Supreme Court Grants Bail in UAPA Case Citing Lack of Prima Facie Evidence: Yedala Subba Rao vs. Union of India (2023) INSC 349

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: 17 April 2023
Citation: (2023) INSC 349
Judges: Abhay S. Oka, J., Rajesh Bindal, J.
Can an accused be denied bail under the stringent provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) if the evidence against them is not prima facie convincing? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this critical question in the case of *Yedala Subba Rao & Anr. vs. Union of India*. The Court examined whether the stringent conditions for granting bail under UAPA were met in the absence of strong initial evidence. The bench comprised Justices Abhay S. Oka and Rajesh Bindal, with the judgment authored by Justice Abhay S. Oka.

Case Background

The appellants, Yedala Subba Rao and another individual, were accused in FIR No. 65 of 2018, registered on 23rd September 2018, at Dumbriguda Police Station, Vishakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh. The charges against them included offences under Section 120B read with Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sections 18, 19, 20, and 39 of the UAPA, and Sections 4 and 5 of the Explosives Substances Act, 1908.

The case stemmed from the killing of Shri Kidari Sarveswara Rao, a Member of the Legislative Assembly, and Shri Siveri Soma, a former MLA, both belonging to the Telugu Desam Party, on 23rd September 2018. The incident occurred near Livitiputtu village when the two leaders were en route to a function. The prosecution alleged that 45 members of the Communist Party of India (Maoist), a notified terrorist organization, stopped their convoy, forced them out of their vehicles, and subsequently killed them.

Initially, the investigation was conducted by a Special Investigation Team, which was later transferred to the National Investigation Agency (NIA). The NIA registered the case as RC-02/2018/NIA/HYD on 6th December 2018. The appellants were arrested on 13th October 2018, and a chargesheet was filed against them on 10th April 2019. The chargesheet named 79 accused and 144 witnesses. As of the date of the judgment, charges had not been framed, and some accused were absconding. The appellants had been in custody for four years and seven months.

Timeline:

Arguments

The appellants, represented by Shri Colin Gonsalves, argued that the chargesheet lacked substantial evidence to implicate them in the crime. The primary points of contention were:

• The recovery of a landmine at the instance of appellant no. 1 (accused no. 46) was suspicious.
• No recovery was shown at the instance of appellant no. 2 (accused no. 47).
• The call detail records (CDR) showing communication between accused nos. 46, 47, and 84 did not establish criminal conspiracy, especially since accused no. 84 had already been granted bail by the High Court.
• The allegation that accused no. 46 purchased medicines worth Rs. 8,000 to be handed over to a Maoist was not sufficient to prove their involvement in the crime.
• There was no evidence to show that the appellants provided shelter or logistic support to the Maoists, or that the landmines were connected to the murder of the leaders.

The appellants relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in *Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb* to argue that prolonged incarceration without a trial was a violation of their rights under Article 21 of the Constitution.

The respondent, represented by Shri K.M. Nataraj, argued that there was sufficient evidence to deny bail to the appellants. The key points of their argument included:

• A landmine was recovered at the instance of accused no. 46 near the site where the deceased leaders were to visit.
• Accused no. 46 disclosed that he had purchased medicines worth Rs. 8,000 and handed them over to a Maoist.
• The appellants used different SIM cards to remain in touch with co-accused.
• Accused no. 47 disclosed that both appellants dug a pit and planted a landmine.
• Accused nos. 46 and 47 were constantly in touch with each other on cell phones for 18 days before the incident.

The respondent contended that the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 43D of UAPA disentitled the appellants to bail as there was material to believe that the accusations against them were prima facie true.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court considered the following key issues:

1. Whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against the appellants under the UAPA are prima facie true, thus warranting denial of bail under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA.
2. Whether the disclosure statements made by the accused are admissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues:

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

The Supreme Court analyzed the evidence and found that the prosecution’s case against the appellants was weak. The Court noted that the recovery of the landmine was suspicious, as the confessional statement of accused no. 46 was recorded before his arrest and did not explicitly state that he would show the location of the landmine. The Court also held that the disclosure statements of the accused were not admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, as they did not lead to the discovery of any new fact and were made while in police custody, thus violating Section 25 of the Evidence Act.

The Court observed that the purchase of medicines by accused no. 46 was not directly linked to the incident and occurred much before the date of the crime. The Court also noted that the call records between the appellants and accused no. 84 were not sufficient to establish a criminal conspiracy, especially since accused no. 84 had already been granted bail by the High Court.

The Court stated that, “As held by this Court, Section 27 of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general rule under Section 25 that a confession made by an accused to a police officer is not admissible in evidence.”

The Court further stated that, “The first condition for the applicability of Section 27 is that the information given by the accused must lead to the discovery of the fact, which is the direct outcome of such information. Only such portion of the information given as is distinctly connected with the said discovery is admissible against the accused.”

The Court also noted that, “Going by the “Mediators’ Report and Seizure Panchnama”, the appellants gave confessional statements immediately after the police caught hold of them even before their arrest was recorded. Therefore, prima facie, it creates a doubt about the genuineness of the statements.”

The Supreme Court concluded that there were no reasonable grounds to believe that the accusations against the appellants under the UAPA were prima facie true. Therefore, the restrictions on granting bail under the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 43D of the UAPA did not apply in this case. The Court clarified that its findings were only prima facie observations for the limited purpose of examining the case under the UAPA and that the trial should proceed uninfluenced by these observations.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the lack of concrete evidence linking the appellants to the crime. The Court was particularly critical of the prosecution’s reliance on confessional statements made by the accused while in police custody, which were deemed inadmissible under the Evidence Act. The Court also highlighted the fact that the recovery of the landmine was not clearly linked to the accused, and the call records were insufficient to establish a criminal conspiracy. The prolonged incarceration of the appellants without a trial also weighed heavily on the Court’s decision.

Key Takeaways

• The Supreme Court emphasized that stringent bail provisions under UAPA should not be applied when there is a lack of prima facie evidence.
• Confessional statements made to police officers while in custody are generally inadmissible under Section 25 of the Evidence Act.
• Disclosure statements under Section 27 of the Evidence Act are only admissible if they lead to the discovery of a new fact.
• Prolonged incarceration without a trial can be a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution.
• The Court reiterated the importance of individual liberty and the need for a fair and speedy trial.

Directions

The Supreme Court directed the respondent to ensure that the appellants were produced before the learned Special Judge for the trial of NIA cases at Vijayawada within one week. The Special Judge was instructed to release the appellants on bail, subject to appropriate conditions determined after hearing both parties.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the stringent provisions of Section 43D(5) of the UAPA cannot be invoked to deny bail when there is a lack of prima facie evidence against the accused. This judgment reinforces the principles of personal liberty and the importance of a fair trial. It also clarifies the interpretation of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, emphasizing that disclosure statements must lead to the discovery of a new fact to be admissible. The judgment does not change the position of law but clarifies its application in cases involving UAPA.

Conclusion

In *Yedala Subba Rao vs. Union of India*, the Supreme Court granted bail to the appellants, emphasizing that the stringent bail provisions under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) cannot be applied when there is a lack of prima facie evidence. The Court held that the confessional statements and other evidence presented by the prosecution were not sufficient to justify the continued detention of the appellants. This judgment underscores the importance of personal liberty and the need for a fair and speedy trial, reinforcing the principles of justice and due process.