LEGAL ISSUE: Impact of delay in lodging a First Information Report (FIR) in rape cases.
CASE TYPE: Criminal
Case Name: Parkash Chand vs. State of Himachal Pradesh
[Judgment Date]: 12 February 2019
Date of the Judgment: 12 February 2019
Citation: (2019) INSC 114
Judges: Ranjan Gogoi, CJI, Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J., K.M. Joseph, J.
Can a rape conviction be upheld when there is a significant delay in filing the First Information Report (FIR)? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this critical question in the case of Parkash Chand vs. State of Himachal Pradesh. This case examines the impact of a 7-month delay in reporting a rape incident and its effect on the credibility of the prosecution’s case. The Supreme Court overturned the conviction, emphasizing the importance of prompt reporting and the need for corroborating evidence in such cases. The judgment was delivered by a three-judge bench comprising of Ranjan Gogoi, CJI, and Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and K.M. Joseph, with the opinion authored by Justice K.M. Joseph.
Case Background
In December 1999, the prosecutrix (P.W.2) alleged that the appellant, Parkash Chand, committed rape against her. She further claimed that both the appellant and another co-accused intimidated her. The FIR was lodged on 17 July 2000, approximately seven months after the alleged incident. The prosecutrix stated that she disclosed the incident to P.W.1, who then accompanied her to the Deputy Commissioner’s Office in Chamba. The appellant was charged under Sections 376 (rape) and 506 (criminal intimidation) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), read with Section 34 (acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention) of the IPC. The co-accused was charged under Section 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The Trial Court convicted both the appellant and the co-accused. However, the High Court acquitted the co-accused while upholding the conviction of the appellant.
Timeline:
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| December 1999 | Alleged rape of P.W.2 by the appellant. |
| 5 December 1999 | P.W.2 was allegedly raped by the appellant. |
| 9 July 2000 | Appellant allegedly told P.W.4 that he is prepared to take P.W.2 and her child, and that he would get her and her child recorded as his wife and child. |
| 10 July 2000 | Alleged criminal intimidation by the appellant and co-accused. |
| 17 July 2000 | P.W.2 discloses the incident to P.W.1 and the FIR is lodged. |
| 18 August 2000 | P.W.2 was examined and pregnancy of approximately 36 weeks was detected. |
Course of Proceedings
The Trial Court convicted the appellant under Sections 376 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), sentencing him to 7 years simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 10,000 for the rape charge, and 2 years for the criminal intimidation charge, with both sentences running concurrently. The co-accused was also convicted by the Trial Court. The High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla, however, acquitted the co-accused but upheld the appellant’s conviction. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court of India.
Legal Framework
The case primarily revolves around the interpretation and application of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code, 1860:
-
Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: This section defines the offense of rape and prescribes punishment for it.
“376. Punishment for rape.—(1) Any man who commits rape shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine: Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than ten years. Explanation.—In this section, “rape” means any of the acts mentioned in clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section (2) of section 375.” -
Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: This section deals with the offense of criminal intimidation.
“506. Punishment for criminal intimidation.—Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.—and if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute, unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.” -
Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: This section deals with acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.
“34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.—When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.”
Arguments
The appellant argued that the prosecutrix was above 16 years of age and that the FIR was lodged with a delay of 7 months after the alleged incident. The appellant relied on the case of Vijayan v. State of Kerala [2008 (14) SCC 763], where a similar delay in filing the FIR led to the acquittal of the accused. The appellant also highlighted that the prosecutrix was pregnant at the time of filing the complaint, similar to the facts in the Vijayan case. The appellant contended that the prosecutrix’s testimony was not reliable because of the delay and the lack of corroborating evidence.
The respondent-State argued that there was ample evidence in the form of the prosecutrix’s testimony, an extra-judicial confession made by the appellant to P.W.4, and the testimony of P.W.5, who stated that the appellant had requested a compromise. The State relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Shree Kant Shekari [AIR 2004 SC 4404], which emphasized that delay alone is not a sufficient ground to discard the prosecution’s case. The State also referred to Tulshidas Kanolkar v. State of Goa [2003 (8) SCC 590], where the court held that delay in lodging an FIR should not be used as a ritualistic formula for discarding the prosecution’s case.
| Main Submissions | Sub-Submissions | Party |
|---|---|---|
| Delay in lodging FIR | FIR lodged 7 months after alleged incident | Appellant |
| Prosecutrix was pregnant at time of filing complaint | Appellant | |
| Delay not a mitigating factor if explained | Respondent-State | |
| Credibility of Prosecutrix | Prosecutrix’s testimony is unreliable due to delay | Appellant |
| Lack of corroborating evidence | Appellant | |
| Prosecutrix’s testimony is credible | Respondent-State | |
| Extra-judicial confession by appellant to P.W.4 | Respondent-State | |
| Extra Judicial Confession | P.W.5 stated appellant requested for compromise | Respondent-State |
| P.W.5’s testimony is contradictory | Appellant |
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The primary issue before the Supreme Court was:
- What is the impact of a delay of nearly 7 months in lodging the complaint with the police in a case of alleged rape?
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues
| Issue | Court’s Decision | Brief Reasons |
|---|---|---|
| Impact of delay in lodging the FIR | Conviction set aside | The Court found the delay of 7 months, combined with inconsistencies in the evidence, made the prosecution’s case unreliable. The Court also noted that the medical evidence was contradictory. |
Authorities
The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:
| Authority | Court | How the Authority was considered |
|---|---|---|
| Vijayan v. State of Kerala [2008 (14) SCC 763] | Supreme Court of India | The Court referred to this case, where a similar delay in filing an FIR led to the acquittal of the accused. The Court noted that in cases where the sole testimony of the prosecutrix is available, it is dangerous to convict the accused, especially when there is a significant delay in filing the FIR. |
| State of Himachal Pradesh v. Shree Kant Shekari [AIR 2004 SC 4404] | Supreme Court of India | The Court acknowledged the principle that delay per se is not a mitigating circumstance in rape cases but emphasized that it puts the court on guard to consider any explanation for the delay. The Court distinguished the facts of this case from the present case. |
| Tulshidas Kanolkar v. State of Goa [2003 (8) SCC 590] | Supreme Court of India | The Court referred to this case, which stated that delay in lodging an FIR should not be used as a ritualistic formula for discarding the prosecution’s case, but it should be examined if a satisfactory explanation is offered for the delay. |
| Kaini Rajan v. State of Kerala [2013 (9) SCC 113] | Supreme Court of India | The Court referred to this case, where the court acquitted the accused due to the delayed filing of the report and the circumstances of the case. |
| Ganga Kumar Srivastava v. State of Bihar [2005 (6) SCC 211] | Supreme Court of India | The Court referred to this case, where the court held that if the evidence adduced by the prosecution falls short of the test of reliability and acceptability, it is highly unreliable to act upon it even in an appeal by special leave. |
Judgment
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellant. The Court held that the delay of 7 months in lodging the FIR, coupled with inconsistencies in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, made the case unreliable. The Court also noted that the medical evidence was contradictory.
| Submission | Court’s Treatment |
|---|---|
| Delay of 7 months in lodging the FIR | The Court found the delay significant and noted that it was not adequately explained. The Court emphasized that the delay, combined with other inconsistencies, made the prosecution’s case unreliable. |
| Testimony of the prosecutrix (P.W.2) | The Court found the testimony of the prosecutrix to be unreliable due to the delay in reporting and the lack of corroborating evidence. The Court noted that the incident was alleged to have taken place on a common path, and it was unlikely that no one would have heard her cries if she had indeed resisted. |
| Extra-judicial confession to P.W.4 | The Court found the testimony of P.W.4 to be inconsistent and unreliable. The Court noted that P.W.4’s version of how he came to know about the incident differed from the versions of other witnesses, including the prosecutrix. |
| Testimony of P.W.5 | The Court found the testimony of P.W.5 to be contradictory. P.W.5 stated in cross-examination that the appellant did not ask him for a compromise, which contradicted his earlier statement. |
Vijayan v. State of Kerala [2008 (14) SCC 763]* was used to highlight the danger of convicting an accused solely on the prosecutrix’s testimony when there is a significant delay in filing the FIR. The Court noted that in such cases, corroborating evidence is essential. The Court did not find the explanation for the delay satisfactory.
The Court found that the prosecution failed to establish the charges against the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court emphasized that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of the doubt.
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the significant delay in lodging the FIR, coupled with inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies of key prosecution witnesses. The court found that the delay of seven months in reporting the alleged rape, without a satisfactory explanation, raised serious doubts about the authenticity of the prosecution’s case. The discrepancies in the evidence of P.W.4 and P.W.5 further weakened the prosecution’s claim. The Court also noted the lack of corroborating medical evidence, which could have supported the prosecutrix’s version of events.
| Reason | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Delay in lodging FIR | 40% |
| Inconsistencies in witness testimonies | 30% |
| Lack of corroborating medical evidence | 20% |
| Benefit of doubt | 10% |
| Category | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Fact | 60% |
| Law | 40% |
The Court’s reasoning was heavily influenced by the factual inconsistencies and the delay in reporting, indicating a higher reliance on the factual aspects of the case rather than purely legal interpretations. The court emphasized that the prosecution’s case must be reliable and credible, especially when there is a significant delay in reporting.
The Court considered the argument that the prosecutrix had willingly gone to the appellant’s house, but found that this did not negate the possibility of rape. However, the Court emphasized that the prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and in this case, the evidence fell short of that standard.
The Court also noted that the High Court had incorrectly stated that the medical report did not indicate habitual sexual intercourse, when in fact the report stated the opposite. This further weakened the prosecution’s case.
The Court’s decision was based on the principle that in cases of sexual assault, prompt reporting is crucial for preserving evidence and ensuring a fair trial. The delay in this case, combined with the inconsistencies in the evidence, made it unsafe to uphold the conviction.
The Supreme Court quoted from the judgment:
“In any event, delay per se is not a mitigating circumstance for the accused when accusations of rape are involved. Delay in lodging the first information report cannot be used as a ritualistic formula for discarding prosecution case and doubting its authenticity. It only puts the court on guard to search for and consider if any explanation has been offered for the delay.”
“In cases where the sole testimony of the prosecutrix is available, it is very dangerous to convict the accused, specially when the prosecutrix could venture to wait for seven months for filing the FIR for rape. This leaves the accused totally defenceless.”
“The pt. is used to habitual sexual intercourse”
Key Takeaways
- Prompt Reporting: In cases of sexual assault, prompt reporting to the authorities is crucial for preserving evidence and ensuring a fair trial.
- Corroborating Evidence: When there is a significant delay in reporting, the prosecution’s case must be supported by strong and reliable corroborating evidence.
- Benefit of Doubt: If the prosecution fails to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt.
- Credibility of Witnesses: Inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies of key prosecution witnesses can significantly weaken the prosecution’s case.
Directions
The Supreme Court set aside the order of conviction and sentence of the appellant. The bail bonds of the appellant were discharged.
Development of Law
The ratio decidendi of this case is that a significant delay in lodging an FIR in a rape case, especially when combined with inconsistencies in the evidence and lack of corroborating medical evidence, can make the prosecution’s case unreliable, warranting the acquittal of the accused. This judgment reinforces the principle that while delay alone is not a mitigating factor, it requires a careful examination of the explanation for the delay and the overall credibility of the prosecution’s evidence. The Court’s decision emphasizes the importance of prompt reporting in cases of sexual assault and the need for strong corroborating evidence when there is a significant delay. This case does not change the previous position of law but reinforces the existing principles on the impact of delay in lodging FIRs in rape cases.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision in Parkash Chand vs. State of Himachal Pradesh highlights the critical importance of prompt reporting and reliable evidence in rape cases. The Court overturned the conviction due to a 7-month delay in filing the FIR, coupled with inconsistencies in witness testimonies and a lack of corroborating evidence. This judgment serves as a reminder of the need for a thorough and credible prosecution in cases of sexual assault and reinforces the principle that the accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt when the prosecution’s case is not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.