Supreme Court Modifies Conviction Under Arms Act: Samir Ahmed Rafiqahmed Ansari vs. State of Gujarat (2018)

Date of the Judgment: 4th October, 2018
Citation: [Not Available in Source]
Judges: R. Banumathi, J. and Indira Banerjee, J.
Can a conviction under Section 25(1AA) of the Arms Act, 1959 be sustained without evidence of manufacturing prohibited arms? This question was addressed by the Supreme Court in a recent judgment. The court examined whether mere possession of a country-made pistol and live cartridges, without evidence of manufacturing, warrants a conviction under this section. The bench consisted of Justice R. Banumathi and Justice Indira Banerjee, with the judgment authored by Justice R. Banumathi.

Case Background

On October 18, 2002, at approximately 8:00 p.m., police officers on patrol found Samir Ahmed Rafiqahmed Ansari (the appellant) and others traveling on a scooter. The appellant was found to be carrying a country-made pistol loaded with live cartridges, along with two additional live cartridges. Following an investigation, a charge sheet was filed against the appellant and two others under Section 399 read with 120B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 25(1AA) of the Arms Act, 1959. The appellant was accused of possessing illegal arms and ammunition.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The Trial Court acquitted the appellant of the offenses under the Indian Penal Code but convicted him under Section 25(1AA) of the Arms Act, sentencing him to two years of rigorous imprisonment. The other two accused were acquitted of all charges. The appellant appealed to the High Court, and the State also appealed for an enhancement of the sentence. The High Court dismissed the appellant’s appeal and allowed the State’s appeal, increasing the sentence to seven years of imprisonment.

Legal Framework

The case primarily revolves around the interpretation and application of the Arms Act, 1959, specifically:

• Section 25(1AA) of the Arms Act, 1959: This section deals with the manufacture, sale, transfer, etc., of prohibited arms.
• Section 3 of the Arms Act, 1959: This section mandates that no person shall acquire, possess, or carry any firearm or ammunition without a license. The source states, “As per Section 3(1) no person shall acquire, have in his possession, or carry any firearm or ammunition unless he holds a licence issued in accordance with the provisions of the Arms Act and the Rules made thereunder.”
• Section 25(1B)(a) of the Arms Act, 1959: This section prescribes punishment for contravention of Section 3, with imprisonment ranging from one to three years and a fine.

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments:

• The appellant argued that the conviction under Section 25(1AA) of the Arms Act, 1959 is not sustainable due to lack of evidence showing that the appellant was involved in the manufacture of arms or prohibited ammunition.
• The appellant contended that the prosecution failed to provide evidence to substantiate the allegation of manufacturing arms.
• The appellant also argued that there was a want of sanction under Section 39 of the Arms Act, but the court did not delve into this argument.

State’s Arguments:

• The State argued for the enhancement of the sentence, which was initially two years, stating that the gravity of the offense warranted a longer term of imprisonment.
• The State contended that the appellant was found in possession of a country-made pistol and live cartridges, which is a violation of the Arms Act, 1959.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The main issue before the Supreme Court was:

1. What is the appropriate offense for which the appellant should be convicted, given that he was found in possession of a country-made pistol loaded with live cartridges and two additional live cartridges?

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The court considered the following legal provisions:

• Section 25(1AA) of the Arms Act, 1959: The court noted that this section pertains to the manufacture, sale, transfer, etc., of prohibited arms.
• Section 3 of the Arms Act, 1959: The court highlighted that this section mandates the possession of a license for acquiring, possessing, or carrying firearms and ammunition.
• Section 25(1B)(a) of the Arms Act, 1959: The court used this section to modify the conviction, as it deals with the punishment for possessing a firearm without a license.

Judgment

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• The Court held that the conviction under Section 25(1AA) of the Arms Act, 1959* was not sustainable because the prosecution had not adduced any evidence to show that the appellant was involved in the manufacturing of arms.
• The Court relied on Section 3 of the Arms Act, 1959* to highlight that possessing a firearm without a license is illegal.
• The Court used Section 25(1B)(a) of the Arms Act, 1959* to modify the conviction, as this section deals with the punishment for possessing a firearm without a license.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court focused on the lack of evidence regarding the manufacturing of arms, which is a necessary element for a conviction under Section 25(1AA) of the Arms Act, 1959. The court emphasized that mere possession of a firearm without a license falls under Section 25(1B)(a) of the Arms Act, 1959. The court also considered the fact that the appellant had already undergone a substantial period of imprisonment.

The court’s reasoning was that Section 25(1AA) of the Arms Act, 1959 specifically deals with the manufacturing, sale, transfer, etc., of prohibited arms. The prosecution did not provide any evidence to show that the appellant was involved in the manufacturing of arms. The court noted that the possession of a country-made pistol without a license is a violation of Section 3 of the Arms Act, 1959, which is punishable under Section 25(1B)(a) of the Arms Act, 1959. As the appellant had already served a portion of his sentence, the court modified the sentence to the period already undergone.

The Supreme Court stated, “In this case, the prosecution has not adduced any evidence to show that the appellant-accused had indulged in manufacturing of arms or prohibited ammunition in contravention of section 7.” The court also noted, “The possession of the country made pistol without licence is punishable under Section 25(1B)(a) of the Arms Act.” Further, the court concluded, “In the result, the conviction of the appellant under Section 25(1AA) of the Arms Act is modified to Section 25(1B) (a) and the sentence of imprisonment is modified to the period already undergone.”

Key Takeaways

• A conviction under Section 25(1AA) of the Arms Act, 1959 requires evidence of manufacturing, selling, or transferring prohibited arms, not just possession.
• Possession of a firearm without a license is a violation of Section 3 of the Arms Act, 1959, and is punishable under Section 25(1B)(a) of the Arms Act, 1959.
• The Supreme Court modified the sentence to the period already undergone, indicating a consideration of the time served by the appellant.

Directions

The Supreme Court directed that the appellant’s bail bonds shall stand discharged.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a conviction under Section 25(1AA) of the Arms Act, 1959 requires evidence of manufacturing, selling, or transferring prohibited arms, not just possession. This clarifies the scope of Section 25(1AA) and distinguishes it from Section 25(1B)(a) of the Arms Act, 1959, which deals with possessing a firearm without a license.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeals, modifying the appellant’s conviction from Section 25(1AA) to Section 25(1B)(a) of the Arms Act, 1959, and reducing the sentence to the period already served. This judgment clarifies the distinction between manufacturing and possessing arms under the Arms Act, 1959.