Supreme Court overturns conviction in corruption case due to lack of demand evidence: Neeraj Dutta vs. State (2023)

Date of the Judgment: March 17, 2023
Citation: Criminal Appeal No. 1669 of 2009
Judges: Abhay S. Oka, J., Rajesh Bindal, J.
Can a public servant be convicted for corruption if there is no direct evidence of them demanding a bribe? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this crucial question in a case where the complainant, who alleged bribery, had died before the trial commenced. The court examined whether circumstantial evidence alone could be sufficient to prove the demand for illegal gratification, a key element in corruption cases. This judgment clarifies the evidentiary standards required in such cases and emphasizes the necessity of proving the demand for a bribe beyond a reasonable doubt.

Case Background

The case involves an appeal by Neeraj Dutta against her conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The original complainant, Mr. Ravijit Singh, alleged that Ms. Dutta, an Inspector in the Delhi Vidyut Board (DVB), demanded a bribe of ₹10,000 for installing an electricity meter in his shop. However, Mr. Singh died before the trial began. The prosecution’s case rested on the testimony of a shadow witness and circumstantial evidence to prove the demand and acceptance of the bribe.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The Special Judge, Delhi, convicted the appellant under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The co-accused was convicted under Section 12 of the same Act but was later acquitted by the High Court. The High Court upheld the appellant’s conviction. A two-judge bench of the Supreme Court, while hearing the appeal, noted a conflict between previous decisions of the court regarding the necessity of direct evidence of demand in corruption cases. Therefore, the matter was referred to a larger bench, which was a Constitution Bench.

Legal Framework

The Supreme Court referred to the relevant provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, as they stood before the 2018 amendment.

• Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (prior to 2018 amendment): This section deals with a public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act. It states that if a public servant accepts or obtains any gratification as a motive or reward for doing or not doing any official act, they are punishable under this section. The court emphasized that the demand for and acceptance of gratification are essential elements for this offense.
  
  “Whoever, being, or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act…”
• Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (prior to 2018 amendment): This section defines criminal misconduct by a public servant. It includes obtaining any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage by corrupt or illegal means or by abusing their position as a public servant.
  
  “A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct… if he, by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage…”

The court clarified that for offenses under Section 7, both the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification must be proven. For offenses under Section 13(1)(d), the acceptance of illegal gratification must be established.

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments:

• The appellant argued that there was no evidence of a demand for illegal gratification.
• It was submitted that proof of demand is a prerequisite for offenses under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
• The findings of the lower courts were based on speculation and conjecture.

Respondent’s Arguments:

• The prosecution argued that the shadow witness (PW-5) had proven the demand.
• It was submitted that circumstantial evidence also proved the demand and acceptance.
• Once demand and acceptance are established, there is a presumption that the gratification was a motive or reward.
• The prosecution contended that no interference was needed with the High Court’s judgment.

Innovativeness of the argument: The appellant’s argument was innovative in highlighting that the prosecution’s case relied heavily on assumptions and lacked concrete proof of a demand for gratification, which is a crucial element for conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The main issue before the Supreme Court was:

1. Whether, in the absence of direct evidence of demand of illegal gratification, it is permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• The court relied on B. Jayaraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh [2014 (13) SCC 55]* and P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. District Inspector of Police, State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. [2015 (10) SCC 152]*, which held that demand and acceptance of illegal gratification must be proved for offenses under Section 7 of the PC Act.
• The court also relied on N. Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu [2021 (3) SCC 687]*, which reiterated that the demand for gratification and its acceptance must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
• The court clarified that the presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988* could only be invoked after the basic facts of demand and acceptance were proven.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court emphasized the necessity of proving the demand for illegal gratification beyond a reasonable doubt. The court found that the prosecution’s evidence was insufficient to prove that the appellant demanded a bribe. The court noted that the shadow witness’s testimony did not establish that the appellant specifically demanded a bribe for installing an electricity meter. Additionally, the court considered the fact that the complainant’s grievance regarding the stolen meter was made eight days after the alleged demand, casting doubt on the prosecution’s case. The court also noted that the complainant did not produce a copy of the application for the electricity meter, further weakening the prosecution’s claim that the bribe was demanded for installing a new meter.

Logical Reasoning:

The court considered the prosecution’s argument that the shadow witness’s testimony proved the demand. However, the court found that the witness’s statement that the appellant asked for papers and money was not sufficient to establish a demand for gratification. The court also considered the fact that the complainant had filed a complaint about a stolen meter eight days after the alleged demand, which created doubt about the prosecution’s case. The court rejected the argument that the presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act could be invoked because the basic facts of demand and acceptance were not proven.

The court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove the demand for gratification beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore, the conviction could not be sustained.

“The demand for gratification and the acceptance thereof are sine qua non for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the PC Act.”

“Even taking the statements of PW-5 in the examination-in-chief as correct, it is impossible to even infer that the demand of Rs.10,000/- was made by the appellant by way of gratification.”

“The allegation of demand of gratification and acceptance made by a public servant has to be established beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Key Takeaways

• The demand for illegal gratification is a crucial element that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in corruption cases.
• In the absence of direct evidence, circumstantial evidence can be used to prove the demand, but it must be strong and consistent with the conclusion of guilt.
• The presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, can only be invoked after the basic facts of demand and acceptance of gratification are proven.
• The prosecution must establish each circumstance from which they want the court to draw a conclusion of guilt.
• Mere acceptance of money is not sufficient to prove a demand for gratification.

Directions

The Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment and the judgment of the Special Court, thereby setting aside the conviction and sentence of the appellant. The bail bonds of the appellant were cancelled.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that in corruption cases, the demand for illegal gratification must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This judgment reinforces the principle that while circumstantial evidence can be used to prove demand, it must be strong and consistent with the conclusion of guilt. It also clarifies that the presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act can only be invoked after the basic facts of demand and acceptance of gratification are proven. This case does not change the previous position of law but rather reinforces the existing principles and clarifies their application in cases where direct evidence is lacking.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court overturned the conviction of Neeraj Dutta, emphasizing that a demand for illegal gratification must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The court found that the prosecution’s evidence, including the testimony of the shadow witness and circumstantial evidence, was insufficient to establish the demand. This judgment reinforces the importance of proving all essential elements of corruption offenses and highlights the high evidentiary standards required for conviction.