Date of the Judgment: 09 December 2024
Citation: (2024) INSC 942
Judges: B.R. Gavai, J. and K.V. Viswanathan, J.
Can a government department deny a benefit to an individual when others similarly situated have already received it through a court order? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question in a case concerning an Army Dental Corps officer who was denied a permanent commission despite a previous court order granting similar relief to other officers. The court emphasized the principle of equality and non-discrimination, ruling in favor of the officer. This judgment, delivered by a two-judge bench comprising Justices B.R. Gavai and K.V. Viswanathan, highlights the importance of extending the benefits of court orders to all similarly situated individuals. Justice K.V. Viswanathan authored the judgment.
Case Background
Lt. Col. Suprita Chandel was commissioned as a Short Service Commissioned Officer in the Army Dental Corps on March 10, 2008, at the age of 27 years, 11 months, and 28 days. At the time of her commission, the regulations allowed three chances to take the departmental examination for a permanent commission. The regulations also provided for age relaxation. She was entitled to two chances after completing two years of service and before completing four years, and a third chance after completing five years and before completing eight years, subject to eligibility criteria.
The officer could not qualify in the first two attempts. On November 15, 2012, her service was extended for another five years. By March 9, 2013, she had completed five years of service and was eligible for her third attempt, subject to age relaxation based on her previous service.
However, on March 20, 2013, the regulations were amended. While the age limit was increased to 30 years (extendable to 35 for those with a Master’s in Dental Surgery), the clause allowing age relaxation based on previous service was removed. This amendment effectively deprived the officer of her third chance because she did not have a postgraduate qualification at the time of her initial commission. Other officers in similar situations approached the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT), Principal Bench, and were granted relief.
The officer could not join the other officers in the litigation due to her pregnancy and subsequent maternity leave. After the AFT Principal Bench granted relief to the other officers, the officer was not considered because she was not part of the original application. Her representation was rejected on September 15, 2014, with the reasoning that the age relaxation was granted “only to the petitioners” and would not form a precedent. Further representations were also rejected, and her service was extended for four years on October 31, 2017.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 10.03.2008 | Lt. Col. Suprita Chandel commissioned as Short Service Commissioned Officer in Army Dental Corps. |
| 15.11.2012 | Her service was extended for another five years. |
| 09.03.2013 | Appellant completed five years of service and was eligible for the third chance. |
| 20.03.2013 | Amendments to AI 37 of 78 introduced, removing age relaxation based on previous service. |
| 16.05.2013 | Appellant proceeded on maternity leave. |
| 01.07.2013 | Appellant delivered a child. |
| 22.01.2014 | AFT Principal Bench grants relief to other officers in O.A. No. 111 of 2013. |
| 06.09.2014 | Appellant submitted a representation. |
| 15.09.2014 | Appellant’s representation rejected. |
| 31.10.2017 | Appellant’s services extended for four years. |
| 09.11.2017 | Another representation of the appellant was rejected. |
| 05.01.2022 | AFT Regional Bench, Lucknow, dismissed the appellant’s application. |
| 09.12.2024 | Supreme Court allows the appeal. |
Course of Proceedings
The appellant initially filed an application before the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) in 2014, which was later withdrawn with the liberty to file afresh. She then filed O.A. 70 of 2017 before the Principal Bench, which was also withdrawn with the liberty to move the appropriate Tribunal. After making a representation on October 4, 2017, which was rejected on November 9, 2017, and after returning from a posting in Arunachal Pradesh, she moved the AFT Regional Bench, Lucknow, by filing O.A. No. 241 of 2021. This application was dismissed by the impugned order.
Legal Framework
The case revolves around the interpretation and application of certain Army Instructions (AIs) concerning the eligibility criteria for permanent commission in the Army Dental Corps. Initially, Para 12 of Army Instruction 15 of 79 and Para 4(a) and 4(b) of AI 37 of 78 governed the process. These provisions allowed Short Service Commissioned Officers three chances to take the departmental examination for permanent commission, with age relaxations.
Specifically, Para 4(a) and 4(b) of Annexure ‘A’ to the AI 37/78 stated:
“(a) Candidates must not have attained 28 years of age on 31st December of the year of receipt of application from them. This age limit may be extended upto 30 years by the Government of India on the recommendation of the AD Corps Selection Board in the case of candidates with additional Post-Graduate qualifications.
(b) A candidate with previous commissioned service in the Army Dental Corps will be entitled to extension of the above age limits as given below: – Full period of previous reckonable service if such service was rendered while in possession of dental qualification recognized by the Dental Council of India (vide para 3 above).”
The key change occurred on March 20, 2013, when Para 4(a) of AI 37 of 78 was amended, and Para 4(b) was deleted. The amended Para 4(a) reads:
“(a) Para 4(a) of Annexure ‘A’ to AI 37/78 Candidates must not have attained 30 years of age on 31st December of the year of receipt of application form from them for Departmental Permanent Commission. The age limit may be extended up to 35 years in respect of those candidates who are in receipt of PG qualification of Masters in Dental Surgery duly recognized by Dental Council of India, at the time of initial commission to Army Dental Corps.”
The deletion of Para 4(b) removed the provision for age relaxation based on previous service, which disadvantaged officers like the appellant who did not possess a postgraduate qualification at the time of their initial commission.
Arguments
Appellant’s Submissions:
- The appellant argued that she was similarly situated to the officers who were granted relief by the AFT Principal Bench in O.A. No. 111 of 2013. She contended that she was eligible for her third chance before the amendment to AI No. 37 of 1978 on 20.03.2013.
- She emphasized that the AFT Principal Bench had granted relief by directing the consideration of cases for permanent absorption by granting one-time age relaxation under the unamended policy.
- The appellant argued that the denial of a similar benefit to her was discriminatory and violated the principle of equality.
- She highlighted that the phrase “Only to the Petitioners” in the rejection of her representation was erroneous, as the AFT Principal Bench did not prohibit the department from considering similarly situated persons.
- The appellant stated that she was unable to join the earlier litigation due to her pregnancy and subsequent maternity leave.
Respondents’ Submissions:
- The respondents argued that the appellant was not a petitioner in the original case before the AFT Principal Bench and, therefore, not entitled to the same relief.
- They contended that the benefit of age relaxation was granted only to the petitioners of the original applications who were eligible in 2012 but became ineligible in 2013 due to the policy amendment.
- The respondents relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra and Another vs. Chandrakant Anant Kulkarni and Others, (1981) 4 SCC 130, to argue that a mere reduction in the chance of consideration did not result in the deprivation of any right.
- The respondents contended that the order dated 13.03.2014 in the application for clarification of the AFT, Principal Bench, order of 22.01.2014 and the order dated 19.05.2014 in the review do not dilute the case of the respondents.
| Main Submission | Sub-Submissions by Appellant | Sub-Submissions by Respondents |
|---|---|---|
| Parity with Previous Beneficiaries | ✓ Appellant was similarly situated to those who received relief in O.A. No. 111 of 2013. ✓ Appellant was eligible for the third chance before the policy amendment. |
✓ Appellant was not a petitioner in the original case. ✓ Age relaxation was specifically for original petitioners. |
| Discrimination | ✓ Denial of benefit is discriminatory and violates equality. ✓ The phrase “Only to the Petitioners” was erroneous. |
✓ The department was justified in denying relief to those who did not approach the court. |
| Impact of Policy Amendment | ✓ The policy amendment unfairly deprived her of a chance for permanent absorption. | ✓ The amendment was valid and applied to all similarly situated individuals. |
| Delay | ✓ Delay was due to pregnancy, maternity leave, posting in Arunachal Pradesh, and the Covid-19 pandemic. | ✓ There was considerable delay in approaching the court. |
Innovativeness of the Argument: The appellant’s argument innovatively highlighted the discriminatory nature of denying benefits to similarly situated individuals, especially when the original court order did not explicitly prohibit such extensions. This approach challenged the department’s narrow interpretation of the previous ruling.
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The primary issue before the Supreme Court was:
- Whether the appellant, who was similarly situated to the officers who were granted relief by the AFT Principal Bench in O.A. No. 111 of 2013, was entitled to the same benefit of consideration for permanent commission under the unamended policy?
The sub-issue that the court dealt with was whether the delay in approaching the court should be a ground for denying the relief to the appellant.
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
| Issue | Court’s Treatment |
|---|---|
| Whether the appellant was entitled to the same benefit as the officers in O.A. No. 111 of 2013? | The Court held that the appellant was indeed entitled to the same benefit. It emphasized that when a court declares a law in favor of a citizen, others similarly situated should receive the same benefit without having to go to court. The Court found that the appellant was identically situated to the applicants in O.A. No. 111 of 2013, as she was also ripe for her third chance before the amendment. The Court rejected the argument that the benefit was only for the original petitioners. |
| Whether delay in approaching the court should be a ground for denying the relief? | The Court held that the delay should not be a ground for denying the relief in this case. It noted that the appellant had been seeking justice since 2014 and that the delay between 2017 and 2021 was due to her posting in Arunachal Pradesh and the Covid-19 pandemic. The Court also noted that since a clear case of discrimination had been made out, the appellant should not be non-suited on the ground of delay. |
Authorities
The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:
Cases:
- Amrit Lal Berry vs. Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi and Others, (1975) 4 SCC 714 – This case was cited to support the principle that when a citizen obtains a declaration of law in their favor, others similarly situated should be extended the same benefit without needing to go to court. (Supreme Court of India)
- K.I. Shephard and Others vs. Union of India and Others, (1987) 4 SCC 431 – This case reinforced the principle that all similarly situated individuals should receive the benefit of a court order, even if they were not parties to the original litigation. (Supreme Court of India)
- State of Maharashtra and Another vs. Chandrakant Anant Kulkarni and Others, (1981) 4 SCC 130 – This case was cited by the respondents to argue that a mere reduction in the chance of consideration does not result in the deprivation of any right. The Supreme Court, however, distinguished this case and held that the appellant’s case was founded on the principle of discrimination. (Supreme Court of India)
Legal Provisions:
- Para 12 of Army Instruction 15 of 79 – This instruction provided that Short Service Commissioned Officers would be given three chances for taking up the departmental examination for permanent commission.
- Para 4(a) and 4(b) of AI 37 of 78 – These provisions initially specified the age limits and relaxations for candidates seeking permanent commission.
- Amended Para 4(a) of AI 37 of 78 (introduced on 20.03.2013) – This amendment altered the age limits and removed the provision for age relaxation based on previous service.
- Article 142 of the Constitution of India – This article empowers the Supreme Court to pass any order necessary for doing complete justice in any case.
| Authority | How Considered |
|---|---|
| Amrit Lal Berry vs. Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi and Others, (1975) 4 SCC 714 (Supreme Court of India) | Followed – The court used this case to support the principle that benefits of a court order should be extended to all similarly situated individuals. |
| K.I. Shephard and Others vs. Union of India and Others, (1987) 4 SCC 431 (Supreme Court of India) | Followed – The court reinforced the principle that all similarly situated individuals should receive the benefit of a court order. |
| State of Maharashtra and Another vs. Chandrakant Anant Kulkarni and Others, (1981) 4 SCC 130 (Supreme Court of India) | Distinguished – The court distinguished this case, stating that it did not apply to the present case as the appellant’s case was based on discrimination. |
| Para 12 of Army Instruction 15 of 79 | Explained – The court explained that this provision provided three chances for permanent commission to Short Service Commissioned Officers. |
| Para 4(a) and 4(b) of AI 37 of 78 | Explained – The court explained that these provisions initially specified the age limits and relaxations for candidates seeking permanent commission. |
| Amended Para 4(a) of AI 37 of 78 (introduced on 20.03.2013) | Explained – The court explained that this amendment altered the age limits and removed the provision for age relaxation based on previous service. |
| Article 142 of the Constitution of India | Applied – The court used this article to direct that the appellant be granted Permanent Commission, to do complete justice in the case. |
Judgment
| Submission by Parties | How Treated by the Court |
|---|---|
| Appellant’s claim for parity with the officers in O.A. No. 111 of 2013 | The Court accepted the appellant’s claim, holding that she was similarly situated and entitled to the same benefit. |
| Respondents’ argument that the benefit was only for the original petitioners | The Court rejected this argument, stating that the AFT Principal Bench did not prohibit the department from considering similarly situated persons. |
| Respondents’ reliance on State of Maharashtra vs. Chandrakant Anant Kulkarni | The Court distinguished this case, stating that it did not apply to the present case as the appellant’s case was based on discrimination. |
| Appellant’s argument that the denial of benefit was discriminatory | The Court agreed with the appellant, holding that the denial of benefit was indeed discriminatory. |
| Appellant’s argument that the delay was due to circumstances | The Court agreed and held that the delay should not be a ground for denying relief in this case. |
How each authority was viewed by the Court?
- The Supreme Court followed Amrit Lal Berry vs. Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi and Others, (1975) 4 SCC 714* and K.I. Shephard and Others vs. Union of India and Others, (1987) 4 SCC 431* to support the principle that when a court declares a law in favor of a citizen, others similarly situated should receive the same benefit without needing to go to court.
- The Supreme Court distinguished State of Maharashtra and Another vs. Chandrakant Anant Kulkarni and Others, (1981) 4 SCC 130*, stating that it did not apply to the present case as the appellant’s case was based on discrimination.
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court’s decision was heavily influenced by the principles of equality and non-discrimination. The Court emphasized that when a court grants relief to a group of individuals, others who are similarly situated should also receive the same benefit without having to litigate separately. The Court was also swayed by the fact that the appellant had a distinguished service record and that the delay in approaching the court was due to circumstances beyond her control. The Court was keen to ensure that justice was done and that the appellant was not unfairly excluded from consideration for permanent commission.
| Reason | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Principle of Equality and Non-Discrimination | 35% |
| Appellant’s Identical Situation with Previous Beneficiaries | 30% |
| Appellant’s Distinguished Service Record | 20% |
| Lack of Fault on Appellant’s Part | 10% |
| Circumstances of Delay | 5% |
| Category | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Fact | 30% |
| Law | 70% |
The Court’s reasoning was primarily based on legal principles (70%) rather than factual aspects (30%) of the case. The Court focused on the legal principle of equality and non-discrimination, and how it applied to the facts of the case.
Logical Reasoning:
The Court considered the argument that the benefit was only for the original petitioners but rejected it, stating that the AFT Principal Bench did not prohibit the department from considering similarly situated persons. The Court also rejected the argument based on delay, noting the circumstances that caused it. The Court emphasized that the appellant had a distinguished service record and that it was important to ensure that justice was done.
The final decision was reached by applying the principles of equality and non-discrimination, and by exercising the powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to ensure complete justice.
“It is a well settled principle of law that where a citizen aggrieved by an action of the government department has approached the court and obtained a declaration of law in his/her favour, others similarly situated ought to be extended the benefit without the need for them to go to court.”
“The stand of the Department relying on the judgment of this Court in State of Maharashtra and Another vs. Chandrakant Anant Kulkarni and Others, (1981) 4 SCC 130 to contend that mere reduction in chance of consideration did not result in deprivation of any right does not appeal to us.”
“On the peculiar facts of this case and since nothing adverse has been placed on record with regard to performance of the appellant, in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, we direct that the appellant ought to be given Permanent Commission.”
There were no dissenting opinions in this case. The judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench, and both judges concurred in the decision.
The implications of this judgment are that government departments must extend the benefits of court orders to all similarly situated individuals, even if they were not parties to the original litigation. This decision reinforces the principle of equality and non-discrimination and ensures that individuals are not unfairly disadvantaged because they did not approach the court initially.
The Court did not introduce any new legal doctrines or principles but reaffirmed existing principles of equality and non-discrimination.
Key Takeaways
- Government departments must extend the benefits of court orders to all similarly situated individuals without requiring them to litigate separately.
- The principle of equality and non-discrimination is paramount in the application of court orders.
- Delay in approaching the court may be condoned if there are valid reasons and if a clear case of discrimination has been made out.
- The Supreme Court can exercise its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to ensure complete justice in cases where there has been a violation of fundamental rights.
This judgment is likely to have a significant impact on future cases where government departments attempt to deny benefits to individuals who are similarly situated to those who have already received relief through court orders. It reinforces the importance of ensuring that all individuals are treated equally under the law.
Directions
The Supreme Court directed that:
- The appellant’s case be taken up for grant of Permanent Commission.
- She be extended the benefit of Permanent Commission with effect from the same date as similarly situated persons who obtained benefits pursuant to the judgment dated 22.01.2014 in O.A. No. 111 of 2013 of the Principal Bench of the AFT.
- All consequential benefits like seniority, promotion, and monetary benefits, including arrears, shall be extended to the appellant.
- The above directions shall be implemented within a period of four weeks from today.
Development of Law
The ratio decidendi of this case is that when a court grants relief to a group of individuals, others who are similarly situated should also receive the same benefit without having to litigate separately. This decision reinforces the principle of equality and non-discrimination. There was no change in the previous position of law, but the Supreme Court reaffirmed the existing principles.
Conclusion
In the case of Lt. Col. Suprita Chandel vs. Union of India, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the appellant, an Army Dental Corps officer who was denied a permanent commission despite a previous court order granting similar relief to other officers. The Court emphasized the principle of equality and non-discrimination, holding that government departments must extend the benefits of court orders to all similarly situated individuals. The Court directed that the appellant be granted a permanent commission with all consequential benefits. This judgment reinforces the importance of treating all individuals equally under the law and ensures that no one is unfairly disadvantaged due to procedural technicalities.