LEGAL ISSUE: Whether the accused are entitled to bail under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) given the stringent conditions for bail under the act.
CASE TYPE: Criminal Law, Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA)
Case Name: Yedala Subba Rao & Anr. vs. Union of India
Judgment Date: 17 April 2023
Introduction
Date of the Judgment: 17 April 2023
Citation: 2023 INSC 3822
Judges: Abhay S. Oka, J., Rajesh Bindal, J. (Bench of two judges)
Can individuals accused of serious offenses under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) be granted bail if the evidence against them is questionable? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this critical question in the case of Yedala Subba Rao & Anr. vs. Union of India. This case revolves around the stringent bail provisions of the UAPA and whether the accused were entitled to bail given the nature of the accusations and the evidence presented. The Supreme Court bench, comprising Justices Abhay S. Oka and Rajesh Bindal, delivered the judgment.
Case Background
The appellants, Yedala Subba Rao and another individual, were accused as accused nos. 46 and 47 in FIR No. 65 of 2018, registered on 23rd September 2018, at Dumbriguda Police Station, Vishakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh. The charges against them included offenses under Section 120B read with Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Sections 18, 19, 20, and 39 of the UAPA, as well as Sections 4 and 5 of the Explosives Substances Act, 1908.
The incident occurred on 23rd September 2018, when Shri Kidari Sarveswara Rao, a Member of the Legislative Assembly, and Shri Siveri Soma, a former MLA, were killed near Livitiputtu village. The prosecution alleged that 45 accused persons, belonging to the Communist Party of India (Maoist), a notified terrorist organization, stopped the leaders’ convoy, forced them out of their vehicles, and subsequently killed them.
The appellants were arrested on 13th October 2018, and a chargesheet was filed against them on 10th April 2019. The chargesheet named 79 accused and 144 witnesses. The appellants had been in custody for four years and seven months at the time of the hearing.
Timeline:
Date | Event |
---|---|
23rd September 2018 | FIR No. 65/2018 registered at Dumbriguda Police Station, Vishakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh. Shri Kidari Sarveswara Rao and Shri Siveri Soma were killed. |
13th October 2018 | Appellants were arrested. |
6th December 2018 | Case registered by NIA as RC-02/2018/NIA/HYD. |
10th April 2019 | Chargesheet filed against the appellants. |
15th December 2020 | Andhra Pradesh High Court granted bail to accused no. 84. |
17th April 2023 | Supreme Court of India grants bail to the appellants. |
Arguments
The appellants’ counsel, Shri Colin Gonsalves, argued that the recovery of a landmine at the instance of appellant no. 1 was suspicious and there was no recovery at the instance of appellant no. 2. He contended that the call detail records (CDR) showing contact between the appellants and accused no. 84 did not establish a criminal conspiracy, especially since accused no. 84 had been granted bail by the High Court. He also argued that the purchase of medicines by appellant no. 1 was not directly linked to the crime. He relied on the decision in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713, emphasizing that the prolonged incarceration of the appellants violated their rights under Article 21 of the Constitution, especially since charges had not yet been framed and the trial was likely to take years.
The respondent’s counsel, Shri K.M. Nataraj, argued that a landmine was recovered at the instance of accused no. 46, and the disclosure statement of accused no. 46 showed that he had purchased a large quantity of medicines for a Maoist. He also argued that the appellants were in constant contact with each other and with co-accused, using SIM cards registered in the names of third parties. He contended that the disclosure statement of accused no. 47 indicated that both appellants had planted a landmine. Therefore, he argued, there was sufficient material to believe that the accusations against the appellants were prima facie true, disentitling them to bail under the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 43D of the UAPA.
Submissions by Parties
Party | Main Submission | Sub-Submissions |
---|---|---|
Appellants | Lack of Prima Facie Evidence |
|
Respondent | Sufficient Material for Prima Facie Case |
|
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court considered the following issue:
- Whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against the appellants of commission of offenses under the UAPA are prima facie true, thereby disentitling them to bail under the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 43D of the UAPA.
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
Issue | Court’s Decision | Brief Reasons |
---|---|---|
Whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against the appellants of commission of offenses under the UAPA are prima facie true? | No | The Court found that the material against the appellants, including the recovery of the landmine, the purchase of medicines, and the call detail records, did not establish a prima facie case for offenses under the UAPA. The court also noted that the High Court had granted bail to accused no. 84, who was similarly situated. |
Authorities
Cases
- Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713 – Supreme Court of India
The Court relied on this case to emphasize that prolonged incarceration without a trial can be a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution.
- Jaffar Hussain Dastagir v. State of Maharashtra (1969) 2 SCC 872 – Supreme Court of India
The Court referred to this case to explain the scope and applicability of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, regarding the admissibility of statements leading to the discovery of facts.
- Pulukuri Kottaya v. King Emperor (1946) SCC online Privy Council 47 – Privy Council
This case was cited as a locus classicus to further explain the principles governing the admissibility of discovery statements under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
Legal Provisions
- Section 120B, Indian Penal Code, 1860
This section deals with the punishment for criminal conspiracy.
- Section 302, Indian Penal Code, 1860
This section deals with the punishment for murder.
- Sections 18, 19, 20, and 39, Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967
These sections deal with offenses related to terrorist acts and membership of terrorist organizations.
- Sections 4 and 5, Explosives Substances Act, 1908
These sections deal with offenses related to explosives.
- Section 25, Indian Evidence Act, 1872
This section states that no confession made to a police officer can be admitted in evidence against the accused.
- Section 27, Indian Evidence Act, 1872
This section is an exception to Section 25 and makes admissible so much of the statement of the accused which leads to the discovery of a fact, irrespective of whether it is confessional or otherwise.
- Section 43D(5), Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967
This section outlines the stringent conditions for granting bail to persons accused of offenses under Chapters IV and VI of the UAPA, stating that bail cannot be granted if there are reasonable grounds to believe the accusations are prima facie true.
Authority Analysis
Authority | Court | How Used |
---|---|---|
Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713 | Supreme Court of India | Relied upon to emphasize the importance of personal liberty and the right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. |
Jaffar Hussain Dastagir v. State of Maharashtra (1969) 2 SCC 872 | Supreme Court of India | Followed to clarify the application of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, regarding the admissibility of discovery statements. |
Pulukuri Kottaya v. King Emperor (1946) SCC online Privy Council 47 | Privy Council | Cited as a locus classicus to explain the scope of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. |
Section 120B, Indian Penal Code, 1860 | Cited in the context of charges against the accused for criminal conspiracy. | |
Section 302, Indian Penal Code, 1860 | Cited in the context of charges against the accused for murder. | |
Sections 18, 19, 20, and 39, Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 | Cited in the context of charges against the accused for terrorist activities. | |
Sections 4 and 5, Explosives Substances Act, 1908 | Cited in the context of charges against the accused for offenses related to explosives. | |
Section 25, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 | Cited to highlight the general rule that confessions to police officers are inadmissible. | |
Section 27, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 | Cited to explain the exception to Section 25, allowing for the admissibility of statements leading to the discovery of facts. | |
Section 43D(5), Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 | Cited to explain the stringent conditions for bail under UAPA. |
Judgment
How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?
Party | Submission | Court’s Treatment |
---|---|---|
Appellants | Recovery of landmine at the instance of appellant no. 1 was suspicious and not admissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. | Accepted. The Court found that the recovery was not admissible as there was no prior statement by the accused showing his knowledge of the location of the landmine. |
Appellants | No recovery at the instance of appellant no. 2. | Accepted. The Court noted that the prosecution did not claim any recovery at the instance of appellant no. 2. |
Appellants | Call detail records do not establish criminal conspiracy, especially since accused no. 84 was granted bail. | Accepted. The Court noted that the High Court had granted bail to accused no. 84 based on similar CDR evidence, and the calls between the appellants did not establish a conspiracy. |
Appellants | Purchase of medicines not linked to the crime. | Accepted. The Court found that the purchase of medicines was not connected to the incident and that the disclosure statement was inadmissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. |
Appellants | Prolonged incarceration violates Article 21 rights. | Accepted. The Court noted that the appellants had been in custody for four and a half years without the trial commencing. |
Respondent | Landmine recovered at the instance of accused no. 46. | Rejected. The Court found that the recovery was not admissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. |
Respondent | Disclosure statement of accused no. 46 about purchasing medicines for Maoist. | Rejected. The Court found that the disclosure statement was inadmissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. |
Respondent | Constant contact between appellants and co-accused using third-party SIMs. | Not sufficient. The Court found that the contact between the appellants was not sufficient to establish a conspiracy, especially since accused no. 84 was granted bail on similar grounds. |
Respondent | Disclosure statement of accused no. 47 about planting a landmine. | Rejected. The Court found that this statement was a confessional statement and not admissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. |
Respondent | Accusations against appellants are prima facie true under UAPA. | Rejected. The Court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case under the UAPA. |
How each authority was viewed by the Court?
- Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713*: The Court relied on this case to emphasize that prolonged incarceration without a trial can be a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution.
- Jaffar Hussain Dastagir v. State of Maharashtra (1969) 2 SCC 872*: The Court followed this case to explain the scope and applicability of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, regarding the admissibility of statements leading to the discovery of facts.
- Pulukuri Kottaya v. King Emperor (1946) SCC online Privy Council 47*: The Court cited this case as a locus classicus to further explain the principles governing the admissibility of discovery statements under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
- Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872: The Court interpreted this section strictly, emphasizing that only the part of the statement that directly leads to the discovery of a fact is admissible. The court found that the statements made by the accused did not satisfy the requirements of this section.
- Section 43D(5) of the UAPA: The Court held that the stringent conditions for bail under this section would not apply, as the prosecution failed to establish a prima facie case against the appellants.
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court’s decision to grant bail was primarily influenced by the lack of credible evidence linking the appellants to the alleged offenses under the UAPA. The Court emphasized that the prosecution’s case was based on inadmissible confessional statements and weak circumstantial evidence. The Court also took into account the prolonged incarceration of the appellants without the trial commencing and the fact that a co-accused with similar evidence against him had been granted bail by the High Court.
Sentiment Analysis of Reasons
Reason | Percentage |
---|---|
Inadmissibility of Confessional Statements | 30% |
Weak Circumstantial Evidence | 25% |
Prolonged Incarceration | 20% |
Bail Granted to Co-Accused | 15% |
Lack of Prima Facie Case under UAPA | 10% |
Fact:Law Ratio
Category | Percentage |
---|---|
Fact | 60% |
Law | 40% |
Logical Reasoning
- Recovery of landmine inadmissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
- Disclosure statements inadmissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
- Call detail records insufficient to prove conspiracy.
- Prolonged incarceration without trial.
- Co-accused granted bail on similar evidence.
The court considered alternative interpretations of the evidence, such as the prosecution’s claim that the recovery of the landmine and the disclosure statements were sufficient to establish a prima facie case. However, the court rejected these interpretations, emphasizing that the statements were inadmissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and that the circumstantial evidence was weak. The court’s final decision was based on a careful evaluation of the evidence and the legal principles governing the admissibility of evidence and the grant of bail under the UAPA.
The court’s decision was unanimous, with both judges agreeing that the appellants were entitled to bail.
The court provided the following reasons for its decision:
- The recovery of the landmine was not admissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, as there was no prior statement by the accused showing his knowledge of the location of the landmine.
- The disclosure statements of the accused were inadmissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
- The call detail records did not establish a criminal conspiracy, especially since accused no. 84, with similar CDR evidence, was granted bail.
- The purchase of medicines was not linked to the crime.
- The appellants had been in custody for four and a half years without the trial commencing.
- There was no prima facie case under the UAPA against the appellants.
The court quoted the following from the judgment:
- “We have examined material relied upon against the appellants in paragraph 5 of the additional affidavit of the respondent as well as the chargesheet. Taking the material against the appellants as it is and without considering the defence of the appellants, we are unable to form an opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against the appellants of commission of offence under the UAPA are prima facie true.”
- “Therefore, prima facie, “the Mediators’ Report and Seizure Panchnama” is not helpful to the prosecution in proving that the landmine was discovered at the instance of the accused no.46.”
- “We, however, make it clear that the findings recorded in this Judgment are only prima facie observations recorded for the limited purposes of examining the case in the light of the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 43D of the UAPA. The trial shall be conducted uninfluenced by these observations.”
Key Takeaways
- The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of personal liberty and the right to a speedy trial, particularly in cases involving stringent bail provisions under the UAPA.
- The Court has reiterated the strict interpretation of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, regarding the admissibility of statements leading to the discovery of facts.
- The judgment highlights that mere suspicion or association is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case under the UAPA, and that the prosecution must provide credible evidence linking the accused to the alleged offenses.
- The decision underscores that prolonged incarceration without a trial can be a violation of fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution.
This judgment may have implications for future cases involving the UAPA, particularly in cases where the evidence against the accused is weak or based on inadmissible statements. It reinforces the need for a thorough and fair assessment of the evidence before denying bail under the stringent provisions of the UAPA.
Directions
The Supreme Court directed the respondent to ensure that the appellants are produced before the learned Special Judge for the trial of NIA cases at Vijayawada within a maximum period of one week from the date of the judgment. The learned Special Judge was directed to release the appellants on bail on appropriate conditions determined by him after hearing the appellants and the respondent.
Specific Amendments Analysis
There were no specific amendments discussed in the judgment.
Development of Law
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the stringent conditions for bail under the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 43D of the UAPA do not apply if the Court, upon perusal of the case diary or the report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is unable to form an opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against the accused are prima facie true. This judgment reinforces the importance of personal liberty and the right to a speedy trial, particularly in cases involving serious offenses under the UAPA. It also reaffirms the strict interpretation of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Supreme Court of India granted bail to the appellants in the case of Yedala Subba Rao & Anr. vs. Union of India, holding that the prosecution had failed to establish a prima facie case against them under the UAPA. The Court emphasized the importance of personal liberty and the right to a speedy trial, and it strictly interpreted the provisions of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. This judgment serves as a reminder of the need for a thorough and fair assessment of evidence before denying bail under the stringent provisions of the UAPA.
Category
Parent Category: Criminal Law
Child Categories:
- Bail
- Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967
- Section 43D, Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967
- Section 27, Indian Evidence Act, 1872
FAQ
Q: What is the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA)?
A: The UAPA is an Indian law aimed at preventing unlawful activities, particularly those related to terrorism. It includes stringent provisions for bail.
Q: What does Section 43D(5) of the UAPA say about bail?
A: Section 43D(5) of the UAPA states that a person accused of offenses under Chapters IV and VI of the Act cannot be released on bail if the court believes there are reasonable grounds to believe the accusations are prima facie true.
Q: What is Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872?
A: Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is an exception to the rule that confessions made to a police officer are inadmissible. It states that if a fact is discovered as a result of information received from an accused person in police custody, so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact discovered may be proved.
Q: What was the main issue in Yedala Subba Rao vs. Union of India?
A: The main issue was whether the accused were entitled to bail under the UAPA, given the stringent conditions for bail under the act.
Q: What was the Supreme Court’s decision in this case?
A: The Supreme Court granted bail to the accused, holding that the prosecution had failed to establish a prima facie case against them under the UAPA.
Q: What factors did the Supreme Court consider in granting bail?
A: The Court considered the lack of credible evidence, the inadmissibility of confessional statements, the prolonged incarceration of the accused, and the fact that a co-accused with similar evidence had been granted bail.
Q: What is the significance of this judgment?
A: The judgment emphasizes the importance of personal liberty, the right to a speedy trial, and the need for a thorough and fair assessment of evidence before denying bail under the UAPA. It also reiterates the strict interpretation of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.