Supreme Court Modifies Convictions in Deadly Mob Attack Case: Joseph vs. State (2017) INSC 1094

Date of the Judgment: 14 December 2017
Citation: (2017) INSC 1094
Judges: Ranjan Gogoi, J., R. Banumathi, J. (authored the judgment)
Can every member of a mob be held responsible for a murder committed by one of them? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question while examining the extent of vicarious liability in cases of unlawful assembly. This judgment clarifies the circumstances under which members of a mob can be held responsible for the actions of other members, specifically concerning Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The Court examined the convictions of eleven individuals involved in a deadly attack, modifying some and upholding others.

Case Background

On January 12, 1994, a tragic incident occurred during a funeral gathering. Anthony Mududhagam (PW2), along with his son Luis John Kennedy (the deceased) and Raja, were present at the funeral of PW2’s cousin. While they were near the house of Sahayam (A3), they were confronted by a group of individuals. This group included Jesu Adimai (A1), Selvaraj (A2), and Sahayam (A3), who were armed with country-made bombs. Additionally, Selvam (A4) and Antony Innasi (A5) carried sickles, and Charles (A6), Jerone (A7), Edwinson (A8), Raj (A9), and Elizabethan (A10) were armed with sticks. Joseph (A11) was also present and allegedly instigated the attack.

According to the prosecution, Joseph (A11) incited the others to attack. Selvam (A4) attacked Suresh (PW1) with a sickle, and Jesu Adimai (A1) threw a bomb that struck Kennedy in the head, causing him to fall. Selvaraj (A2) also threw a bomb, injuring Raja’s leg. Sahayam (A3) threw a bomb that landed on the ground. Antony Innasi (A5) attacked PW2, and the remaining accused assaulted Raja and PW2 with sticks. The injured were taken to the hospital, but Kennedy died en route due to his injuries.

Timeline:

Course of Proceedings

The trial court convicted all eleven accused under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), read with Section 149 IPC, for the murder of Kennedy. They were also convicted for other offenses, including rioting and causing hurt. The accused then appealed to the High Court, which upheld the trial court’s decision. The appellants then approached the Supreme Court.

Legal Framework

The Supreme Court focused on Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which deals with vicarious liability in cases of unlawful assembly. Section 149 of the IPC states:
“If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.”

The Court highlighted that Section 149 of the IPC has two parts:

• The first part applies when an offense is committed in furtherance of the common object of the unlawful assembly.
• The second part applies when the members of the assembly knew that the offense was likely to be committed in furtherance of the common object.

The Court also referred to Section 141 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which defines an unlawful assembly as an assembly of five or more persons with a common object to commit an offense.

Arguments

The appellants argued that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of a common object among the accused to cause the death of Kennedy. They contended that they should not have been convicted for murder with the aid of Section 149 of the IPC. The appellants claimed that they did not know that the death of Kennedy was likely to be caused by the unlawful assembly.

The State argued that the evidence and circumstances clearly proved the existence of a common object, and the lower courts had rightly convicted the accused under Section 302 of the IPC with the aid of Section 149 of the IPC.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The main issue before the Supreme Court was:

1. Whether the prosecution succeeded in proving the existence of a common object amongst the accused persons.
2. Whether the accused persons acted in prosecution of the common object.
3. Whether the accused persons knew that the death was likely to be committed, to convict the accused under Section 302 of the IPC with the aid of Section 149 of the IPC.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered several authorities while deciding the case:

Judgment

The Supreme Court modified the convictions of several accused based on the evidence and the principles of Section 149 of the IPC.

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• The Court relied on Rajendra Shantaram Todankar v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (2003) 2 SCC 257* to explain the two parts of Section 149 of the IPC.
• The Court used Allauddin Mian and Others. Sharif Mian and Anr. v. State of Bihar (1989) 3 SCC 5* to highlight that Section 149 of the IPC must be strictly construed as it imposes a constructive penal liability.
• The Court cited Lalji and Ors. v. State of U.P. (1989) 1 SCC 437* to emphasize that the common object must be inferred from the facts and circumstances of each case.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was significantly influenced by the lack of evidence demonstrating a shared intention among all the accused to commit murder. The Court emphasized that while some accused carried bombs and directly participated in the killing, others were armed with less lethal weapons like sticks and sickles. The Court noted that the accused seemed to have reacted individually to the exhortation of Joseph (A11), rather than acting as part of a pre-planned murder conspiracy. This distinction was crucial in determining the extent of vicarious liability under Section 149 of the IPC. The Court also considered the fact that the accused were not all equally armed, suggesting that not everyone had the intention to kill. The Court also considered the fact that the incident occurred during a funeral, where two factions were present, and that the attack was sudden and not pre-planned by all the accused.

Logical Reasoning:

Judgment

The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of a common object amongst all the accused to commit murder. The Court modified the convictions as follows:

• Joseph (A11): His conviction under Section 302 of the IPC read with Section 149 of the IPC was modified to Section 302 of the IPC read with Section 109 of the IPC (abetment).
• Sahayam (A3): His conviction under Section 302 of the IPC read with Section 149 of the IPC was modified to Section 302 of the IPC read with Section 34 of the IPC (common intention).
• Accused Nos. 4 to 10: Their convictions under Section 302 of the IPC read with Section 149 of the IPC were set aside.
• Selvam (A4) and Antony Innasi (A5): Their convictions for causing hurt were maintained under Section 324 of the IPC.
• Accused Nos. 6 to 10: Their convictions for causing hurt were modified to Section 323 of the IPC.

The Court observed, “Had the other accused intended to kill Kennedy and the witnesses, they would have inflicted injuries on the vital organs or used the surest weapon of committing murder and not mere sickles/sticks.”

The Court also noted, “The words uttered by accused Joseph is the starting point for all the troubles and all the accused acted only on such instigation of accused Joseph (A11).”

Further, the Court stated, “The bomb hurled by Selvaraj (A2) and Sahayam (A3), though, had not hit the deceased, the fact remains that they carried the bomb which clearly indicates that Sahayam (A3) was sharing the intention with Jesu Adimai (A1) and Selvaraj (A2) in committing the murder.”

The Court clarified that the acquittal of Selvaraj (A2) and Sahayam (A3) under the Arms Act was due to the lack of prior sanction and did not affect their conviction under the IPC.

Key Takeaways

• Vicarious liability under Section 149 of the IPC requires proof of a common object or knowledge of the likelihood of an offense being committed.
• Not every member of an unlawful assembly is automatically liable for all offenses committed by other members.
• The nature of weapons carried and the manner of attack are crucial in determining the common object.
• Instigation can lead to liability under Section 109 of the IPC (abetment).
• The court will examine the facts and circumstances of each case to determine the common object of the unlawful assembly.

Directions

The Supreme Court directed Sahayam (A3) and Joseph (A11) to surrender to serve their remaining sentences. Accused Nos. 4 to 10 were not required to surrender as they had already served more than six years in prison.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that for Section 149 of the IPC to apply, there must be a common object amongst the members of the unlawful assembly, or the members must have knowledge that the offense was likely to be committed. The judgment clarifies that not every member of the unlawful assembly is automatically liable for the acts of the other members. This case reinforces the principle that vicarious liability under Section 149 of the IPC must be strictly construed and applied based on the specific facts and circumstances of each case. The Supreme Court has not changed the previous position of law but has clarified it with the facts of the present case.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment in this case emphasizes the importance of proving a common object or shared knowledge for vicarious liability under Section 149 of the IPC. The Court modified the convictions, highlighting that not all members of a mob are equally responsible for the actions of others. This judgment provides clarity on the application of Section 149 of the IPC and underscores the need for a nuanced approach in determining criminal liability in cases of unlawful assembly.