Supreme Court Orders Examination of Witness in Dowry Death Case: Manju Devi vs. State of Rajasthan (2019)

Date of the Judgment: 16th April, 2019

Citation: 2019 INSC 368

Judges: Abhay Manohar Sapre, J., Dinesh Maheshwari, J.

Can a trial court refuse to summon a crucial witness simply because the trial has been ongoing for a long time? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question in a case concerning the death of a woman in Nigeria, allegedly due to dowry harassment. The court had to consider whether the testimony of the doctor who conducted the first post-mortem in Nigeria was essential for a just decision, even if the trial had been pending for several years.
The Supreme Court of India, in this case, was hearing an appeal against the order of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur which had upheld the trial court’s decision to reject the appellant’s application to summon a key witness. The Supreme Court overturned the High Court’s decision and ordered the trial court to examine the witness. The judgment was authored by Justice Dinesh Maheshwari, with Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre concurring.

Case Background

The appellant’s daughter was married to the accused, respondent No. 2, on April 21, 2008. After living in her matrimonial home, she moved to Bangalore and then to Nigeria with her husband. The prosecution alleges that she was regularly harassed for dowry. On January 14, 2010, while in Nigeria, she was found dead under unnatural circumstances, hanging from a ceiling fan in her room. Her father filed a First Information Report (FIR) alleging dowry harassment and cruelty leading to her death. The first post-mortem was conducted in Nigeria by Dr. I. Yusuf, who stated the cause of death as “asphyxia secondary to strangulation”. The body was then brought to India, where a Medical Board could not determine the cause or time of death. A charge sheet was filed against the husband for offences under Sections 302, 304-B, and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The Trial Court rejected the appellant’s application under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) to summon Dr. I. Yusuf, stating that the trial had been pending for eight years and that the post-mortem report was already on record. The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur dismissed the appellant’s petition, stating there was no reason to interfere with the Trial Court’s discretion. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Legal Framework

The Supreme Court referred to Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), which states:

“311. Power to summon material witness, or examine person present: Any Court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or recall and re-examine any person already examined; and the Court shall summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person if his evidence appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the case.”

The Court also referred to Sections 284 and 285 of the CrPC, which deal with the issuance of commissions for the examination of witnesses when their attendance cannot be procured without undue delay, expense, or inconvenience. Section 284(1) states:

“Whenever, in the course of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, it appears to a Court of Magistrate that the examination of a witness is necessary for the ends of justice, and that the attendance of such witness cannot be procured without an amount of delay, expense or inconvenience which, under the circumstances of the case, would be unreasonable, the Court or Magistrate may dispense with such attendance and may issue a commission for the examination of the witness in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter”

Section 285 of the CrPC deals with the procedure of issuing the commission to the concerned authority.

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments:

• The appellant argued that Dr. I. Yusuf, who conducted the first post-mortem, is a material witness whose testimony is essential for a just decision.
• The appellant contended that the Trial Court’s rejection of the application based on the delay in the trial was not a judicious approach.
• The appellant submitted that the Trial Court should ensure all material evidence is on record to arrive at a just conclusion.
• The appellant also suggested that Dr. I. Yusuf could be examined through video conferencing.

Respondent’s Arguments:

• The respondent argued that the appellant’s application was a tactic to protract the trial.
• The respondent contended that the Trial Court had consciously exercised its discretion in rejecting the application and that the High Court rightly declined to interfere.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court considered the following issue:

1. Whether the Trial Court was justified in rejecting the application under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) to summon Dr. I. Yusuf, the doctor who conducted the first post-mortem in Nigeria?

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues

Authorities

The Supreme Court relied on the following authorities:

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

The Court referred to Mohanlal Shamji Soni v. Union of India: 1991 Supp (1) SCC 271*, Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat: (2004) 4 SCC 158*, Mina Lalita Baruwa v. State of Orissa and Others : (2013) 16 SCC 173* and Rajaram Prasad Yadav v. State of Bihar and Ors : 2013 (14) SCC 461* to emphasize the principles underlying Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) and the amplitude of the powers of the Court.

The Court relied on Natasha Singh v. CBI (State) : (2013) 5 SCC 741* to reiterate that the discretionary power under Section 311 CrPC is very wide but must be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily, and that the determinative factor should be whether summoning/recalling a witness is essential for a just decision.

The Court also referred to State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Praful B. Desai : (2003) 4 SCC 601* to highlight that recording of evidence through video conferencing is a viable option when a witness is not available in the country and that it satisfies the object of providing that evidence be recorded in the presence of the Accused.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of ensuring a just decision by considering all necessary and material evidence. The Court noted that the first post-mortem was conducted by Dr. I. Yusuf in Nigeria, and his testimony was crucial, especially since the Medical Board in India could not form a definite opinion on the cause of death. The Court also considered that the copy of the post-mortem report was on record, but the accused had the right to cross-examine the doctor. The Court also took into account the fact that the appellant had suggested that the doctor could be examined through video conferencing. The Court also noted that the Trial Court had not considered the relevant aspects of the case and had prioritized the delay in the trial over the need for material evidence.

Fact:Law Ratio

Logical Reasoning:

The Court considered that the Trial Court had not considered the relevant aspects of the case and had prioritized the delay in the trial over the need for material evidence. The Court also considered the fact that the witness was in Nigeria and that video conferencing was a viable option. The Court also noted that the appellant had suggested that the doctor could be examined through video conferencing. The Court also considered the fact that the copy of the post-mortem report was on record, but the accused had the right to cross-examine the doctor.

The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the application was a tactic to delay the trial, stating that the need for material evidence outweighed concerns about delay. The Court also rejected the argument that the Trial Court had exercised its discretion correctly, stating that the Trial Court’s discretion was not exercised judiciously in this case.

The Supreme Court’s decision was based on the principle that the primary goal of a trial is to arrive at a just decision based on all the material evidence. The Court held that the Trial Court had erred in prioritizing the delay in the trial over the need for material evidence.

The Court stated, “the length/duration of a case cannot displace the basic requirement of ensuring the just decision after taking all the necessary and material evidence on record.”

The Court also noted, “the testimony of the said doctor who conducted the first post-mortem in Nigeria is germane to the questions involved in this matter; and for a just decision of the case with adequate opportunity to both the parties to put forward their case, the application under Section 311 CrPC ought to have been allowed.”

The Court further observed, “the Trial Court could have unquestionably taken recourse to the provisions of Sections 284 and 285 CrPC so as to avoid the delay in the matter and inconvenience to the parties and the witness.”

Key Takeaways

• Courts must prioritize the need for material evidence to ensure a just decision, even if it means delaying the trial.
• Trial courts should not reject applications to summon material witnesses solely based on the length of the trial.
• The testimony of a medical professional who conducted the first post-mortem is considered crucial in cases involving unnatural deaths.
• Courts should consider using video conferencing to record the evidence of witnesses who are not available in the country, to avoid inconvenience and delay.
• The discretionary powers under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) must be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily.

Directions

The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the Trial Court and the High Court and directed the Trial Court to take necessary measures to ensure the examination of Dr. I. Yusuf, either by issuing a commission or recording his statement through video conferencing. The Trial Court was also directed to ensure expeditious proceedings to conclude the matter at the earliest.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the need for material evidence outweighs concerns about delay in a criminal trial, and that the discretionary power under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) must be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. The Supreme Court also reiterated the importance of considering video conferencing for examining witnesses who are not available in the country.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, emphasizing that the need for material evidence is paramount for a just decision. The Court directed the Trial Court to examine Dr. I. Yusuf, either through commission or video conferencing, and to expedite the trial. This judgment underscores the importance of ensuring that all material evidence is considered in a criminal trial, even if it means delaying the proceedings.