LEGAL ISSUE: Whether a conviction under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) can be sustained when the victim eloped willingly and medical evidence doesn’t conclusively prove sexual assault.

CASE TYPE: Criminal

Case Name: P. Yuvaprakash vs. State rep. by Inspector of Police

[Judgment Date]: 18 July 2023

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: 18 July 2023

Citation: (2023) INSC 676

Judges: S. Ravindra Bhat, J., Aravind Kumar, J.

Can a person be convicted under the POCSO Act if the alleged victim willingly eloped and there is no conclusive evidence of sexual assault? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question, overturning a conviction under the POCSO Act. The case involved a man convicted of sexual assault and child marriage, but the Supreme Court found that the prosecution failed to prove the victim was a minor and that there was no evidence of forced sexual assault. This judgment highlights the importance of proper age determination and the necessity of proving the elements of sexual assault beyond reasonable doubt. The judgment was authored by Justice S. Ravindra Bhat, with Justice Aravind Kumar concurring.

Case Background

The case began with a complaint by T. Abdul Hameed, who reported that his younger daughter, M, aged 17 (almost 18), had been kidnapped on 13 January 2015. According to the complaint, M was taken by the appellant, Yuvaprakash, and two others while returning from the hospital. The complainant’s elder daughter informed him of the incident over the phone. After a fruitless search, Abdul Hameed filed a complaint under Section 366A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

The prosecution alleged that on 14 January 2015, the appellant and others took M to a temple where the appellant tied a thali around her neck, solemnizing their marriage. Following the marriage, M was taken to the second accused’s house, where she stayed with the appellant. It was further alleged that the appellant had repeated sexual intercourse with M during this period. On 15 January 2015, they went to Madurai, where they stayed until 25 January 2015, during which time the appellant allegedly continued to have sexual intercourse with M.

On 25 January 2015, after learning about the police complaint, the appellant and others abandoned M in Madurai. M returned home to Erode, where her father took her to the police station. She gave a statement to the investigating officer (PW-16) under Section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.PC). M also gave a statement under Section 164 of the Cr.PC, where she stated that she and the appellant were in love for about a year, a fact known to her family. She stated that she had eloped with the appellant voluntarily and married him willingly. She clarified that she was never abducted nor married forcibly.

Timeline:

Date Event
13 January 2015 M is allegedly kidnapped near Rita School, Shastri Nagar.
14 January 2015 M and the appellant get married at a temple in Kodumudi.
15 January 2015 M and the appellant travel to Madurai.
15 January 2015 – 25 January 2015 M and the appellant stay in Madurai.
25 January 2015 M is abandoned in Madurai and returns home to Erode.
25 January 2015 M’s father takes her to the police station; she gives a statement to the police.
18 July 2023 Supreme Court delivers its judgment.

Course of Proceedings

Initially, the police registered a missing person report, which was later altered to include offences under Sections 6 and 17 of the POCSO Act, Section 506 of the IPC, and Section 10 of the Child Marriage Prohibition Act, 2006. The trial court found the appellant and others guilty. The appellant was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life under Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

The High Court modified the conviction. The accused A3, A4, A6 to A9 were convicted under Section 10 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006. The second accused (A2) was acquitted of all charges. The appellant’s conviction under the POCSO Act was confirmed, but his sentence was reduced to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment. He was also convicted under Section 10 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006. The appellant was acquitted from the charge under Section 366 of the IPC.

Legal Framework

The Supreme Court examined several key legal provisions:

  • Section 34 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act): This section outlines the procedure for dealing with offenses committed by a child and the determination of age by the Special Court. Specifically, Section 34(2) states that if a question arises whether a person is a child, the Special Court shall determine it after satisfying itself about the age, recording its reasons in writing.

    “34. Procedure in case of commission of offence by child and determination of age by Special Court. – (1) Where any offence under this Act is committed by a child, such child shall be dealt with under the provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016). (2) If any question arises in any proceeding before the Special Court whether a person is a child or not, such question shall be determined by the Special Court after satisfying itself about the age of such person and it shall record in writing its reasons for such determination. (3) No order made by the Special Court shall be deemed to be invalid merely by any subsequent proof that the age of a person as determined by it under sub-section (2) was not the correct age of that person.”
  • Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (JJ Act): This section deals with the presumption and determination of age. It specifies the order of preference for documents to determine age, prioritizing school certificates and birth certificates over medical tests.

    “94. Presumption and determination of age. – (1) Where, it is obvious to the Committee or the Board, based on the appearance of the person brought before it under any of the provisions of this Act (other than for the purpose of giving evidence) that the said person is a child, the Committee or the Board shall record such observation stating the age of the child as nearly as may be and proceed with the inquiry under section 14 or section 36, as the case may be, without waiting for further confirmation of the age. (2) In case, the Committee or the Board has reasonable grounds for doubt regarding whether the person brought before it is a child or not, the Committee or the Board, as the case may be, shall undertake the process of age determination, by seeking evidence by obtaining – (i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board, if available; and in the absence thereof; (ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the orders of the Committee or the Board: Provided such age determination test conducted on the order of the Committee or the Board shall be completed within fifteen days from the date of such order. (3) The age recorded by the Committee or the Board to be the age of person so brought before it shall, for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the true age of that person.”
  • Section 6 of the POCSO Act: Defines the punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault.

    “Whoever, commits aggravated penetrative sexual assault, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.”
  • Section 3 of the POCSO Act: Defines penetrative sexual assault.

    “3. Penetrative Sexual Assault. – A person is said to commit “penetrative sexual assault” if – (a) he penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a child or makes the child to do so with him or any other person; or (b)…………………… (c)…………………… (d)……………………”
  • Section 5 of the POCSO Act: Defines aggravated penetrative sexual assault.

    “5. Aggravated Penetrative Sexual Assault. – (a) (l)whoever commits penetrative sexual assault on the child more than once or repeatedly; or ”
  • Section 351 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC): Defines assault.

    “Whoever makes any gesture, or any preparation intending or knowing it to be likely that such gesture or preparation will cause any person present to apprehend that he who makes that gesture or preparation is about to use criminal force to that person, is said to commit an assault.”
  • Section 350 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC): Defines criminal force.

    “Whoever intentionally uses force to any person, without that person’s consent, in order to the committing of any offence, or intending by the use of such force to cause, or knowing it to be likely that by the use of such force he will cause injury, fear or annoyance to the person to whom the force is used, is said to use criminal force to that other.”

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments:

  • The appellant argued that the victim, M, in her statement under Section 164 of the Cr.PC, clearly stated that she left with the appellant of her own accord. She also acknowledged that they had known and loved each other for a year. The appellant contended that M’s subsequent retraction of this statement should have raised serious doubts about the prosecution’s case.
  • The appellant argued that the trial court erred in finding that the prosecution had failed to show that M was not under coercion from the appellant. The appellant highlighted that when the Magistrate recorded M’s statement, she was not under the influence of the appellant.
  • The appellant further argued that the prosecution failed to establish M’s age as under 18, relying on Section 34 of the POCSO Act and Section 94 of the JJ Act. They pointed out that the ossification test indicated M’s age was between 18 and 20, which was not considered by the lower courts.
  • The appellant contended that the High Court’s acquittal of the charge under Section 366 IPC contradicted the prosecution’s story of kidnapping or forceful abduction.

State’s Arguments:

  • The State argued that even if M and the appellant knew each other and had feelings for each other, the fact remained that M was below the statutory age, and therefore, consent was irrelevant.
  • The State submitted that the findings of the courts below with respect to M’s age were corroborated by the testimony of DW-2, the Head Mistress of M’s school, who stated that according to school records, M’s date of birth was 11 July 1997.

[TABLE] of Submissions:

Main Submission Sub-Submissions (Appellant) Sub-Submissions (State)
Victim’s Statement
  • Victim stated she left willingly in 164 statement.
  • Victim acknowledged a prior relationship.
  • Retraction of statement should raise doubts.
  • Victim was below statutory age.
  • Consent is irrelevant.
Victim’s Age
  • Prosecution failed to prove age below 18.
  • Ossification test indicated age between 18-20.
  • School records support age below 18.
  • Testimony of DW-2 corroborates school records.
Kidnapping
  • Acquittal under Section 366 IPC contradicts kidnapping story.
  • Victim was below statutory age.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court considered the following issues:

  1. Whether the prosecution had successfully proven that the victim was a minor at the time of the alleged offense.
  2. Whether the elements of sexual assault under the POCSO Act were established, given the victim’s initial statement and the medical evidence.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues

Issue Court’s Decision Brief Reasoning
Whether the victim was a minor at the time of the alleged offense? No. The court found that the prosecution failed to prove the victim was a minor. The school transfer certificate was not a valid document under Section 94 of the JJ Act. The ossification test indicated that the victim was between 18 and 20 years old.
Whether the elements of sexual assault under the POCSO Act were established? No. The court found that the victim had eloped willingly and there was no evidence of forced sexual assault. The medical evidence did not conclusively prove penetrative sexual assault.

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Cases:

  • Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., 2021 (12) SCR 502 (Supreme Court of India): This case outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required, emphasizing the hierarchy of documents to be considered. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia ) with Section 94 of the JJ Act.
  • Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors, [2019] 9 SCR 735 (Supreme Court of India): This case clarified that the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation certificate are in the same category for age determination, and medical analysis is only to be used as a last resort.
  • Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain v State of West Bengal, [2012] 9 SCR 224 (Supreme Court of India): This three-judge bench held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile is upon the person claiming it, and also indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference.

Legal Provisions:

  • Section 34 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act): Procedure for determining age in cases under the POCSO Act.
  • Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (JJ Act): Presumption and determination of age.
  • Section 6 of the POCSO Act: Punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault.
  • Section 3 of the POCSO Act: Definition of penetrative sexual assault.
  • Section 5 of the POCSO Act: Definition of aggravated penetrative sexual assault.
  • Section 351 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC): Definition of assault.
  • Section 350 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC): Definition of criminal force.

[TABLE] of Authorities Considered:

Authority Court How it was used
Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., 2021 (12) SCR 502 Supreme Court of India Outlined the procedure for age determination, emphasizing the hierarchy of documents.
Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors, [2019] 9 SCR 735 Supreme Court of India Clarified the equal importance of school and matriculation certificates for age determination.
Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain v State of West Bengal, [2012] 9 SCR 224 Supreme Court of India Stated that the burden of proving juvenility lies on the person claiming it and established a hierarchy of documents for age proof.
Section 34 of the POCSO Act Procedure for determining age in cases under the POCSO Act.
Section 94 of the JJ Act Presumption and determination of age.
Section 6 of the POCSO Act Punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault.
Section 3 of the POCSO Act Definition of penetrative sexual assault.
Section 5 of the POCSO Act Definition of aggravated penetrative sexual assault.
Section 351 of the IPC Definition of assault.
Section 350 of the IPC Definition of criminal force.

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

Submission Court’s Treatment
Appellant’s submission that the victim’s statement under Section 164 Cr.PC indicated she left willingly. The Court accepted this submission, noting that the victim’s initial statement was truthful and that she had eloped willingly.
Appellant’s submission that the prosecution failed to prove the victim’s age was below 18. The Court agreed, holding that the prosecution did not provide the required documents as per Section 94 of the JJ Act and that the ossification test was the most authentic evidence.
Appellant’s submission that the High Court’s acquittal of the charge under Section 366 IPC contradicted the prosecution’s story of kidnapping. The Court concurred, noting this inconsistency.
State’s submission that the victim’s age was below 18 and consent was irrelevant. The Court rejected this submission, finding that the prosecution did not provide sufficient evidence to prove the victim was a minor.
State’s submission that the school records supported the victim’s age being below 18. The Court rejected this submission, stating that the transfer certificate was not a valid document under Section 94 of the JJ Act.

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

  • The Supreme Court relied on Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., 2021 (12) SCR 502* to emphasize the procedure for age determination, highlighting the hierarchy of documents to be considered.
  • The Supreme Court cited Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors, [2019] 9 SCR 735* to clarify that both the school date of birth certificate and matriculation certificates are in the same category for age determination.
  • The Supreme Court referred to Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain v State of West Bengal, [2012] 9 SCR 224* to reiterate that the burden of proving juvenility lies on the person claiming it, and also indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference.
  • The Supreme Court utilized Section 34 of the POCSO Act to understand the procedure for determining age in cases under the POCSO Act.
  • The Supreme Court applied Section 94 of the JJ Act to determine the correct procedure for the presumption and determination of age.
  • The Supreme Court used Section 6 of the POCSO Act to understand the punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault.
  • The Supreme Court referred to Section 3 of the POCSO Act to define penetrative sexual assault.
  • The Supreme Court referred to Section 5 of the POCSO Act to define aggravated penetrative sexual assault.
  • The Supreme Court referred to Section 351 of the IPC to define assault.
  • The Supreme Court referred to Section 350 of the IPC to define criminal force.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the lack of conclusive evidence that the victim was a minor and the absence of proof of forced sexual assault. The court emphasized the importance of adhering to the statutory procedure for age determination as outlined in Section 94 of the JJ Act. The court also gave significant weight to the victim’s initial statement under Section 164 of the Cr.PC, where she stated that she had willingly eloped and married the appellant.

Sentiment Analysis of Reasons Given by the Supreme Court:

Reason Percentage
Failure to prove victim’s age as a minor 40%
Victim’s initial statement of willing elopement 30%
Lack of evidence of forced sexual assault 20%
Inconsistency in the High Court’s judgment regarding Section 366 IPC 10%

Fact:Law Ratio

Category Percentage
Fact (Consideration of Factual Aspects) 60%
Law (Consideration of Legal Aspects) 40%

Logical Reasoning:

Issue: Was the victim a minor?
Prosecution failed to provide valid age proof under JJ Act
Ossification test indicated age between 18-20
Conclusion: Victim not proven to be a minor
Issue: Was there sexual assault?
Victim’s initial statement indicated willing elopement
Medical evidence did not prove forced sexual assault
Conclusion: No proof of sexual assault under POCSO

The court’s reasoning was based on a careful analysis of the facts, medical evidence, and legal provisions. The court emphasized that the prosecution had failed to meet its burden of proof on key elements of the case. The court also highlighted the importance of the victim’s initial statement under Section 164 of the Cr.PC, which indicated that she had willingly eloped and married the appellant. The court rejected the High Court’s view that the victim’s statement was not voluntary, noting that the magistrate who recorded the statement had affirmed its veracity. The court also noted that the High Court had acquitted the appellant under Section 366 of the IPC, which was inconsistent with the prosecution’s story of kidnapping.

The court stated that “In this case, the appellant was charged , inter alia, for the offence under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The offence under Section 6 depends on the proof that a “sexual assault” took place.”

The court also observed that “All the facts proved in this case clearly indicate M’s willingness to accompany the appellant and even celebrate their marriage.”

The court further stated that “Having regard to these overall factors, the court is of the opinion that M’s statement under Section 164 of the Cr. PC contained a truthful narration of the events. This, in other words, meant that there was no penetrative sexual assault on her. Therefore, the provisions of the POCSO Act will not be applicable in this case.”

There were no dissenting opinions in this case. The judgment was delivered by a bench of two judges, with both judges concurring on the final decision.

Key Takeaways

  • Age Determination: The judgment underscores the importance of following the correct procedure for age determination as outlined in Section 94 of the JJ Act. School certificates and birth certificates are to be prioritized over medical tests.
  • Burden of Proof: The prosecution bears the burden of proving all elements of an offense, including the victim’s age and the commission of sexual assault.
  • Voluntary Elopement: The court recognized the significance of the victim’s initial statement indicating that she had willingly eloped and married the appellant. This highlights that consent, though irrelevant in cases of minors, can be a factor in assessing whether there was coercion or force.
  • Medical Evidence: The court emphasized that medical evidence must conclusively prove penetrative sexual assault to secure a conviction under the POCSO Act.
  • Inconsistencies: The court highlighted the inconsistency in the High Court’s judgment, where it acquitted the appellant under Section 366 of the IPC, contradicting the prosecution’s story of kidnapping.

Potential Future Impact: This judgment may serve as a precedent in cases involving elopement and alleged sexual assault, emphasizing the need for strict adherence to procedural requirements for age determination and the importance of establishing the elements of sexual assault beyond reasonable doubt. It also underscores the need for courts to consider the victim’s initial statements and the context of the situation. This case will likely be cited in similar cases to ensure that the prosecution meets the required burden of proof and that the courts follow the correct procedure for age determination.

Directions

The Supreme Court directed that the appellant be set at liberty forthwith unless required in connection with any other case.

Specific Amendments Analysis

There is no specific amendment analysis in the judgment.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that in cases under the POCSO Act, the prosecution must strictly adhere to the procedure for age determination as outlined in Section 94 of the JJ Act. The court also emphasized that the prosecution must prove all elements of the offense, including forced sexual assault, beyond reasonable doubt. This judgment clarifies the importance of the hierarchy of documents for age determination and reinforces the need for conclusive evidence of sexual assault. There is no change in the previous position of the law.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in P. Yuvaprakash vs. State overturns a conviction under the POCSO Act, emphasizing the necessity of proving the victim’s age as a minor and the commission of forced sexual assault beyond reasonable doubt. The court highlighted the importance of adhering to the statutory procedure for age determination and gave significant weight to the victim’s initial statement of willing elopement. This judgment reinforces the need for a rigorous approach in POCSO cases, ensuring that convictions are based on solid evidence and adherence to legal procedures.