LEGAL ISSUE: Whether a compulsory amalgamation order under Section 396 of the Companies Act, 1956, is valid when it does not adequately compensate the transferor company and its shareholders, and when the conditions precedent for such an order are not met.
CASE TYPE: Corporate Law, Amalgamation
Case Name: 63 Moons Technologies Ltd. (Formerly Known as Financial Technologies India Ltd.) & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors.
[Judgment Date]: 30 April 2019
Introduction
Date of the Judgment: 30 April 2019
Citation: (2019) INSC 441
Judges: R.F. Nariman, J. and Vineet Saran, J.
Can the government force a merger between two companies if it believes it’s in the public interest, even if one company is profitable and the other is struggling? The Supreme Court of India recently tackled this question, focusing on the legality of a compulsory amalgamation order under Section 396 of the Companies Act, 1956. The case involved 63 Moons Technologies Ltd. (formerly Financial Technologies India Ltd.) and its subsidiary, National Spot Exchange Ltd. (NSEL). The core issue was whether the government’s order to merge these two companies was valid, given the financial implications for 63 Moons Technologies and its shareholders.
The Supreme Court, in this judgment, examined the scope and applicability of Section 396 of the Companies Act, 1956, which allows the Central Government to order compulsory amalgamation of companies in the public interest. The court scrutinized whether the government’s order was valid, considering the financial implications for the transferor company and its shareholders, and whether all the conditions precedent for such an order were met.
Case Background
63 Moons Technologies Ltd. (FTIL) is a company that provides software for trading. It held a 99.99% share in its subsidiary, NSEL, which was set up to provide a platform for trading commodities. In 2007, NSEL received an exemption from certain regulations, allowing it to operate forward contracts of one-day duration. However, in 2013, a major crisis occurred when it was discovered that some traders on the NSEL platform had defaulted on payments amounting to approximately INR 5600 crore.
This payment crisis led to the closure of NSEL’s spot exchange operations. The Forward Markets Commission (FMC) recommended that the government verify the commodity stocks in NSEL’s warehouses and fix liability on FTIL, the parent company. Investigations revealed that NSEL was involved in “paired contracts,” which were essentially financing transactions rather than actual commodity sales, violating the terms of its exemption.
The Ministry of Finance, based on the findings of the FMC and a forensic audit report, proposed the amalgamation of FTIL and NSEL under Section 396 of the Companies Act. The Central Government issued a draft amalgamation order, which FTIL challenged in the Bombay High Court. The Bombay High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by FTIL, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.
Timeline
Date | Event |
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2005 | NSEL incorporated by Multi Commodities Exchanges (MCX) and its nominees. |
05.06.2007 | Union of India issues exemption notification under Section 27 of the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952, for NSEL. |
October 2008 | NSEL commences operations. |
27.04.2012 | Department of Consumer Affairs (DCA) issues show cause notice to NSEL for alleged violation of FCRA exemption. |
12.07.2013 | DCA directs NSEL to halt new contracts and settle existing ones. |
July 2013 | 13,000 traders claim to have been defrauded by NSEL members; INR 5600 crore payment default. |
31.07.2013 | NSEL suspends trading and closes spot exchange operations. |
12.08.2013 | FMC recommends verification of commodities and fixing liability on FTIL. |
27.08.2013 | FMC directs forensic audit of NSEL by Grant Thornton LLP. |
30.09.2013 | Union of India orders inspection of NSEL and FTIL books; EOW registers cases against NSEL and FTIL personnel. |
17.12.2013 | FMC declares FTIL not “fit and proper” to hold equity in commodity exchanges. |
18.08.2014 | FMC suggests merger of FTIL and NSEL to the Union of India. |
19.09.2014 | Ministry of Finance withdraws exemption granted to NSEL. |
15.10.2014 | Additional Secretary, Department of Economic Affairs, proposes merger of FTIL and NSEL under Section 396 of the Companies Act. |
21.10.2014 | Draft order of amalgamation circulated to stakeholders. |
10.11.2014 | FTIL files Writ Petition challenging the draft order. |
12.02.2016 | Final amalgamation order passed, merging FTIL and NSEL. |
04.12.2017 | Bombay High Court dismisses FTIL’s writ petition. |
30.04.2019 | Supreme Court allows appeals, sets aside Bombay High Court judgment. |
Legal Framework
The case primarily revolves around Section 396 of the Companies Act, 1956, which empowers the Central Government to order compulsory amalgamation of companies in the public interest. This section is an exception to the usual procedures of voluntary amalgamation under Sections 394 and 395 of the same Act.
Section 396(1) states that where the Central Government is satisfied that it is essential in the public interest that two or more companies should amalgamate, it may provide for such amalgamation by order.
Section 396(3) mandates that every member or creditor of each company before the amalgamation shall have, as nearly as may be, the same interest in or rights against the company resulting from the amalgamation as he had in the original company. If the interest or rights are less, the member or creditor is entitled to compensation.
Section 396(4) outlines the procedural requirements for such an order, including sending a draft order to the companies, considering objections, and ensuring that compensation assessments are completed.
Article 31A of the Constitution of India protects laws providing for the amalgamation of two or more corporations in the public interest from being challenged on the grounds of Articles 14 (equality before law) and 19 (protection of certain rights).
Article 13(3) defines “law” to include any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom, or usage having the force of law.
Arguments
Arguments by the Appellants (63 Moons Technologies Ltd. & Ors.):
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FTIL and NSEL are separate legal entities with distinct businesses and independent boards of directors. FTIL has not participated in NSEL’s profits, receiving only maintenance fees for technology services.
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A compulsory amalgamation order under Section 396 is invalid if its sole purpose is to impose NSEL’s unadjudicated liabilities on FTIL.
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The amalgamation order is based on an inconclusive forensic audit report by Grant Thornton, which stated that its findings were not verified and could be amended.
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The condition precedent for passing an amalgamation order is that compensation be assessed under Section 396(3) for both transferor and transferee companies, which was not done for FTIL and its shareholders.
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The amalgamation order interferes with the judicial process by ignoring decrees and arbitral awards obtained by NSEL against defaulters.
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The Central Government did not apply its mind to whether such an order was “essential” in the public interest. The public interest includes the interest of FTIL’s 63,000 shareholders, who would face a huge liability.
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The amalgamation order is arbitrary and violates Articles 14, 19, and 300A of the Constitution of India. It also violates the principle of proportionality.
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The reasons given by the Bombay High Court for upholding the amalgamation order were not part of the draft order, thus violating the principles of natural justice.
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The High Court erred in ignoring the economic value of shares, holding that no compensation was needed for FTIL shareholders as the number of shares remained the same, despite their value becoming nil.
Arguments by the Respondents (Union of India & Ors.):
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FTIL held 99.9998% of NSEL’s shares, and NSEL was promoted by and is part of the FTIL group. NSEL’s board was under the control of FTIL.
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Shri Jignesh Shah was the common linchpin of both companies, holding 45% shares of FTIL and being the Chairman-cum-Managing Director, as well as Vice Chairman on the Board of NSEL.
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NSEL promoted “paired contracts” which were financing transactions, breaching the exemption granted to it under the FCRA.
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NSEL misrepresented that it dealt with commodities and spot delivery, while it was running a finance exchange with no commodities in stock.
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The amalgamation order was not just for repayment of debts but to instill confidence in commodity markets.
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The order was passed after hearing FTIL and NSEL, and is in the nature of delegated legislation, thus immune from challenge under Articles 14 and 19.
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The Central Government order does not direct any payment by the amalgamated company; it is to enable FTIL’s finances to be used for ongoing litigation.
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The economic value of shares is an uncertain phenomenon, and compensation under Section 396(3) need not be mathematically precise.
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The Central Government was satisfied on objective facts that it was essential in public interest to pass such order.
Sub-Submissions categorized by main submissions of all sides pertaining to the issue:
Main Submission | Sub-Submissions (Appellants) | Sub-Submissions (Respondents) |
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Validity of Amalgamation Order |
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Compensation |
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Public Interest |
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Procedural Issues |
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Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court framed the following key issues for consideration:
- Whether the amalgamation order under Section 396 of the Companies Act, 1956, is valid when it does not adequately compensate the transferor company and its shareholders.
- Whether the conditions precedent for passing an amalgamation order under Section 396 were met in the present case.
- Whether the Central Government’s satisfaction that the amalgamation is essential in the public interest was based on relevant and objective facts.
- Whether the amalgamation order is in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
- Whether the amalgamation order is in violation of Article 19 of the Constitution of India.
- Whether the amalgamation order is in violation of Article 300A of the Constitution of India.
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues:
Issue | Court’s Decision | Brief Reasons |
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Validity of Amalgamation Order | Invalid | The order did not adequately compensate the transferor company and its shareholders, and the conditions precedent for such an order were not met. |
Compensation | Inadequate | The assessment order did not provide any compensation to FTIL shareholders and creditors for the economic loss caused by the amalgamation. |
Public Interest | Not Established | The amalgamation order was primarily for the recovery of dues, not for the general public interest. The reasons given by the High Court were not part of the draft order. |
Essentiality | Not Established | The Central Government did not apply its mind to whether amalgamation was “essential” in the public interest. The emergency situation that justified such action had ceased to exist. |
Violation of Article 14 | Yes | The order was arbitrary and unreasonable, violating the right to equality. |
Violation of Article 19 | Yes | The order was an excessive invasion of the rights of shareholders and creditors. |
Violation of Article 300A | Yes | The order deprived the shareholders and creditors of their property without due process. |
Authorities
The Supreme Court relied on the following authorities:
Authority | Court | How it was used | Legal Point |
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Prem Nath Raina v. State of Jammu & Kashmir and Ors., (1983) 4 SCC 616 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to emphasize that Article 31A does not justify irrational violation of Articles 14 and 19. | Constitutional interpretation; limitation on Article 31A. |
Budhan Singh and Anr. v. Nabi Bux and Anr., [1970] 2 SCR 10 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to show that laws should be interpreted to advance public welfare and avoid harsh or ridiculous effects. | Statutory interpretation; legislative intent. |
Prag Ice & Oil Mills v. Union of India, (1978) 3 SCC 459 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to show that Article 31A must be construed strictly. | Constitutional interpretation; scope of Article 31A. |
Union of India and Anr. v. Cynamide India Ltd. and Anr., (1987) 2 SCC 720 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to distinguish between administrative and legislative orders. | Administrative law; nature of legislative orders. |
K.I. Shephard v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 431 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to show that an order of amalgamation is administrative, not legislative. | Administrative law; nature of administrative orders. |
New Bank of India Employees’ Union and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., (1996) 8 SCC 407 | Supreme Court of India | Distinguished to show that Section 396(5) of the Companies Act is akin to the provision considered in K.I. Shephard. | Administrative law; distinguishing legislative and administrative actions. |
Quarry Owners’ Association v. State of Bihar and Ors., (2000) 8 SCC 655 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to show that laying an order before Parliament is mandatory. | Statutory interpretation; mandatory requirements. |
J.K. (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. New Kaiser-i-Hind Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., [1969] 2 SCR 866 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to show that an order under Section 391 has statutory force. | Company law; statutory force of orders. |
Thomas Dana v. State of Punjab, [1959] Supp (1) SCR 274 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to show that the substance, not the form, matters when it comes to the violation of a fundamental right. | Constitutional law; substance over form. |
Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) Lal Kuan, Delhi and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., [1960] 2 SCR 671 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to show that the reality and substance of a statute are important, not just its form. | Constitutional law; substance over form. |
Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India, [1962] 3 SCR 842 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to show that the Constitution must be interpreted broadly. | Constitutional interpretation; broad interpretation. |
Ajay Hasia and Ors. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and Ors., (1981) 1 SCC 722 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to show that authorities under Article 12 are bound by the same constitutional limitations as the government. | Constitutional law; scope of Article 12. |
M.C. Mehta and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. (Shriram – Oleum Gas), (1987) 1 SCC 395 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to show that the court must look at the substance and not the form when dealing with violations of fundamental rights. | Constitutional law; substance over form. |
Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board, [1966] Supp SCR 311 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to interpret the phrase “in the opinion of” in Section 237(b) of the Companies Act, 1956. | Company law; interpretation of discretionary powers. |
Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. S.D. Agarwal, [1969] 3 SCR 108 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to show that the government’s opinion must be based on objective facts. | Company law; judicial review of government orders. |
Rampur Distillery Co. Ltd. v. Company Law Board, [1970] 2 SCR 177 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to show that the satisfaction of the government must be based on objective facts. | Administrative law; judicial review of administrative decisions. |
Western U.P. Electric Power & Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Anr., (1969) 1 SCC 817 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to show that the government must show that the exercise of power was necessary in public interest. | Administrative law; judicial review of government orders. |
M.A. Rasheed and Ors. v. State of Kerala, [1975] 2 SCR 93 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to show that administrative decisions must be made in good faith on relevant considerations. | Administrative law; judicial review of administrative decisions. |
Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal, (1975) 2 SCC 81 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to set out parameters for judicial review of subjective satisfaction of detaining authority. | Administrative law; judicial review of subjective satisfaction. |
Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to define the grounds for judicial review of administrative action. | Administrative law; scope of judicial review. |
Bhikhubhai Vithlabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 4 SCC 144 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to show that the formation of opinion must be based on material. | Administrative law; formation of opinion. |
M. Jhangir Bhatusha and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., 1989 Supp (2) SCC 201 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to show that the court cannot sit in judgment on the sufficiency of reasons for a government order. | Administrative law; judicial review of government orders. |
J. Jayalalitha v. Union of India, (1999) 5 SCC 138 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to define the meaning of “necessary” as indispensable, needful, or essential. | Statutory interpretation; meaning of “necessary”. |
State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Ors., [1952] 3 SCR 889 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to show that public interest is the general interest of the community. | Constitutional law; definition of public interest. |
Manimegalai v. Special Tehsildar (Land Acquisition Officer) Adi Dravidar Welfare, (2018) 13 SCC 491 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to define the concept of public purpose. | Constitutional law; definition of public purpose. |
Rameshwar Prasad and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors., (1983) 2 SCC 195 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to define “public interest” in the context of the Motor Vehicles Act. | Administrative law; definition of public interest. |
Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary and Ors., (1992) 4 SCC 305 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to define “public interest” as something in which the community has a pecuniary interest. | Administrative law; definition of public interest. |
Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and Ors. v. Jan Mohd. Usmanbhai and Anr., (1986) 3 SCC 20 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to show that “public interest” includes public order, health, security, morals, and economic welfare. | Administrative law; definition of public interest. |
B.P. Sharma v. Union of India and Ors., (2003) 7 SCC 309 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to show that “public interest” includes economic stability and prevention of fraud. | Administrative law; definition of public interest. |
Hindustan Lever Employees’ Union v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. and Ors., 1995 Supp (1) SCC 499 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to define “public interest” in the context of company law. | Company law; definition of public interest. |
Bihar Public Service Commission v. Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi and Anr., (2012) 13 SCC 61 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to define “public interest” in the context of service law. | Service law; definition of public interest. |
R.R. Tripathi v. Union of India,(2017) 10 SCC 724 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to show that the court can interfere when an order is found to be arbitrary. | Administrative law; judicial review of government orders. |
Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra and Anr., (2018) 6 SCC 454 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to show that the court can interfere when an order is found to be unreasonable. | Administrative law; judicial review of government orders. |
Shayara Bano v. Union of India and Ors., (2017) 9 SCC 1 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to show that the court can interfere when an order is found to be manifestly arbitrary. | Administrative law; judicial review of government orders. |
Judgment
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals filed by 63 Moons Technologies Ltd. and other appellants, setting aside the judgment of the Bombay High Court. The Court held that the amalgamation order under Section 396 of the Companies Act, 1956, was invalid.
The Court found that the amalgamation order did not adequately compensate the transferor company and its shareholders. The conditions precedent for passing such an order were not met. The Central Government did not apply its mind to whether such an order was “essential” in the public interest. The court also held that the amalgamation order was arbitrary, unreasonable, and violated Articles 14, 19, and 300A of the Constitution of India.
The Court emphasized that while Article 31A protects laws providing for amalgamation from challenge under Articles 14 and 19, it does not justify an irrational violation of these articles. The court also noted that the amalgamation order was more about recovering dues than serving the broader public interest. The Court also held that the reasons given by the Bombay High Court for upholding the amalgamation order were not part of the draft order, thus violating the principles of natural justice.
Implications
The Supreme Court’s judgment has significant implications for corporate law and the government’s power to order compulsory amalgamations. Here are the key takeaways:
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Limitations on Government Power: The judgment clarifies that the government’s power to order compulsory amalgamation under Section 396 of the Companies Act is not absolute. The government must ensure that all conditions precedent are met, including adequate compensation for the transferor company and its shareholders.
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Protection of Shareholder Rights: The judgment emphasizes the importance of protecting the rights of shareholders and creditors in compulsory amalgamation orders. The Court held that the economic value of shares cannot be ignored and that compensation must be assessed.
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Public Interest Requirement: The judgment clarifies that the public interest requirement for compulsory amalgamation must be genuine and not merely a pretext for recovering dues. The government must demonstrate that the amalgamation is essential for the broader public good.
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Judicial Review: The judgment reinforces the power of judicial review over government orders, especially when fundamental rights are involved. The Court can interfere when an order is found to be arbitrary, unreasonable, or violative of constitutional provisions.
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Procedural Due Process: The judgment highlights the importance of following procedural due process, including providing a fair hearing and ensuring that all reasons for the order are part of the draft order.
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Statutory Interpretation: The judgment provides important insights into the interpretation of Section 396 of the Companies Act, emphasizing the need to balance the public interest with the rights of stakeholders.
Flowchart of Compulsory Amalgamation Process under Section 396