Supreme Court Convicts Accused Under Section 304 Part I IPC in Rioting Case: State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Subhash @ Pappu (2022)

Date of the Judgment: 01 April 2022
Citation: 2022 INSC 325
Judges: Justice M.R. Shah and Justice B.V. Nagarathna
Can a person be convicted for murder when they did not inflict the fatal blow, but were part of an unlawful assembly where another member caused the death? The Supreme Court of India addressed this question in a recent judgment, overturning the acquittal by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. The case involved an incident of rioting where one person died from a knife injury, and the court examined the culpability of an accused who was present and armed, but did not directly inflict the fatal wound. The bench comprised of Justice M.R. Shah and Justice B.V. Nagarathna, who delivered the judgment.

Case Background

On December 4, 1980, at 2:00 PM, Subhash @ Pappu, along with Pramod, Munna Lal, and three unknown individuals, went to Hari Om’s shop in Firozabad, demanding sugar and kerosene without ration cards. When Bengali, a servant at the shop, refused, one of the individuals stabbed him, and another hit him with a hockey stick. Hari Singh (PW-5) lodged the First Information Report (F.I.R.) at 5:15 PM on the same day at P.S. Firozabad (South), District Agra. Bengali made a dying declaration on December 5, 1980, at 11:40 AM, before the Additional City Magistrate, Agra, while undergoing treatment at S.N. Hospital. Bengali died on January 4, 1981.

Following the investigation, a charge sheet was filed on January 25, 1981, against all the accused. Subhash @ Pappu surrendered before the Court on February 6, 1981. The case was committed to the Court of IVth Additional Sessions Judge, Agra, and was numbered as Sessions Case No. 361 of 1982. Subhash @ Pappu was charged under Section 148 and Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Pramod and Munna Lal were charged under Sections 147, 149, and 302 of the IPC. The Trial Court convicted Subhash @ Pappu under Sections 302 and 148 of the IPC but acquitted Pramod and Munna Lal.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The Trial Court convicted Subhash @ Pappu under Section 302 (murder) and Section 148 (rioting with a deadly weapon) of the IPC, sentencing him to life imprisonment and three years of rigorous imprisonment, respectively. However, the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad acquitted Subhash @ Pappu, primarily because the dying declaration did not specify who inflicted the knife blow, and there were contradictions in the witness testimonies regarding who inflicted the knife blow. The High Court noted that the dying declaration stated that Pappu s/o Baijnath hit the deceased with a hockey stick, not a knife.

Legal Framework

The case revolves around the interpretation of several sections of the Indian Penal Code, 1860:

• Section 146, Indian Penal Code: Defines rioting as the use of force or violence by an unlawful assembly or any member thereof, in prosecution of the common object of such assembly.
• Section 148, Indian Penal Code: Deals with rioting while being armed with a deadly weapon or anything that, used as a weapon, is likely to cause death. It states, “Whoever is guilty of rioting, being armed with a deadly weapon or with anything which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.”
• Section 149, Indian Penal Code: Addresses the concept of common object and vicarious liability in unlawful assemblies. It states, “If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.”
• Section 302, Indian Penal Code: Defines punishment for murder.
• Section 304 Part I, Indian Penal Code: Deals with culpable homicide not amounting to murder and specifies punishment for the same.
• Section 464, Code of Criminal Procedure: Deals with the effect of omission to frame, or absence of, or error in, charge. It states, “No finding, sentence or order by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be deemed invalid merely on the ground that no charge was framed or on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the charge including any misjoinder of charges, unless, in the opinion of the Court of appeal, confirmation or revision, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.”

Arguments

Arguments by the State:

• The State argued that the High Court erred in acquitting the accused, as the dying declaration clearly stated that the respondent was present and actively participated in the commission of the offense.
• It was submitted that the accused could be convicted under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC, as he was part of an unlawful assembly with the common object of harming Bengali.
• The State contended that the initial complaint (F.I.R.) alleged that Subhash @ Pappu inflicted the knife blow, and even though the informant turned hostile, the charge under Section 148 was valid.
• The State argued that even if the accused only hit with a hockey stick, he could still be convicted for murder with the aid of Section 149, as the death was caused by the unlawful assembly.
• The State also argued that the High Court erred in acquitting the accused under Section 148, as the dying declaration mentioned six to seven persons were involved, and the acquittal of two co-accused did not negate the unlawful assembly.
• The State submitted that contradictions between the F.I.R. and the dying declaration should not be a ground for acquittal, especially since the F.I.R. was given by a hostile witness.

Arguments by the Accused:

• The accused argued that the High Court rightly acquitted him due to material contradictions between the F.I.R. and the dying declaration regarding who inflicted the knife blow.
• It was contended that the dying declaration did not specify who inflicted the knife blow, and since the accused was not charged under Section 149, he could not be convicted for murder with its aid.
• The accused submitted that hitting with a hockey stick is not a deadly weapon, and since only three accused were charged, the conviction under Section 148 was not valid.
• The accused argued that the dying declaration was unreliable as there was no urgency to record it the day after the incident.
• The accused also argued that the hockey stick was not recovered, and the death occurred after 30 days due to septicemia, which might fall under Section 304 Part II of the IPC.

Submissions Table

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed the following issues for consideration:

1. Whether the High Court was justified in acquitting the accused for the offence under Section 302 and Section 148 of the IPC.
2. Whether the accused can be convicted for the offence under Section 302 with the aid of Section 149 of the IPC when the deceased died due to septicemia after a period of thirty days.
3. Whether the respondent-accused can be convicted for the offence under Section 148 IPC when the number of accused chargesheeted/charged/tried were less than five in number.

The court also considered the sub-issue of whether a hockey stick can be considered a deadly weapon under Section 148 of the IPC.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following cases and legal provisions:

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

The court relied on Rohtas Vs. State of Haryana, (2020) 14 SCALE 14 to support the argument that the acquittal of some co-accused does not negate the unlawful assembly. The court used Fainul Khan Vs. State of Jharkhand, (2019) 9 SCC 549 to support that a defective charge does not vitiate the trial unless it causes a failure of justice. The court cited Annareddy Sambasiva Reddy Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2009) 12 SCC 546 to show that a conviction can be sustained even without a specific charge under Section 149 if the ingredients are obvious. The court used Alister Anthony Pareira Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 2 SCC 648 to reinforce the principles of criminal liability. The court distinguished Laxman Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 6 SCC 710, stating that it does not lay down an absolute proposition that a dying declaration should be discarded if there was no immediate danger to life. The court used Sanjay Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2016) 3 SCC 62 to alter the conviction from Section 302 to Section 304 Part I, as the death was due to septicemia after 30 days.

The court also relied on Section 146 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 to define rioting and establish the guilt of the accused. It relied on Section 148 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 to establish the guilt of the accused for rioting with deadly weapons. The court used Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 to establish the vicarious liability of the accused for the acts of the unlawful assembly. The court initially considered Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 but ultimately altered the conviction to Section 304 Part I. The court used Section 304 Part I of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 to alter the conviction as the death was not an immediate result of the injury. The court used Section 464 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to justify the conviction despite the defective charge.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the reliability of the dying declaration and the principle of vicarious liability under Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. The court emphasized that the accused was part of an unlawful assembly that caused the death of the victim, even though he did not inflict the fatal blow. The court also considered the fact that the death was not an immediate result of the injury, which led to the alteration of the conviction from Section 302 to Section 304 Part I.

The court’s reasoning focused on the following key points:

• The dying declaration was credible and proved the presence and participation of the accused in the unlawful assembly.
• The accused was part of an unlawful assembly that had the common object of harming the deceased.
• The accused could be held liable for the actions of other members of the unlawful assembly under Section 149 of the IPC.
• The death was a consequence of the unlawful assembly’s actions, even though it was not an immediate result of the injury.
• The defective charge did not cause prejudice to the accused.

Fact:Law Ratio

Logical Reasoning:

The Supreme Court considered alternative interpretations, such as the accused being convicted under Section 302, but rejected it due to the fact that the death was not an immediate result of the injury. The court also considered the argument that the accused should not be convicted under Section 148, but rejected it based on the fact that the unlawful assembly used a deadly weapon. The court ultimately decided to alter the conviction to Section 304 Part I of the IPC, while upholding the conviction under Section 148.

The court’s decision was clear: while the accused did not inflict the fatal blow, he was part of an unlawful assembly that caused the death of the victim. Therefore, he was culpable under the law.

The court’s reasons for the decision included:

• The dying declaration was credible and proved the presence and participation of the accused in the unlawful assembly.
• The accused was part of an unlawful assembly that had the common object of harming the deceased.
• The accused could be held liable for the actions of other members of the unlawful assembly under Section 149 of the IPC.
• The death was a consequence of the unlawful assembly’s actions, even though it was not an immediate result of the injury.
• The defective charge did not cause prejudice to the accused.

The Supreme Court quoted from the judgment, “From the dying declaration it emerges that six to seven persons attacked the deceased including Pappu s/o Baijnath.” The court further stated, “Therefore, even if the role attributed to the respondent -accused was that of hitting the deceased by a hockey stick, in that case also for the act of other persons, who were part of the unlawful assembly of inflicting the knife blow, the respondent accused can be held guilty of having committed the murder of deceased Bengali, with the aid of Section 149 IPC.” The court also noted, “The submission on behalf of the accused relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of Laxman (supra) that the day on which the dying declaration was recorded, there was no extreme emergency and/or his condition was not so serious or there was any danger to his life and therefore there was no reason and/or cause to record the dying declaration and therefore the dying declaration is not believable, has no substance.”

There were no dissenting opinions in this case. The bench comprised of Justice M.R. Shah and Justice B.V. Nagarathna, who both agreed on the final judgment.

The court’s reasoning was based on a strict interpretation of the law and the facts of the case. The court emphasized that the accused was part of an unlawful assembly that caused the death of the victim, and therefore, he was culpable under the law. The court also emphasized that the defective charge did not cause prejudice to the accused, and therefore, it did not vitiate the trial.

The potential implications for future cases are that it reinforces the principle of vicarious liability under Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. It clarifies that a person can be held liable for the actions of other members of an unlawful assembly, even if they did not directly inflict the fatal blow. It also clarifies that a defective charge does not vitiate the trial unless it causes prejudice to the accused.

There were no new doctrines or legal principles introduced in this case. The court applied existing legal principles to the facts of the case.

Key Takeaways

• A person can be convicted for culpable homicide (Section 304 Part I) if they are part of an unlawful assembly that causes death, even if they did not directly inflict the fatal injury.
• The principle of vicarious liability under Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code is upheld, making members of an unlawful assembly responsible for the actions of the group.
• A defective charge does not invalidate a trial unless it causes a failure of justice.
• Dying declarations are considered reliable evidence, especially when recorded by a competent authority.
• The number of accused charged does not negate the existence of an unlawful assembly if the evidence suggests that more than five people were involved.

Directions

The Supreme Court directed the respondent to surrender within four weeks to undergo the remaining part of the sentence.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a person can be held liable for culpable homicide notamounting to murder (Section 304 Part I) if they are part of an unlawful assembly that causes death, even if they did not directly inflict the fatal injury. This decision reinforces the principle of vicarious liability under Section 149 of the IPC and clarifies that a defective charge does not invalidate a trial unless it causes a failure of justice.

This judgment does not introduce any new legal principles but rather applies existing principles to the facts of the case. It serves as a reminder that the law holds each member of an unlawful assembly responsible for the actions of the group, and that the court will look at the substance of the matter, rather than just the procedure.