt with the issues:
| Issue | Court’s Decision | Brief Reasons |
|---|---|---|
| Whether the case fell under the “rarest of rare” category | No | The Court found no evidence of premeditation or diabolic planning, and the possibility of the accused-appellant not realizing the fatal consequences of his actions could not be ruled out. |
| Whether the accused-appellant was effectively defended | No | The lawyer representing the accused-appellant only pleaded not guilty, emphasizing that there was no eye witness to the incident and sought leniency only on the ground of the age of the accused-appellant. The accused-appellant was not given a chance to present mitigating circumstances. |
| Whether the hearing under Section 235(2) of CrPC was effective | No | The Trial Court did not elicit relevant facts or give the accused-appellant an opportunity to file an affidavit with mitigating factors. |
| Whether the Trial Court considered mitigating circumstances and possibility of reformation | No | The Trial Court did not consider mitigating circumstances, the possibility of reformation, or whether there was an alternative to the death sentence. |
| Whether the death sentence should be confirmed or commuted | Commuted to life imprisonment | The Court held that the case did not fall into the “rarest of rare” category and that the accused-appellant was not given an effective hearing on sentencing. It also considered the possibility of reformation and the lack of evidence of premeditation. |
Authorities
The Supreme Court relied on the following authorities:
| Authority | Court | How Considered | Legal Point |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684 | Supreme Court of India | Followed | Established that death penalty should only be imposed in the “rarest of rare” cases, and that life imprisonment is the rule. |
| Rajesh Kumar vs. State (through Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2011) 13 SCC 706 | Supreme Court of India | Followed | Reiterated the principle that life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an exception, to be imposed only in the “rarest of rare” cases with special reasons. |
| Santa Singh vs. State of Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 190 | Supreme Court of India | Followed | Held that Section 235(2) of the CrPC is not a mere formality and requires a separate stage for hearing the accused on the question of sentence. |
| Dagdu and Others v. State of Maharashtra (1977) 3 SCC 684 | Supreme Court of India | Followed | Reiterated that the mandate of Section 235(2) of the CrPC must be obeyed in letter and spirit, and the accused must be given a real and effective opportunity to present data on sentencing. |
| Machhi Singh & Others v. State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470 | Supreme Court of India | Followed | Held that a balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances has to be drawn up before exercising the option of death penalty. |
| Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 6 SCC 498 | Supreme Court of India | Followed | Emphasized the importance of rehabilitation and that the State must prove that rehabilitation is not possible before a death sentence is awarded. |
| Ajay Pandit and Another v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 8 SCC 43 | Supreme Court of India | Followed | Stressed that the court has a duty to elicit relevant facts even if the accused is silent, and that the purpose of Section 235(2) of CrPC must be understood. |
| Mohinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2013) 3 SCC 294 | Supreme Court of India | Followed | Highlighted that the death penalty should only be imposed when the alternative of life imprisonment is futile and serves no purpose. |
| Panchhi and Others v. State of U.P. (1998) 7 SCC 177 | Supreme Court of India | Followed | Observed that brutality of the manner in which a murder was perpetrated is not the sole criterion for determining whether the case is one of the “rarest of rare cases.” |
| Bantu v. State of M.P. (2001) 9 SCC 615 | Supreme Court of India | Followed | Held that the absence of a criminal record and the possibility of the accused not being a grave danger to society are factors against imposing the death sentence. |
| Amit v. State of Maharashtra (2003) 8 SCC 93 | Supreme Court of India | Followed | Held that the absence of previous heinous crimes and the lack of evidence that the accused would be a danger to society are factors against awarding the death penalty. |
| Rahul v. State of Maharashtra (2005) 10 SCC 322 | Supreme Court of India | Followed | Held that the absence of a previous criminal record and no adverse reports on the conduct of the accused are factors against imposing the death penalty. |
| Surendra Pal Shivbalakpal v. State of Gujarat (2005) 3 SCC 127 | Supreme Court of India | Followed | Held that the absence of previous criminal involvement is a factor to be considered while awarding the sentence. |
| Mukesh and Another v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Others (2017) 3 SCC 717 | Supreme Court of India | Followed | Deemed it appropriate to give the accused an opportunity to file affidavits to bring on record mitigating circumstances for the reduction of sentence. |
| Rajendra Prahladrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra (R.P. (Crl) No. 306-307 of 2013) | Supreme Court of India | Referred to | Death sentence commuted to life imprisonment in a similar case of rape and murder of a child. |
| Mohd. Manan @ Abdul Mannan v. State of Bihar (R.P (Crl) No. 308 of 2011 in Crl. A. No. 379 of 2009) | Supreme Court of India | Referred to | Death sentence commuted to life imprisonment. |
| Haru Ghosh vs. State of West Bengal (2009) 15 SCC 551 | Supreme Court of India | Followed | Commuted death sentence to life imprisonment, considering factors such as lack of premeditation and the accused having minor children. |
| Lehna vs. State of Haryana (2002) 3 SCC 765 | Supreme Court of India | Followed | Modified the punishment from death sentence to life imprisonment, noting that there was no evidence of diabolic planning despite the cruelty of the act. |
| Mulla and Another v. State of U.P. (2010) 3 SCC 508 | Supreme Court of India | Followed | Affirmed that the court can prescribe the length of incarceration, especially when death sentence is replaced by life imprisonment. |
Judgment
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the accused-appellant for the offenses under Sections 302, 376(2)(f), and 377 of the IPC, read with Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the POCSO Act. However, the Court commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment, emphasizing that the case did not fall under the “rarest of rare” category.
How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?
| Submission | Court’s Treatment |
|---|---|
| The case did not fall under the category of the “rarest of rare” cases. | Accepted. The Court held that the case did not meet the criteria for the “rarest of rare” cases. |
| The accused-appellant was not effectively defended during the trial and appeal. | Accepted. The Court noted that the accused-appellant was not effectively defended, particularly during the sentencing phase. |
| The hearing on the quantum of sentence under Section 235(2) of the CrPC was not effective. | Accepted. The Court found that the hearing was not effective as the accused was not given an opportunity to present mitigating circumstances. |
| The trial court did not consider mitigating circumstances or the possibility of reformation. | Accepted. The Court noted that the trial court failed to consider mitigating circumstances and the possibility of reformation. |
| There was no finding that there was no alternative to the death sentence. | Accepted. The Court observed that there was no finding that death sentence was the only alternative. |
| The accused-appellant argued that there was no reason to believe he would be a continuing threat to society if not executed. | Accepted. The Court agreed that there was no evidence to suggest that the accused would be a threat to society. |
| The crime was heinous and committed with extreme depravity, justifying the death penalty. | Partially Accepted. While the Court acknowledged the heinous nature of the crime, it held that it did not warrant the death penalty. |
| There were no mitigating circumstances to warrant a lesser sentence. | Rejected. The Court found that the trial court failed to consider mitigating circumstances. |
How each authority was viewed by the Court?
The Court relied on several precedents to come to its conclusion:
- Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab [CITATION]*: The court reiterated that the death penalty is an exception and should be imposed only in the “rarest of rare” cases.
- Rajesh Kumar vs. State [CITATION]*: The court reaffirmed the importance of considering mitigating circumstances and that life imprisonment is the rule.
- Santa Singh vs. State of Punjab [CITATION]*: The court emphasized the importance of a proper hearing on sentencing as per Section 235(2) of the CrPC.
- Dagdu and Others v. State of Maharashtra [CITATION]*: The court stressed that the hearing on sentencing must be real and effective.
- Machhi Singh & Others v. State of Punjab [CITATION]*: The court reiterated the need to balance aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
- Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra [CITATION]*: The court emphasized the importance of considering rehabilitation.
- Ajay Pandit and Another v. State of Maharashtra [CITATION]*: The court highlighted the duty to elicit relevant facts even if the accused is silent.
- Mohinder Singh v. State of Punjab [CITATION]*: The court noted that the death penalty should be imposed only when life imprisonment is futile.
- Panchhi and Others v. State of U.P. [CITATION]*: The court observed that brutality alone does not make a case the “rarest of rare.”
- Bantu v. State of M.P. [CITATION]*: The court considered the absence of a criminal record to be a mitigating factor.
- Amit v. State of Maharashtra [CITATION]*: The court found the absence of previous heinous crimes to be a factor against the death penalty.
- Rahul v. State of Maharashtra [CITATION]*: The court considered the absence of a criminal record to be a mitigating factor.
- Surendra Pal Shivbalakpal v. State of Gujarat [CITATION]*: The court considered the absence of previous criminal involvement to be a mitigating factor.
- Mukesh and Another v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Others [CITATION]*: The court deemed it appropriate to give the accused an opportunity to file affidavits to bring on record mitigating circumstances.
- Rajendra Prahladrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra [CITATION]*: The court referred to a similar case where the death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment.
- Mohd. Manan @ Abdul Mannan v. State of Bihar [CITATION]*: The court referred to a similar case where the death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment.
- Haru Ghosh vs. State of West Bengal [CITATION]*: The court commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment, considering factors such as lack of premeditation.
- Lehna vs. State of Haryana [CITATION]*: The court modified the punishment from death sentence to life imprisonment, noting that there was no evidence of diabolic planning.
- Mulla and Another v. State of U.P. [CITATION]*: The court affirmed that the court can prescribe the length of incarceration.
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court’s decision to commute the death sentence was influenced by several factors, including:
- The lack of evidence of premeditation or diabolic planning.
- The possibility that the accused-appellant did not realize the fatal consequences of his actions.
- The ineffective legal representation of the accused-appellant, particularly during the sentencing phase.
- The failure of the trial court to consider mitigating circumstances and the possibility of reformation.
- The absence of a finding that there was no alternative to the death sentence.
- The need for an effective hearing under Section 235(2) of the CrPC, which was not provided in this case.
The Court emphasized that while the crime was heinous and barbaric, it did not automatically fall under the “rarest of rare” category. The Court also noted that it is essential to consider the possibility of reformation and rehabilitation of the accused-appellant.
Sentiment Analysis of Reasons Given by the Supreme Court
| Reason | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Lack of premeditation or diabolic planning | 25% |
| Possibility that the accused did not realize fatal consequences | 20% |
| Ineffective legal representation | 20% |
| Failure to consider mitigating circumstances and reformation | 20% |
| Absence of finding that death sentence was the only alternative | 15% |
Fact:Law Ratio
| Category | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Fact | 30% |
| Law | 70% |
Logical Reasoning
No evidence of premeditation or diabolic planning.
Possibility that the accused did not realize the fatal consequences.
Defense focused only on lack of eyewitnesses.
No effort to present mitigating circumstances.
Trial court did not elicit relevant facts.
No opportunity for the accused to present mitigating factors.
No consideration of mitigating circumstances.
No consideration of the possibility of reformation.
The Court quoted the following from the judgment:
- “The legislature, therefore, decided that it is only when the accused is convicted that the question of sentence should come up for consideration and at that stage, an opportunity should be given to the accused to be heard in regard to the sentence.”
- “The Court, on convicting an accused, must unquestionably hear him on the question of sentence. The mandate of Section 235(2) of the CrPC must be obeyed in letter and spirit, and the accused must be given a real and effective opportunity to present data relevant to sentencing.”
- “The Court has a duty to elicit relevant facts even if the accused is silent. The purpose of Section 235(2) of the CrPC must be understood.”
- “The Court must consider whether there is any possibility of rehabilitation of the accused. The State must prove that rehabilitation is not possible before a death sentence is awarded. The Court must also consider whether there is any alternative to the death sentence.”
- “The brutality of the manner in which a murder was perpetrated is not the sole criterion for determining whether the case is one of the “rarest of rare cases”. There has to be a balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The Court must also consider whether the accused is a grave danger to society.”
- “The absence of a criminal record, the possibility of the accused not being a grave danger to society, and the possibility of rehabilitation are factors against imposing the death sentence. The Court must also consider whether the accused is a grave danger to society.”
- “The absence of previous heinous crimes and the lack of evidence that the accused would be a danger to society are factors against awarding the death penalty.”
- “The absence of a previous criminal record and no adverse reports on the conduct of the accused are factors against imposing the death penalty.”
- “The absence of previous criminal involvement is a factor to be considered while awarding the sentence.”
- “The Court deemed it appropriate to give the accused an opportunity to file affidavits to bring on record mitigating circumstances for the reduction of sentence.”
- “It is only when the alternative of life imprisonment is futile and serves no purpose, that the death penalty should be imposed.”
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision in this case underscores the importance of a nuanced approach when dealing with capital punishment, even in heinous crimes. The Court emphasized the need to consider mitigating circumstances, the possibility of reformation, and the importance of an effective hearing on sentencing. By commuting the death sentence to life imprisonment, the Court reaffirmed that the death penalty should be reserved for the “rarest of rare” cases and that life imprisonment remains the rule.
This case serves as a significant reminder of the delicate balance that must be struck between retribution and rehabilitation in the administration of justice, particularly in cases involving capital punishment. The Supreme Court’s judgment reflects a commitment to upholding the principles of fairness and due process, even in the face of the most heinous crimes.