Supreme Court Orders Fresh Hearing in Land Dispute: Ashim Ranjan Das vs. Shibu Bodhak (2018)

Date of the Judgment: April 05, 2018

Citation: 2018 INSC 278

Judges: J. Chelameswar, J., Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.

Can a land dispute be resolved without hearing all parties involved? The Supreme Court of India addressed this question in a case concerning land ownership in West Bengal. The court emphasized the importance of natural justice, ensuring all affected parties have a chance to present their case. This case revolves around a complex history of land transfers and disputes, ultimately leading to the Supreme Court ordering a fresh hearing. The judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench comprising Justice J. Chelameswar and Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, with Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul authoring the opinion.

Case Background

The case revolves around land originally owned by Krishna Pada Supai (KPS) under an ex-intermediary Kali Charan Pramanick in Mauza Jogatipota, West Bengal. In 1962, KPS transferred 14.89 acres of this land to Jitendra Lal Paul (8.26 acres) and Golap Bala Saha Mondal (6.63 acres). The dispute began when a Revenue Officer initiated proceedings under Section 44(2a) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953, which allows for the revision of entries in the record-of-rights. This action led to the cancellation of the tenancy rights of both Paul and Mondal.

Golap Bala Saha Mondal challenged this order in the Calcutta High Court, which set aside the cancellation in 1973, citing a lack of notice to Mondal and the Revenue Officer’s lack of jurisdiction to determine if the recorded owner was a benamidar (a person holding property in their name for another person). However, Jitendra Lal Paul did not challenge the order, and after his death, his land was eventually sold to Ashim Ranjan Das, the appellant in this case.

Meanwhile, the State Government, believing the land of Jitendra Lal Paul had vested in them, granted pattas (land deeds) to Shibu Bodhak and Tapan Malik (respondents 1 and 2) in 1980. In 1990, the heirs of Jitendra Lal Paul, including Ashim Ranjan Das, filed a writ petition arguing that the land should not be vested in the State. This petition was successful in 1997, based on the 1973 High Court order. Following this, Ashim Ranjan Das filed another writ petition in 1998 to have his name mutated in the records, which was transferred to the Land Tribunal.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The Revenue Officer’s order canceling the tenancy rights of Jitendra Lal Paul and Golap Bala Saha Mondal was challenged by Mondal in the Calcutta High Court. The High Court set aside the order in 1973, stating that the proceedings were conducted without notice to Mondal and that the Revenue Officer lacked jurisdiction to determine if the recorded owner was a benamidar. However, no such challenge was made by or on behalf of Jitendra Lal Paul.

Later, after the land was sold to Ashim Ranjan Das, a writ petition was filed by the heirs of Jitendra Lal Paul, including Das, in 1990. This petition was allowed in 1997 based on the 1973 High Court order. Subsequently, Ashim Ranjan Das filed a writ petition in 1998, which was transferred to the Land Tribunal. The Tribunal ordered the restoration of the land to KPS in 2000, which was unsuccessfully challenged by the State Government.

Shibu Bodhak and Tapan Malik, the patta holders, then appealed the Tribunal’s order in the High Court, which set aside the Tribunal’s order in 2004, citing a violation of natural justice as they were not heard by the Tribunal. The High Court ordered a fresh hearing before the Tribunal, which led to the current appeal before the Supreme Court.

Legal Framework

The case primarily involves the interpretation and application of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953, and the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955.

The West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953, aims to acquire estates and the rights of intermediaries. Section 2(i) defines “intermediary” as a proprietor, tenure-holder, or any other intermediary above a raiyat or a non-agricultural tenant. Section 4 allows the State Government to declare that all estates and the rights of every intermediary shall vest in the State. Section 5 specifies the effect of such a notification, including that non-agricultural tenants and raiyats hold land directly under the State. Section 6 allows intermediaries to retain certain lands, such as homesteads and agricultural land, as tenants under the State.

Section 44 of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953, deals with the preparation and revision of the record-of-rights. Sub-section (2a) allows an officer to revise an entry in the record after giving the persons interested an opportunity of being heard. The Supreme Court noted that the Revenue Officer sought to exercise power under Section 44(2a) of the Acquisition Act suo moto on 7.4.1969.

The West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955, was enacted to reform land tenure laws after the vesting of estates in the State. It vests rights in land in the raiyat.

Relevant provisions include:

• Section 2(i) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953:
  “intermediary” means a proprietor, tenure-holder, under-tenure-holder or any other intermediary above a raiyat or a non-agricultural tenant and includes a service tenure-holder and, in relation to mines and minerals, includes a lessee and a sub-lessee;
• Section 4 of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953:
  (1) The State Government may from time to time by notification declare that with effect from the date mentioned in the notification, all estates and the rights of every intermediary in each such estate situated in any district or part of a district specified in the notification, shall vest in the State free from all incumbrances.
• Section 5(1)(c) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953:
  (Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 6, every non-agricultural tenant holding any land) under an intermediary, and until the provisions of Chapter VI are given effect to, every raiyat holding any land under an intermediary, shall hold the same directly under the State, as if the State had been the intermediary, and on the same terms and conditions as immediately before the date of vesting:
• Section 6(1) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953:
  Notwithstanding anything contained in sections 4 and 5, an intermediary shall , except in the cases mentioned in the proviso to sub-section (2) but subject to the other provisions of that sub-section, be entitled to retain with effect from the date of vesting — (a) land comprised in homesteads; (b) land comprised in or appertaining to buildings and structures owned by the intermediary or by any person, not being a tenant holding under him by leave or license; (c) non-agricultural land in his khas possession including land held under him by any person , not being a tenant, by leave or license, not exceeding fifteen acres in area, and excluding any land retained under clause (a): Provided that the total area of land retained by an intermediary under clauses (a) and (c) shall not exceed twenty acres, as may be chosen by him: (d) agricultural land in his khas possession, not exceeding twenty-five acres in area , as may be chosen by him; (e) tank fisheries;
• Section 44(2a) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953:
  An officer specially empowered by the State Government may, on application within nine months, or of his own motion within [sixty years], from the date of final publication of the record-of-rights or from the date of coming into force of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 1957 (West Ben. Ord. X of 1957), whichever is later, revise an entry in the record finally published in accordance with the provisions of subsection (2) after giving the persons interested an opportunity of being heard and after recording reasons therefor:

Arguments

Appellant’s (Ashim Ranjan Das) Arguments:

• The appellant contended that the vesting of the land in the State Government was void ab initio because the proceedings under Section 44(2a) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953, were set aside by the High Court in 1973. Therefore, the subsequent grant of pattas to respondents 1 and 2 by the State was also invalid.
• The appellant argued that the respondents 1 and 2 should not have any grievance about not being made parties in Appeal No.401/2000 since the issue of the proceedings under Section 44(2a) of the Acquisition Act already stood resolved and had attained finality.
• The appellant’s rights derived from Jitendra Lal Paul, whose land was wrongly vested in the State, and the 1997 order in favour of the heirs of Jitendra Lal Paul should be upheld.

Respondents’ (Shibu Bodhak and Tapan Malik) Arguments:

• The respondents argued that they were patta holders of the land since 1980 and were not given an opportunity to be heard by the Tribunal before the order directing the cancellation of their pattas was passed.
• They contended that the Tribunal’s order was in violation of the principles of natural justice, as they were not made parties to the proceedings and were not given a chance to present their case.
• The respondents emphasized that they had been in possession of the land since 1980 and only became aware of the cancellation of their pattas when they received a notice in April 2001.

State’s Arguments:

• The State argued that the land of Jitendra Lal Paul had vested in the State Government and hence, the State was authorized to grant pattas to the respondents 1 and 2.

The innovativeness of the argument of the appellant lies in the fact that the appellant was trying to rely on a previous order of the Calcutta High Court which was in favour of another party and was trying to claim that the same order should be applicable to him. On the other hand, the respondents were relying on the principle of natural justice that they should have been given an opportunity to be heard before any order was passed against them.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court did not explicitly frame issues in the judgment. However, the core issue was whether the High Court was correct in remanding the matter back to the Tribunal for a fresh hearing.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues:

Authorities

The Supreme Court did not explicitly rely on any specific cases or books in its reasoning. The primary focus was on the application of the principles of natural justice and the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953, and the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955.

The Court considered the following legal provisions:

• Section 2(i) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953, defining “intermediary”.
• Section 4 of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953, regarding the vesting of estates in the State.
• Section 5(1)(c) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953, regarding the holding of land under the State.
• Section 6(1) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953, regarding the right of intermediaries to retain certain lands.
• Section 44(2a) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953, regarding the revision of entries in the record-of-rights.

Judgment

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• The Court considered the provisions of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953, particularly Sections 2(i), 4, 5(1)(c), 6(1), and 44(2a) to understand the legal framework and the powers of the Revenue Officer and State Government in the context of land acquisition and tenancy rights.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the principle of natural justice. The Court emphasized that the patta holders (respondents 1 and 2) were directly affected by the Tribunal’s order to cancel their pattas and should have been given an opportunity to be heard. The Court noted that the Tribunal’s order violated the principles of natural justice, as the respondents were not made parties to the proceedings. The Court also took into account the fact that the respondents had been in possession of the land since 1980 and were only made aware of the cancellation of their pattas in 2001.

The Court also considered the chequered factual history of the case, the previous order of the High Court in 1973, and the subsequent actions of the State Government. The Court noted that while the proceedings initiated under Section 44(2a) of the Acquisition Act in 1969 were set aside by the High Court’s order in 1973, the State Government took action regarding the land of Jitendra Lal Paul, leading to the issuance of pattas to respondents 1 and 2 in 1980. The Court also took into account that the appellant had purchased the land in 1987 and filed the writ petition in 1990.

The Supreme Court considered the alternative interpretation that the respondents were not necessary parties to the proceedings before the Tribunal. However, the Court rejected this interpretation on the ground that the respondents were directly affected by the Tribunal’s order and should have been given an opportunity to be heard. The Court also noted that the Tribunal’s order was passed without impleading the respondents, who were the patta holders, and that the hearing to be given by the Block Land and Reforms Officer would be of no consequence, as the Tribunal had already directed the mutation of the plots in favor of the appellant.

The decision was that the matter should be remanded to the Tribunal for a fresh hearing, giving the respondents an opportunity to present their case. The court did not make any observations on the merits of the controversy and this setting aside was necessitated on account of violation of principles of natural justice.

The Court stated: “In such a situation the first two respondents, at least, have a right to be heard and that is what has weighed with the High Court while setting at naught the directions of the Tribunal dated 19.9.2000 and subsequent proceedings thereto, vide order in appeal dated 7.5.2004.”

The Court also said: “We believe the endeavour of the appellant through the present proceedings has proved to be a fruitless exercise as by now the matter on being remanded would have been adjudicated, after giving opportunities to the first two respondents.”

The Court further observed: “The case has had a chequered factual history.”

The majority opinion was delivered by Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul.

Key Takeaways

• The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of natural justice in land dispute cases.
• All parties affected by a judicial or quasi-judicial order must be given an opportunity to be heard.
• Orders passed without adhering to the principles of natural justice are liable to be set aside.
• The case highlights the complexities of land disputes and the importance of proper procedure.
• The judgment reinforces the principle that even if an order is passed based on a previous order, it is important to hear the affected parties.

Directions

The Supreme Court did not give any specific directions other than remitting the matter back to the Land Tribunal for a fresh hearing, allowing the respondents to file their affidavits and be heard on the merits of the controversy.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of the case is that any order passed by a quasi-judicial body without giving an opportunity to the affected parties to be heard is liable to be set aside for violation of principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court reiterated the importance of following the principles of natural justice, which is a well-established principle of law.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court’s decision to remand the matter back to the Land Tribunal. The ruling underscores the importance of adhering to the principles of natural justice in land dispute cases. The case serves as a reminder that all affected parties must be given a fair opportunity to present their case before any decision is made that impacts their rights. The Supreme Court’s decision ensures that the land dispute will be re-examined with all parties being heard, which is a fundamental requirement of a fair judicial process.