Supreme Court Quashes Charges of Outraging Modesty and Criminal Intimidation Against Director: Naresh Aneja vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2025) INSC 19 (2 January 2025)

Date of the Judgment: 2 January 2025
Citation: (2025) INSC 19
Judges: C.T. Ravikumar, J., Sanjay Karol, J.
Can a person be charged with outraging modesty and criminal intimidation based on vague allegations? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question in a case involving a company director accused of workplace harassment. The court quashed the charges, finding insufficient evidence to support the allegations. This judgment clarifies the threshold for establishing offenses under Section 354 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The judgment was authored by Justice Sanjay Karol, with Justice C.T. Ravikumar concurring.

Case Background

The case involves Naresh Aneja, the appellant, and Puja Tankha, the complainant, who were directors in M/s LAJ-IDS Exports Pvt. Ltd. The complainant alleged that R.K. Aneja, brother of the appellant, had harassed her at the workplace. She also accused the appellant of using abusive language and mental harassment when she tried to file a complaint.

Initially, the complainant filed a complaint with the police, which did not lead to any action. Subsequently, she filed an application under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, before the Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM), leading to the registration of an FIR against both the appellant and his brother. The appellant then filed a petition in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad seeking to quash the charges, which was rejected.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) directed the registration of a complaint and investigation based on the complainant’s application under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Subsequently, an FIR was registered under Sections 354 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court seeking to quash the FIR, which was rejected. The High Court stated that only malicious or malafide institution of proceedings warrants interference and that the High Court could not undertake a “microscopic examination of facts and evidence.”

Legal Framework

The Supreme Court examined the provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, specifically:

• Section 354: “Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty.” This section punishes anyone who assaults or uses criminal force against a woman, intending to outrage her modesty.
• Section 503: “Criminal intimidation.” This section defines criminal intimidation as threatening someone with injury to their person, reputation, or property, with the intent to cause alarm.
• Section 506: “Punishment for criminal intimidation.” This section prescribes the punishment for criminal intimidation, which can extend to two years of imprisonment, or a fine, or both.

The Court also referred to Section 350 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 which defines criminal force as “Whoever intentionally uses force to any person, without that person’s consent, in order to the committing of any offence, or intending by the use of such force to cause, or knowing it to be likely that by the use of such force he will cause injury, fear or annoyance to the person to whom the force is used, is said to use criminal force to that other.”

Arguments

Appellant’s Submissions:

• The appellant argued that the complainant had concealed an earlier complaint making the same allegations, which was found to be a dispute arising from company affairs.
• The appellant contended that neither the FIR nor the chargesheet disclosed any offense committed by him.
• The appellant claimed that the FIR was motivated by the complainant’s fraudulent intentions.

Complainant’s Submissions:

• The complainant argued that the appellant and his brother took undue advantage of her and blackmailed her.
• The complainant contended that the FIR and statements under Section 161 and 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, clearly showed that R.K. Aneja made inappropriate advances and the appellant degraded her.
• The complainant submitted that the appellant had concealed his criminal history.
• The complainant relied on Rupan Deol Bajaj v. K.P.S Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194], Rajesh Bajaj v. State of NCT of Delhi [(1999) 3 SCC 259], and Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E Ltd. & Ors [(2002) 1 SCC 234] to argue that a prima facie case was made out.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed the following issue:

1. Whether the charges levied against the appellant are ex-facie made out from the record, thereby justifying the High Court’s refusal to quash proceedings by invoking its inherent powers u/s 482 CrPC.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates how the Court decided the issue:

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

The Supreme Court held that the charges against the appellant under Sections 354 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, were not made out.

The Court observed that for Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, to apply, there must be an assault or use of criminal force against a woman with the intent to outrage her modesty. The court noted that the record was silent with respect to the use of any force by the appellant. The court also found that there was no evidence of intent to outrage modesty.

Regarding Section 503 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the court stated that there must be a threat with the intention to cause alarm. The court found that the FIR, interim investigation report, and chargesheet did not disclose any offense of criminal intimidation by the appellant.

The court also held that statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, are inadmissible as evidence and cannot be used to establish an offense. The court clarified that even if the statements were considered, no prima facie offense was made out against the appellant.

The Supreme Court quashed the criminal proceedings against the appellant, Naresh Aneja.

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• Raju Pandurang Mahale v. State of Maharashtra [(2004) 4 SCC 371]*: The Court used this case to explain the essential elements of Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, emphasizing that criminal force and intent to outrage modesty are necessary.
• Rupan Deol Bajaj v. K.P.S Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194]*: The Court referred to this case to define ‘modesty’, but also noted that the interpretation of ‘modesty’ should be in the present context.
• Major Singh [AIR 1967 SC 63]*: The Court used this case to understand the interpretation of ‘modesty’ but also noted that the interpretation of ‘modesty’ should be in the present context.
• Attorney General v. Satish [(2022) 5 SCC 545]*: This case was used to highlight the evolving understanding of ‘modesty’ in the context of Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, noting its patriarchal origins and the need for contemporary interpretation.
• Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka [(2015) 7 SCC 423]*: The Court relied on this case to explain the requirements for establishing criminal intimidation under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, emphasizing the need for intention to cause alarm.
• Parminder Kaur v. State of Punjab [(2020) 8 SCC 811]*: This case was used to affirm the principle of application of Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, as explained in Manik Taneja.
• Sharif Ahmed v. State of U.P [2024 SCC OnLine SC 726]*: The Court cited this case to underscore the importance of demonstrating the intention to cause alarm for an offense of criminal intimidation.
• State of Maharashtra v. Maroti [(2023) 4 SCC 298]*: The Court referred to this case to emphasize that statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, are inadmissible as evidence.
• Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab [(2020) 3 SCC 317]*: This case was cited to reinforce that statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, cannot be considered in quashing proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
• State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [(1992) Suppl (1) SCC 335]*: This case was recognized as the locus classicus on the power of the High Court to quash criminal proceedings.
• Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. [(2006) 6 SCC 736]*: The Court used this case to outline the principles for quashing a complaint under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
• State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy [(1977) 2 SCC 699]*: This case was cited to underscore the purpose of the High Court’s inherent powers to prevent abuse of process.
• State of A.P. v. Aravapally Venkanna [(2009) 13 SCC 443]*: This case was cited in the context of the power of the High Court to quash criminal proceedings.
• Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra [(2021) 19 SCC 401]*: This case was cited in the context of the power of the High Court to quash criminal proceedings.
• Sachin Garg v. State of U.P. [2024 SCC OnLine SC 82]*: This case was cited in the context of the power of the High Court to quash criminal proceedings.
• Vishal Noble Singh v. State of U.P. [2024 SCC OnLine SC 1680]*: This case was cited in the context of the power of the High Court to quash criminal proceedings.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision to quash the charges against the appellant was primarily influenced by the lack of evidence to support the allegations under Sections 354 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Court emphasized that vague statements and the absence of clear evidence of criminal force, intent to outrage modesty, or intention to cause alarm were insufficient to establish these offenses. The Court also highlighted the inadmissibility of statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, as substantive evidence.

The Court’s reasoning was based on a careful examination of the factual evidence presented, as well as the legal requirements for establishing offenses under Sections 354 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Logical Reasoning:

The Court rejected the complainant’s arguments that the statements under Section 161 and 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, established the offenses, emphasizing the inadmissibility of Section 161 statements as evidence.

The Court’s decision was unanimous.

The Court’s reasoning was based on a careful examination of the factual evidence presented, as well as the legal requirements for establishing offenses under Sections 354 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The court emphasized that vague statements and the absence of clear evidence of criminal force, intent to outrage modesty, or intention to cause alarm were insufficient to establish these offenses.

The Court did not introduce any new doctrines or legal principles but reinforced the existing legal standards for establishing offenses under Sections 354 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

The Court also clarified that its observations were restricted only to the appellant, Naresh Aneja, and no view was expressed regarding R.K. Aneja.

The Court emphasized that its observations were restricted only to the appellant, Naresh Aneja, and no view was expressed regarding R.K. Aneja.

The Supreme Court quoted the following from the judgment:

• “It is well settled that when considering an application u/s 482 CrPC, the court cannot conduct a mini -trial but instead is to be satisfied that prima facie the offences as alleged are made out.”
• “A bear perusal of Section 354, IPC reveals that for it to apply, the offence must be committed against a woman; criminal force must be applied against her ; and such application of force must be with the intent to outrage her modesty.”
• “The threat must be with intention to cause alarm to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit to do any work. Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of this section.”

Key Takeaways

• Vague allegations and statements are insufficient to establish offenses under Sections 354 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
• For Section 354, there must be evidence of criminal force and intent to outrage modesty.
• For Section 506, there must be evidence of a threat with the intention to cause alarm.
• Statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, are inadmissible as evidence.
• The High Court’s inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, can be invoked to quash proceedings when no prima facie case is made out.

Directions

The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and quashed the criminal proceedings against the appellant.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that for an offence under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, there must be criminal force and intent to outrage modesty, and for an offence under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, there must be a threat with the intention to cause alarm. Mere allegations are not sufficient to establish these offences. This judgment reinforces the existing legal standards for establishing these offences and does not change the previous positions of law.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in Naresh Aneja vs. State of Uttar Pradesh clarifies that criminal charges under Sections 354 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, cannot be sustained without concrete evidence of criminal force, intent to outrage modesty, or intent to cause alarm. This judgment underscores the importance of thorough investigation and the need for specific, rather than vague, allegations to proceed with a criminal case. The court’s decision to quash the charges against the appellant highlights the judiciary’s role in safeguarding individuals from baseless accusations and ensuring that criminal proceedings are initiated only when there is sufficient evidence.