Supreme Court Expands Dowry Definition in Dowry Death Case: State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Jogendra & Anr. (2022) INSC 30

Date of the Judgment: 11 January 2022

Citation: 2022 INSC 30

Judges: N.V. Ramana, CJI, A. S. Bopanna, J., Hima Kohli, J. (authored the opinion)

Can a demand for money to build a house be considered dowry? The Supreme Court of India addressed this critical question in a dowry death case, clarifying the scope of what constitutes dowry under Indian law. This judgment has significant implications for how cases of dowry harassment and death are viewed and prosecuted. The Supreme Court, in this case, expanded the definition of dowry to include demands for money for purposes like constructing a house, thereby setting aside the High Court’s judgment.

Case Background

Geeta Bai, an 18-year-old woman, married Jogendra (Respondent No. 1) on May 7, 1998. She resided with her mother, Kamla Bai, and brother with her maternal uncle, Bansi Lal [PW-1], before her marriage. Within four years of her marriage, on April 20, 2002, Geeta Bai died by suicide at her matrimonial home by setting herself on fire. She was five months pregnant at the time. An FIR was lodged on April 23, 2002, after receiving information from the hospital.

The prosecution alleged that Geeta Bai was constantly harassed by her husband, Jogendra, and her father-in-law, Badri Prasad (Respondent No. 2), for money to construct a house. The family members of Geeta Bai were unable to meet these demands. This harassment, according to the prosecution, led her to commit suicide. The trial court convicted Jogendra and Badri Prasad under Sections 304-B (dowry death), 306 (abetment of suicide), and 498-A (cruelty) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. However, the High Court overturned the convictions under Sections 304-B and 306 for both respondents and under 498-A for Badri Prasad, while upholding the conviction under 498-A for Jogendra, reducing his sentence to the period already served. The State of Madhya Pradesh appealed to the Supreme Court.

Timeline:

Course of Proceedings

The Trial Court convicted Jogendra and Badri Prasad under Sections 304-B, 306, and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, sentencing them to rigorous imprisonment. The conviction was primarily based on the testimonies of Geeta Bai’s maternal uncles, who stated that the respondents had been demanding money for constructing a house, which her family could not provide, leading to her harassment and suicide.

The High Court overturned the convictions under Sections 304-B and 306 for both respondents. It acquitted Badri Prasad under Section 498-A, while maintaining Jogendra’s conviction under the same section but reducing his sentence. The High Court reasoned that the demand for money to construct a house did not constitute a dowry demand and that there was no evidence to prove abetment of suicide. The High Court relied on the judgments in K. Prema S. Rao and Another v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao and Others, (2003) 1 SCC 217, Saro Rana and Others v. State of Jharkhand, 2005 Crl.L.J. 65 and Appasaheb and Another v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC 721 to hold that a demand for money for house construction cannot be treated as a dowry demand.

Legal Framework

The Supreme Court examined the following key legal provisions:

• Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC): This section defines dowry death. It states that if a woman dies due to burns or bodily injury, or otherwise than under normal circumstances, within seven years of her marriage, and it is shown that she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives for dowry, it is considered a dowry death.
• Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961: This section defines “dowry” as “any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly – (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or (b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person; at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties…”
• Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC): This section deals with cruelty by a husband or his relatives towards a married woman.
• Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC): This section deals with abetment of suicide.
• Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872: This section deals with the presumption of dowry death.

The Court emphasized that the interpretation of “dowry” should be expansive to fulfill the legislative intent of curbing dowry demands, a social evil.

Arguments

Appellant (State of Madhya Pradesh):

• The State argued that the High Court failed to appreciate the harassment caused to Geeta Bai by the respondents.
• It was submitted that the respondents constantly demanded money from Geeta Bai to construct a house and purchase a plot of land.
• The State contended that the testimonies of Bansi Lal [P.W.-1], Shyam Bihari [P.W.-2], Amrit Lal [P.W.-4], and Rajesh Bhai [P.W.-6] clearly stated that Geeta Bai was assaulted for not bringing ₹50,000 for house construction.
• The State argued that the demand for money to construct a house should be treated as a dowry demand, thus attracting Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
• The State also argued that this was a clear case of abetment to commit suicide, and the trial court’s conviction should be upheld.

Respondents (Jogendra and Badri Prasad):

• The respondents argued that the demand for money to construct a house cannot be treated as a dowry demand.
• They contended that the High Court correctly set aside the conviction under Section 304-B and 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
• The respondents submitted that there was no evidence of abetment to commit suicide.
• It was also argued that the deceased was also a party to the demand as she had asked her mother and maternal uncle to contribute to the construction of the house.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed the following issues for consideration:

1. Whether the demand for money for the construction of a house would fall within the definition of “dowry” as defined under Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860?
2. Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the conviction of the respondents under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860?
3. Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the conviction of the respondents under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860?

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• The Supreme Court expressly overruled the judgments in Appasaheb and Another v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC 721 and Vipin Jaiswal[a-1] v. State of Andhra Pradesh represented by Public Prosecutor, (2013) 3 SCC 684, stating that they do not state the law correctly. It held that these cases had taken a strict view of the definition of dowry, which was contrary to the object of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
• The Court relied on Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2015) 6 SCC 477, for the expansive definition of dowry.
• The Court also relied on Kans Raj v. State of Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC 207, Dinesh v. State of Haryana, (2014) 12 SCC 532, and Sher Singh @ Partapa v. State of Haryana, (2015) 3 SCC 724 to interpret the term “soon before” in the context of dowry death.
• The Court also relied on Gurmeet Singh v. State of Punjab, (2021) 6 SCC 108 and Satbir Singh and Another v. State of Haryana, (2021) 6 SCC 1 to reiterate the guidelines for trial under Section 304-B IPC.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court was primarily influenced by the need to interpret the law in a manner that would curb the social evil of dowry demands. The Court emphasized that a liberal and expansive interpretation of the term “dowry” was necessary to achieve the legislative intent behind Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The Court noted that the High Court had taken a narrow view of the definition of dowry, which was not in line with the object of the legislation. The court was also influenced by the fact that the deceased had been subjected to continuous harassment for dowry, which ultimately led to her suicide.

The Supreme Court’s reasoning involved a step-by-step analysis of the facts, the legal provisions, and the precedents. The Court emphasized the need for a pragmatic and sensitive approach in cases of dowry death. The Court also considered the social context in which the case arose, noting that the parties were not financially well off.

The Court considered the argument that the deceased was also a party to the demand, but rejected it, stating that the deceased was pressurized to make such a request. The Court also considered the fact that the deceased had committed suicide, but held that this did not take the case out of the purview of Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

The Supreme Court, while setting aside the High Court’s judgment, did not disturb the acquittal of the respondents under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, as the prosecution could not conclusively prove abetment to suicide.

“Given that the statute with which we are dealing must be given a fair, pragmatic, and common sense interpretation so as to fulfil the object sought to be achieved by Parliament…”

“The Latin maxim “ Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat ” i.e, a liberal construction should be put up on written instruments, so as to uphold them, if possible, and carry into effect, the intention of the parties, sums it up.”

“…‘Soon before’ is a relative term which is required to be considered under specific circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time-limit.”

Key Takeaways

• The Supreme Court has clarified that the definition of “dowry” under Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, is expansive and includes any property or valuable security, including money demanded for purposes like constructing a house.
• Demands for money or property made at any time before, during, or after the marriage, if connected to the marriage, can be considered dowry.
• The term “soon before” in the context of dowry death is relative and does not mean “immediately before.” It implies a proximate and live link between the dowry demand and the death of the woman.
• The courts must adopt a sensitive and pragmatic approach to dowry death cases, keeping in mind the social context in which they arise.
• This judgment has significant implications for future cases of dowry death, as it clarifies the scope of the term “dowry” and expands the ambit of Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Directions

The Supreme Court directed the respondents to surrender before the trial court within four weeks to undergo the remaining period of their sentence.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the definition of “dowry” under Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, includes any property or valuable security, including money demanded for purposes like constructing a house, if connected to the marriage. This judgment expands the scope of Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. This judgment overrules the previous position of law as held in Appasaheb and Another v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC 721, and Vipin Jaiswal[a-1] v. State of Andhra Pradesh represented by Public Prosecutor, (2013) 3 SCC 684.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal in part, restoring the trial court’s conviction under Sections 304-B and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, while upholding the High Court’s decision to acquit under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Court held that the demand for money to construct a house constitutes a dowry demand and that the harassment of the deceased was directly linked to the dowry demand. This judgment provides a more expansive interpretation of dowry, aiming to curb the social evil of dowry demands.