Supreme Court quashes Arms Act case for possession of button knife: Irfan Khan vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (2024) INSC 924

Date of the Judgment: 03 December 2024
Citation: 2024 INSC 924
Judges: Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J., Sandeep Mehta, J.
Can a person be prosecuted under the Arms Act simply for possessing a button knife? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question, clarifying that mere possession of a button knife is not an offense unless it is for the purpose of manufacture, sale, or testing. This judgment provides significant relief to individuals who might have been wrongly charged under the Arms Act. The bench comprised Justices Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Sandeep Mehta, with Justice Mehta authoring the judgment.

Case Background

On 9th July 2022, an FIR No. 477/2022 was lodged at Police Station, Govind Puri against Irfan Khan (the appellant). The FIR alleged that Irfan was found acting suspiciously in Pravasi Park. Upon searching him, the police recovered a button knife with a total length of 31.5 cm, a blade length of 14.5 cm, and a width of 3 cm. Following the investigation, a charge sheet was filed against Irfan for offenses under Sections 25, 54, and 59 of the Arms Act, 1959. Irfan then filed a petition before the High Court of Delhi under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeking to quash the FIR and the charge sheet. The High Court rejected his petition on 18th April 2023, leading to the present appeal by special leave before the Supreme Court.

Timeline:

Legal Framework

The case revolves around the interpretation of the Arms Act, 1959, and the Arms Rules, 2016, specifically concerning the possession of knives. According to Rule 3 read with Category V of Schedule I (Part A) of the Arms Rules, 2016, a knife with a blade longer than 9 inches (22.86 cm) or wider than 2 inches (5.08 cm) is considered an arm, possession of which is an offense. However, the Delhi Administration had issued a notification on 29th October 1980 (DAD Notification) that brought certain categories of knives, with dimensions lesser than those specified in the Arms Act and Arms Rules, under the purview of the Act, when meant for “manufacture, sale or possess for sale or test”.

The relevant portion of the Arms Rules, 2016, states:

“V. Arms other than firearms: Sharp-edged and deadly weapons, namely: Swords (including sword-sticks), daggers, bayonets, spears (including; lances and javelins), battle-axes, knives (including Kirpans and Khukries) and other such weapons with blades longer than 9” or wider than 2” other than those designed for domestic, agricultural, scientific or industrial purposes, steel batton, “Zipo” and other such weapons called ‘life preservers’, machinery for making arms, other than category II, and any other arms which the Central Government may notify under Section 4 of the Act.”

The DAD Notification of 29th October 1980, states:

“…no person in the Union Territory of Delhi shall manufacture, sale or possess for sale or test spring actuated knives, gararidar knives, bottondar knives and other knives which open or close with any other mechanical device with a sharp edge blade of 7.62 Cms, or more in length and 1.72 Cms or more in breadth in the Union Territory of Delhi” unless he hold a licence issued in accordance with provisions of the Arms Act, 1959 (No. 64 of 1959) and Arms Rule, 1962 framed thereunder…”

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments:

• The appellant argued that the charge sheet against him was flawed because it did not allege that the button knife he possessed was for manufacture, sale, or testing, which is a necessary condition under the DAD notification to constitute an offense.
• The appellant contended that the DAD notification only applies to the manufacture, sale, or possession for sale or test of specific knives and does not cover simple possession.
• The appellant emphasized that the dimensions of the knife recovered from him were less than those specified in the Arms Act and Rules, and the DAD notification only applied to the stated purposes.

Respondent’s Arguments:

• The respondent argued that the possession of the button knife itself was a violation of the DAD notification.
• The respondent claimed that the aspect of whether the possession was for sale or test should be determined during the trial.
• The respondent contended that the possession of the weapon was contrary to the DAD notification dated 29th October, 1980.

The core of the appellant’s argument is that the DAD Notification should be interpreted strictly, applying only to those who manufacture, sell, or possess knives for sale or testing. The respondent’s argument, on the other hand, implies that mere possession of a button knife, regardless of intent, is a violation of the notification. The innovativeness of the appellant’s argument lies in the strict interpretation of the DAD notification, focusing on the specific purposes mentioned in it, rather than a broad interpretation that would encompass all forms of possession.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court considered the following issue:

1. Whether the proceedings against the appellant under Sections 25, 54, and 59 of the Arms Act, 1959, based on the charge sheet, are sustainable when there is no allegation that the button knife recovered from him was for the purpose of manufacture, sale, or test, as required by the DAD Notification dated 29th October, 1980.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Court primarily relied on the following legal provisions and notifications:

• The Arms Act, 1959: The primary legislation governing arms and their possession.
• The Arms Rules, 2016: Rule 3 read with Category V of Schedule I (Part A) defines certain knives as arms if they exceed specific dimensions.
• DAD Notification dated 29th October, 1980: This notification brings certain knives with lesser dimensions under the purview of the Arms Act when meant for manufacture, sale, or possession for sale or test.

Judgment

Authorities Viewed by the Court:

• The Court interpreted the Arms Act, 1959, and Arms Rules, 2016, in conjunction with the DAD Notification. The court held that the DAD notification is an exception to the general rules regarding arms, and it should be interpreted strictly. The court emphasized that the DAD Notification specifies that the knives are brought under the purview of the Arms Act only when they are meant for “manufacture, sale or possession for sale or test”.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the absence of any allegation in the charge sheet that the button knife possessed by the appellant was for the purpose of manufacture, sale, or test. The Court emphasized the specific language of the DAD Notification, which explicitly limits its application to these scenarios. The Court also highlighted that the prosecution cannot improve its case beyond what is stated in the charge sheet and that the accused cannot be subjected to trial without the basic ingredients of the offense being present in the charge sheet.

The Court’s reasoning was primarily based on legal interpretation, emphasizing the specific language of the DAD Notification and the requirements for a valid charge sheet. While the facts of the case were important, the legal interpretation of the DAD Notification was the dominant factor.

The Court considered the alternative interpretation that mere possession of the knife is sufficient for prosecution but rejected it because the DAD notification specifies that the knives are brought under the purview of the Arms Act only when they are meant for “manufacture, sale or possession for sale or test”. The court held that the prosecution cannot improve its case beyond what is stated in the charge sheet.

The Supreme Court held that:

“…there is not even a whisper that the appellant’s possession of the said buttondar knife was for any of the prohibited categories as indicated in the DAD Notification.”

“…before requiring the accused to undergo trial for simple possession of the knife, the prosecution would have to at least present the basic allegations constituting the ingredients of the offences in the charge-sheet.”

“…the proceedings sought to be undertaken against the appellant in pursuance of the impugned charge-sheet for the offence under Sections 25, 54 and 59 of the Arms Act, tantamount to an abuse of the process of law and deserve to be quashed.”

Key Takeaways

• Mere possession of a button knife is not an offense under the Arms Act unless the prosecution can prove that it was for manufacture, sale, or testing.
• The DAD Notification of 29th October 1980, is to be interpreted strictly, focusing on the specific purposes mentioned in it.
• The prosecution cannot improve its case beyond what is stated in the charge sheet.
• The judgment provides relief to individuals who might have been wrongly charged under the Arms Act for simply possessing a button knife.
• This judgment clarifies the scope of the DAD Notification and sets a precedent for similar cases involving possession of knives.

Directions

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court order dated 18th April 2023. Consequently, the FIR No. 477 of 2022, the charge sheet, and all proceedings against the appellant were quashed.

Specific Amendments Analysis

There are no specific amendments discussed in the judgment.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the DAD Notification of 29th October 1980, which brings certain knives under the purview of the Arms Act, applies only when the knives are meant for “manufacture, sale or possession for sale or test.” This decision clarifies that mere possession of a button knife, without the intention to manufacture, sell, or test it, does not constitute an offense under the Arms Act and the DAD Notification. This interpretation limits the scope of the DAD Notification and provides a narrower interpretation of what constitutes an offense under the Arms Act with respect to knives.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s judgment in Irfan Khan vs. State (NCT of Delhi) quashed the criminal proceedings against the appellant, holding that mere possession of a button knife does not constitute an offense under the Arms Act and the DAD Notification unless it is for the purpose of manufacture, sale, or testing. This decision provides clarity on the interpretation of the DAD Notification and offers significant relief to individuals who might have been wrongly charged for simple possession of knives. The Court emphasized the importance of the specific language of the DAD Notification and the need for the prosecution to present the basic allegations constituting the offense in the charge sheet.