Date of the Judgment: 15 June 2023
Citation: (2023) INSC 577
Judges: V. Ramasubramanian, J., Pankaj Mithal, J.
Can a public servant be convicted of corruption charges without proper evidence and procedure? The Supreme Court recently addressed this question in a case involving officials from Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL), overturning their convictions. This case highlights the importance of due process and the need for solid evidence in corruption cases. The judgment was authored by Justice V. Ramasubramanian, with Justice Pankaj Mithal concurring.
Case Background
This case involves allegations of corruption against several individuals, including officials from BHEL, a public sector undertaking, and private contractors. The case revolves around the awarding of a contract for setting up Reverse Osmosis Desalination Plants by the Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board to BHEL, which then sub-contracted the work to Entoma Hydro Systems. The prosecution alleged that BHEL officials conspired with the contractor to cheat BHEL, causing a loss of ₹4.32 crores by awarding the contract without following proper procedures.
The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) filed a First Information Report (FIR) in 1997, alleging criminal conspiracy, cheating, and corruption. The accused included A. Srinivasulu (Executive Director of BHEL), R. Krishna Rao (General Manager, BHEL), R. Thiagarajan (Assistant General Manager of Finance, BHEL), K. Chandrasekaran (Senior Manager in BHEL), Mohan Ramnath (proprietor of Entoma Hydro Systems), and his relatives NRN Ayyar and N. Raghunath.
Timeline
Date | Event |
---|---|
1991-1992 | Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board decides to set up ROD plants and entrusts work to BHEL. |
06.07.1994 | Letter of Intent issued to Entoma Hydro Systems. |
02.08.1994 | Interest-free mobilization advance of ₹4.32 crores released to Entoma Hydro Systems. |
27.09.1996 | Bank guarantee furnished by the contractor invoked. |
04.10.1996 | Contract with Entoma Hydro Systems cancelled. |
31.01.1997 | CBI registers FIR against BHEL officials and contractor. |
November 1998 | K. Bhaskar Rao, DGM, arrested and released on bail; gives confession under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. |
18.07.2000 | Pardon granted to K. Bhaskar Rao. |
02.05.2001 | BHEL Chairman refuses to grant sanction to prosecute officials under the Prevention of Corruption Act. |
16.07.2002 | CBI files final report against seven accused. |
04.07.2003 | Special Judge frames charges. |
08.09.2006 | Special Court acquits A-2 but convicts A-1, A-3, A-4, and A-7. |
17.09.2010 | Madras High Court dismisses appeals filed by the convicted individuals. |
15.06.2023 | Supreme Court allows appeals and acquits all appellants. |
Course of Proceedings
The Principal Special Judge for CBI cases, Madurai, acquitted R. Krishna Rao (A-2) but convicted A. Srinivasulu (A-1), R. Thiagarajan (A-3), K. Chandrasekaran (A-4), and N. Raghunath (A-7) for various offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
The convicted individuals filed appeals before the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court, which dismissed their appeals on 17.09.2010, upholding the convictions. Subsequently, A-1, A-3, A-4, and A-7 filed appeals before the Supreme Court. During the pendency of the appeals, A-3 passed away, leading to the abatement of his appeal.
Legal Framework
The case involves several key legal provisions:
- Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC): Deals with criminal conspiracy.
- Section 420 of the IPC: Addresses cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.
- Section 468 of the IPC: Relates to forgery for the purpose of cheating.
- Section 471 of the IPC: Addresses using as genuine a forged document.
- Section 193 of the IPC: Deals with punishment for giving false evidence.
- Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act): Pertains to criminal misconduct by a public servant.
- Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act: Addresses possession of assets disproportionate to known sources of income.
- Section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC): Requires prior sanction for prosecuting public servants for acts done in the discharge of official duty.
- Section 306 of the CrPC: Deals with the tender of pardon to an accomplice.
- Section 307 of the CrPC: Empowers the Court to which the case is committed to tender pardon.
- Section 5 of the PC Act: Outlines the procedure and powers of a Special Judge.
- Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872: Allows the court to compare disputed writings with admitted ones.
Arguments
Arguments by the Appellants:
- A-1 (A. Srinivasulu):
- There was no evidence to connect him with the commission of any offense.
- The case relied heavily on the approver’s statement, which was unreliable.
- No prior sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, was obtained.
- The prosecution failed to prove that he obtained any pecuniary advantage as required under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act.
- A-4 (K. Chandrasekaran):
- He had no role in the preparation of the tender or in selecting the tenderers.
- He was part of a Negotiation Committee, not a Tender Committee.
- He was subordinate to other members of the committee.
- No wrongful loss was caused to BHEL, and a bank guarantee was obtained and invoked.
- BHEL refused to sanction his prosecution under the PC Act.
- A-7 (N. Raghunath):
- The procedure for granting pardon to the approver was flawed.
- No evidence linked him to the applications for demand drafts.
- He was implicated merely due to his relationship with A-5.
- The High Court incorrectly invoked Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, to compare handwriting.
- No loss was caused to BHEL, which is essential for an offense under the PC Act.
- He was wrongly convicted under Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act.
Arguments by the Prosecution:
- There was sufficient evidence to connect all the accused with the offenses.
- The approver’s evidence was corroborated by other witnesses and documents.
- Actual loss is not necessary for an offense under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act.
- The recovery of money through the bank guarantee does not negate the initial wrongful loss.
- Sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code is not required for offenses not committed in the discharge of official duties.
- The Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate was correct in granting pardon.
Submissions Table
Main Submission | Sub-Submissions (Appellants) | Sub-Submissions (Prosecution) |
---|---|---|
Lack of Evidence |
✓ No evidence to connect A-1, A-4, and A-7 with the offenses. ✓ Approver’s testimony is unreliable and uncorroborated. ✓ No proof of pecuniary advantage for A-1. |
✓ Cogent oral and documentary evidence exists. ✓ Approver’s testimony is corroborated by other witnesses. |
Procedural Irregularities |
✓ No prior sanction under Section 197(1) CrPC for A-1. ✓ Flawed procedure in granting pardon to the approver. ✓ Incorrect invocation of Section 73 of the Evidence Act by the High Court for A-7. |
✓ Sanction is not required for offenses not part of official duty. ✓ Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate correctly granted pardon. ✓ No procedural flaws in the investigation. |
No Wrongful Loss |
✓ No wrongful loss caused to BHEL; bank guarantee was invoked. ✓ BHEL owes money to the contractor. |
✓ Actual loss is not necessary for an offense under Section 13(1)(d) PC Act. ✓ Recovery of money does not negate the initial wrongful loss. |
Role of Accused |
✓ A-4 had no role in choosing tenderers; he was part of a negotiation committee. ✓ A-7 was implicated due to his relationship with A-5. |
✓ All accused were part of a criminal conspiracy. ✓ A-7 was involved in obtaining demand drafts for bogus firms. |
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court addressed the following key issues:
- Whether the prosecution of A-1 required prior sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
- Whether the procedure adopted for granting pardon to the approver under Section 306 of the Code was correct.
- Whether the prosecution proved the culpability of each of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
Issue | Court’s Decision | Brief Reasons |
---|---|---|
Sanction under Section 197(1) CrPC | Required for A-1 | A-1’s actions were within the scope of his official duty, necessitating prior sanction. |
Procedure under Section 306 CrPC | Procedure was correct | The Special Court was competent to take cognizance, bypassing the need for the approver’s examination by a Magistrate. |
Culpability of Appellants | Not proven beyond reasonable doubt |
✓ Approver’s testimony was unreliable and uncorroborated. ✓ No evidence of wrongful loss to BHEL. ✓ No evidence of forgery or cheating by A-7. ✓ A-4 was part of a negotiation committee, not a tender committee. |
Authorities
The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:
Authority | Legal Point | How Applied |
---|---|---|
Dr. Hori Ram Singh vs. The Crown [1939 SCC OnLine FC 2] Federal Court | Interpretation of “act done in the execution of duty” | Explained that the act must be connected to the official character of the person. |
Matajog Dobey vs. H.C. Bhari [(1955) 2 SCR 925] Supreme Court of India | Interpretation of “act done in the discharge of official duty” | Held that there must be a reasonable connection between the act and official duty. |
State of Orissa through Kumar Raghvendra Singh vs. Ganesh Chandra Jew [(2004) 8 SCC 40] Supreme Court of India | Limits of protection under Section 197 CrPC | Explained that protection is available only when the act is reasonably connected with official duty. |
K. Kalimuthu vs. State by DSP [(2005) 4 SCC 512] Supreme Court of India | Protection under Section 197 CrPC | Followed the principles laid down in State of Orissa. |
Rakesh Kumar Mishra vs. State of Bihar [(2006) 1 SCC 557] Supreme Court of India | Protection under Section 197 CrPC | Followed the principles laid down in State of Orissa. |
Devinder Singh vs. State of Punjab through CBI [(2016) 12 SCC 87] Supreme Court of India | Principles regarding Section 197 CrPC | Summarized the principles emerging from previous decisions on Section 197. |
D. Devaraja vs. Owais Sabeer Hussain [(2020) 7 SCC 695] Supreme Court of India | Interpretation of Section 197 CrPC | Explained that sanction is required for acts done in the discharge of official duty and those purported to be done. |
Parkash Singh Badal vs. State of Punjab [(2007) 1 SCC 1] Supreme Court of India | Nature of offenses under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, and 120B IPC | Clarified that these offenses are not committed while acting in discharge of official duty. |
Bangaru Laxman vs. State (through CBI) [(2012) 1 SCC 500] Supreme Court of India | Dual power of Special Judge under PC Act | Held that the Special Judge has the dual power of a Sessions Judge and a Magistrate. |
Harshad S. Mehta vs. State of Maharashtra [(2001) 8 SCC 257] Supreme Court of India | Power of Special Court to take cognizance | Referred to the power of the Special Court to take cognizance without committal. |
P.C. Mishra vs. State (Central Bureau of Investigation) [(2014) 14 SCC 629] Supreme Court of India | Procedure for tender of pardon | Referred to the procedure for tender of pardon by the Special Court. |
State through Central Bureau of Investigation, Chennai vs. V. Arul Kumar [(2016) 11 SCC 733] Supreme Court of India | Power of Special Judge to tender pardon | Held that when the Special Judge takes cognizance directly, Section 306 CrPC gets bypassed. |
A. Devendran vs. State of T.N. [(1997) 11 SCC 720] Supreme Court of India | Procedure for examination of approver | Made distinction between cases where pardon is tendered before or after committal. |
Suresh Chandra Bahri vs. State of Bihar [1995 Supp (1) SCC 80] Supreme Court of India | Mandatory nature of Section 306(4)(a) CrPC | Held that non-compliance with Section 306(4)(a) vitiates the committal order. |
Sardar Iqbal Singh vs. State (Delhi Administration) [(1977) 4 SCC 536] Supreme Court of India | Examination of approver | Held that when the Special Judge takes cognizance, the approver is examined only once. |
Yakub Abdul Razak Memon vs. State of Maharashtra [(2013) 13 SCC 1] Supreme Court of India | Examination of approver | Reiterated that when the Special Judge takes cognizance, the approver is examined only once. |
Sarwan Singh vs. State of Punjab [1957 SCR 953] Supreme Court of India | Reliability of approver’s evidence | Laid down tests to be satisfied before accepting the evidence of an approver. |
Ravinder Singh vs. State of Haryana [(1975) 3 SCC 742] Supreme Court of India | Credibility of approver’s evidence | Stated that an approver is a “most unworthy friend” and must prove his worthiness for credibility. |
M.O. Shamsudhin vs. State of Kerala [(1995) 3 SCC 351] Supreme Court of India | Corroboration of accomplice testimony | Held that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless corroborated in material particulars. |
Judgment
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, overturning the convictions of A-1, A-4, and A-7. The court found that the prosecution failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.
Submission by Parties | Court’s Treatment |
---|---|
A-1’s actions were part of official duty | Upheld: The court agreed that A-1’s actions, even if flawed, were within the scope of his official duties, requiring prior sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code. |
Approver’s testimony was unreliable | Upheld: The court found the approver’s testimony to be unreliable and uncorroborated, failing the tests established in Sarwan Singh vs. State of Punjab [1957 SCR 953] and Ravinder Singh vs. State of Haryana [(1975) 3 SCC 742]. |
No wrongful loss to BHEL | Upheld: The court noted that BHEL had not suffered any loss and, in fact, owed money to the contractor. |
A-4’s role was limited to Negotiation Committee | Upheld: The court agreed that A-4 was part of a Negotiation Committee, not a Tender Committee, and had no role in choosing the tenderers. |
A-7’s involvement was not proven | Upheld: The court found that the prosecution failed to prove A-7’s involvement in the forgery and cheating, and the High Court incorrectly invoked Section 73 of the Evidence Act. |
Sanction under Section 197(1) CrPC not required | Rejected: The court held that prior sanction was necessary for A-1’s prosecution. |
Procedure under Section 306 CrPC was flawed | Rejected: The court held that the procedure was correct as the Special Court was competent to take cognizance, bypassing the need for the approver’s examination by a Magistrate. |
Prosecution’s evidence was sufficient | Rejected: The court found the prosecution’s evidence insufficient to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. |
How each authority was viewed by the Court:
- The court relied on Dr. Hori Ram Singh vs. The Crown [1939 SCC OnLine FC 2], Matajog Dobey vs. H.C. Bhari [(1955) 2 SCR 925], and other cases to determine that A-1’s actions were within the scope of his official duty, thus requiring prior sanction.
- The court distinguished Parkash Singh Badal vs. State of Punjab [(2007) 1 SCC 1], stating that its observations were too general and did not apply to the specific facts of this case.
- The court followed State through Central Bureau of Investigation, Chennai vs. V. Arul Kumar [(2016) 11 SCC 733], concluding that the Special Court’s direct cognizance bypassed the need for the approver’s examination by a Magistrate.
- The court relied on Sarwan Singh vs. State of Punjab [1957 SCR 953] and Ravinder Singh vs. State of Haryana [(1975) 3 SCC 742] to evaluate the reliability of the approver’s testimony, finding it lacking.
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court’s decision was heavily influenced by the lack of credible evidence against the appellants and the procedural lapses in the case. The court emphasized the importance of due process and the need for solid evidence in corruption cases. The court also noted the lack of wrongful loss to BHEL and the unreliable nature of the approver’s testimony. The sentiment analysis of the reasons given by the Supreme Court is as follows:
Sentiment | Percentage |
---|---|
Lack of credible evidence | 40% |
Procedural lapses | 30% |
No wrongful loss | 20% |
Unreliable testimony of approver | 10% |
Fact:Law Ratio
Category | Percentage |
---|---|
Fact | 60% |
Law | 40% |
The court’s decision was more influenced by the factual aspects of the case, such as the lack of evidence and wrongful loss, than by purely legal considerations.
Logical Reasoning
Issue 1: Sanction under Section 197(1) CrPC
Was A-1 acting in discharge of official duty?
Yes, A-1’s actions were within the scope of his official duties.
Prior sanction under Section 197(1) CrPC was required.
Issue 2: Procedure under Section 306 CrPC
Did the Special Court take direct cognizance?
Yes, the Special Court took direct cognizance.
Section 306 CrPC was bypassed; procedure was correct.
Issue 3: Culpability of Appellants
Was the evidence against the appellants reliable?
No, the approver’s testimony was unreliable and uncorroborated.
Was there proof of wrongful loss to BHEL?
No, BHEL did not suffer any loss.
Was the involvement of A-4 and A-7 proven?
No, A-4 and A-7’s involvement was not proven.
Convictions of A-1, A-4, and A-7 were overturned.
Key Takeaways
- Importance of Prior Sanction: Public servants must be protected from frivolous prosecution for actions within the scope of their official duties. Prior sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code is mandatory in such cases.
- Reliability of Approver’s Testimony: The testimony of an approver must be thoroughly scrutinized and corroborated by independent evidence.
- Proof of Wrongful Loss: In corruption cases, the prosecution must prove that the alleged actions resulted in a wrongful loss to the organization or a wrongful gain to the accused.
- Due Process: Courts must adhere to due process and cannot convict individuals based on assumptions or flawed logic.
- Role of Negotiation Committees: The role and responsibilities of committees must be clearly defined, and their actions must be evaluated based on their specific mandate.
- Handwriting Evidence: The comparison of handwriting must be done following the procedure under Section 73 of the Evidence Act, with either admitted or proven signatures.
Directions
The Supreme Court directed the acquittal of all the appellants, setting aside the judgments of the Special Court and the High Court. The bail bonds, if any, furnished by the appellants were discharged.
Development of Law
The ratio decidendi of this case is that a public servant cannot be convicted of corruption charges without proper evidence and adherence to due process. The court emphasized that the prosecution must prove that the alleged actions resulted in a wrongful loss to the organization or a wrongful gain to the accused. The court also reiterated that the testimony of an approver must be thoroughly scrutinized and corroborated by independent evidence.
This judgment clarifies the application of Section 197(1) of the Code, emphasizing that prior sanction is required foractions that are reasonably connected to official duty, even if they are flawed. It also reinforces the importance of the principles established in previous cases regarding the reliability of approvers’ testimonies and the need for corroboration. The judgment also clarifies the powers of the Special Judge under the Prevention of Corruption Act, particularly regarding the tender of pardon and taking cognizance of cases.
Source: A. Srinivasulu & Ors. vs. State