LEGAL ISSUE: Whether non-compliance with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, regarding the delivery of the Public Analyst’s report to the accused, warrants the overturning of a conviction.
CASE TYPE: Criminal Law, Food Adulteration
Case Name: Vijendra vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
[Judgment Date]: July 31, 2019
Date of the Judgment: July 31, 2019
Citation: (2019) INSC 752
Judges: R. Banumathi, J. and A.S. Bopanna, J.
Can a conviction for food adulteration stand if the accused was not properly served with the Public Analyst’s report, as required by law? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this crucial question in a case concerning the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The court examined whether the procedural lapses in providing the report to the accused prejudiced their right to a fair trial. The bench comprised Justices R. Banumathi and A.S. Bopanna, with the judgment authored by Justice A.S. Bopanna.
Case Background
On October 16, 1979, a Food Inspector, R.C. Kansal, found Vijendra (the appellant) selling buffalo milk without a license on Acchapalgarhi Road, Pilakhuwa, Ghaziabad. Suspecting adulteration, the Food Inspector purchased 660 ml of milk for ₹1.65 in the presence of a public witness, Radhey Shyam. The milk sample was divided into three parts, sealed, and labeled with the appellant’s thumb impression. One sample was sent to the Public Analyst in Lucknow on October 17, 1979.
The Public Analyst’s report, dated November 15, 1979, revealed that the milk sample was deficient by 12% in milk fat and 27% in non-fatty solids, thus declaring it adulterated. The Chief Medical Officer, Y.K. Bhushan, granted consent for prosecution on February 6, 1980. A complaint was filed in court on March 18, 1980, and the court took cognizance of the matter. The Public Analyst’s report was sent to the appellant by registered post on April 7, 1980.
During the trial, the prosecution examined the Food Inspector (PW-1), a clerk from the Chief Medical Officer’s office (PW-2), and the public witness (PW-3). PW-2 testified that the Public Analyst’s report was sent to the appellant via registered post on April 7, 1980. However, PW-3 was declared hostile by the prosecution. The appellant pleaded not guilty and did not present any defense evidence.
The Trial Court convicted the appellant, sentencing him to six months of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹1000. The appeal filed by the appellant was also dismissed. Subsequently, the appellant filed a Criminal Revision before the High Court, which was also dismissed.
Timeline
Date | Event |
---|---|
October 16, 1979 | Food Inspector found the appellant selling milk without a license. Milk sample taken. |
October 17, 1979 | One sample sent to Public Analyst, Lucknow |
November 15, 1979 | Public Analyst’s report declared the milk adulterated. |
February 6, 1980 | Chief Medical Officer granted consent for prosecution. |
March 18, 1980 | Complaint filed in court. Court took cognizance. |
April 7, 1980 | Public Analyst’s report sent to the appellant by registered post. |
June 2, 1987 | Trial Court convicted the appellant. |
November 1, 1988 | Appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed. |
December 9, 2014 | High Court of Allahabad dismissed the Criminal Revision filed by the appellant. |
July 31, 2019 | Supreme Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant. |
Course of Proceedings
The Trial Court convicted the appellant, holding that the prosecution had proven the case despite the independent witness turning hostile. The court relied on the testimony of the Food Inspector and the clerk who sent the report. The Trial Court also held that the delay in sending the report to the appellant was not fatal to the prosecution.
The Additional Sessions Judge upheld the conviction, agreeing with the Trial Court’s findings. The High Court of Allahabad also dismissed the Criminal Revision filed by the appellant. The High Court held that the purpose of Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 was to enable the accused to apply for re-testing of the sample, and since the appellant did not apply for it, there was substantial compliance of the law.
Legal Framework
The case primarily revolves around the interpretation of Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, and Rule 9B of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955.
Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 states:
“After the institution of the prosecution under this Act, the accused shall, on payment of the prescribed fee, be given a copy of the report of the public analyst and it shall be open to the accused to make an application to the court within a period of ten days from the date of the receipt of the copy of the report to get the sample of the article of food kept by the local authority analysed by the Central Food Laboratory.”
Rule 9B of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, specifies the procedure for forwarding the Public Analyst’s report:
“The Local (Health) Authority shall, within 10 days after the institution of the prosecution, forward a copy of the report of the result of the analysis by the Public Analyst by registered post or by hand, as may be appropriate, to the person from whom the sample of the article was taken by the Food Inspector.”
These provisions ensure that the accused is informed of the findings of the Public Analyst and has the opportunity to challenge the report by seeking a re-analysis from the Central Food Laboratory.
Arguments
Appellant’s Arguments:
- The appellant argued that there was non-compliance with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, as the Public Analyst’s report was not served on him. The mere statement of the prosecution witnesses that the report was sent by registered post is not sufficient without proof of postal receipt or acknowledgment.
- The report was sent after a delay of 19 days from the date of filing of the complaint, whereas the law mandates that the report should be sent within 10 days of the institution of prosecution.
- There was non-compliance of Rules 17 and 18 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955.
- The independent witness did not support the prosecution’s case, and the Food Inspector’s testimony alone is insufficient to prove the guilt of the appellant.
- The prosecution did not establish that the sample was taken properly after stirring the milk, which is essential for accurate analysis.
Respondent’s Arguments:
- The respondent contended that Section 13(2) and Rule 9A use the word “forward” and not “serve” or “deliver,” implying that the obligation is only to send the report, not to ensure its receipt by the accused.
- The appellant had the option to apply to the court for sending the sample to the Central Food Laboratory for re-testing, but he failed to do so. Therefore, the appellant cannot claim prejudice due to non-compliance or defective compliance of the law.
Main Submission | Sub-Submissions |
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Non-compliance of Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 |
|
Non-compliance of Rules 17 and 18 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 |
|
Insufficient Evidence |
|
Compliance with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 |
|
No prejudice caused to the appellant |
|
Innovativeness of the argument: The appellant’s argument that the mere dispatch of the report is insufficient and that the actual delivery of the report to the accused is necessary for compliance with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, is a significant point. This argument highlights the importance of ensuring that the accused is fully aware of the charges and has a fair opportunity to defend themselves.
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court considered the following issues:
- Whether the non-compliance with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, regarding the delivery of the Public Analyst’s report to the accused, warrants the overturning of a conviction.
- Whether the prosecution has established that the sample was taken in the proper manner, especially in light of the independent witness not supporting the prosecution’s case.
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues:
Issue | Court’s Decision | Brief Reasons |
---|---|---|
Whether non-compliance with Section 13(2) warrants overturning the conviction? | Yes | The court held that the delivery of the report is essential to enable the accused to seek re-analysis and that the mere dispatch of the report is not sufficient. Since there was no proof of delivery, the accused’s right to seek re-analysis was defeated. |
Whether the prosecution established that the sample was taken in the proper manner? | No | The court noted that the independent witness did not support the prosecution’s case and that the evidence did not establish that the sample was taken properly after stirring the milk, which is essential for accurate analysis. |
Authorities
The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:
Cases:
- Ram Lubhaya vs. Municipal Corporation, 1975 FAJ page no. 253 – The Supreme Court of India. This case was cited by the Trial Court and High Court to hold that the guilt can be proved by the evidence of the Food Inspector. The Supreme Court in the present case did not rely on this case.
- K. Harikumar vs. Food Inspector, Punaloor Municipality (1995) Supple 3 SCC 405 – The Supreme Court of India. This case was relied upon by the Supreme Court to emphasize the importance of stirring and churning of milk and curd for attaining homogeneity before taking the sample for analysis.
Legal Provisions:
- Section 7(1)/16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 – This section deals with the penalties for selling adulterated food.
- Section 10(7) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 – This section requires the Food Inspector to call one or more persons to be present when taking a sample.
- Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 – This section provides the accused the right to receive a copy of the Public Analyst’s report and to apply for re-analysis by the Central Food Laboratory.
- Rule 9B of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 – This rule specifies the procedure for forwarding the Public Analyst’s report to the accused.
- Rules 17 and 18 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 – These rules specify the procedure for taking samples of food.
Authority | Court | How it was considered |
---|---|---|
Ram Lubhaya vs. Municipal Corporation, 1975 FAJ page no. 253 | Supreme Court of India | Cited by lower courts to justify conviction based on Food Inspector’s evidence, but not relied upon by the Supreme Court in this case. |
K. Harikumar vs. Food Inspector, Punaloor Municipality (1995) Supple 3 SCC 405 | Supreme Court of India | Relied upon to emphasize the importance of proper sampling techniques, including stirring and churning, to ensure accurate analysis. |
Section 7(1)/16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 | Statute | The section under which the appellant was charged and convicted. |
Section 10(7) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 | Statute | The section that mandates the presence of independent witnesses during sample collection. |
Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 | Statute | The section that provides the accused the right to receive the Public Analyst’s report and to apply for re-analysis. |
Rule 9B of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 | Rules | The rule that specifies the procedure for forwarding the Public Analyst’s report. |
Rules 17 and 18 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 | Rules | The rules that specify the procedure for taking samples of food. |
Judgment
Submission by Parties | How it was treated by the Court |
---|---|
Appellant’s submission that the Public Analyst’s report was not served on him. | The Court agreed that there was no proof of delivery of the report, and the mere dispatch of the report was not sufficient compliance with the law. |
Appellant’s submission that the report was sent after a delay of 19 days. | The Court noted that the report was sent beyond the 10-day period as required by the rules. |
Appellant’s submission that the independent witness did not support the prosecution’s case. | The Court noted that the independent witness did not support the prosecution’s case. |
Appellant’s submission that the prosecution did not establish proper sampling techniques. | The Court agreed that the prosecution did not establish that the sample was taken properly after stirring the milk. |
Respondent’s argument that “forward” does not mean “serve” or “deliver”. | The Court rejected this interpretation, holding that the purpose of Section 13(2) is to enable the accused to seek re-analysis, which requires actual delivery of the report. |
Respondent’s argument that the appellant did not apply for re-testing. | The Court held that the failure to apply for re-testing was not relevant, since the appellant’s right to do so was prejudiced by the non-delivery of the report. |
How each authority was viewed by the Court?
✓ Ram Lubhaya vs. Municipal Corporation, 1975 FAJ page no. 253: The Supreme Court did not rely on this case, which was cited by the lower courts to justify the conviction based on the Food Inspector’s evidence alone.
✓ K. Harikumar vs. Food Inspector, Punaloor Municipality (1995) Supple 3 SCC 405: The Supreme Court relied on this case to emphasize the importance of proper sampling techniques, including stirring and churning, to ensure accurate analysis of milk products.
✓ Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954: The Supreme Court emphasized that this section provides a valuable right to the accused, which can only be exercised if the accused is duly served with the Public Analyst’s report.
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the need to protect the procedural rights of the accused. The Court emphasized that the right to receive the Public Analyst’s report under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, is a valuable right that must be strictly adhered to. The Court noted that the purpose of this provision is to enable the accused to seek a re-analysis of the sample if they are not satisfied with the Public Analyst’s report.
The Court also considered the importance of proper sampling techniques, particularly for milk, where the fat content can vary depending on how the sample is taken. The Court noted that the independent witness did not support the prosecution’s case and that the prosecution failed to establish that the sample was taken correctly.
The Court was not swayed by the argument that the appellant could have applied for a re-analysis, as the appellant’s right to do so was prejudiced by the non-delivery of the report.
The Court’s reasoning was based on the principle that penal consequences must be construed strictly, and any lapses in procedure that prejudice the accused’s rights cannot be ignored.
The Supreme Court’s decision underscores the importance of adhering to procedural safeguards in criminal cases, especially those involving food adulteration, where the consequences for the accused can be severe.
Reason | Sentiment Analysis |
---|---|
Non-delivery of the Public Analyst’s report to the accused | The Court emphasized the importance of actual delivery of the report to enable the accused to seek re-analysis. |
Failure to establish proper sampling techniques | The Court highlighted that the prosecution did not prove that the milk sample was taken properly after stirring, which is essential for accurate analysis. |
Independent witness not supporting the prosecution’s case | The Court noted that the lack of support from the independent witness weakened the prosecution’s case. |
Procedural lapses that prejudiced the accused’s rights | The Court emphasized that procedural lapses that prejudice the accused’s rights cannot be ignored, particularly when penal consequences are involved. |
Strict construction of penal consequences | The Court emphasized that penal consequences must be construed strictly, and any lapses in procedure that prejudice the accused’s rights cannot be ignored. |
Category | Percentage |
---|---|
Fact | 40% |
Law | 60% |
Fact:Law Ratio Analysis: The ratio of fact to law in this case is 40:60. This indicates that while the factual aspects of the case, such as the manner in which the sample was taken and the testimony of the witnesses, were important, the court’s decision was primarily driven by legal considerations, particularly the interpretation of Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, and the procedural safeguards it provides.
Logical Reasoning
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the appellant’s failure to apply for re-testing was a waiver of his rights. The court held that the appellant’s right to seek re-analysis was prejudiced by the non-delivery of the report, and therefore, the conviction could not be sustained.
The Court also rejected the argument that the term “forward” in Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, and Rule 9B of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, only requires the dispatch of the report and not its actual delivery. The Court held that the purpose of the provision is to enable the accused to seek re-analysis, which requires actual delivery of the report.
The Court also highlighted the importance of proper sampling techniques, particularly for milk, where the fat content can vary depending on how the sample is taken. The Court noted that the independent witness did not support the prosecution’s case and that the prosecution failed to establish that the sample was taken correctly.
The Supreme Court’s decision was based on the principle that penal consequences must be construed strictly, and any lapses in procedure that prejudice the accused’s rights cannot be ignored.
The majority opinion was delivered by Justice A.S. Bopanna, with Justice R. Banumathi concurring. There were no dissenting opinions.
The Court’s decision has significant implications for future cases involving food adulteration, as it emphasizes the importance of adhering to procedural safeguards to ensure a fair trial.
The Supreme Court quoted the following from the judgment:
- “The very purpose of furnishing such report is to enable the accused to seek for reference to the Central Food Laboratory for analysis if the accused is dissatisfied with the report.”
- “Such safeguard provided to the accused under Section 13(2) of the Act is a valuable right.”
- “In that circumstance when the appellant/accused is made to suffer the penal consequences, it will have to be construed strictly.”
Key Takeaways
- The Supreme Court emphasized that the actual delivery of the Public Analyst’s report to the accused is mandatory under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, and the mere dispatch of the report is not sufficient.
- The right of the accused to seek re-analysis of the sample by the Central Food Laboratory is a valuable right that must be protected.
- The prosecution must establish that the sample was taken in a proper manner, particularly for milk, where the fat content can vary depending on how the sample is taken.
- The testimony of the Food Inspector alone is not sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused, especially when the independent witness does not support the prosecution’s case.
- Procedural lapses that prejudice the accused’s rights cannot be ignored, particularly when penal consequences are involved.
Directions
The Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the lower courts and acquitted the appellant of the charge under Section 7(1)/16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
Development of Law
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the actual delivery of the Public Analyst’s report to the accused is mandatory under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, and the mere dispatch of the report is not sufficient. This decision clarifies the procedural requirements for cases under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, and emphasizes the importance of protecting the rights of the accused. This case also highlights the importance of proper sampling techniques and the need for corroborating evidence in such cases. There is a change in the previous position of law, where the lower courts had held that the mere dispatch of the report is sufficient.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision in Vijendra vs. State of Uttar Pradesh underscores the importance of adhering to procedural safeguards in criminal cases, particularly those involving food adulteration. The Court held that the actual delivery of the Public Analyst’s report to the accused is mandatory and that the prosecution must establish that the sample was taken in a proper manner. The Court’s decision protects the rights of the accused and ensures a fair trial.