LEGAL ISSUE: Whether individuals can be held vicariously liable for murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, when their actions, though contributing to the circumstances, did not directly cause the death and lacked a shared intention for the fatal act.
CASE TYPE: Criminal Law
Case Name: Krishnamurthy @ Gunodu and Others vs. State of Karnataka
[Judgment Date]: 16 February 2022
Introduction
Date of the Judgment: 16 February 2022
Citation: 2022 INSC 139
Judges: Sanjiv Khanna, J., Bela M. Trivedi, J.
Can a person be convicted of murder if they did not directly inflict the fatal blow, but were involved in the events leading up to it? The Supreme Court of India addressed this question in a recent case, clarifying the scope of vicarious liability in criminal law. The Court examined whether the common intention to commit an offense under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) extends to actions that were not directly intended or foreseen by all participants. The judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench comprising Justice Sanjiv Khanna and Justice Bela M. Trivedi.
Case Background
The case involves an incident where Venkatarama was attacked by Krishnamurthy, Gopala, and Thimmappa, along with a juvenile. The incident occurred at the victim’s farmland. The prosecution’s case was that all the accused had a common intention to cause the death of Venkatarama. The witnesses testified that Thimmappa and the juvenile held Venkatarama’s hands, Gopala pulled his legs, and Krishnamurthy assaulted him, leading to his death. The High Court of Karnataka upheld the conviction of all three appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Unspecified Date | Venkatarama, his wife Channamma (PW-1), and son Ramanjaneya (PW-4) were at their land. |
| Unspecified Date | Accused Thimmappa, ‘A’ (juvenile), Gopala, and Krishnamurthy arrived at the land. |
| Unspecified Date | Thimmappa and ‘A’ held Venkatarama’s hands. |
| Unspecified Date | Gopala pulled Venkatarama’s legs, causing him to fall. |
| Unspecified Date | Krishnamurthy assaulted Venkatarama, leading to his death. |
| 20th February 2021 | High Court of Karnataka affirmed the conviction of the appellants. |
| 16th February 2022 | Supreme Court delivered the judgment. |
Course of Proceedings
The High Court of Karnataka, Kalaburagi Bench, had affirmed the conviction of Krishnamurthy, Gopala, and Thimmappa under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC, along with individual convictions under Sections 447, 504, 506, and 341 of the IPC. The appellants then approached the Supreme Court of India.
Legal Framework
The judgment primarily revolves around the interpretation and application of the following provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860:
- Section 302: This section defines the punishment for murder.
- Section 34: This section deals with acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention, stating that when a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.
- Section 447: This section defines the punishment for criminal trespass.
- Section 504: This section defines the punishment for intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace.
- Section 506: This section defines the punishment for criminal intimidation.
- Section 341: This section defines the punishment for wrongful restraint.
- Section 300: This section defines murder.
- Section 323: This section defines the punishment for voluntarily causing hurt.
- Section 299: This section defines culpable homicide.
The Supreme Court also referred to Section 33 of the IPC, which states that the word “act” denotes as well a series of acts as a single act, and the word “omission” denotes as well a series of omissions as a single omission.
The Court also discussed Sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act, 1872, particularly Section 43, which states that judgments other than those mentioned in Sections 40 to 42 are irrelevant unless the existence of that judgment, order or decree is a fact in issue or is relevant under some other provisions of this Act.
Arguments
The arguments presented before the Supreme Court can be summarized as follows:
- Appellants’ Argument: The appellants, Thimmappa and Gopala, argued that they should not be held liable for murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. They contended that their actions were limited to holding the victim’s hands and pulling his legs, respectively, and they did not participate in the fatal assault by Krishnamurthy. They argued that there was no common intention between them and Krishnamurthy to cause the specific injuries that led to the victim’s death. They also argued that since the juvenile ‘A’ was acquitted, they should also be acquitted on the ground of parity.
- Respondent’s Argument: The State of Karnataka argued that all the accused shared a common intention to harm the deceased. They contended that the actions of Thimmappa and Gopala in restraining the victim facilitated the fatal assault by Krishnamurthy, thereby making them vicariously liable for murder under Section 34 of the IPC.
The arguments hinged on whether the actions of Thimmappa and Gopala were in furtherance of a common intention to commit murder, or if their actions were merely preparatory acts that did not directly lead to the fatal injuries. The prosecution argued that the actions of all accused were part of a single criminal act, making them jointly liable. The appellants argued that their actions were separate from the act of assault by Krishnamurthy, and they did not foresee the extent of violence that was inflicted.
| Main Submissions | Sub-Submissions (Appellants) | Sub-Submissions (Respondent) |
|---|---|---|
| Vicarious Liability under Section 34 IPC | ✓ Actions limited to holding hands and pulling legs. ✓ No participation in the fatal assault. ✓ No shared intention for the specific fatal act. |
✓ Actions facilitated the fatal assault. ✓ All actions were part of a single criminal act. ✓ Shared intention to harm the deceased. |
| Parity with Juvenile Accused | ✓ Juvenile ‘A’ was acquitted, so appellants should also be acquitted. | ✓ The juvenile’s case was a separate proceeding and not relevant to the present appeal. |
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court framed the following key issues for consideration:
- Whether Thimmappa and Gopala could be held vicariously liable for the murder of Venkatarama under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC.
- Whether the acquittal of the juvenile ‘A’ should lead to the acquittal of the appellants on the ground of parity.
The court also considered the specific acts attributed to each of the accused and whether those acts were in furtherance of a common intention to commit murder.
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues:
| Issue | Court’s Decision | Brief Reasons |
|---|---|---|
| Whether Thimmappa and Gopala could be held vicariously liable for murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC? | No. Conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC was converted to Section 323 read with Section 34 IPC. | The court held that Thimmappa and Gopala did not share a common intention with Krishnamurthy to cause the specific fatal injuries. Their actions were limited to restraining the victim, and they did not participate in the brutal assault that led to his death. |
| Whether the acquittal of the juvenile ‘A’ should lead to the acquittal of the appellants on the ground of parity? | No. The contention was rejected. | The court stated that the proceedings against the juvenile were independent and separate. The evidence and findings in those proceedings were not relevant to the present appeal. |
Authorities
The Supreme Court relied on several key judgments and legal provisions to arrive at its decision. These authorities were used to interpret the scope and applicability of Section 34 of the IPC, particularly in cases involving vicarious liability for criminal acts.
| Authority | Court | How the Authority was Used |
|---|---|---|
| Suresh and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2001) 3 SCC 673 | Supreme Court of India | The court referred to this case to define the principle of vicarious liability under Section 34 of the IPC, emphasizing the need for a pre-arranged plan or common intention. The court quoted the observations regarding the element of participation in the crime and the requirement of physical presence at the scene. |
| Afrahim Sheikh and Others v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1964 SC 1263 | Supreme Court of India | This case was used to explain the meaning of “criminal act” under Section 34 of the IPC, highlighting that it refers to the unity of criminal behavior resulting in a punishable offense. The court quoted the observation that if there is a common intention, the whole result is attributable to each offender. |
| Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. The King-Emperor, ILR (1925) 52 Cal. 197 | Judicial Commissioner | The court used this case to define “criminal act” and to explain that an act is done by several persons when all are principals in the doing of it. The court quoted the observations on the interpretation of Section 34 and the liability of participants in a criminal act. |
| Satrughan Patar v. Emperor | Patna High Court | This case was referred to emphasize that Section 34 may be applied only when the court can hold with certainty that a particular accused must have preconceived the result or acted in concert with others to bring about that result. |
| Tukaram Ganpat Pandare v. State of Maharashtra, (1974) 4 SCC 544 | Supreme Court of India | This case was cited to illustrate that common intention may be by an overt or covert act, by active presence or at a distant location, but there should be a measure of jointness in the commission of the act. |
| Ramaswami Ayyangar v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1976) 3 SCC 779 | Supreme Court of India | This case was used to emphasize that the essence of Section 34 is the simultaneous consensus of the minds of the persons participating in the criminal action to bring about a particular result. |
| Krishnan and Another v. State of Kerala, (1996) 10 SCC 508 | Supreme Court of India | The court referred to this case to highlight that an overt act is not a requirement for Section 34 to operate, but the prosecution must establish that the persons concerned shared the common intention. |
| King Emperor v. Barendra Kumar Ghose, AIR 1924 Calcutta 257 | Calcutta High Court | This case was used to explain that Section 34 regards the act done as the united act of the immediate perpetrator and his confederates present at the time, and that the language used is susceptible of that meaning. |
| Bashir v. State, AIR 1953 All 668 | Allahabad High Court | The court referred to this case to explain the scope and significance of the words “in furtherance” used in Section 34 of the IPC, illustrating with examples how an act can be in furtherance of a common intention. |
| Surendra Chauhan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2000) 4 SCC 110 | Supreme Court of India | This case was cited to emphasize that a person must be physically present at the actual commission of the crime for the purpose of facilitating or promoting the offense. The court also highlighted that the essence of Section 34 is the simultaneous consensus of the minds of persons participating in the criminal action. |
| Mithu Singh v. State of Punjab, (2001) 4 SCC 193 | Supreme Court of India | This case was cited to highlight that the inference as to common intention should not be readily drawn, and culpable liability can arise only if such inference can be drawn with a degree of assurance. |
| Rajesh Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2008) 15 SCC 705 | Supreme Court of India | The court referred to this case to elucidate the principles applicable to Section 34, emphasizing that the section is based on the principle of joint liability and that the common intention must be before the commission of the crime. |
| Arun v. State by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, (2008) 15 SCC 501 | Supreme Court of India | This case was used to emphasize that a person accompanying the principal culprit does not necessarily share his intention in respect of every act which the latter might eventually commit. |
| Hardev Singh and Another v. State of Punjab, (1975) 3 SCC 731 | Supreme Court of India | This case was used to provide benefit to one of the accused as he did not act conjointly with others in committing the murder. |
| Dharam Pal and Others v. State of Haryana, (1978) 4 SCC 440 | Supreme Court of India | This case was used to highlight the test that should be applied to invoke and convict a co-accused under Section 34 of the IPC, emphasizing the need for a prior meeting of the minds. |
Judgment
The Supreme Court delivered the following judgment:
| Submission by the Parties | Court’s Treatment |
|---|---|
| Thimmappa and Gopala should not be held liable for murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. | The Court agreed, holding that they did not share the common intention for the fatal assault by Krishnamurthy. Their conviction was converted to Section 323 read with Section 34 IPC. |
| The acquittal of juvenile ‘A’ should lead to the acquittal of the appellants on the ground of parity. | The Court rejected this argument, stating that the proceedings against the juvenile were separate and irrelevant to the present appeal. |
How each authority was viewed by the Court?
- The Court relied on Suresh and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh [CITATION] to define common intention and emphasized the need for a pre-arranged plan.
- Afrahim Sheikh and Others v. State of West Bengal [CITATION] was used to explain that a criminal act under Section 34 implies a unity of criminal behavior, and all participants are liable if they share a common intention.
- Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. The King-Emperor [CITATION] was used to define “criminal act” and to explain that an act is done by several persons when all are principals in the doing of it.
- The Court referred to Satrughan Patar v. Emperor [CITATION], emphasizing that Section 34 can be applied only when the court can hold with certainty that a particular accused must have preconceived the result or acted in concert with others to bring about that result.
- The Court cited Tukaram Ganpat Pandare v. State of Maharashtra [CITATION] to illustrate that common intention may be by an overt or covert act, by active presence or at a distant location, but there should be a measure of jointness in the commission of the act.
- Ramaswami Ayyangar v. State of Tamil Nadu [CITATION] was used to emphasize that the essence of Section 34 is the simultaneous consensus of the minds of the persons participating in the criminal action to bring about a particular result.
- The Court referred to Krishnan and Another v. State of Kerala [CITATION] to highlight that an overt act is not a requirement for Section 34 to operate, but the prosecution must establish that the persons concerned shared the common intention.
- King Emperor v. Barendra Kumar Ghose [CITATION] was used to explain that Section 34 regards the act done as the united act of the immediate perpetrator and his confederates present at the time, and that the language used is susceptible of that meaning.
- The Court referred to Bashir v. State [CITATION] to explain the scope and significance of the words “in furtherance” used in Section 34 of the IPC, illustrating with examples how an act can be in furtherance of a common intention.
- Surendra Chauhan v. State of Madhya Pradesh [CITATION] was cited to emphasize that a person must be physically present at the actual commission of the crime for the purpose of facilitating or promoting the offense.
- The Court cited Mithu Singh v. State of Punjab [CITATION] to highlight that the inference as to common intention should not be readily drawn, and culpable liability can arise only if such inference can be drawn with a degree of assurance.
- Rajesh Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh [CITATION] was referred to elucidate the principles applicable to Section 34, emphasizing that the section is based on the principle of joint liability and that the common intention must be before the commission of the crime.
- Arun v. State by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu [CITATION] was used to emphasize that a person accompanying the principal culprit does not necessarily share his intention in respect of every act which the latter might eventually commit.
- The Court referred to Hardev Singh and Another v. State of Punjab [CITATION] to provide benefit to one of the accused as he did not act conjointly with others in committing the murder.
- The Court cited Dharam Pal and Others v. State of Haryana [CITATION] to highlight the test that should be applied to invoke and convict a co-accused under Section 34 of the IPC, emphasizing the need for a prior meeting of the minds.
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the principle of personal culpability and the need for a clear demonstration of common intention to attract vicarious liability under Section 34 of the IPC. The Court emphasized that mere presence or participation in the events leading up to a crime is not sufficient to establish common intention for the ultimate criminal act. The Court carefully analyzed the testimonies of the witnesses, the post-mortem report, and the specific roles attributed to each accused.
| Sentiment | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Lack of Shared Intention | 40% |
| Principle of Personal Culpability | 30% |
| Insufficient Evidence of Participation in Fatal Act | 20% |
| Benefit of Doubt | 10% |
Fact:Law Ratio
| Category | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Fact | 60% |
| Law | 40% |
The Court’s reasoning was based on the following points:
- No Shared Intention for the Fatal Act: The Court found that Thimmappa and Gopala did not share a common intention with Krishnamurthy to cause the specific injuries that led to Venkatarama’s death. Their actions of holding the hands and pulling the legs of the victim were not directly linked to the brutal assault by Krishnamurthy.
- Principle of Personal Culpability: The Court emphasized the principle of personal culpability, stating that a person should be held responsible for their own actions and not for acts they did not intend or foresee.
- Insufficient Evidence of Participation in Fatal Act: The Court noted that Thimmappa and Gopala did not participate in the actual assault by Krishnamurthy. They did not facilitate or help him in the assault, and their actions were not directly connected to the fatal injuries.
- Benefit of Doubt: The Court concluded that it could not be held with certainty that Thimmappa and Gopala had a common intention with Krishnamurthy to commit the murder. Therefore, they were given the benefit of doubt.
The Court stated, “When we apply the aforesaid principles relating to applicability of Section 34 IPC to the facts of the present case, we feel that Thimmappa and Gopala are entitled to the benefit of doubt on the ground that it cannot be with certainty held that they had common intention, viz. the injuries inflicted by Krishnamurthy on Venkatarama after he had fallen down.”
The Court also observed, “We have no grounds to accept that they could have preconceived the brutal assault by Krishnamurthy who had put his knees on the neck and jumped on the chest of the deceased to cause the injuries resulting in his death.”
The Court further noted, “Given the acts attributed to Thimmappa and Gopala, the assault by Krishnamurthy and the resultant outcome were unexpected.”
Logical Reasoning
Issue: Vicarious liability of Thimmappa and Gopala for murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC.
Step 1: Analyze the actions of Thimmappa and Gopala. They held the victim’s hands and pulled his legs, respectively.
Step 2: Determine if these actions were in furtherance of a common intention to commit murder.
Step 3: Assess if there was a pre-arranged plan or shared intention for the brutal assault by Krishnamurthy.
Step 4: Evaluate if Thimmappa and Gopala had the requisite awareness or knowledge that the fatal injuries were likely to be inflicted.
Step 5: Conclude that Thimmappa and Gopala did not share the common intention for the fatal assault and did not participate in it. They are given the benefit of doubt.
Final Decision: Thimmappa and Gopala’s conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC is converted to Section 323 read with Section 34 IPC.
Key Takeaways
- Vicarious liability under Section 34 of the IPC requires a clear demonstration of common intention. Mere presence or participation in the events leading up to a crime is not sufficient.
- The principle of personal culpability is paramount in criminal law. Individuals should be held responsible for their own actions and not for acts they did not intend or foresee.
- The term “act in furtherance of common intention” has a wide scope but is not unlimited. The act must be connected to the common intention. The act should not be remote or unconnected to the common intention.
- In cases involving physical violence, the court will carefully analyze the specific roles of each accused. The court will also consider whether the accused could have reasonably foreseen the outcome of the actions.
Directions
The Supreme Court directed that:
- Thimmappa and Gopala, who were on bail, were to surrender within one month.
- The sentence awarded to Krishnamurthy was modified to life imprisonment. The condition that life imprisonment shall be till the end of natural life was set aside.
- The sentences awarded to the appellants will run concurrently.
- The appellants would be entitled to the benefit of Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Development of Law
The Supreme Court clarified that to attract vicarious liability under Section 34 of the IPC, it is essential to prove that the co-perpetrators shared a common intention for the specific criminal act. The Court held that in the present case, Thimmappa and Gopala did not share the common intention for the brutal assault by Krishnamurthy. The Court reaffirmed that the principle of personal culpability is paramount and that an individual should be held responsible for their own actions. The court also stated that the term “act in furtherance of common intention” has a wide scope but is not unlimited. The act must be connected to the common intention.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s judgment in Krishnamurthy @ Gunodu and Others vs. State of Karnataka provides a significant clarification on the application of Section 34 of the IPC. The Court emphasized that vicarious liability requires a clear demonstration of common intention for the specific criminal act. The judgment highlights the importance of personal culpability and the need for a direct link between the actions of an accused and the ultimate criminal outcome. The Court converted the conviction of Thimmappa and Gopala from Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC to Section 323 read with Section 34 of the IPC, providing them with the benefit of doubt. The judgment serves as a reminder that the principle of joint liability under Section 34 of the IPC is not absolute and requires a careful analysis of the facts and circumstances of each case.