Supreme Court modifies sentence in dowry death case: Kashmira Devi vs. State of Uttarakhand (28 January 2020)

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: 28 January 2020

Citation: (2020) INSC 73

Judges: R. Banumathi, J., A.S. Bopanna, J.

Can a conviction for dowry death be sustained based on a dying declaration and circumstantial evidence? The Supreme Court of India addressed this crucial question in the case of *Kashmira Devi vs. State of Uttarakhand*, where the High Court had convicted the appellant for dowry death. This case examines the evidentiary value of dying declarations and the circumstances surrounding a death within seven years of marriage. The judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench comprising Justice R. Banumathi and Justice A.S. Bopanna, with Justice A.S. Bopanna authoring the opinion.

Case Background

The case revolves around the death of Urmila @ Guddi, who was married to Jagdish Singh four years prior to the incident. The prosecution’s case was that Urmila was subjected to constant harassment and beatings by her husband and in-laws, including the appellant Kashmira Devi (mother-in-law), for dowry. Despite the dowry given at the time of marriage, the demands continued. In November 2007, Urmila was severely beaten, leading her to return to her parental home. On 02.02.2008, her parents sent her back to her matrimonial home, stating their inability to meet the dowry demands. On 08.02.2008, the family received news that Urmila was burnt. Initially, the in-laws claimed it was a stove burst. However, Urmila’s mother, PW1, found her daughter with severe burn injuries and was threatened by the in-laws. Urmila succumbed to her injuries on 14.02.2008. Subsequently, a complaint was filed on 15.02.2008, alleging dowry harassment and murder.

Timeline:

Course of Proceedings

The trial court acquitted the appellant and other accused, stating that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court noted the existence of three dying declarations, deeming them dubious. It also highlighted that prosecution witnesses were not present at the scene, and a defense witness stated that the deceased caught fire from the stove. The High Court, however, reversed the trial court’s decision, convicting the appellant under Section 304-B read with Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The High Court relied on the dying declaration recorded on 13.02.2008, stating it was natural, voluntary, and without influence. The High Court also noted the proximity between the dowry demand, harassment, and the death.

Legal Framework

The case primarily involves the interpretation and application of the following legal provisions:

• Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: This section deals with dowry death. It states, “Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.”
• Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: This section addresses cruelty by husband or his relatives. It states, “Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.”
• Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872: This section deals with the presumption of dowry death. It states, “When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.”

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments:

• The High Court erred in not considering the possibility of an accidental death.
• The prosecution failed to establish that there was cruelty or harassment soon before the death in relation to dowry demands.
• There was no reliable evidence of a subsisting dowry demand.
• The parents of the deceased never reported any dowry demand to the police or elders.
• The High Court should not have discarded the first two dying declarations where the deceased stated the incident was an accident.
• The third dying declaration was a result of the deceased being brainwashed by her parents.
• The High Court erred in applying the presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, without sufficient evidence.

Respondents’ Arguments:

• The High Court correctly appreciated the dying declaration of 13.02.2008, which supported the prosecution’s case.
• The High Court correctly applied the law under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
• The deceased died within seven years of marriage and was subjected to cruelty and harassment for dowry.
• The accused failed to rebut the presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
• The evidence of PW1, PW2, and PW3 established that the deceased was subjected to cruelty for insufficient dowry.
• Each dying declaration has to be assessed independently, and the High Court rightly found the dying declaration of 13.02.2008 to be trustworthy.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court considered the following issues:

1. Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the acquittal order passed by the Trial Court.
2. Whether the High Court was correct in relying on the dying declaration of 13.02.2008.
3. Whether the ingredients of Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 were satisfied.
4. Whether the sentence awarded to the appellant by the High Court was justified.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court:

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• The Court relied on Kans Raj v. State of Punjab and Others (2000) 5 SCC 207 and Smt Shanti and Another v. State of Haryana (1991) 1 SCC 371 to establish the essential ingredients for a conviction under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
• The Court cited Smt. Shanti and Anr. Vs. State of Haryana AIR 1991 SC 1226 to state that no separate sentence was awarded under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, when a substantive sentence was awarded under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
• The Court referred to Sanjay Kumar Jain Vs State Of Delhi (2011) 11 SCC 733 to discuss the applicability of Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
• The Court followed Ashabai and Another Vs State of Maharashtra (2013) 2 SCC 224, stating that when there are multiple dying declarations, each has to be assessed independently on its own merits.
• The Court relied on Nallam Veera Stayanandam & Ors. Vs. The Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P. (2004) 10 SCC 769 to state that each dying declaration has to be considered independently on its own merit as to its evidentiary value.
• The Court considered State of Karnataka Vs. Suvarnamma & Anr. (2015) 1 SCC 323, highlighting that the dying declaration recorded by the police officer was consistent with the circumstances on record.
• The Court referred to Hem Chand Vs. State of Haryana (1994) 6 SCC 727 to state that life imprisonment under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 should be awarded in rare cases.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the following:

• Reliability of the Dying Declaration: The Court gave significant weight to the dying declaration recorded on 13.02.2008, finding it to be voluntary and truthful. The Court noted that this declaration was made when the deceased was free from the influence of her in-laws and was specific about the appellant’s role in the incident.
• Evidence of Dowry Harassment: The Court relied on the testimony of the deceased’s parents and relatives, which established that the deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment for dowry. This evidence was crucial in establishing the ingredients of Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
• Presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872: The Court found that the prosecution had successfully established the necessary ingredients for the presumption of dowry death to apply. The accused failed to rebut this presumption.
• Rejection of Accidental Death Theory: The Court rejected the possibility of an accidental death, as the dying declaration of 13.02.2008 clearly indicated that the appellant had set the deceased ablaze.
• Circumstantial Evidence: The Court also considered the fact that the in-laws did not inform the deceased’s parents about the incident and refused to let the mother accompany the deceased to the hospital, which were seen as strong circumstances against the appellant.

Fact:Law

Logical Reasoning:

The court considered the possibility that the deceased was brainwashed by her parents but rejected it, stating that if the deceased wanted to falsely implicate someone, she would have implicated all the family members and not just the mother-in-law. The court also noted that the deceased was very specific about the mother-in-law’s actions.

The court’s decision was based on a thorough analysis of the evidence, the dying declarations, and the legal provisions. The court’s reasoning was clear and logical, and it provided a detailed explanation of why it rejected the appellant’s arguments.

“When dying declarations of deceased Urmila were recorded on 06.02.2008 and 07.02.2008, accused were present in the room. However, by the time when her third dying declaration was recorded on 13.02.2008, parents of deceased Urmila had come and deceased had given the statement without any fear of the accused.”

“From the evidence of PW-1, prosecution has proved that “soon before the death”, deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment. When prosecution has established that deceased was subjected to dowry harassment “soon before the death” and that within seven years of marriage deceased Urmila had died an unnatural death, the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is to be raised against the appellant that she caused the dowry death.”

“If it was a case of false implication, there was no reason for the deceased to have been so specific insofar as the act of causing the death without naming the other members of the family when all of them were involved in the act of demanding dowry and was complaining earlier about the harassment meted out by them.”

Key Takeaways

• Evidentiary Value of Dying Declarations: The judgment reinforces that a dying declaration, if found to be truthful and voluntary, can be the sole basis for conviction. It also highlights that each dying declaration must be assessed independently.
• Presumption of Dowry Death: The judgment emphasizes that once the prosecution establishes the essential ingredients of dowry death, the burden shifts to the accused to rebut the presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
• Importance of Circumstantial Evidence: The judgment demonstrates the significance of circumstantial evidence in cases of dowry death, especially when direct evidence is lacking.
• Modification of Sentence: The Supreme Court’s decision to modify the sentence from life imprisonment to seven years of rigorous imprisonment underscores the need to consider mitigating factors such as age and family circumstances while awarding sentences in dowry death cases.

Directions

The Supreme Court modified the sentence of the appellant, ordering her to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years, which shall include the period of sentence already undergone by the appellant. The fine as imposed and the default sentence was sustained.

Specific Amendments Analysis

There was no specific amendment discussed in this judgment. The Supreme Court’s decision focused on the application of existing laws and their interpretation within the context of the facts presented.

Conclusion

In *Kashmira Devi vs. State of Uttarakhand*, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the appellant for dowry death under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Court relied heavily on the dying declaration of the deceased, which specifically implicated the appellant in the crime. The Court also emphasized the importance of circumstantial evidence and the presumption of dowry death under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. While the conviction was upheld, the Court modified the sentence from life imprisonment to seven years of rigorous imprisonment, taking into account the appellant’s age and other mitigating factors. This case serves as a significant precedent in dowry death cases, highlighting the evidentiary value of dying declarations and the strict application of legal provisions aimed at curbing dowry-related violence.