Date of the Judgment: 23 April 2025
Citation: 2025 INSC 552
Judges: Dipankar Datta, J., Prashant Kumar Mishra, J.
Can a family settlement be challenged by a third party? The Supreme Court of India addressed this question in a recent case involving a dispute over property rights. The core issue revolved around the validity of sale deeds and the applicability of limitation periods in a suit for cancellation, recovery of possession, and injunction. The bench, comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra, overturned the Allahabad High Court’s decision, favoring the appellants and restoring the trial court’s original dismissal of the suit.
Case Background:
The case originates from a property dispute involving the family of Dr. Babu Ram Garg, the common ancestor of the parties. The dispute centers around House No. 49/1, Nai Mandi, Muzaffarnagar. Here’s a chronological breakdown of the key events:
- 17 October 1951: Dr. Babu Ram Garg allegedly executes a will, bequeathing the suit property to his two sons, Ishwar Chand and Dr. Karam Chand. His third son, Ramesh Chand, receives the business of a pharmacy and Rs 5,000 instead of a share in the property.
- 1956: A family settlement is purportedly entered into, resulting in the names of Leelawati (Ishwar Chand’s wife) and Ramesh Chand being recorded in respect of the suit property. The remaining properties are allotted to Dr. Karam Chand.
- 1984: Ishwar Chand passes away.
- 30 May 1987: Leelawati files a civil suit against Ramesh Chand, seeking ownership of the western portion of the suit property. The suit is decreed via compromise.
- 15 June 1992: Dr. Karam Chand institutes a suit against Ramesh Chand and Ishwar Chand’s heirs, seeking a permanent injunction to restrain them from alienating the suit property. An ex-parte ad-interim injunction is granted.
- 16 June 1992 & 29 June 1992: During the pendency of the second suit, Ramesh Chand executes two sale deeds in favor of the appellants, Rajeev Gupta & Ors., for a total consideration of Rs 80,000. The deeds are registered on 17 June 1992 and 30 June 1992, respectively.
- 28 September 1992: A compromise is reached between Dr. Karam Chand and Ishwar Chand’s heirs, with Dr. Karam Chand relinquishing his rights in the western portion of the house.
- 13 October 1992: The second suit is compromised between Dr. Karam Chand and Ramesh Chand, with Dr. Karam Chand’s absolute rights over the eastern portion of the suit property being accepted. Ramesh Chand is permitted to remain in possession and use part of the rental receipts.
- 1997: A mutation occurs in the revenue records in favor of the appellants.
- 2002: Ramesh Chand passes away.
- 25 February 2003: Dr. Karam Chand and his son institute a suit against the appellants and other heirs, seeking cancellation of the sale deeds, recovery of possession, and injunction.
- 28 January 2008: A compromise is reached between the plaintiffs and Ramesh Chand’s legal heirs, accepting the will and stating that Ramesh Chand had no right to execute the sale deeds.
Timeline:
Date | Event |
---|---|
17 October 1951 | Alleged execution of will by Dr. Babu Ram Garg |
1956 | Family settlement; names of Leelawati and Ramesh Chand mutated |
1984 | Death of Ishwar Chand |
30 May 1987 | First suit decreed via compromise |
15 June 1992 | Dr. Karam Chand files second suit; ex-parte injunction granted |
16 June 1992 | First sale deed executed by Ramesh Chand |
29 June 1992 | Second sale deed executed by Ramesh Chand |
28 September 1992 | Compromise between Dr. Karam Chand and Ishwar Chand’s heirs |
13 October 1992 | Second suit compromised between Dr. Karam Chand and Ramesh Chand |
1997 | Mutation in revenue records in favor of appellants |
2002 | Death of Ramesh Chand |
25 February 2003 | Dr. Karam Chand and son institute the subject suit |
28 January 2008 | Compromise between plaintiffs and Ramesh Chand’s legal heirs |
Legal Framework:
The judgment refers to several important legal provisions that form the basis of its analysis:
- Section 100, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC): Deals with second appeals to the High Court.
- Order 6 Rule 17, CPC: Concerns the amendment of pleadings in a civil suit.
- Section 68, Indian Evidence Act, 1872: Requires that at least one attesting witness be called to prove the execution of a will.
- Section 90A, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (as amended by the State of Uttar Pradesh): Pertains to the presumption of valid execution of documents older than 30 years.
- Section 41, Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (ToP Act): Protects the rights of a transferee who acts in good faith, relying on the apparent ownership of the transferor.
- Section 52, Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (ToP Act): Deals with the doctrine of lis pendens, which states that a transfer of property during the pendency of a suit is subject to the outcome of that suit.
- Article 59, Limitation Act, 1963: Prescribes a three-year limitation period for suits seeking cancellation of documents.
- Article 65, Limitation Act, 1963: Prescribes a twelve-year limitation period for suits seeking possession of immovable property based on title.
These legal provisions are crucial in determining the rights and obligations of the parties involved in the property dispute.
Arguments:
The appellants (Rajeev Gupta & Ors.) and the respondents (Prashant Garg & Ors.) presented several arguments to support their respective positions.
Arguments by the Appellants:
- Validity of the Will: The appellants argued that the plaintiffs’ claim to title rested entirely on the will, which lacked pertinent particulars regarding its execution. They contended that the original will was not produced, and only a certified copy was presented five years after the suit was instituted.
- Nature of the Suit: The appellants asserted that the plaint originally contained a prayer for cancellation of the sale deeds, which was later given up. They argued that a suit for bare relief of possession could not succeed where there was a cloud over the title.
- Collusive Suits: The appellants contended that the first and second suits, which were decreed by way of compromise, were collusive and thus constituted an exception to the doctrine of lis pendens.
- Locus Standi: The appellants argued that Ramesh Chand had already executed the two sale deeds before the compromise in the second suit was recorded. Therefore, he no longer had any locus to enter into the said compromise.
- Interim Order: The appellants claimed that the interim order of injunction in the second suit was never communicated to them.
- Section 41 of the ToP Act: The appellants argued that Section 41 of the ToP Act applied to the proceedings since the plaintiffs had allowed Ramesh Chand to act as the owner of the property.
- Limitation: The appellants contended that the plaintiffs’ suit was barred by limitation, as the limitation period for suits seeking cancellation of documents is three years.
Arguments by the Respondents:
- Validity of the Will: The respondents argued that the will of Dr. Babu Ram Garg gave all three sons shares of the testator’s properties, leaving none behind. They contended that Ramesh Chand not having been bequeathed any interest in the suit property by his father, he could not have transferred any portion thereof to the appellants.
- Admission of the Will: The respondents asserted that the will stood admitted by all heirs of Dr. Babu Ram Garg, and none of the legal heirs contested the same.
- Violation of Stay Order: The respondents argued that the sale deeds executed by Ramesh Chand in favor of the appellants were executed in violation of the ad-interim stay order passed in the second suit and hence, were void.
- Prayer for Cancellation: The respondents contended that the plaint duly prayed for cancellation of sale deeds, by way of abundant caution.
- Section 41 of the ToP Act: The respondents argued that the appellants would not get the benefit of Section 41 of the ToP Act in the absence of any pleadings to such effect.
- Compromise Decrees: The respondents submitted that no challenge could have been laid to such compromise without filing an application under Order XXIII Rule 3, CPC.
- Limitation: The respondents submitted that the main relief sought in the suit was recovery of possession, the limitation period for which is twelve years.
Submissions Table:
Issue | Appellants’ Submissions | Respondents’ Submissions |
---|---|---|
Validity of the Will |
✓ Plaint lacked details regarding execution ✓ Original will not produced |
✓ Will gave all sons shares ✓ Ramesh Chand not bequeathed interest |
Nature of the Suit |
✓ Prayer for cancellation given up ✓ Suit for bare possession cannot succeed |
✓ Plaint prayed for cancellation |
Collusive Suits | ✓ First and second suits were collusive | – |
Locus Standi | ✓ Ramesh Chand had no locus after sale deeds | – |
Interim Order | ✓ Interim order never communicated | ✓ Sale deeds violated stay order |
Section 41 of ToP Act | ✓ Plaintiffs allowed Ramesh Chand to act as owner | ✓ No pleadings to that effect |
Compromise Decrees | – | ✓ No challenge to compromise without application |
Limitation | ✓ Suit barred by limitation (3 years) | ✓ Main relief was recovery of possession (12 years) |
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court:
The Supreme Court addressed the following key issues:
- Whether the suit was barred by limitation.
- Whether the sale deeds were void documents.
- Whether the will stood admitted in the previous suits and was no longer required to be proved.
- Whether the first appellate court was right in decreeing the suit without the plaintiffs seeking relief of declaration/cancellation.
Treatment of the Issue by the Court:
The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues:
Issue | Court’s Decision | Brief Reasons |
---|---|---|
Whether the suit was barred by limitation | Yes, the suit was barred by limitation. | The primary relief sought was cancellation of the sale deeds, which had a limitation period of three years. The suit was instituted eleven years after the execution of the sale deeds. |
Whether the sale deeds were void documents | No, the sale deeds were not void documents. | The sale deeds were not void ab initio due to the operation of an injunction order. Additionally, the appellants were bona fide purchasers for value and entitled to the benefit of Section 41 of the ToP Act. |
Whether the will stood admitted in the previous suits and was no longer required to be proved | No, the will was not admitted and was required to be proved. | The principle that a will must be proven in accordance with Section 68 of the Evidence Act is firmly established in law. The plaintiffs’ title to the suit property could not have been traced to the will of Dr. Babu Ram Garg. |
Whether the first appellate court was right in decreeing the suit without the plaintiffs seeking relief of declaration/cancellation | No, the first appellate court was not right in decreeing the suit. | The first appellate court acted illegally in granting relief to the plaintiffs by passing a decree for recovery of possession without there being any decree for declaration of rights/cancellation of deeds. |
Authorities:
The court considered the following authorities and legal provisions:
- Khatri Hotels (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2011) 9 SCC 126: Examined the position under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 vis-à-vis Article 58 of the Limitation Act.
- Rukhmabai v. Lala Laxminarayan, AIR 1960 SC 335: Stated that the right to sue accrues when the defendant has clearly and unequivocally threatened to infringe the right asserted by the plaintiff in the suit.
- Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India, (2020) 17 SCC 260: Applied Khatri Hotels (P) Ltd. in the context of Order VII Rule 11, CPC.
- Union of India v. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd., (2004) 2 SCC 247: Noticed the distinction between Article 58 and Article 113 of the Limitation Act.
- Madhukar Vishwanath v. Madhao, (1999) 9 SCC 446: Held that possession only being a consequential relief, Article 65 would not apply.
- L.C. Hanumanthappa v. H.B. Shivakumar, (2016) 1 SCC 332: Affirmed the principle in Madhukar Vishwanath v. Madhao.
- Rajpal Singh v. Saroj, (2022) 15 SCC 260: Held that where a composite suit had been filed for cancellation of the sale deed and of possession, the limitation period would have to be adjudged from the primary relief of cancellation.
- Sopanrao v. Syed Mehmood, (2019) 7 SCC 76: While adjudicating a suit for possession and declaration of title, held that the limitation for filing a suit for possession on the basis of title is 12 years.
- G.T. Girish v. Y. Subba Raju, (2022) 12 SCC 321: Held that a transfer which is made lis pendens is not a void document.
- Ramesh Verma v. Lajesh Saxena, (2017) 1 SCC 257: Held that the requirement of proof of a will in accordance with Section 68 is not done away with, even if the will is not disputed by the opposite party.
- Benga Behera v. Braja Kishore Nanda, (2007) 9 SCC 728: Observed that a document upon which a title is based is required to be proved by primary evidence, and secondary evidence may be given under Section 65(c) of the Evidence Act.
- Jagmail Singh v. Karamjit Singh, (2020) 5 SCC 178: Reiterated that under the Evidence Act, facts have to be established by primary evidence and secondary evidence is only an exception to the rule.
- Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy, (2008) 4 SCC 594: Held that where the plaintiff is in possession, but his title to the property is in dispute, or under a cloud, or where the defendant asserts title thereto and there is also a threat of dispossession from the defendant, the plaintiff will have to sue for declaration of title and the consequential relief of injunction.
Authorities Considered by the Court:
Authority | Court | How Considered |
---|---|---|
Khatri Hotels (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2011) 9 SCC 126 | Supreme Court of India | Examined and applied in the context of limitation. |
Rukhmabai v. Lala Laxminarayan, AIR 1960 SC 335 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to define when the right to sue accrues. |
Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India, (2020) 17 SCC 260 | Supreme Court of India | Applied Khatri Hotels (P) Ltd. in the context of Order VII Rule 11, CPC. |
Union of India v. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd., (2004) 2 SCC 247 | Supreme Court of India | Noticed the distinction between Article 58 and Article 113 of the Limitation Act. |
Madhukar Vishwanath v. Madhao, (1999) 9 SCC 446 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to emphasize that possession is a consequential relief. |
L.C. Hanumanthappa v. H.B. Shivakumar, (2016) 1 SCC 332 | Supreme Court of India | Affirmed the principle in Madhukar Vishwanath v. Madhao. |
Rajpal Singh v. Saroj, (2022) 15 SCC 260 | Supreme Court of India | Held that the limitation period is adjudged from the primary relief of cancellation. |
Sopanrao v. Syed Mehmood, (2019) 7 SCC 76 | Supreme Court of India | Discussed but distinguished due to differing facts and circumstances. |
G.T. Girish v. Y. Subba Raju, (2022) 12 SCC 321 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to clarify that transfers made lis pendens are not void documents. |
Ramesh Verma v. Lajesh Saxena, (2017) 1 SCC 257 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to emphasize the requirement of proving a will as per Section 68 of the Evidence Act. |
Benga Behera v. Braja Kishore Nanda, (2007) 9 SCC 728 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to highlight that documents related to title must be proved by primary evidence. |
Jagmail Singh v. Karamjit Singh, (2020) 5 SCC 178 | Supreme Court of India | Reiterated that facts must be established by primary evidence. |
Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy, (2008) 4 SCC 594 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to explain when a plaintiff needs to sue for declaration of title. |
Judgment:
How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?
Party | Submission | Court’s Treatment |
---|---|---|
Appellants | Validity of the Will | Accepted; the Court found that the plaintiffs failed to prove the execution of the will as required by law. |
Appellants | Nature of the Suit | Accepted; the Court agreed that the suit was primarily for cancellation of sale deeds and was therefore time-barred. |
Appellants | Collusive Suits | Accepted; the Court found that the previous suits were collusive and did not bind the appellants. |
Appellants | Locus Standi | Accepted; the Court agreed that Ramesh Chand had no right to enter into a compromise after selling the property. |
Appellants | Interim Order | Accepted; the Court noted that there was no proof that the appellants had knowledge of the injunction order. |
Appellants | Section 41 of the ToP Act | Accepted; the Court found that the appellants were bona fide purchasers and entitled to the benefit of Section 41. |
Appellants | Limitation | Accepted; the Court held that the suit was barred by limitation. |
Respondents | Validity of the Will | Rejected; the Court found that the plaintiffs failed to prove the execution of the will. |
Respondents | Admission of the Will | Rejected; the Court found that the appellants were not bound by any admission of their predecessor. |
Respondents | Violation of Stay Order | Rejected; the Court found that the sale deeds were not void due to the stay order. |
Respondents | Prayer for Cancellation | Rejected; the Court found that the suit was primarily for cancellation and was therefore time-barred. |
Respondents | Section 41 of the ToP Act | Rejected; the Court found that the appellants had sufficiently pleaded the applicability of Section 41. |
Respondents | Compromise Decrees | Rejected; the Court found that the compromise decrees did not bind the appellants. |
Respondents | Limitation | Rejected; the Court held that the suit was barred by limitation. |
How each authority was viewed by the Court?
- Khatri Hotels (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2011) 9 SCC 126:* The Court relied on this authority to interpret Article 58 of the Limitation Act and determine when the right to sue first accrues.
- Rukhmabai v. Lala Laxminarayan, AIR 1960 SC 335:* The Court cited this case to define when a threat gives rise to a compulsory cause of action.
- Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India, (2020) 17 SCC 260:* The Court applied this authority to interpret Article 113 of the Limitation Act.
- Union of India v. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd., (2004) 2 SCC 247:* The Court referred to this case to distinguish between Article 58 and Article 113 of the Limitation Act.
- Madhukar Vishwanath v. Madhao, (1999) 9 SCC 446:* The Court relied on this authority to emphasize that possession is a consequential relief.
- L.C. Hanumanthappa v. H.B. Shivakumar, (2016) 1 SCC 332:* The Court affirmed the principle in Madhukar Vishwanath v. Madhao.
- Rajpal Singh v. Saroj, (2022) 15 SCC 260:* The Court cited this case to hold that the limitation period is adjudged from the primary relief of cancellation.
- Sopanrao v. Syed Mehmood, (2019) 7 SCC 76:* The Court discussed this case but distinguished it due to differing facts and circumstances.
- G.T. Girish v. Y. Subba Raju, (2022) 12 SCC 321:* The Court cited this case to clarify that transfers made lis pendens are not void documents.
- Ramesh Verma v. Lajesh Saxena, (2017) 1 SCC 257:* The Court cited this case to emphasize the requirement of proving a will as per Section 68 of the Evidence Act.
- Benga Behera v. Braja Kishore Nanda, (2007) 9 SCC 728:* The Court cited this case to highlight that documents related to title must be proved by primary evidence.
- Jagmail Singh v. Karamjit Singh, (2020) 5 SCC 178:* The Court reiterated that facts must be established by primary evidence.
- Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy, (2008) 4 SCC 594:* The Court cited this case to explain when a plaintiff needs to sue for declaration of title.
What weighed in the mind of the Court?:
The Supreme Court’s decision in Rajeev Gupta & Ors. vs. Prashant Garg & Ors. was influenced by several key factors, primarily revolving around the principles of limitation, evidence, and property law. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to the prescribed limitation periods for seeking legal remedies, particularly in cases involving the cancellation of sale deeds. The failure of the plaintiffs to initiate the suit within the stipulated three-year period weighed heavily against their claim.
The Court also focused on the plaintiffs’ inability to adequately prove the execution and validity of the will, which formed the basis of their title claim. The lack of primary evidence and the absence of attesting witnesses further weakened their case. Additionally, the Court considered the conduct of the parties and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the sale deeds, finding that the appellants were bona fide purchasers who had acted in good faith.
Factor | Percentage |
---|---|
Limitation Period | 35% |
Failure to Prove Will | 30% |
Bona Fide Purchasers | 20% |
Collusive Nature of Previous Suits | 15% |
The ratio of fact to law in the Supreme Court’s decision can be analyzed as follows:
Category | Percentage |
---|---|
Facts | 45% |
Law | 55% |
The Court’s decision was thus primarily based on legal principles, but the factual matrix of the case played a significant role in shaping the outcome.
Flowchart of the Decision-Making Process:
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court’s decision in Rajeev Gupta & Ors. vs. Prashant Garg & Ors. underscores the critical importance of adhering to limitation periods and providing adequate evidence to support claims in property disputes. The Court’s emphasis on the principles of limitation, the burden of proof, and the protection of bona fide purchasers serves as a reminder of the legal safeguards in place to ensure fairness and certainty in property transactions. The judgment highlights the necessity for plaintiffs to diligently pursue their legal remedies within the prescribed timeframes and to present compelling evidence to substantiate their claims.