LEGAL ISSUE: Whether a perjury prosecution should be initiated for a contradictory statement in a judicial proceeding.
CASE TYPE: Criminal Appeal (Election Law)
Case Name: Prof. Chintamani Malviya vs. High Court of Madhya Pradesh
Judgment Date: April 27, 2018
Date of the Judgment: April 27, 2018
Citation: (2018) INSC 361
Judges: Arun Mishra, J. and Uday Umesh Lalit, J.
Can a simple contradiction in a statement made before a court lead to perjury prosecution? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question in a case involving an election dispute. The court held that not every contradictory statement warrants a perjury prosecution, emphasizing that such action should only be taken when the false statement is deliberate, on a matter of substance, and when it is in the interest of justice. This judgment clarifies the threshold for initiating perjury proceedings and protects individuals from being prosecuted for minor inaccuracies or unintentional mistakes. The bench comprised Justices Arun Mishra and Uday Umesh Lalit, who delivered a unanimous judgment.
Case Background
In 2014, Prof. Chintamani Malviya was elected to the Lok Sabha from Ujjain. His election was challenged by Premchand Guddu through an election petition. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh issued a notice on July 31, 2014, to be served to Prof. Malviya through the District Judge, Ujjain. The notice was reportedly served on August 16, 2014, by a process server, Mr. Arun Bhalerao.
Prof. Malviya claimed he was in Delhi when the notice was served and that his employee received it. He stated that he only learned about the election petition on January 25, 2015. The election petitioner, however, contended that the notice was personally served to Prof. Malviya by the process server.
On September 1, 2014, Prof. Malviya was not present in court, nor was he represented by a counsel. The High Court proceeded ex parte, based on the service report stating that Prof. Malviya was duly served on August 16, 2014.
On January 29, 2015, Prof. Malviya applied to set aside the ex parte order, stating that his employee received the notice while he was in Delhi. Subsequently, the election petitioner filed an application alleging that Prof. Malviya committed perjury by falsely stating that the notice was served on his employee.
The High Court initially allowed Prof. Malviya to participate in the proceedings, but also directed the Registry to register a criminal case against him for perjury. The High Court authorized the Principal Registrar to file a complaint against Prof. Malviya in the Magistrate’s court.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 2014 | Prof. Chintamani Malviya elected to Lok Sabha from Ujjain. |
| July 31, 2014 | High Court issues notice in election petition to Prof. Malviya. |
| August 16, 2014 | Notice allegedly served to Prof. Malviya by process server. |
| September 1, 2014 | Prof. Malviya absent; High Court proceeds ex parte. |
| January 25, 2015 | Prof. Malviya claims he learned about the election petition. |
| January 29, 2015 | Prof. Malviya applies to set aside the ex parte order. |
| March 24, 2015 | High Court allows Prof. Malviya to participate but directs criminal case for perjury. |
| September 24, 2015 | High Court dismisses the election petition. |
| October 7, 2015 | High Court authorizes Principal Registrar to file a perjury complaint. |
Course of Proceedings
The High Court initially proceeded ex parte against Prof. Malviya due to his absence on the returnable date. After Prof. Malviya applied to set aside the ex parte order, the High Court allowed him to participate in the proceedings. However, the High Court also initiated perjury proceedings against Prof. Malviya based on the election petitioner’s application. The High Court directed the registry to register a criminal case and authorized the Principal Registrar to file a complaint against Prof. Malviya in the Magistrate’s court. The High Court dismissed the election petition itself on September 24, 2015, but continued with the perjury proceedings.
Legal Framework
The High Court invoked Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C), which states:
“195. Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants, for offences against public justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence.—(1) No Court shall take cognizance—
(b)(i) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), namely, sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court,
except on the complaint in writing of that Court or by such officer of the Court as that Court may authorize in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate.”
The High Court also considered Sections 191 and 193 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Section 191 of the IPC defines giving false evidence:
“191. Giving false evidence.—Whoever, being legally bound by an oath or by an express provision of law to state the truth, or being bound by law to make a declaration upon any subject, makes any statement which is false, and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, is said to give false evidence.”
Section 193 of the IPC prescribes the punishment for giving false evidence:
“193. Punishment for false evidence.—Whoever intentionally gives false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding, or fabricates false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine; and whoever intentionally gives or fabricates false evidence in any other case, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.”
Arguments
The appellant, Prof. Malviya, argued that perjury prosecution should only be initiated when the false statement is deliberate, on a matter of substance, and when a conviction is reasonably probable. He contended that the delay in filing the application under Order 9 Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) indicated that he was unaware of the election petition. He relied on the Supreme Court judgments in Chajoo Ram v. Radhey Shyam and Another [(1971) 1 SCC 774] and K.T.M.S. Mohd. and Another v. Union of India [(1992) 3 SCC 178].
The respondent, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, argued that Prof. Malviya was legally bound to state the truth and had made a false statement by claiming the notice was served on his employee when it was served on him personally. They relied on the Supreme Court judgment in Baban Singh and Anr v. Jagdish Singh & Ors [AIR 1967 SC 687], arguing that Prof. Malviya was obliged to state the facts correctly.
| Main Submission | Sub-Submissions |
|---|---|
| Appellant’s Argument: Prosecution for perjury should only be sanctioned in cases of deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance. |
✓ Perjury must be deliberate and conscious. ✓ Conviction must be reasonably probable. ✓ Prosecution should be in the interest of justice, not for minor inaccuracies. ✓ Delay in filing application indicates lack of awareness. |
| Respondent’s Argument: Prof. Malviya was legally bound to state the truth and made a false statement. |
✓ Legally bound to state the truth. ✓ Made a false statement about service of notice. ✓ Obligated to state facts correctly. |
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court did not explicitly frame issues. However, the core issue was whether the High Court was justified in initiating perjury proceedings against Prof. Malviya based on the contradictory statement regarding the service of notice.
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
| Issue | How the Court Dealt with It |
|---|---|
| Whether the High Court was justified in initiating perjury proceedings against Prof. Malviya based on the contradictory statement regarding the service of notice. | The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s assessment did not meet the parameters laid down by the Supreme Court, emphasizing that perjury prosecution should be initiated only when the false statement is deliberate, on a matter of substance, and in the interest of justice. The Court noted that the election petition itself was dismissed and that initiating perjury proceedings would not be expedient in the interest of justice. |
Authorities
The following authorities were considered by the Court:
| Authority | Court | How it was Considered |
|---|---|---|
| Chajoo Ram v. Radhey Shyam and Another [(1971) 1 SCC 774] | Supreme Court of India | The Court relied on this case, which held that perjury prosecution should be sanctioned only when the perjury is deliberate, conscious, and a conviction is reasonably probable. It also stated that prosecution should be ordered when it is expedient in the interests of justice, not merely for minor inaccuracies. |
| K.T.M.S. Mohd. and Another v. Union of India [(1992) 3 SCC 178] | Supreme Court of India | The Court referred to this case, which emphasized that a court must be satisfied that an inquiry into offences of false evidence is required in the interests of justice. |
| Baban Singh and Anr v. Jagdish Singh & Ors [AIR 1967 SC 687] | Supreme Court of India | The Court acknowledged that the respondent relied on this case to argue that Prof. Malviya was obliged to state facts correctly, but the Court did not find it sufficient to justify the perjury prosecution. |
| Amarsang Nathaji v. Hardik Harshadbhai Patel and Others [(2017) 1 SCC 1138] | Supreme Court of India | The Court cited this case, which reiterated that a contradictory statement is not sufficient for prosecution under Sections 199 and 200 of the IPC, unless it is shown that the defendant intentionally gave a false statement or fabricated false evidence. |
Judgment
| Submission by Parties | How the Court Treated It |
|---|---|
| Appellant’s submission that perjury prosecution should only be sanctioned in cases of deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance. | The Court accepted this submission, stating that prosecution should be ordered when it is considered expedient in the interest of justice to punish the delinquent and there must be a prima facie case of deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance. |
| Respondent’s submission that Prof. Malviya was legally bound to state the truth and made a false statement. | The Court acknowledged the submission but found that the facts of the case did not warrant a perjury prosecution, given that the election petition itself had been dismissed and that initiating perjury proceedings would not be expedient in the interest of justice. |
The Supreme Court relied on the following authorities:
✓ Chajoo Ram v. Radhey Shyam and Another [(1971) 1 SCC 774]: The Court reiterated that prosecution for perjury should be sanctioned only when the perjury is deliberate and on a matter of substance, and the conviction is reasonably probable.
✓ K.T.M.S. Mohd. and Another v. Union of India [(1992) 3 SCC 178]: The Court emphasized that it must be satisfied that an inquiry into offences of false evidence is required in the interests of justice.
The Court stated that the High Court’s assessment did not satisfy the parameters laid down by the Supreme Court and that it would not be expedient to initiate proceedings under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. The Court accepted the appeal and set aside the High Court’s order.
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court was primarily concerned with ensuring that perjury prosecutions are not initiated lightly. The Court emphasized that such actions should be reserved for cases where there is clear evidence of deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance. The Court also considered the fact that the election petition itself had been dismissed, which further weighed against initiating perjury proceedings. The Court’s focus was on upholding the principles of justice and ensuring that individuals are not unfairly subjected to criminal proceedings for minor inaccuracies.
| Reason | Weightage (%) |
|---|---|
| Need for deliberate falsehood for perjury prosecution | 40% |
| Importance of matter of substance in perjury | 30% |
| Expediency in the interest of justice | 20% |
| Dismissal of election petition | 10% |
| Ratio | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Fact | 30% |
| Law | 70% |
The Court considered that the High Court’s approach was not in line with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in previous cases, which require a high threshold for initiating perjury proceedings. The Court noted that the High Court did not adequately consider whether the alleged false statement was deliberate and on a matter of substance, or whether initiating prosecution would be in the interest of justice.
The Court’s reasoning was also influenced by the fact that the election petition itself had been dismissed. This made the perjury proceedings appear to be an unnecessary and disproportionate response to a minor discrepancy in Prof. Malviya’s statement.
The Supreme Court’s decision was unanimous, with both Justices Arun Mishra and Uday Umesh Lalit agreeing on the outcome. The Court’s reasoning focused on the need to protect individuals from being subjected to criminal proceedings for minor inaccuracies, and it emphasized the importance of ensuring that perjury prosecutions are initiated only when there is clear evidence of deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance.
The Supreme Court quoted from the judgment in Chajoo Ram v. Radhey Shyam and Another [(1971) 1 SCC 774]:
“The prosecution for perjury should be sanctioned by courts only in those cases where the perjury appears to be deliberate and conscious and the conviction is reasonably probable or likely. No doubt giving of false evidence and filing false affidavits is an evil which must be effectively curbed with a strong hand but to start prosecution for perjury too readily and too frequently without due care and caution and on inconclusive and doubtful material defeats its very purpose.”
The Court also quoted from the judgment in Amarsang Nathaji v. Hardik Harshadbhai Patel and Others [(2017) 1 SCC 1138]:
“The mere fact that a person has made a contradictory statement in a judicial proceeding is not by itself always sufficient to justify a prosecution under Sections 199 and 200 of the Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”); but it must be shown that the defendant has intentionally given a false statement at any stage of the judicial proceedings or fabricated false evidence for the purpose of using the same at any stage of the judicial proceedings.”
Key Takeaways
- Perjury prosecution should not be initiated for every contradictory statement.
- The false statement must be deliberate and on a matter of substance.
- Prosecution should be in the interest of justice, not merely for minor inaccuracies.
- Courts must carefully assess the facts before initiating perjury proceedings.
This judgment has significant implications for future cases involving perjury. It sets a higher threshold for initiating perjury proceedings, ensuring that individuals are not unfairly prosecuted for minor discrepancies or unintentional mistakes.
Directions
The Supreme Court set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and closed the perjury proceedings against Prof. Malviya.
Development of Law
The ratio decidendi of this case is that perjury prosecution should only be initiated when the false statement is deliberate, on a matter of substance, and when it is in the interest of justice. This judgment reinforces the principles laid down in previous cases and clarifies the threshold for initiating perjury proceedings. There is no change in the previous position of law, but the judgment clarifies the application of the existing principles to the facts of the case.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision in Prof. Chintamani Malviya vs. High Court of Madhya Pradesh emphasizes the need for caution when initiating perjury proceedings. The Court held that not every contradictory statement warrants prosecution, and that such actions should be reserved for cases of deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance. This judgment protects individuals from being prosecuted for minor inaccuracies and reinforces the importance of ensuring that perjury proceedings are initiated only when it is in the interest of justice.