Supreme Court overturns rape conviction in consensual relationship case: Naim Ahamed vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (30 January 2023)

Date of the Judgment: 30 January 2023
Citation: 2023 INSC 852
Judges: Hon’ble Justices Ajay Rastogi and Bela M. Trivedi. The judgment was authored by Justice Bela M. Trivedi.

Can a sexual relationship between two consenting adults, where one party promised marriage but later did not fulfill it, be considered rape? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this critical question, examining the nuances of consent and the difference between a false promise and a broken promise in the context of Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. This judgment clarifies the legal position on consent in such cases, providing important guidance for future cases.

Case Background

The prosecutrix, a married woman with three children, lived in a rented house in Delhi. The accused, Naim Ahamed, lived in a house opposite hers. In 2009, the prosecutrix and the accused began a sexual relationship. The prosecutrix alleged that the accused had promised to marry her, stating that her husband did not earn enough and that he would take care of her. In 2011, she became pregnant with the accused’s child. The accused continued to assure her of marriage even after the child’s birth.

In 2012, the accused moved the prosecutrix to another rented premises and continued the relationship. Later, he left stating that his parents were ill and asked her to take shelter in a shelter home. He also forced her to divorce her husband. The prosecutrix later discovered that the accused was already married with children when she visited his native place. Despite this, the relationship continued. In 2014, the prosecutrix divorced her husband, leaving her three children with him. In 2015, she lodged a complaint against the accused for rape, claiming that he had not married her as promised.

Timeline:

Course of Proceedings

The Sessions Court found the accused guilty of rape under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, sentencing him to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 50,000, with an additional one year of imprisonment for non-payment. The court also ordered the accused to pay Rs. 5,00,000 as compensation to the prosecutrix. On appeal, the High Court of Delhi modified the sentence to 7 years of imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5,000, while upholding the compensation order. The accused then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Legal Framework

The case primarily revolves around the interpretation of Section 90 and Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
Section 90 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 defines what does not constitute valid consent. It states:

“90. Consent known to be given under fear or misconception.—A consent is not such a consent as it intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception; or Consent of insane person.—if the consent is given by a person who, from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his consent; or Consent of child.—unless the contrary appears from the context, if the consent is given by a person who is under twelve years of age.”

This means that if someone agrees to something because they are scared, or because they misunderstand the situation, their consent is not valid under the law.

Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 defines rape. It states:

“375. Rape.- A man is said to commit “rape” if he-
(a) penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or
(b) inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or
(c) manipulates any part of the body of a woman so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of such woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or
(d) applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person,
under the circumstances falling under any of the following seven descriptions:-
First- Against her will.
Secondly- Without her consent.
Thirdly- With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested in fear of death or of hurt.
Fourthly- With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married.
Fifthly- With her consent when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent.
Sixthly- With or without her consent, when she is under eighteen years of age.
Seventhly- when she is unable to communicate consent.”

This section defines rape as sexual acts performed under specific circumstances, including without consent or under a misconception of fact. The second circumstance states that sexual intercourse without consent constitutes rape. The third, fourth, and fifth circumstances specify situations where consent is not considered valid. The court considered the second clause of Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 along with Section 90 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

The Supreme Court also referred to Section 114A of the Indian Evidence Act, which states that if a woman says in court that she did not consent to sexual intercourse, the court shall presume that she did not consent.

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments:

• The appellant argued that the prosecutrix had willingly engaged in a sexual relationship with him for about five years, starting in 2009-2010 and continuing after the birth of their child in 2011, until the complaint was filed in 2015.
• The appellant contended that the prosecutrix was aware that he was married and had children.
• The appellant submitted that the prosecutrix filed a false case against him after he refused to give her a large sum of money.
• The appellant relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Deelip Singh alias Dilip Kumar vs. State of Bihar [(2005) 1 SCC 88], Prashant Bharti vs. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2013) 9 SCC 293], and Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar vs. State of Maharashtra and Others [(2019) 18 SCC 191], to argue that a long-term consensual relationship cannot be considered rape under the misconception of fact under Section 90 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Respondent’s Arguments:

• The respondent argued that the lower courts had correctly found the appellant guilty of rape under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
• The respondent contended that the appellant had lured the prosecutrix into a sexual relationship by falsely promising to marry her.
• The respondent submitted that the prosecutrix’s consent was obtained under a misconception of fact, as the appellant had no intention of marrying her and had breached his promise.

Amicus Curiae’s Arguments:

• The Amicus Curiae, Ms. Indira Jaising, argued that there is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex.
• Ms. Jaising submitted that the court should carefully examine whether the accused had made a false promise of marriage with malafide intentions or if it was a mere breach of promise.
• She argued that the lower courts had rightly appreciated the evidence and concluded that the prosecutrix’s consent was obtained under a misconception of fact under Section 90 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, thus falling under the second clause of Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Submissions Table:

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court did not explicitly frame issues in a separate section. However, the main issue that the Court considered was:

1. Whether the consent given by the prosecutrix for sexual intercourse was under a misconception of fact as per Section 90 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and whether the act committed by the accused falls under the definition of rape as per Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, specifically under clause ‘Secondly’.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates how the Court decided the issue:

Authorities

The Supreme Court referred to several cases and legal provisions to support its reasoning. These are categorized by the legal points they address:

On the Interpretation of Consent and Misconception of Fact:

• Uday vs. State of Karnataka [(2003) 4 SCC 461] – Supreme Court of India: The court discussed that consent given by a prosecutrix who is in love with the accused, on the promise of marriage, is not necessarily consent under a misconception of fact. The court emphasized that each case must be considered based on its facts.
• Deelip Singh alias Dilip Kumar vs. State of Bihar [(2005) 1 SCC 88] – Supreme Court of India: The court clarified that a false promise to marry, made with no intention of fulfilling it, vitiates consent. However, a mere breach of promise does not necessarily amount to a misconception of fact.
• Deepak Gulati vs. State of Haryana [(2013) 7 SCC 675] – Supreme Court of India: The court distinguished between rape and consensual sex, stating that the court must examine whether the accused had malafide intentions or had made a false promise of marriage to satisfy his lust.
• Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar vs. State of Maharashtra and Others [(2019) 18 SCC 191] – Supreme Court of India: The court reiterated that there is a distinction between rape and consensual sex, and the court must examine the intention of the accused when making a promise of marriage.

Legal Provisions:

• Section 90 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: Defines consent given under fear or misconception of fact as not valid consent.
• Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: Defines rape and the circumstances under which sexual intercourse is considered rape.
• Section 114A of the Indian Evidence Act: States that in certain cases, the court shall presume that a woman did not consent if she states so in her evidence.
• Section 276 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Specifies how evidence should be recorded in court.
• Section 277 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Specifies the language in which evidence should be recorded.

Treatment of Authorities Table:

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• The Supreme Court followed the principles laid down in Uday vs. State of Karnataka [(2003) 4 SCC 461]*, emphasizing that each case must be considered based on its unique facts.
• The Supreme Court relied on Deelip Singh alias Dilip Kumar vs. State of Bihar [(2005) 1 SCC 88]*, to distinguish between a false promise and a broken promise, holding that a false promise made with no intention of fulfilling it vitiates consent.
• The Supreme Court used Deepak Gulati vs. State of Haryana [(2013) 7 SCC 675]*, to reinforce the distinction between rape and consensual sex, emphasizing the need to examine the accused’s intentions.
• The Supreme Court applied the principles from Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar vs. State of Maharashtra and Others [(2019) 18 SCC 191]*, to reiterate that a sexual relationship based on love and passion, and not solely on a false promise, does not constitute rape.
• The Supreme Court interpreted Section 90 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, in the context of the case, clarifying that the prosecutrix’s consent was not given under a misconception of fact.
• The Supreme Court interpreted Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, to determine if the facts of the case fell within the definition of rape, particularly the second clause.
• The Supreme Court explained Section 114A of the Indian Evidence Act, noting that while the presumption of absence of consent can be raised, it was not applicable in this case due to the specific facts.
• The Supreme Court explained the importance of following the procedure under Section 276 and Section 277 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, for recording evidence.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was influenced by several key factors:

• Duration of the Relationship: The fact that the prosecutrix and the accused had a sexual relationship for about five years weighed heavily in the court’s assessment. This long-term relationship was seen as inconsistent with the idea that the prosecutrix was acting under a misconception of fact from the beginning.
• Maturity of the Prosecutrix: The court considered that the prosecutrix was a married woman and mother of three children, making her a mature individual capable of understanding the consequences of her actions. This undermined the argument that she was easily deceived or acting under a misconception of fact.
• Awareness of Marital Status: The court noted that the prosecutrix was aware that the accused was married, which further weakened the claim that she believed he would marry her.
• Distinction between False and Broken Promises: The court emphasized the difference between a false promise (where the intention to marry never existed) and a broken promise (where unforeseen circumstances prevent the fulfillment of the promise). The court found that the facts of the case did not indicate a false promise from the start.
• Motive for the Complaint: The court considered the accused’s statement that the prosecutrix filed the complaint after he refused to meet her monetary demands, which cast doubt on the genuineness of her claim of rape.

Sentiment Analysis of Reasons:

Fact:Law Ratio:

The Supreme Court’s decision was influenced by a combination of factual and legal considerations. The ratio is as follows:

This indicates that the court gave more weight to the specific facts of the case, such as the duration of the relationship and the prosecutrix’s awareness of the accused’s marital status, while also considering the legal principles related to consent and the definition of rape.

Logical Reasoning:

The court considered alternative interpretations, such as the argument that the prosecutrix’s consent was vitiated by a false promise of marriage, but rejected it. The court reasoned that the facts did not support the claim of a false promise from the beginning. The court concluded that the prosecutrix had willingly engaged in a relationship with the accused, and that the case did not fall within the definition of rape under Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

The court observed that, “In case of false promise, the accused right from the beginning would not have any intention to marry the prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceited the prosecutrix by giving a false promise to marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach of promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might have given a promise with all seriousness to marry her, and subsequently might have encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfill his promise.”

The Court also observed that, “The prosecutrix being a married woman and the mother of three children was matured and intelligent enough to understand the significance and the consequences of the moral or immoral quality of act she was consenting to.”

The Court further observed that, “Even otherwise, if her entire conduct during the course of such relationship with the accused, is closely seen, it appears that she had betrayed her husband and three children by having relationship with the accused, for whom she had developed liking for him.”

The Court did not have any minority opinions.

Key Takeaways

• A long-term consensual sexual relationship, even if based on a promise of marriage that is later broken, does not automatically constitute rape.
• The court will examine the intention of the accused at the time of making the promise of marriage. If the accused never intended to marry, it may constitute rape. However, if there was an intention to marry, but the promise was broken due to unforeseen circumstances, it will not constitute rape.
• The maturity and awareness of the prosecutrix are important factors in determining whether consent was given under a misconception of fact.
• The court will consider the entire conduct of the prosecutrix and the surrounding circumstances to determine if the consent was genuine.
• The court will also consider the motive of the prosecutrix in filing the complaint.

Potential Future Impact: This judgment provides clarity on the issue of consent in sexual relationships based on promises of marriage. It emphasizes the need to differentiate between a false promise and a broken promise, and it highlights the importance of examining the facts and circumstances of each case. This decision will likely influence future cases involving similar issues, ensuring that the law is applied fairly and consistently. It also serves as a reminder that the law recognizes the autonomy of individuals who make informed decisions about their sexual relationships.