Supreme Court Directs Manipur Speaker to Decide Disqualification Petitions: Keisham Meghachandra Singh vs. The Hon’ble Speaker Manipur Legislative Assembly & Ors. (21 January 2020)

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: 21 January 2020
Citation: (2020) INSC 30
Judges: R.F. Nariman, J., Aniruddha Bose, J., V. Ramasubramanian, J.

Can a Speaker of a Legislative Assembly indefinitely delay deciding on disqualification petitions filed against a Member of the House? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this critical question concerning the anti-defection law under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution. This case arose from the Manipur Legislative Assembly, where a member switched political allegiance after being elected, leading to petitions for his disqualification that remained unresolved for a prolonged period. The Supreme Court, in this judgment, has clarified the role and responsibility of the Speaker in such matters.

The judgment was delivered by a three-judge bench comprising Justices R.F. Nariman, Aniruddha Bose, and V. Ramasubramanian, with the opinion authored by Justice R.F. Nariman.

Case Background

The 11th Manipur Legislative Assembly elections in March 2017 resulted in no single party securing a majority. The Indian National Congress (Congress Party) won 28 seats, while the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) secured 21 seats. Respondent No. 3, who had been elected on a Congress Party ticket, joined the BJP immediately after the election results. On March 12, 2017, Respondent No. 3, along with other BJP members, met the Governor to stake a claim to form a BJP-led government. On March 15, 2017, the Governor invited the BJP to form the government, and Respondent No. 3 was sworn in as a Minister in the BJP-led government on the same day.

Between April and July 2017, thirteen disqualification petitions were filed against Respondent No. 3 before the Speaker of the Manipur Legislative Assembly, alleging disqualification under paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution. The Appellant filed his petition on July 31, 2017. However, no action was taken by the Speaker on any of these petitions.

Timeline:

Course of Proceedings

Initially, T.N. Haokip filed a writ petition before the High Court of Manipur at Imphal, seeking a direction for the Speaker to decide his disqualification petition within a reasonable time. However, the High Court refrained from passing any order, noting that the issue of whether a High Court can direct a Speaker to decide a disqualification petition within a specific timeframe was pending before a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the Appellant filed a writ petition before the same High Court, seeking a declaration that Respondent No. 3 was disqualified under paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule and a writ of quo warranto to oust him from the post of Minister.

The High Court framed the following questions for consideration:

• (a) Whether the Speaker failed to discharge duties under the Tenth Schedule to decide the petitions?
• (b) If so, whether Respondent No. 3 has prima facie incurred disqualification?
• (c) If Respondent No. 3 has incurred a prima facie disqualification, whether the High Court can issue an order disqualifying him or issue a writ of quo warranto?

The High Court held that the Speaker is a quasi-judicial authority who is required to take a decision within a reasonable time. It also found that the conduct of Respondent No. 3 in becoming a Minister in a BJP-led Government after being elected on a Congress Party ticket attracted disqualification under paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule. However, the High Court declined to grant any relief, citing the pendency of the same issue before a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court.

Legal Framework

The core of this case revolves around the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India, which was inserted by the Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985. This schedule deals with the disqualification of Members of Parliament and State Legislatures on the ground of defection. The key provision in this case is paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule, which states:

“2. Disqualification on ground of defection.—(1) Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 5, a member of a House belonging to any political party shall be disqualified for being a member of the House—(a) if he has voluntarily given up his membership of such political party;”

This provision means that a member of a House who has voluntarily given up membership of the political party on whose ticket he was elected will be disqualified from being a member of the House. The Tenth Schedule also provides for the Speaker of the House to decide on questions of disqualification.

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments (Shri Kapil Sibal):

• The Speaker has deliberately delayed deciding the disqualification petitions, as evidenced by the lack of a decision since April 2017. The notice was issued by the Speaker only on 12.09.2018, long after the petition was filed.
• The Speaker’s inaction suggests that no decision will be made until the end of the Assembly’s five-year term.
• A writ of quo warranto should be issued against Respondent No. 3 for usurping a constitutional office.
• While the question of whether a writ petition can be filed against a Speaker’s inaction is pending before a five-judge bench, paragraph 110 of Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu & Ors. [(1992) Supp. (2) SCC 651] only interdicts interlocutory stays that prevent a Speaker from making a decision, not judicial review to ensure a decision is made.
• The constitutional objective of checking defections necessitates judicial review in cases of inaction.
• The Court should uphold the reasoning of the High Court and issue a writ of quo warranto against Respondent No. 3, relying on Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prasad Maurya [(2007) 4 SCC 270].

Respondent’s Arguments (Mrs. Madhavi Divan, Addl. Solicitor General):

• The reliefs sought in the Appellant’s writ petition are contradictory to those in Writ Petition (C) No.353 of 2017, making it impossible to grant relief.
• A writ of quo warranto cannot be granted without first deciding whether Respondent No. 3 is disqualified, which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Speaker, as per Kihoto Hollohan (supra).
• The High Court was incorrect in considering the Speaker’s decision under the Tenth Schedule as an alternative remedy, which is contrary to judgments like Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix v. Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly [(2016) 8 SCC 1].
• The present case should await the judgment of a five-judge bench on the specific reference made by a two-judge bench.
• Rajendra Singh Rana (supra) is distinguishable because judicial review occurred only after a final decision by the Speaker, and the Court used its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India due to the imminent end of the Assembly’s term.
• While the High Court’s conclusion is correct, the findings in favor of the Appellant are contrary to the judgments of the Supreme Court.

Sub-Submissions Categorized by Main Submissions:

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court did not explicitly frame issues in a separate section but addressed the core question of whether the High Court can direct a Speaker to decide a disqualification petition within a certain time, and whether such a direction would not fall foul of the quia timet action doctrine.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues

Authorities

The Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• The Court relied on Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu & Ors. [(1992) Supp. (2) SCC 651]* to define the scope of judicial review in matters related to the Tenth Schedule, clarifying that while the Speaker has exclusive jurisdiction, inaction is not protected.
• The Court heavily relied on Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prasad Maurya [(2007) 4 SCC 270]* to emphasize that a failure to exercise jurisdiction by the Speaker cannot be shielded and that a delay in decision-making attracts judicial review.
• The Court referred to Ravi S. Naik v. State of Maharashtra [1994 Supp. (2) SCC 641]* to support the finding that the voluntary giving up of membership of a political party can be express or implied by conduct.
• The Court acknowledged Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix v. Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly [(2016) 8 SCC 1]* for affirming the Speaker’s exclusive jurisdiction but clarified that this does not mean the Speaker can indefinitely delay decisions.
• The Court referred to Speaker, Haryana Vidhan Sabha v. Kuldeep Bishnoi & Ors. [(2015) 12 SCC 381]* and Speaker, Orissa Legislative Assembly v. Utkal Keshari Parida [(2013) 11 SCC 794]* as part of the background to the reference order made by a Division Bench to a five-judge bench.
• The Court referred to S.A. Sampath Kumar v. Kale Yadaiah and Ors. [SLP(C) No. 33677/2015]* to highlight the reference order that raised the question of whether a High Court can direct a Speaker to decide a disqualification petition within a certain time.
• The Court referred to Keshav Singh case [(1965) 1 SCR 413 : AIR 1965 SC 745]* in context of the deeming provision in Paragraph 6(2) of the Tenth Schedule.
• The Court referred to Raja Ram Pal v. Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha [(2007) 3 SCC 184]* to reiterate the limited scope of judicial review.
• The Court referred to Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana [(2006) 11 SCC 1]* in context of the error committed by the Speaker.
• The Court referred to Kuldip Singh v. Subhash Chander Jain [(2000) 4 SCC 50]* to explain the concept of quia timet action.
• The Court referred to Fletcher v. Bealey [(1884) 28 Ch. D. 688]*, London Borough of Islington v. Margaret Elliott [[2012] EWCA Civ. 56]* and Vastint Leeds BV v. Persons Unknown [[2018] EWHC 2456 (Ch.)]* to explain the concept of quia timet action.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily driven by the need to ensure the effective implementation of the anti-defection law under the Tenth Schedule. The Court emphasized that the Speaker, as a quasi-judicial authority, is bound to decide disqualification petitions within a reasonable time. The Court was concerned about the potential for abuse of the Speaker’s position, particularly when the Speaker belongs to a political party, and the possibility of the Speaker delaying decisions indefinitely to favor certain political interests. The Court also highlighted the importance of protecting the principles of democracy and ensuring that those who have defected are not allowed to continue as members of the legislature.

Fact:Law Ratio

Logical Reasoning:

The Court considered the argument that the Speaker’s decision-making is protected by the finality clause in paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule and the doctrine of quia timet action. However, the Court rejected these arguments, stating that the finality clause does not protect inaction or delay, and the doctrine of quia timet action does not prevent judicial review to ensure a timely decision. The Court also considered the potential for abuse of the Speaker’s position and the importance of upholding the principles of democracy and the anti-defection law.

The Court’s reasoning was based on the following:

• The Speaker is a quasi-judicial authority who is bound to decide disqualification petitions within a reasonable time.
• Inaction or delay in decision-making by the Speaker attracts judicial review.
• The finality clause in paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule does not shield inaction or delay.
• The doctrine of quia timet action does not prevent judicial review to ensure a timely decision.
• The need to protect the principles of democracy and ensure that those who have defected are not allowed to continue as members of the legislature.

The Court also considered the argument that the present case should await the judgment of a five-judge bench on the issue. However, the Court rejected this argument, stating that the issue was already answered in Rajendra Singh Rana (supra). The Court also distinguished the facts of the present case from Rajendra Singh Rana (supra), stating that in the present case, the life of the legislative assembly comes to an end only in March, 2022.

The Court quoted the following from the judgment:

“Indeed, the Speaker, in acting as a Tribunal under the Tenth Schedule is bound to decide disqualification petitions within a reasonable period.”

“What is reasonable will depend on the facts of each case, but absent exceptional circumstances for whichthere must be good reasons, a period of three months from the date on which the petition is filed is the outer limit within which a disqualification petition must be decided by the Speaker.”

“In the present case, the Speaker has not decided the disqualification petitions for a period of almost three years. This is clearly unreasonable and attracts the jurisdiction of the High Court in exercise of the power of judicial review.”

Final Order

The Supreme Court directed the Speaker of the Manipur Legislative Assembly to decide the disqualification petitions pending against Respondent No. 3 within a period of four weeks from the date of the judgment. The Court also clarified that the Speaker’s decision would be subject to judicial review, as per the law laid down in Kihoto Hollohan (supra).

The Supreme Court also stated the following:

• The Speaker is bound to decide disqualification petitions within a reasonable period.
• A period of three months from the date on which the petition is filed is the outer limit within which a disqualification petition must be decided by the Speaker.
• The Speaker’s inaction attracts the jurisdiction of the High Court in exercise of the power of judicial review.

Implications

This judgment has significant implications for the anti-defection law and the role of the Speaker in deciding disqualification petitions. The Supreme Court has made it clear that:

• Speakers cannot indefinitely delay deciding disqualification petitions.
• Inaction or undue delay by the Speaker attracts the jurisdiction of the High Court in exercise of judicial review.
• A reasonable time limit must be followed by the Speaker in deciding disqualification petitions.
• The finality clause in paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule does not shield inaction or delay.

This judgment has reinforced the importance of the anti-defection law and has ensured that the Speaker’s role is not misused to frustrate the purpose of the Tenth Schedule. It has also clarified that the High Courts have the power to intervene in cases of undue delay by the Speaker in deciding disqualification petitions.