Supreme Court Dismisses Suit as Barred by Limitation: Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust vs. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle (20 December 2024)

Date of the Judgment: 20 December 2024

Citation: 2024 INSC 1010 (This is a hypothetical citation)

Judges: J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan

Can a long-dormant claim to land ownership be revived after decades, especially when prior court decisions and registered sales exist? The Supreme Court of India recently tackled this question, focusing on the crucial aspect of limitation in civil suits. The case centered on a dispute over land in Pune, where the plaintiff, claiming to be a descendant of a historical royal family, sought to overturn previous court decrees and registered sale deeds. The Supreme Court, in this judgment, clarified the application of limitation laws, emphasizing that a suit must be filed within the prescribed time from when the cause of action first arises. The bench comprised Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, with the majority opinion authored by Justice R. Mahadevan.

Case Background

The dispute revolves around lands in Yerawada, Pune. The plaintiff, Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle, claimed ownership as a descendant of the Bhonsale dynasty, asserting that his ancestors were granted revenue rights over the land. The defendant, Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust, claimed ownership based on purchases made in 1938 and 1952, through a court auction and a registered sale deed respectively. The Trust also relied on a compromise decree from 1990, which affirmed their title to the land. The plaintiff filed a suit in 2009 seeking a declaration of his ownership, possession of the land, and to declare the previous compromise decrees as void.

Timeline:

Course of Proceedings

The trial court initially rejected the defendant’s application to dismiss the suit based on limitation, stating that it was a mixed question of law and fact requiring evidence. The High Court upheld this decision, prompting the defendants to appeal to the Supreme Court. The High Court observed that the plaintiff asserted that the Gosavi family had no authority to create third-party rights and were only entitled to revenue grants. The High Court also noted that the issue of whether the plaintiff was entitled to a declaration in view of the sale deeds executed in favor of the defendant was a matter of trial and that the defendants played a systematic fraud on various courts and usurped the suit lands under suspicious compromises.

Legal Framework

The Supreme Court considered the following legal provisions:

• Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC): This provision allows for the rejection of a plaint if the suit appears to be barred by any law.
• Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963: This article prescribes a three-year limitation period for suits seeking a declaration, starting from when the right to sue first accrues.
• Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963: This article prescribes a three-year limitation period for suits seeking cancellation of an instrument or decree, starting from when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled first become known to him.
• Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963: This article prescribes a twelve-year limitation period for suits for possession of immovable property based on title, starting from when the defendant’s possession becomes adverse to the plaintiff.
• Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882: This section defines “notice” and includes constructive notice through registration of a document. It states that a person is deemed to have notice of a fact when they actually know it, or when they would have known it but for willful abstention from enquiry or gross negligence. Explanation I states that when a transaction relating to immovable property is required by law to be and has been effected by a registered instrument, any person acquiring such property shall be deemed to have notice of such instrument from the date of registration.
• Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963: This section allows a person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable to sue to have it adjudged void or voidable.
• Order XXIII Rule 3A of CPC: This rule bars a suit to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful.

The Court also discussed the concept of “cause of action,” which is a bundle of material facts that a plaintiff must prove to obtain relief. The Court emphasized that a suit must be instituted when the right asserted is infringed or when there is a clear threat to infringe such right.

Arguments

Appellants’ Arguments:

• The appellants argued that the suit was barred by limitation based on the averments in the plaint. They contended that the plaintiff was attempting to question orders passed by various courts, including the Supreme Court, which date back to 1953.
• The appellants submitted that the Trust had purchased the suit lands in 1938 and 1952 through registered sale deeds and that the plaintiff was attempting to create an illusion of a cause of action by claiming that he became aware of the issue only in 2007.
• They argued that the limitation period for seeking cancellation of an instrument is three years from the date of knowledge, and the plaintiff and his predecessors were deemed to have knowledge of the registered sale deeds.
• The appellants also contended that the plaintiff’s claim for possession was barred by limitation as he had not asserted any right over the lands prior to 2008 or 2009.
• The appellants argued that the plaintiff, being a stranger, had no locus standi to seek a declaration that the compromise decrees were void.

Respondent’s Arguments:

• The respondent argued that his ancestor was granted only revenue rights, not ownership rights, and therefore the Gosavi family had no right to sell the suit properties.
• The respondent contended that the compromise decrees were obtained clandestinely without his knowledge and were not binding on him.
• The respondent stated that he became aware of the proceedings affecting his rights only on 2nd March 2007, when he was informed about a civil application, and that this date was the starting point for the limitation period.
• The respondent argued that the issue of limitation was a mixed question of fact and law that could only be decided after evidence was led.
• The respondent relied on the decisions in Satti Paradesi Samadhi & Pillayar Temple v. M. Sankuntala and Sajjan Sikaria v. Shakuntala Devi Mishra to argue that the court cannot try a suit on mixed issues of law and fact as a preliminary issue and that the written statement of the defendant cannot be considered while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC.

Submissions by Parties

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court addressed the following key issues:

1. Whether the suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff is barred by limitation, in the light of the averments contained in the plaint.
2. Whether the plaintiff has a cause of action to file the suit.
3. Whether the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• The Court relied on Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali [2020] 7 SCC 366* to outline the law for deciding applications under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC.
• The Court applied the principles from Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi [1986] Supp SCC 315* to emphasize that meaningless litigation should not waste judicial time.
• The Court used the test laid down in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I [2004] 9 SCC 512* to determine if the averments in the plaint would result in a decree.
• The Court followed Hardesh Ores (P.) Ltd. v. Hede & Co. [2007] 5 SCC 614* to construe the plaint as it stands, without adding or subtracting words.
• The Court applied the principle from T. Arivanandam v. T.V. Satyapal [1977] 4 SCC 467* to reject the plaint as it was manifestly vexatious and did not disclose a clear right to sue.
• The Court relied on Khatri Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India [2011] 9 SCC 126* to emphasize that limitation begins when the right to sue first accrues.
• The Court applied State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh [1991] 4 SCC 1* to determine when the right to sue first accrued.
• The Court followed Prem Singh v. Birbal [2006] 5 SCC 353* to emphasize the presumption of validity of a registered document and to discuss the scope of Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
• The Court used R.K. Mohd. Ubaidullah v. Hajee C. Abdul Wahab [2000] 6 SCC 402* to highlight that actual possession is constructive notice of title.
• The Court applied Ningawwa v. Byrappa Shiddappa Hireknrabar [1968] 2 SCR 797* to distinguish between void and voidable documents.
• The Court followed Dilboo v. Dhanraji [2000] 7 SCC 702* to state that the date of registration becomes the date of deemed knowledge.
• The Court relied on Mohd. Noorul Hoda v. Bibi Raifunnisa [1996] 7 SCC 767* to discuss the effect of willful abstention from making inquiries.
• The Court followed Triloki Nath Singh v. Anirudh Singh [2020] 6 SCC 629* to state that the bar under Order XXIII Rule 3A of CPC is applicable to third parties.
• The Court distinguished Satti Paradesi Samadhi & Pillayar Temple v. M. Sankuntala [2015] 5 SCC 674* by stating that the court has no jurisdiction to try a suit on mixed issues of law and fact as a preliminary issue.
• The Court distinguished Sajjan Sikaria v. Shakuntala Devi Mishra [2005] 13 SCC 687* by stating that while dealing with an application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC, there is no requirement to consider the written statement filed by the defendant.
• The Court followed Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra [2003] 1 SCC 557* to state that the relevant facts for deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC are the averments in the plaint.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the following factors:

• Limitation: The court found that the plaintiff’s suit was hopelessly barred by limitation as the plaintiff and his predecessors did not challenge the registered sale deeds and court decrees within the prescribed time. The court emphasized that the plaintiff’s claim of knowledge in 2007 was a fictional date created to circumvent the law of limitation.
• Constructive Notice: The court held that the plaintiff and his predecessors had constructive notice of the registered sale deeds from the date of registration, and their failure to challenge them within the limitation period was fatal to their claim.
• Lack of Cause of Action: The court found that the plaintiff’s claim was based on vague statements and an imaginary cause of action. The court also noted that the plaintiff’s claim that the grant was only a revenue grant and not a soil grant was not accepted by the State which entered into a compromise.
• Locus Standi: The court held that the plaintiff, being a stranger to the suits that ended in compromise, had no locus standi to seek a declaration that the compromise decrees were void.
• Abuse of Process: The court observed that the plaintiff’s suit was a clear abuse of process, and the courts should not hesitate to reject such suits at the threshold to prevent unnecessary wastage of judicial time.

Sentiment Analysis of Reasons Given by the Supreme Court

Fact : Law Ratio

The Supreme Court’s reasoning was heavily influenced by legal considerations (70%), focusing on the application of limitation laws and principles of constructive notice, while also considering the factual aspects of the case (30%), such as the plaintiff’s claim of knowledge and the history of the land transactions.

Logical Reasoning

Issue 1: Whether the suit is barred by limitation?

Issue 2: Whether the plaintiff has a cause of action?

Issue 3: Whether the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC?

Final Decision

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and rejected the plaint. The court held that the suit was hopelessly barred by limitation, and the plaintiff had no locus standi to challenge the compromise decrees. The court emphasized that the plaintiff’s claim of knowledge in 2007 was fictional and that the plaintiff and his predecessors had constructive notice of the registered sale deeds. The court also observed that the plaintiff’s suit was an abuse of process.

Implications

This judgment has significant implications for similar cases involving land disputes and limitation issues. The Supreme Court has reiterated the importance of adhering to the prescribed limitation periods and has emphasized that the courts should not entertain suits that are clearly barred by limitation. The judgment reinforces the principle that constructive notice through registration of documents is sufficient to trigger the limitation period. It also clarifies that a person cannot circumvent the law of limitation by creating a fictional date of knowledge. This judgment also highlights that the courts should not hesitate to reject plaints at the threshold if they are found to be an abuse of process. This ruling underscores the need for plaintiffs to act diligently and promptly in asserting their rights and challenging transactions that affect their interests.