LEGAL ISSUE: Whether the nature of injuries sustained is the sole determinant for framing charges under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (attempt to murder).

CASE TYPE: Criminal Law

Case Name: Shoyeb Raja vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

[Judgment Date]: 25 September 2024

Date of the Judgment: 25 September 2024

Citation: (2024) INSC 731

Judges: C.T. Ravikumar, J. and Sanjay Karol, J.

Can a charge of attempt to murder be dismissed solely based on the nature of injuries being minor? The Supreme Court of India addressed this crucial question in a recent criminal appeal. The Court examined whether the High Court of Madhya Pradesh was correct in setting aside the framing of charges under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), which deals with attempt to murder, based on the nature of injuries sustained by the complainant. The bench consisted of Justices C.T. Ravikumar and Sanjay Karol, with the judgment authored by Justice Sanjay Karol.

Case Background

The complainant, Shoyeb Raja, was appointed as the Chairman of the District Waqf Board, Seoni, and was tasked with overseeing Masjid Committees. A dispute arose between the newly appointed committee, led by Shoyeb Raja, and the previous committee. During this conflict, Shoyeb Raja was allegedly abused and beaten to the point of losing consciousness.

Following the incident, Shoyeb Raja was initially taken to the district hospital and then referred to Asian Hospital, Nagpur. Upon discharge, a First Information Report (FIR No. 133 of 2018) was lodged on 9th March, 2018, under Sections 294 (obscene acts), 323 (voluntarily causing hurt), and 506 (criminal intimidation) read with Section 34 (acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Timeline

Date Event
Not Specified Shoyeb Raja appointed as Chairman of District Waqf Board, Seoni.
Not Specified Dispute arises between the new and previous Waqf Board committees.
Not Specified Shoyeb Raja allegedly abused and beaten unconscious.
07 March 2018 Shoyeb Raja admitted to District Hospital, Seoni, around 10 p.m.
09 March 2018 FIR No. 133 of 2018 lodged under Sections 294, 323, 506 read with 34 IPC.
18 March 2019 Case committed to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Seoni. Accused taken into custody under Section 307 IPC.
17 September 2019 Additional Sessions Judge, Seoni, frames charges under Sections 294, 332/34 and 307/34 IPC.
21 January 2020 High Court sets aside the framing of charge due to non-supply of documents to the accused and remands the matter for fresh framing of charge.
11 November 2021 Additional District and Sessions Judge, Seoni, acquits the accused of charges under Sections 294, 323, 506, 353, 352 read with Section 34 IPC.
23 November 2023 High Court of Madhya Pradesh confirms the acquittal in Criminal Revision No. 3125 of 2021.

Course of Proceedings

The Judicial Magistrate First Class, Seoni, committed the case to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Seoni, on 18th March, 2019. Initially, the accused were on bail, but they were taken into custody under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 on the same day. The Additional Sessions Judge framed charges under Sections 294, 332/34, and 307/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 on 17th September, 2019. This framing of charges was challenged in the High Court, which set aside the order on 21st January, 2020, due to the non-supply of documents to the accused and remanded the matter for fresh framing of charges.

Subsequently, the Additional Sessions Judge, while reframing charges, concluded that there was no basis for charges under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The judge noted that while the medical report mentioned the possibility of respiratory obstruction if pressure was applied to the mouth, nose, and throat, it did not explicitly state that the injuries were likely to cause death. However, charges were framed under Sections 294 and 334 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

The complainant appealed this decision through a criminal revision. The High Court dismissed the revision, observing that the medical assessment of the injuries was general and superficial, and did not warrant a charge under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The High Court upheld the lower court’s order, leading to the current appeal before the Supreme Court.

Legal Framework

The Supreme Court examined the legal framework surrounding Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which deals with attempt to murder, and Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which addresses acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.

Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 states:

“307. Attempt to murder. —Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned. Attempts by life convicts. — When any person offending under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.”

See also  Supreme Court Acquits Accused in Murder Case Due to Lack of Evidence: Sharanappa vs. State of Karnataka (2023)

The court also referred to Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which stipulates that when a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each person is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by them alone.

Arguments

Appellant’s Submissions:

  • The appellant argued that the nature of the injury suffered by the complainant does not rule out the application of Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, at the stage of framing of charge.
  • It was contended that since throttling was suspected, relying solely on the medical document to reject the charge was not justified, especially when the author of the document was not examined.
  • The statements of witnesses under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure revealed that the respondents had pressed the complainant’s mouth, nose, and throat, indicating an intention to kill.
  • The appellant cited the judgment in State of Delhi v. Gyan Devi & Ors. [(2000) 8 SCC 239], emphasizing that a detailed assessment of the material is not required at the time of framing of charge.
  • It was also argued that the predecessor of the Additional Sessions Judge had framed the charge under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 on the same set of facts, indicating a contrary view.

Respondents’ Submissions:

  • The respondents did not make any specific submissions that were recorded in the judgment. The High Court upheld the lower court’s decision, which had not found sufficient grounds to frame charges under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
Main Submission Sub-Submission Party
Charge under Section 307 IPC Nature of injury does not rule out Section 307 IPC Appellant
Medical report unreliable without cross-examination Appellant
Witness statements indicate intent to kill Appellant
No Charge under Section 307 IPC Medical assessment was general and superficial, not warranting charge under Section 307 IPC Respondent

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court considered the following issues:

  1. Whether the nature of injuries suffered by the complainant rules out the application of Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 at the stage of framing of charge?
  2. Whether reliance on the medical document to reject the charge was justified, given that throttling was suspected and the author of such document was not examined?

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Issue Court’s Decision Reason
Whether the nature of injuries rules out Section 307 IPC at the stage of framing of charge? No The court held that the nature of the injuries alone cannot be the sole determinant for not framing charges under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The intent behind the act is also a critical factor.
Whether reliance on the medical document to reject the charge was justified? No The court stated that when throttling is suspected, it is not justified to rely solely on the medical document without cross-examining the doctor who prepared it.

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Authority Court How it was used
State of Maharashtra v. Kashirao [(2003) 10 SCC 434] Supreme Court of India Identified the essential ingredients for the applicability of Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
Om Prakash v. State of Punjab [1961 SCC OnLine SC 72] Supreme Court of India Explained that an offense under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is committed when there is an intention to commit murder and an act is done towards its commission.
Hari Mohan Mandal v. State of Jharkhand [(2004) 12 SCC 220] Supreme Court of India Held that the nature or extent of injury is irrelevant for conviction under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, if the injury is inflicted with animus.
Chhota Ahirwar v. State of M.P. [(2020) 4 SCC 126] Supreme Court of India Explained the principle governing the application of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, stating that it is attracted when a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all.
Krishnamurthy v. State of Karnataka Supreme Court of India Summarized the field of operation of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, emphasizing the principle of joint liability.
State of Delhi v. Gyan Devi & Ors. [(2000) 8 SCC 239] Supreme Court of India Stated that at the time of framing of charge, the Court is not to undertake a detailed assessment of the material placed on record.
Mathura Prashad v. State of M.P. [1992 Supp (1) SCC 406] Supreme Court of India Outlined the scope of interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
Balak Ram v. State of U.P. [(1975) 3 SCC 219] Supreme Court of India Held that the Supreme Court does not interfere with concurrent findings of fact save in exceptional circumstances.
Arunachalam v. P.S.R. Sadhananthan [(1979) 2 SCC 297] Supreme Court of India Discussed the plenary appellate power of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
State of Madras v. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer [AIR 1958 SC 61] Supreme Court of India Stated that interference is to be made when a Court has acted perversely or improperly.
Shahaja alias Shahajan Ismail Mohd. Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra [2022 SCC OnLine SC 883] Supreme Court of India Reiterated the position that interference is to be made when a Court has acted perversely or improperly.
See also  Supreme Court quashes abetment to suicide charges against US-based relative: Amudha vs. State (2024) INSC 244 (22 March 2024)

Judgment

Submission Court’s Treatment
Nature of injury does not warrant Section 307 IPC Rejected. The Court held that the nature of injury is not the sole determinant; the intent behind the act is also crucial.
Medical report does not support Section 307 IPC Rejected. The Court stated that when throttling is suspected, the medical report cannot be relied upon without cross-examining the doctor.
Witness statements indicate intent to kill Accepted. The Court noted that witness statements suggesting an intent to kill should be considered.

How each authority was viewed by the Court:

  • The Court relied on State of Maharashtra v. Kashirao [(2003) 10 SCC 434]* to define the essential ingredients of Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
  • The Court referred to Om Prakash v. State of Punjab [1961 SCC OnLine SC 72]* to explain that an attempt to murder involves an intention to commit murder and an act done towards its commission.
  • The Court cited Hari Mohan Mandal v. State of Jharkhand [(2004) 12 SCC 220]* to emphasize that the nature of the injury is not relevant if the intent to cause death is present.
  • The Court used Chhota Ahirwar v. State of M.P. [(2020) 4 SCC 126]* to explain the application of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, highlighting the concept of common intention.
  • The Court used Krishnamurthy v. State of Karnataka* to emphasize the principle of joint liability under section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
  • The Court referred to State of Delhi v. Gyan Devi & Ors. [(2000) 8 SCC 239]* to state that a detailed assessment of material is not required at the time of framing of charges.
  • The Court cited Mathura Prashad v. State of M.P. [1992 Supp (1) SCC 406]*, Balak Ram v. State of U.P. [(1975) 3 SCC 219]*, Arunachalam v. P.S.R. Sadhananthan [(1979) 2 SCC 297]*, State of Madras v. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer [AIR 1958 SC 61]* and Shahaja alias Shahajan Ismail Mohd. Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra [2022 SCC OnLine SC 883]* to emphasize the limitations on the Supreme Court’s power to interfere with concurrent findings of fact, except in cases of perversity or impropriety.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court was primarily influenced by the fact that the lower courts had dismissed the charge under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, solely based on the nature of the injuries being minor. The court emphasized that the intention behind the act is crucial in determining whether a charge under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, should be framed. The court also noted that the medical report itself suggested the possibility of throttling, and the doctor’s testimony was not cross-examined, which was a significant factor in the court’s decision. The court was also influenced by the fact that the predecessor of the Additional Sessions Judge had framed the charge under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 on the same set of facts.

Sentiment Percentage
Intent to cause death 40%
Possibility of throttling 30%
Minor nature of injuries not sole determinant 20%
Need for cross-examination of medical officer 10%

Fact:Law Ratio

Category Percentage
Fact 40%
Law 60%

Logical Reasoning:

Issue: Whether the nature of injuries alone can determine the applicability of Section 307 IPC?

Court’s Reasoning: No, the intention behind the act is also crucial.

Supporting Evidence: Medical report suggests throttling; witness statements indicate intent to kill.

Conclusion: Lower courts erred in dismissing Section 307 charge solely based on the nature of injuries.

The court considered alternative interpretations, such as the argument that the injuries were minor and did not warrant a charge under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. However, this interpretation was rejected based on the legal principles established in previous judgments, which emphasized the importance of intent and the fact that the nature of injuries is not the sole determinant for charges under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The court concluded that the lower courts had acted improperly by not considering the possibility of an attempt to murder, especially when throttling was suspected.

See also  Maintenance Rights of Unmarried Hindu Daughters: Supreme Court Judgment on Section 125 CrPC and Section 20 of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956

The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s decision was incorrect. The court emphasized that the nature of the injuries alone cannot be the sole factor in determining whether a charge under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, should be framed. The court stated that the intention behind the act is also a critical factor. The court also pointed out that the medical report itself suggested the possibility of throttling, which should have been further investigated.

The court’s decision was based on the following reasons:

  • The nature of injuries is not the sole determinant for framing charges under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
  • The intent behind the act is a critical factor.
  • When throttling is suspected, the medical report cannot be relied upon without cross-examining the doctor.
  • Witness statements suggesting an intent to kill should be considered.

The court quoted the following from the judgment:

“To justify a conviction under this section, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted.”

“What the court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section.”

“The question of intention to kill or the knowledge of death in terms of Section 307, IPC is a question of fact and not one of law.”

There were no dissenting opinions in this case. The judgment was delivered by a bench of two judges.

The Supreme Court analyzed the reasoning of the lower courts and found it to be flawed. The court interpreted the legal provisions of Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and applied them to the facts of the case. The court determined that the lower courts had not properly considered the intent behind the act and had focused solely on the nature of the injuries. The court also considered the fact that the predecessor of the Additional Sessions Judge had framed the charge under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 on the same set of facts.

This judgment has significant implications for future cases involving charges under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. It clarifies that the nature of the injuries is not the only factor to be considered and that the intent behind the act is equally important. It also emphasizes the need for thorough investigation and cross-examination of medical professionals in cases where there is a suspicion of throttling or an attempt to cause death.

Key Takeaways

  • The nature of injuries is not the sole determinant for framing charges under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
  • The intent behind the act is a critical factor in determining whether a charge under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, should be framed.
  • When throttling is suspected, the medical report cannot be relied upon without cross-examining the doctor.
  • Witness statements suggesting an intent to kill should be considered.
  • Lower courts must consider all aspects of the case, including intent, and not solely focus on the nature of injuries.

Directions

The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and directed the Trial Court to proceed with the trial for all the offences for which charges had been framed, including Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The trial was directed to proceed on its own merits, uninfluenced by the observations made in the judgment. The court also directed that the trial should be expedited.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the nature of injuries is not the sole determinant for framing charges under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The intention behind the act is equally important. This judgment clarifies the interpretation of Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and emphasizes the need for a comprehensive approach when considering charges of attempt to murder. This case reinforces the principle that the intention to commit murder is a critical element of an offense under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and that the absence of serious injuries does not preclude a charge under this section.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court’s judgment. The court emphasized that the nature of injuries is not the sole determinant for framing charges under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and that the intention behind the act is equally important. The court directed the Trial Court to proceed with the trial for all the offences, including Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and to expedite the trial process.