Supreme Court: Interim Victim Compensation Not a Condition for Anticipatory Bail in Criminal Cases (24 January 2023)

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: 24 January 2023

Citation: 2023 INSC 47

Judges: Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J. and Abhay S. Oka, J.

Can a court demand payment of interim compensation to a victim as a condition for granting anticipatory bail to an accused? The Supreme Court recently addressed this critical question, clarifying the boundaries of bail jurisprudence and victim compensation. This judgment emphasizes that pre-trial proceedings, such as anticipatory bail, should not be used for recovering money or imposing compensation. The bench comprised Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Abhay S. Oka, who delivered a unanimous decision.

Case Background

The case of Talat Sanvi v. State of Jharkhand & Anr. arose from an order where a lower court had imposed a condition of interim victim compensation for granting anticipatory bail. The appellant, Talat Sanvi, challenged this order, arguing that such a condition was not legally sound. The core issue was whether a court could mandate payment of interim victim compensation as a prerequisite for anticipatory bail. The appellant sought to have the condition of interim victim compensation removed from the anticipatory bail order.

Timeline

Legal Framework

The Supreme Court referred to Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), which deals with victim compensation. According to Section 357 of the CrPC:

“357. Order to pay compensation.—(1) When a Court imposes a sentence of fine or a sentence (including a sentence of death) of which fine forms a part, the Court may, when passing judgment, order the whole or any part of the fine recovered to be applied—(a) in defraying the expenses properly incurred in the prosecution;(b) in the payment to any person of compensation for the loss or injury caused by the offence, when compensation is, in the opinion of the Court, recoverable by such person in a Civil Court;(c) when any person is convicted of any offence for having caused the death of another person or of having abetted the commission of such an offence, in paying compensation to the persons who are, under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 (13 of 1855), entitled to recover damages from the person sentenced for the loss resulting to them from such death;(d) when any person is convicted of any offence which includes theft, criminal misappropriation, criminal breach of trust, or cheating, or of having dishonestly received or retained, or of having voluntarily assisted in disposing of, stolen property knowing or having reason to believe the same to be stolen, in paying compensation to any bona fide purchaser of such property for the loss of the same if such property is recovered from the possession of the person so convicted.”

The Court also highlighted the limitations under sub-section (2) of Section 357 of the CrPC, stating that no such payment shall be made before the period allowed for presenting the appeal has elapsed or before the decision of the appeal. Sub-section (3) specifies that compensation is for the person who has suffered loss or injury due to the act for which the accused has been sentenced. Sub-section (4) provides the appellate court, High Court, or Court of Sessions the power to direct payment of compensation when exercising revision powers. The Court noted that victim compensation is linked to the final decision regarding the alleged offense and not during the pre-trial stage.

Arguments

The appellant argued that imposing interim victim compensation as a condition for anticipatory bail was against established legal principles. They contended that anticipatory bail proceedings are not meant for recovering money or determining compensation. The appellant relied on previous judgments of the Supreme Court that clarified that bail conditions should not be based on the capacity to pay or deposit money. The core argument was that victim compensation is a matter to be decided post-trial and not during the anticipatory bail stage.

The respondent’s arguments are not explicitly mentioned in the provided text. However, it can be inferred that the respondent (State of Jharkhand) likely defended the lower court’s order, possibly arguing for the need to ensure victim compensation at the earliest stage. However, the Supreme Court did not find merit in such arguments in light of the previous judgments.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The primary issue before the Supreme Court was:

1. Whether interim victim compensation can be imposed as a condition for granting anticipatory bail.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

Judgment

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

✓ Sahab Alam @ Guddu v. The State of Jharkhand & Anr. [Criminal Appeal No.1318/2022]*: The court relied on this case to reiterate that bail cannot be granted solely based on the ability to deposit money.

✓ Udho Thakur and Anr. ETC. v. The State of Jharkhand & Anr. [Criminal Appeal Nos.1703-1704 of 2022]*: The court used this case to reinforce that pre-arrest bail proceedings are not meant for money recovery.

✓ Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: The court interpreted this section to mean that victim compensation is a consequence of the final decision in a case and not a condition for bail.

✓ Dharmesh v. State of Gujarat [(2021) 7 SCC 198]*: The court cited this case to emphasize that compensation under Section 357 of CrPC can only arise after the conclusion of the trial.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the principle that bail proceedings should not be used for recovering money or imposing compensation. The Court emphasized that victim compensation is a matter to be decided post-trial, after a determination of guilt. The court’s reasoning was driven by the need to maintain the integrity of the criminal justice system and ensure that bail conditions are not based on the financial capacity of the accused.

Logical Reasoning

The Court explicitly stated, “the question of interim victim compensation cannot form part of the bail jurisprudence.” Further, it noted, “pre-arrest bail proceedings are not money recovery proceedings.” The Court also observed, “victim compensation is simultaneous with the final view taken in respect of the alleged offence… and, thus, there is no question of any imposition pre-finality of the matter pre-trial.”

Key Takeaways

• ✓ Interim victim compensation cannot be imposed as a condition for granting anticipatory bail.
• ✓ Bail proceedings should not be used for recovering money or imposing compensation.
• ✓ Victim compensation is a matter to be decided post-trial, after a determination of guilt.
• ✓ This judgment reinforces the principle that bail conditions should be based on the nature of the offense and not on the financial capacity of the accused.

Directions

The Supreme Court quashed the condition of interim victim compensation imposed by the lower court while maintaining the other aspects of the grant of anticipatory bail. The matter was disposed of, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that interim victim compensation cannot be a condition for granting anticipatory bail. This judgment reinforces the existing legal position that bail proceedings are not for money recovery and that victim compensation is a matter to be decided after the conclusion of the trial. The Supreme Court has reaffirmed its previous stance on the issue, ensuring consistency in the application of bail jurisprudence.

Conclusion

In the case of Talat Sanvi v. State of Jharkhand & Anr., the Supreme Court definitively held that interim victim compensation cannot be imposed as a condition for anticipatory bail. This decision clarifies that bail proceedings are not meant for recovering money or determining compensation. The court emphasized that victim compensation is a matter to be decided post-trial, after a determination of guilt. This judgment reinforces the principles of bail jurisprudence and ensures that bail conditions are not based on the financial capacity of the accused but on the nature of the offense.