Supreme Court quashes charges against financier in disproportionate assets case: State vs. Uttamchand Bohra (2021)

Date of the Judgment: 9 December 2021

Citation: (2021) INSC 738

Judges: K.M. Joseph, J., S. Ravindra Bhat, J.

Can a person be charged with criminal conspiracy and abetment solely based on the possession of a property document? The Supreme Court of India addressed this critical question in a recent case involving allegations of disproportionate assets against a public servant. The court examined whether a financier, found in possession of a sale deed, could be implicated in the public servant’s alleged corruption. This judgment clarifies the standard of evidence required to establish criminal liability in such cases. The bench comprised Justices K.M. Joseph and S. Ravindra Bhat, with the majority opinion authored by Justice S. Ravindra Bhat.

Case Background

The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) filed a case against Andasu Ravindar (A-1), an income tax official, and his wife Kavitha Andasu (A-2), alleging that they had amassed assets disproportionate to their known sources of income. The CBI also implicated Uttamchand Bohra (the respondent), a financier, alleging that he was a close associate of A-1 and had assisted him in acquiring properties through a company named M/s Raviteja Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd. The CBI alleged that the original sale deed of a flat purchased by the company was found in Uttamchand’s possession.

The prosecution’s case against Uttamchand was primarily based on two points: first, the seizure of the sale deed from his possession, and second, his alleged involvement in an earlier case where he was accused of assisting A-1 in transporting a bribe. The CBI argued that Uttamchand’s possession of the sale deed indicated his involvement in a conspiracy with A-1 to acquire benami property. Uttamchand, on the other hand, contended that mere possession of the sale deed did not make him criminally liable, especially since his relationship with A-1 was known and he had advanced money to A-2, which was disclosed in his income tax returns.

Timeline:

Course of Proceedings

The trial court rejected Uttamchand’s application for discharge under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). Uttamchand then approached the High Court of Judicature at Madras, which, exercising its powers under Section 397 and Section 401 of the CrPC, quashed the charge sheet against him. The High Court held that mere possession of the sale deed, even if witnessed by Uttamchand’s employee, was not sufficient to establish criminal liability. Aggrieved by this decision, the CBI filed a special leave petition before the Supreme Court.

Legal Framework

The case revolves around several key legal provisions:

• Section 120A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC): Defines criminal conspiracy as an agreement between two or more persons to do an illegal act or an act that is not illegal by illegal means.

  “When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done,— (1) an illegal act, or (2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy…”

• Section 120B of the IPC: Prescribes the punishment for criminal conspiracy.
• Section 107 of the IPC: Defines abetment as instigating, engaging in a conspiracy, or intentionally aiding the commission of an offense.

  “A person abets the doing of a thing, who— First.—Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly.—Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly.—Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.”

• Section 109 of the IPC: Provides for the punishment of abetment when the act abetted is committed.

  “Whoever abets any offence shall, if the act abetted is committed in consequence of the abetment, and no express provision is made by this Code for the punishment of such abetment, be punished with the punishment provided for the offence.”

• Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PCA): Defines criminal misconduct by a public servant, including possession of disproportionate assets.

  “A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct… if he or any person on his behalf, is in possession or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income.”

• Section 13(2) of the PCA: Prescribes the punishment for criminal misconduct by a public servant.

  “Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than 3 [four years] but which may extend to 4 [ten years] and shall also be liable to fine.”

• Section 397 and Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC): Grants the High Court powers of revision.
• Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC): Deals with discharge of accused.
• Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC): Deals with report of police officer on completion of investigation.

Arguments

Submissions of the CBI:

• The CBI argued that Uttamchand was part of a criminal conspiracy with A-1, the public servant, to acquire assets disproportionate to A-1’s known income.
• The CBI contended that the sale deed was seized from Uttamchand’s possession, and he had no explanation for it.
• The CBI argued that Uttamchand was a financier who lent money to A-2 and was closely associated with A-1, indicating his involvement in the conspiracy.
• The CBI pointed out that the property was purchased using funds routed through companies that had official dealings with A-1, and that Uttamchand’s employee was a witness to the sale deed.
• The CBI relied on the earlier case against Uttamchand, where he was accused of assisting A-1 in transporting a bribe, to show his involvement in A-1’s illegal activities.
• The CBI cited the depositions of PW-70 and PW-71 to show A-1 amassed wealth illicitly and was aided by others like Uttamchand.
• The CBI contended that the trial court correctly framed charges against Uttamchand based on the evidence available.

Submissions of Uttamchand Bohra:

• Uttamchand argued that mere possession of the sale deed did not make him criminally liable.
• He contended that his relationship with A-1 and A-2 as a financier was known and admitted by the prosecution.
• Uttamchand argued that the prosecution had not produced any material to implicate him in the crime of conspiracy.
• He pointed out that the statements of the approvers did not implicate him in any way.
• Uttamchand submitted that the High Court was justified in allowing his discharge application since the prosecution failed to establish a prima facie case against him.
• He argued that he was not a public servant and could not commit an offence under Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the PCA.
• Uttamchand contended that there was no evidence linking him to the transaction of sale of the flat or any allegation that he received any monetary benefit.
• He argued that no allegation in the chargesheet amounted to an offence under Section 109 of the IPC.

Submissions Table

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court considered the following key issue:

1. Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the charge sheet against the respondent (Uttamchand Bohra) under Section 397 and Section 401 of the CrPC.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

• Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of West Bengal [(1973) 3 SCC 753]:* The court cited this case to emphasize that the test in a criminal trial is whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding, not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction.
• State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh [(1977) 4 SCC 39]:* The court acknowledged this case, which held that strong suspicion is sufficient for framing charges, but distinguished it from the present case where the suspicion was not supported by evidence.
• Union of India vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal & Ors [1979 (3) SCC 04]:* The court referred to this case to highlight that if two views are equally possible and the evidence only raises suspicion, the judge is justified in discharging the accused.
• Central Bureau of Investigation v. K. Narayana Rao [(2012) 9 SCC 512]:* The court extensively quoted this case, which summarized the principles relating to the discharge of an accused, emphasizing that the court should sift the evidence to determine if there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
• Sajjan Kumar [(2010) 9 SCC 368]:* The court considered this case in relation to the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the CrPC, noting that if there is a strong suspicion leading the court to believe that the accused has committed an offense, it is not open to the court to say there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
• State of J&K v. Sudershan Chakkar [(1995) 4 SCC 181]:* The court relied on this case to highlight that the court must confine its attention to the documents referred to under Section 173 of the CrPC when framing charges.
• P. Nallammal v. State [(1999) 6 SCC 559]:* The court referred to this case to emphasize that the initial burden of showing a conspiracy existed cannot be alleged against a non-public servant.
• Deepak Surana v. State of M.P.:* The court cited this case to reiterate that suspicion is not sufficient to enable the framing of a charge.
• P. Vijayan [(2010) 2 SCC 398]:* The court referred to this case, which discussed the discharge of the accused under Section 227 of the Code, stating that the judge has to sift the evidence to find out if there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
• Aloka Bose v. Parmatma Devi [(2009) 2 SCC 582]:* The court cited this case in the context of whether the agreements relied upon by the prosecution could be said to be relevant.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the lack of concrete evidence linking Uttamchand to the alleged criminal conspiracy and abetment. The court emphasized that mere possession of the sale deed and the fact that Uttamchand’s employee witnessed it were insufficient to establish criminal liability. The court also noted that Uttamchand was not a public servant and could not be charged under Section 13(1)(e) of the PCA. The court highlighted the absence of any evidence showing Uttamchand’s involvement in the money trail or the transaction for the purchase of the property. The court also considered the fact that the sale deed was seized from Uttamchand’s house in relation to another FIR, not the one related to disproportionate assets.

Fact:Law Ratio

The court’s reasoning was more heavily influenced by the factual aspects of the case, particularly the lack of evidence linking Uttamchand to the alleged crimes (60%), while the legal aspects (40%) were also considered, such as the interpretation of conspiracy and abetment under the IPC and PCA.

Logical Reasoning

Judgment

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal filed by the CBI, upholding the High Court’s decision to quash the charges against Uttamchand Bohra. The court found that the prosecution had failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case against Uttamchand for criminal conspiracy or abetment. The court emphasized that mere possession of the sale deed and the fact that Uttamchand’s employee witnessed it were not sufficient to implicate him in the alleged offenses.

The court stated, “The material to implicate someone as a conspirator acting in concert with a public servant, alleged to have committed misconduct, under the PCA, or amassed assets disproportionate to a public servant’s known sources of income, thus, has to be on firm ground.”

The court further added, “In the present case, only two circumstances – the custody of the sale deed (of the property allegedly belonging to A-1) and the fact that it was witnessed by Uttamchand’s employee – are alleged against the respondent. These are wholly insufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion, or make out a prima case against him, for conspiracy.”

The court also noted, “The factual narration in this case would reveal that Uttamchand, the respondent, was not a public officer or public servant. He cannot therefore, be charged with committing an offence under Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the PCA.”

The court concluded that the charges against Uttamchand were not sustainable due to lack of evidence.

Key Takeaways

• Mere possession of a property document is not sufficient to establish criminal conspiracy or abetment in a disproportionate assets case.
• The prosecution must provide concrete evidence linking an individual to the alleged conspiracy and illegal activities.
• A non-public servant cannot be charged under Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
• The court must confine its attention to the documents referred to under Section 173 of the CrPC when framing charges.
• Suspicion alone cannot be the basis for framing charges; there must be a reasonable suspicion supported by evidence.
• The court must sift through the evidence to determine if there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

Directions

No specific directions were given by the Supreme Court in this case.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that mere possession of a property document and the fact that an individual’s employee witnessed the sale deed are not sufficient grounds to establish criminal conspiracy or abetment in a disproportionate assets case. This judgment clarifies that the prosecution must provide concrete evidence to link an individual to the alleged offenses. This case reinforces the principle that suspicion alone cannot be the basis for framing charges and that the court must sift through the evidence to determine if there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It also emphasizes that non-public servants cannot be charged under Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.