Supreme Court overturns Labour Court on employee’s date of birth: Barsua Iron Ore Mines vs. United Mines Mazdoor Union (2024)

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: April 2, 2024

Citation: 2024 INSC 264

Judges: Hima Kohli, J. and Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.

Can an employee change their date of birth in service records after a significant period, especially when the initial date was crucial for obtaining employment? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this issue in a case involving a dispute over an employee’s date of birth. The court had to determine whether the employee could alter his declared date of birth after nearly a decade of service. The two-judge bench of Justices Hima Kohli and Ahsanuddin Amanullah delivered the judgment, with Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah authoring the opinion.

Case Background

The case revolves around an employee, respondent no. 3, who initially joined Barsua Iron Ore Mines as a Piece Rated Mazdoor on a casual basis on April 14, 1972. At the time of his employment, he declared his age as 24 years, which was recorded as a date of birth of December 27, 1948. This was based on his oral declaration, as he did not provide any documentary proof. He was regularized on June 22, 1981. Later, on August 14, 1982, he submitted another form, changing his date of birth to March 12, 1955, again without providing any documentary proof. This change was recorded by the employer without proper scrutiny. Subsequently, on November 24, 1998, the employer requested documentary proof for his date of birth, and he submitted a School Transfer Certificate (STC) dated January 12, 1972, which indicated he was 17 years and 1 month old in 1972. Based on his initial declaration, the employer determined his date of birth as December 27, 1948, on November 29, 2001. This led to a dispute, which was referred to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court (CGIT) on October 9, 2003. The employee retired on December 31, 2008, based on the initial date of birth.

Timeline:

Course of Proceedings

The Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court (CGIT) ruled in favor of the employee on January 24, 2018, stating that the employer’s decision to determine the employee’s date of birth based on the initial descriptive roll was unjustified. The CGIT awarded the employee 50% back wages from his retirement in 2008 until his supposed retirement date in 2015 based on the date of birth in the STC (March 12, 1955). The employer then filed a writ petition before the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack, challenging the CGIT award. The High Court dismissed the petition on February 4, 2021, upholding the CGIT’s decision.

Legal Framework

The primary legal provision relevant to this case is Section 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which defines the term “appropriate Government” in relation to industrial disputes. According to the Act:

‘(a) “appropriate Government” means,—
(i) in relation to any Industrial Disputes concerning any industry carried on by or under the authority of the
Central Government or by a railway company or concerning any such controlled industry as may be specified
in this behalf by the Central Government or in relation to an Industrial Dispute concerning a Dock Labour
Board established under Section 5-A of the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948 (9 of 1948),
or the Industrial Finance Corporation of India Limited formed and registered under the Companies Act, 1956,
or the Employees’ State Insurance Corporation established under Section 3 of the Employees’ State Insur –
ance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948), or the Board of Trustees constituted under Section 3-A of the Coal Mines Provid –
ent Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1948 (46 of 1948), or the Central Board of Trustees and the State
Boards of Trustees constituted under Section 5-A and Section 5-B, respectively, of the Employees’ Provident
Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (19 of 1952), or the Life Insurance Corporation of India estab –
lished under Section 3 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (31 of 1956), or the Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation Limited registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) or the Deposit Insurance and
Credit Guarantee Corporation established under Section 3 of the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee
Corporation Act, 1961 (47 of 1961), or the Central Warehousing Corporation established under Section 3 of
the Warehousing Corporations Act, 1962 (58 of 1962), or the Unit Trust of India established under Section 3 of
the Unit Trust of India Act, 1963 (52 of 1963), or the Food Corporation of India established under Section 3, or
a Board of Management established for two or more contiguous States under Section 16 of the Food Corpor –
ations Act, 1964 (37 of 1964), or the Airports Authority of India constituted under Section 3 of the Airports Au –
thority of India Act, 1994 (55 of 1994), or a Regional Rural Bank established under Section 3 of the Regional
Rural Banks Act, 1976 (21 of 1976), or the Export Credit and Guarantee Corporation Limited or the Industrial
Reconstruction Corporation of India Limited, or the Banking Service Commission established, under Section 3
of the Banking Service Commission Act, 1975, or an air transport service, or a banking or an insurance com –
pany, a mine, an oilfield, a Cantonment Board, or a major port, any company in which not less than fifty-one
per cent of the paid-up share capital is held by the Central Government, or any corporation, not being a cor –
poration referred to in this clause, established by or under any law made by Parliament, or the Central public
sector undertaking, subsidiary companies set up by the principal undertaking and autonomous bodies owned
or controlled by the Central Government, the Central Government, and
(ii) in relation to any other industrial dispute, including the State public sector undertaking, subsidiary com –
panies set up by the principal undertaking and autonomous bodies owned or controlled by the State Govern –
ment, the State Government:
Provided that in case of a dispute between a contractor and the contract labour employed through
the contractor in any industrial establishment where such dispute first arose, the appropriate Government
shall be the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, which has control over such
industrial establishment.’

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments:

• The employee’s conduct disentitles him to any relief because he cannot retract his initially declared date of birth, especially after nine years.
• The initial declaration of December 27, 1948, was not an inadvertent error because if he had declared his actual date of birth as March 12, 1955, he would have been underage (17 years and 1 month) for employment.
• The employee is trying to take double advantage by using one date of birth for employment and another for later service benefits.
• The CGIT’s conclusion that the employer’s determination of the date of birth was unjustified is arbitrary and without basis.
• The High Court failed to consider the employee’s conduct and the nine-year delay in seeking a change of date of birth.

Respondent’s Arguments:

• The initial declaration was based on an oral statement, and the authority recording the date of birth made an error.
• The STC dated January 12, 1972, clearly indicates his correct date of birth as March 12, 1955, which requires correction in the employer’s records.
• The CGIT and the High Court did not commit any error.
• The employee was unaware of the recorded date of birth as December 27, 1948, and took steps to correct it when he became aware.
• The employee should not suffer for the employer’s fault, especially since the employer later recorded his date of birth as March 12, 1955, in 1982.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court did not explicitly frame issues in a separate section. However, the core issue that the court addressed was:

Whether the employee can change his initially declared date of birth after a long period of service, especially when that initial declaration was the basis for his employment?

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• The Court relied on Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v Shib Kumar Dushad, (2000) 8 SCC 696* to emphasize the importance of the date of birth issue for both the employer and employee.
• The Court relied on Union of India v C Rama Swamy, (1997) 4 SCC 647* to highlight that relief should not be granted if the employee had misrepresented their date of birth for advantage.
• The Court relied on Karnataka Rural Infrastructure Development Limited v T P Nataraja, (2021) 12 SCC 27* to summarize the principles regarding the change of date of birth in service records, which included the fact that application for change of date of birth can only be as per the relevant provisions/regulations applicable, even if there is cogent evidence, the same cannot be claimed as a matter of right and application can be rejected on the ground of delay.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court was primarily influenced by the following factors:

• The employee’s initial declaration of his date of birth was a deliberate act to secure employment.
• The employee attempted to change his date of birth after a significant delay.
• The employee would have been underage at the time of initial employment if his claimed date of birth was considered.
• The principles of estoppel prevent the employee from changing his date of birth.

Logical Reasoning:

The court considered that the employee’s initial declaration was a calculated move to secure employment, as he would have been underage with his claimed date of birth. The court also noted the delay in seeking the change and the principles of estoppel.

The court rejected the employee’s argument that the initial recording of the date of birth was an error. The court found that the employee’s conduct indicated a deliberate misrepresentation of age to gain employment. The court also rejected the argument that the STC was sufficient proof of the correct date of birth, noting that it was submitted after a long delay and that the employee would have been underage at the time of initial employment if the STC was considered.

The Supreme Court stated, “From this point of view, it is clear that the disclosure of the originally-given date of birth by the respondent no.3 was a well-thought out plan hatched by him, at the relevant time.”

The Supreme Court further stated, “Moreover, the principles of estoppel would come into play in the present case. The respondent no.3, having stated on 27.12.1972, that his date of birth was 27.12.1948, cannot be permitted to raise the claim of his date of birth being 12.03.1955, that too on 14.08.1982, i.e., almost after a decade (counting from 27.12.1972 to 14.08.1982).”

The court also observed, “In view of the aforesaid, this Court finds that the much-delayed disclosure of the date of birth as 12.03.1955 by the respondent no.3, coupled with his initial declaration and the admitted position that based on such initial declaration, he had received employment, as otherwise based on 12.03.1955, he could not have been legally appointed due to being under-age, there is no manner of doubt that the respondent no.3, irrespective of his real date of birth, for the purpose of employment under the appellant, cannot be allowed the purported rectification/correction of date of birth to 12.03.1955.”

Key Takeaways

• Employees cannot change their declared date of birth after a significant period, especially if the initial declaration was essential for securing employment.
• Employers are justified in relying on the initial date of birth declared by the employee if there is no documentary proof provided at the time of employment.
• The principles of estoppel apply, preventing employees from changing their date of birth after a long delay.
• Courts will not grant relief to employees who have misrepresented their date of birth to gain an advantage.

Directions

The Supreme Court set aside the CGIT award and the High Court judgment. The court held that the employee was rightly retired based on his initial date of birth (December 27, 1948). The court also set aside the direction to award 50% back wages to the employee.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of the case is that an employee cannot change their initially declared date of birth after a considerable period, especially when that initial declaration was the basis for their employment. This judgment reinforces the principle that employees cannot take advantage of their own misrepresentations and that employers are justified in relying on the initial declarations made by employees. This decision clarifies the position of law that principles of estoppel would apply in such cases where an employee seeks to change date of birth after a long period.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the decisions of the CGIT and the High Court. The court held that the employee’s initial date of birth declaration was valid, and he could not change it after a long period of service. The judgment emphasizes the importance of truthful declarations at the time of employment and the application of the principle of estoppel in such cases.