LEGAL ISSUE: Whether Private Tour Operators (PTOs) were illegally denied registration for the Hajj pilgrimage. CASE TYPE: Public Law/Writ Petition. Case Name: United Air Travel Services vs. Union of India. Judgment Date: May 7, 2018
Date of the Judgment: May 7, 2018
Citation: The case does not have a citation in the Indian Supreme Court (INSC) format.
Judges: J. Chelameswar, J., and Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J. The judgment was delivered by a division bench.
Can a government authority reject applications for registration based on criteria that they had already exempted? The Supreme Court addressed this question in a batch of writ petitions filed by Private Tour Operators (PTOs) who were denied registration for the Hajj pilgrimage in 2016. The court found that the rejection was illegal and awarded compensation to the affected PTOs. The judgment was delivered by a division bench comprising Justices J. Chelameswar and Sanjay Kishan Kaul, with the opinion authored by Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul.
Case Background
The case involves several Private Tour Operators (PTOs) who facilitate travel for Hajj and Umrah pilgrimages. These PTOs applied for registration and quota allocation for the Hajj pilgrimage in 2016. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) rejected their applications, citing non-compliance with certain clauses of the policy for PTOs. However, these clauses were the very ones from which the PTOs were exempted. The PTOs had previously qualified for the 2015 Hajj pilgrimage but did not receive a quota due to a draw of lots. According to the policy, they were entitled to be allocated seats in the following year without a draw of lots, provided they remained qualified.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 2013-2017 | The ‘Policy for Private Tour Operators for Hajj 2013-2017’ was in effect. |
| 7.8.2015 | Draw of lots was held for Hajj 2015. Petitioners did not get quota. |
| 7.8.2015 | Press Release issued listing PTOs who qualified but did not get quota, including the petitioners. |
| 29.4.2016 | Ministry of External Affairs published norms for registration of PTOs for Hajj 2016, exempting certain clauses for those who qualified in 2015 but did not get quota. |
| 26.7.2016 | Rejection letters issued to the petitioners (sent via email on 27.7.2016) citing non-compliance with exempted clauses. |
| May 7, 2018 | Supreme Court delivers judgment. |
Course of Proceedings
The petitioners, who were qualified PTOs for the year 2015 but did not receive a quota through the draw of lots, were entitled to an allocation of 150 seats for the 2016 Hajj pilgrimage, as per clause 4(b) of the policy. However, their applications for the 2016 Hajj were rejected by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). The rejection letters cited non-compliance with clauses (vii), (x), (xi), and (xii) of Annexure A of the PTO policy. These were the very clauses from which the petitioners were exempted by the MEA’s notification dated 29.4.2016. The petitioners then filed writ petitions in the Supreme Court challenging the rejection.
Legal Framework
The core of the case revolves around the “Policy for Private Tour Operators for Hajj 2013 – 2017,” which was approved by the Supreme Court in the case of *Union of India v. Rafique Shaikh Bhikan*. This policy outlined the eligibility criteria and procedures for registering PTOs for the Hajj pilgrimage. The policy was to remain valid for five years and was not to be questioned in any court or authority. The relevant clauses of the policy are as follows:
Clause 3 of the policy states that PTOs are divided into two categories:
- Category I: PTOs registered with MEA and facilitated Hajis at least for 7 Haj operations or more.
- Category II: PTOs registered with MEA and facilitated Hajis for at least 1 to 6 Haj operations and PTOs which have facilitated at least 50 umrah pilgrims in a year for any five years.
Clause 4(b) of the policy states:
“A qualified PTO which fails to get selected under the draw of lots in any year will be allocated 150 seats in the ensuing year without qurrah if it remains a qualified PTO.”
The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) notification dated 29.4.2016, stated that PTOs who qualified under Category II by virtue of facilitating a minimum of 50 Umrah pilgrims in a year for any 5 years were exempted from clauses (vii), (x), (xi), and (xii) of Annexure A. These clauses are:
“ANNEXURE-A
Terms and Conditions for Registration of
Private Tour Operators (PTOs) for Haj-2016
Each PTO should establish that it is a genuine and established
Tour Operator having experience in sending tourists/pilgrims
abroad for which it should produce the following documents:
Sl. No. Terms and Conditions
vii Proof of payment made through banking (Bank
Statement) or other authorized channels towards
purchase of tickets and hiring of accommodation in
Makkah/Madinah for the financial year 2013-14
(Haj2013) or 2014-15 (Haj 2014). Payments towards
purchase of tickets, hiring of accommodation for
pilgrims in Makkah/Madinah, by any other means,
would not be accepted.
x Copies of Registration Certificate issued to the PTO
in support their aim-wise and PTO-wise.
xi Contract for hiring of buildings for pilgrims and
“Tasreeh” together with English translations PTO
category wise. (Please enclose rental receipts and a
copy of lease deed, duly signed with the Saudi owners
for Haj.
xii Copy of Munazzim Card and relevant Haj visa pages
of the Passport of the Proprietor/Owner.”
The Supreme Court also referred to Article 14 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees equality before the law and prohibits arbitrary actions by the state.
Arguments
The petitioners argued that they were wrongly denied registration for Hajj 2016 because the rejection letters cited non-compliance with clauses of Annexure A, from which they were specifically exempted by the notification dated 29.4.2016. They contended that they were entitled to an allocation of 150 seats for the 2016 Hajj pilgrimage, as per clause 4(b) of the policy, since they had qualified as PTOs in 2015 but did not receive a quota due to the draw of lots.
The respondents, represented by the Additional Solicitor General, did not dispute that the rejection letters cited the wrong reasons. However, they attempted to argue that there were other reasons for rejection, which were not communicated in the rejection letters. The respondents contended that the rejection was based on non-compliance with the policy as laid down by the Supreme Court for any one of the Hajj years.
The Supreme Court did not accept the arguments made by the respondents and held that the reasons for rejection must be judged based on what was communicated in the rejection letters.
| Main Submission | Sub-Submissions |
|---|---|
| Petitioners’ Submission |
|
| Respondents’ Submission |
|
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court did not frame specific issues. However, the core issue was whether the rejection of the petitioners’ applications for Hajj 2016 was valid given that the rejection was based on clauses from which they were exempted.
The sub-issue was whether the respondent could supplement the reasons for rejection with other reasons not mentioned in the rejection letter.
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
The following table demonstrates how the Court dealt with the issue:
| Issue | Court’s Decision |
|---|---|
| Whether the rejection of the petitioners’ applications for Hajj 2016 was valid given that the rejection was based on clauses from which they were exempted. | The Court held that the rejection was invalid because the reasons cited were the very clauses from which the petitioners were exempted. |
| Whether the respondent could supplement the reasons for rejection with other reasons not mentioned in the rejection letter. | The Court held that the validity of an order must be judged by the reasons mentioned in the order itself and cannot be supplemented with fresh reasons. |
Authorities
The Supreme Court relied on the following authorities:
| Authority | Court | How it was Used | Ratio |
|---|---|---|---|
| Union of India v. Rafique Shaikh Bhikan | Supreme Court of India | The policy for PTOs was approved by the Supreme Court. | The policy was to remain valid for five years and was not to be questioned in any court or authority. |
| Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors. [ (1978) 1 SCC 405 ] | Supreme Court of India | The Court relied on this case to reiterate that the validity of an order must be judged by the reasons mentioned in the order itself and cannot be supplemented with fresh reasons. | When a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. |
| Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa [ (1993) 2 SCC 746 ] | Supreme Court of India | The Court relied on this case to explain the principles of awarding damages in public law. | The purpose of public law is to protect citizens’ rights, and compensation is awarded to penalize wrongdoers for breaching their public duty. |
| Common Cause, a Registered Society v. Union of India [ (1999) 6 SCC 667 ] | Supreme Court of India | The Court referred to this case to further emphasize the principles of damages in public law. | Damages can be awarded in public law proceedings to ensure that public bodies or officials do not act unlawfully. |
| N. Nagendra Rao & Co. v. State of A.P. [(1994) 6 SCC 205] | Supreme Court of India | The Court relied on this case to state that the determination of vicarious liability of the State is linked with the negligence of its officers. | The State can be held vicariously liable for the actions of its officers if they can be sued personally. |
Judgment
The Supreme Court quashed the rejection letters issued by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). The Court held that the reasons cited for disqualification were non-compliance with clauses from which the petitioners had been specifically exempted. The Court also rejected the respondent’s argument that there were other reasons for rejection not mentioned in the letters, citing the principle established in *Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors.*
| Submission by the Parties | How the Court Treated the Submission |
|---|---|
| Petitioners’ submission that they were wrongly denied registration for Hajj 2016 because the rejection letters cited non-compliance with clauses from which they were specifically exempted. | The Court accepted this submission and held that the rejection was illegal and arbitrary. |
| Respondents’ submission that the reasons were wrongly communicated in the rejection letter and that there was actually some other reason for the rejection. | The Court rejected this submission, stating that the validity of an order must be judged by the reasons mentioned in the order itself and cannot be supplemented with fresh reasons. |
Authorities Viewed by the Court:
- The Court followed the principles laid down in *Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors.* [(1978) 1 SCC 405], stating that the validity of an order must be judged by the reasons mentioned in the order itself.
- The Court relied on *Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa* [(1993) 2 SCC 746], *Common Cause, a Registered Society v. Union of India* [(1999) 6 SCC 667], and *N. Nagendra Rao & Co. v. State of A.P.* [(1994) 6 SCC 205] to award damages in public law.
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court was primarily concerned with the arbitrary and illegal nature of the actions of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). The Court emphasized that the PTOs were denied registration based on reasons that were not applicable to them, as they had been explicitly exempted from those conditions. This action was deemed a clear violation of the principles of fairness and equality enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court also highlighted the importance of holding public authorities accountable for their actions and ensuring that they do not act unlawfully.
The Court’s decision to award compensation was driven by the need to provide a remedy for the injustice suffered by the PTOs. The Court recognized that the passage of time had made certain reliefs infructuous, but it could not leave the petitioners remediless. The award of damages in public law was intended to penalize the wrongdoer and ensure that public bodies do not act arbitrarily.
| Sentiment | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Arbitrariness and Illegality of the Action | 40% |
| Violation of Article 14 of the Constitution | 25% |
| Need to provide a remedy for the injustice suffered by the PTOs | 20% |
| Importance of holding public authorities accountable | 15% |
| Ratio | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Fact | 30% |
| Law | 70% |
Logical Reasoning
The Court considered the alternative interpretations of the policy, but rejected them stating that the reasons for rejection must be judged based on what was communicated in the rejection letters. The Court emphasized that the reasons cited for disqualification were non-compliance with clauses from which the petitioners had been specifically exempted. The Court also rejected the respondent’s argument that there were other reasons for rejection not mentioned in the letters, citing the principle established in *Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors.*
The Supreme Court stated:
“A bare perusal of the aforesaid letter would show that the reason cited for disqualification was non-compliance of the very clauses of which exemption had been granted to the petitioners.”
“The aforesaid legal position, thus, makes the stand of the respondent unsustainable, resulting in the quashing of the impugned letters of rejection.”
“The mindless action of the respondents in rejecting the eligibility of the petitioners for the year 2016 on the very grounds on which they were exempted necessitates that the petitioners should be entitled to damages in public law so that they are compensated, at least, to some extent for not having been able to carry on with their business on account of illegal action of the respondents.”
The court held that the action of the respondents was a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
The Court awarded a compensation of Rs. 5 lakh per petitioner as damages in public law. The Court stated that the award was not based on actual loss but was intended to penalize the wrongdoer and ensure that public bodies do not act arbitrarily.
Key Takeaways
- Government authorities cannot reject applications based on criteria from which applicants have been specifically exempted.
- The validity of an order must be judged by the reasons mentioned in the order itself and cannot be supplemented with fresh reasons.
- Public authorities are accountable for their actions and must act fairly and legally.
- Damages can be awarded in public law to compensate individuals for losses suffered due to the illegal actions of public authorities.
- The Supreme Court can award compensation to individuals whose fundamental rights have been violated due to arbitrary actions of the State.
Directions
The Supreme Court directed the respondents to remit an amount of Rs. 5 lakh per petitioner within two months from the date of the order. Failing this, the amount would carry interest at 15% per annum. The Court also stated that it would be open to the respondents to recover the amount of damages and costs from the delinquent officers responsible for passing such unsustainable orders.
Development of Law
The ratio decidendi of this case is that when a government authority makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons mentioned in the order itself and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons. Additionally, public authorities are accountable for their actions and must act fairly and legally. The Court also reiterated the principles of awarding damages in public law to compensate individuals for losses suffered due to the illegal actions of public authorities. This case reinforces the principle that public bodies must act within the bounds of the law and that arbitrary actions will be penalized.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s judgment in this case underscores the importance of fairness and accountability in government actions. By quashing the rejection letters and awarding compensation, the Court upheld the rights of the PTOs and sent a clear message that arbitrary actions by public authorities will not be tolerated. The judgment serves as a reminder that public bodies must act within the bounds of the law and that individuals have recourse to the courts when their rights are violated.
Category
Parent Category: Public Law
- Child Category: Writ Petition
- Child Category: Article 14, Constitution of India
- Child Category: Damages in Public Law
Parent Category: Hajj Policy
- Child Category: Policy for Private Tour Operators for Hajj 2013 – 2017
Parent Category: Constitution of India
- Child Category: Article 14, Constitution of India
FAQ
Q: What was the main issue in this case?
A: The main issue was whether Private Tour Operators (PTOs) were illegally denied registration for the Hajj pilgrimage in 2016.
Q: Why were the PTOs denied registration?
A: The PTOs were denied registration because the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) cited non-compliance with certain clauses of the PTO policy. However, these were the very clauses from which the PTOs were exempted.
Q: What did the Supreme Court decide?
A: The Supreme Court quashed the rejection letters and awarded each petitioner a compensation of Rs. 5 lakh.
Q: What is the significance of this judgment?
A: This judgment emphasizes that government authorities cannot reject applications based on criteria from which applicants have been specifically exempted. It also reinforces the principle that public authorities are accountable for their actions and must act fairly and legally.
Q: What is “damages in public law”?
A: Damages in public law are compensation awarded by courts to individuals who have suffered losses due to the illegal actions of public authorities. It is meant to penalize wrongdoers and ensure that public bodies do not act arbitrarily.