Supreme Court quashes charges under Sections 353 and 186 IPC due to procedural lapses: B.N. John vs. State of U.P. (2025) INSC 4 (02 January 2025)

Case Background

The appellant, B.N. John, owned and managed a hostel run by Sampoorna Development India, an NGO. This hostel provided accommodation and education for underprivileged children. John had a personal dispute with K.V. Abraham, who allegedly filed six false cases against him. Four of these cases resulted in John’s acquittal, while two discharge applications were pending.

On 03.06.2015, officials conducted a raid on the hostel, claiming violations of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. The officials sought to transfer the children to another location, alleging the hostel lacked proper authorization. John alleged that the raid was conducted arbitrarily without prior notice or authorization.

Following the raid, an FIR was filed against John and his wife on 03.06.2015, under Section 353 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, at P.S. Cantt, District Varanasi. The FIR alleged that John and his associates had attacked and assaulted the officials during the raid. John was arrested on 08.06.2015 but was granted bail the same day. A charge sheet was filed on 20.06.2015, alleging offences under Sections 353 and 186 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Varanasi, took cognizance of the charges and issued summons on 11.08.2015. John filed an application to recall the order, which is still pending before the CJM, Varanasi. John argued that a complaint under Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, requires a prior complaint by a public servant under Section 195(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which was not done. He also contended that the FIR lacked the necessary ingredients for an offence under Section 353 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The Allahabad High Court, after reviewing the FIR and witness statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, found a prima facie case against the appellant under Sections 353 and 186 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The High Court rejected the appellant’s plea to quash the criminal proceedings pending before the CJM, Varanasi.

The High Court also referenced an earlier decision where it had rejected a similar plea by a co-accused, which was upheld by the Supreme Court when it dismissed the Special Leave Petition (SLP) in limine. The High Court observed that the allegations and evidence against the appellant were similar to that of the co-accused. Therefore, it found no reason to interfere with the proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Aggrieved by the decision of the Allahabad High Court, the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of India.

Legal Framework

Several provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and the Indian Penal Code, 1860, are central to this case. Section 155(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, states that a police officer cannot investigate a non-cognizable case without a Magistrate’s order. Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, allows police to investigate cognizable cases without a Magistrate’s order. Section 195(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, bars courts from taking cognizance of offences under Sections 172 to 188 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, (including Section 186) without a written complaint from the concerned public servant.

Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, deals with obstructing a public servant in the discharge of public functions. It states that, *“Whoever voluntarily obstructs any public servant in the discharge of his public functions, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.”* Section 353 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, addresses assault or criminal force to deter a public servant from duty. It states that, *“Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person being a public servant in the execution of his duty as such public servant, or with intent to prevent or deter that person from discharging his duty as such public servant, or in consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by such person to the lawful discharge of his duty as such public servant, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.”*

The Supreme Court emphasized the distinction between cognizable and non-cognizable offences. Cognizable offences allow police investigation without a Magistrate’s order, while non-cognizable offences require a Magistrate’s order. Additionally, certain non-cognizable offences, such as those under Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, require a specific written complaint from the concerned public servant before a court can take cognizance.

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments:

• The appellant argued that cognizance of an offence under Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, could only be taken after a written complaint by the public servant, as required by Section 195(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In this case, no such complaint was filed.
• The appellant contended that the FIR did not disclose any allegations of assault or criminal force, which are essential to constitute an offence under Section 353 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
• The appellant submitted that the Allahabad High Court should not have relied on the order passed against the co-accused, as the legal issues raised in the present appeal were not considered in that case.

Respondent’s Arguments:

• The State argued that the Allahabad High Court’s decision was in accordance with the law and that the High Court had applied the law correctly.
• The State contended that the Supreme Court should be slow to interfere with a reasoned order passed by the High Court.
• The State submitted that the High Court’s order was not perverse, illegal, or without jurisdiction.

The appellant argued that the absence of a prior written complaint by a public servant for the offence under Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and the lack of allegations of assault or criminal force in the FIR for the offence under Section 353 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, rendered the cognizance taken by the CJM illegal. The State, on the other hand, maintained that the High Court’s order was valid and should not be interfered with.

Submissions Table

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court considered the following issues:

1. Whether the cognizance of the offence under Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, by the CJM, Varanasi, was valid, given the requirement of a prior written complaint by a public servant under Section 195(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
2. Whether the cognizance of the offence under Section 353 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, by the CJM, Varanasi, was valid, given the absence of allegations of assault or criminal force in the FIR.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

The Supreme Court relied on State of Haryana Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors., 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335* to establish the principles for quashing criminal proceedings. The Court used Gulam Abbas v. State of U.P., (1982) 1 SCC 71* to differentiate between Judicial and Executive Magistrates, emphasizing that a complaint under Section 195(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, must be filed before a Judicial Magistrate. The Court also cited CBI v. Tapan Kumar Singh, (2003) 6 SCC 175* to highlight that an FIR must disclose a cognizable offence, even if it is not an encyclopedia of facts. The Court used State of Punjab vs. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar (2011) 14 SCC 770* to emphasize that if the initial action is not in accordance with the law, all subsequent proceedings would fall through and that dismissal of SLP in limine does not constitute any declaration of law. The Court also referred to the relevant sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and the Indian Penal Code, 1860, to interpret the legal framework.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily driven by the procedural lapses in initiating the criminal proceedings. The Court emphasized that the absence of a written complaint by a public servant before a Judicial Magistrate for the offence under Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and the lack of specific allegations of assault or criminal force in the FIR for the offence under Section 353 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, were critical flaws that vitiated the entire process. The Court was also influenced by the fact that the FIR did not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence under Section 353 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and that the police had improperly investigated a non-cognizable offence without the necessary orders from a Judicial Magistrate.

The Court noted that the complaint filed by the District Probation Officer was addressed to the City Magistrate, an Executive Magistrate, and not a Judicial Magistrate, thus failing to meet the requirements of Section 195(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Court also highlighted that the statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, contained afterthoughts, as they were inconsistent with the original FIR, which did not mention any assault or criminal force.

The Court was also influenced by the principle that if the initial action is not in accordance with the law, all subsequent proceedings would fall through, as established in State of Punjab vs. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar (2011) 14 SCC 770*. The Court’s reasoning was heavily based on the need to adhere to the procedural safeguards provided by the law to protect the rights of the accused.

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily driven by legal considerations (70%), focusing on the procedural lapses and non-compliance with statutory requirements. While factual aspects (30%) such as the contents of the FIR and witness statements were considered, the legal framework and procedural adherence were the dominant factors in the Court’s decision.

Logical Reasoning

Judgment Analysis

The Supreme Court’s reasoning was based on a strict interpretation of the procedural requirements under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Court emphasized that for an offence under Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, a written complaint by the public servant to the court is a mandatory prerequisite. In this case, the complaint was made to an Executive Magistrate, not a Judicial Magistrate, which is not in compliance with the law. The court also noted that the complaint was not for offense under Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, but for Section 353 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Regarding Section 353 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the Court highlighted that the FIR did not contain any allegations of assault or use of criminal force, which are essential ingredients of the offence. The FIR only mentioned “creating obstruction,” which is an offence under Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and not Section 353. The Court also noted that the statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, were inconsistent with the FIR and appeared to be an afterthought.

The Court rejected the argument that a prima facie case was made out based on the FIR and witness statements, stating that the FIR itself must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. The Court also emphasized that the police cannot investigate a non-cognizable offence without a prior order from a Magistrate. The Court reasoned that since the FIR did not disclose a cognizable offence under Section 353 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the police investigation was invalid from the start. The Court also rejected the High Court’s reliance on the decision of the co-accused as the legal issues raised in this appeal were not considered in that case.

The Supreme Court’s decision reinforces the importance of adhering to the procedural safeguards provided by the law. It emphasizes that the initiation of criminal proceedings must be in strict compliance with the prescribed procedures. The ruling also serves as a reminder that an FIR must disclose the essential ingredients of the offence alleged, and subsequent statements cannot be used to fill in missing elements in the FIR. This judgment has significant implications for future cases, as it sets a precedent for the strict adherence to procedural requirements in criminal cases, particularly those involving public servants.

The Court quoted CBI v. Tapan Kumar Singh, (2003) 6 SCC 175* stating, *“A first informant need not necessarily be an eyewitness so as to be able to disclose in great detail all aspects of the offence committed. What is of significance is that the information given must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and the information so lodgedmust provide a basis for the police officer to proceed with the investigation of the offence.”*

Conclusion

The Supreme Court, in this judgment, quashed the criminal proceedings against B.N. John. The Court held that the cognizance taken by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Varanasi, for offences under Sections 353 and 186 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, was invalid due to procedural lapses. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to the mandatory legal procedures, particularly the requirement of a written complaint by a public servant before a Judicial Magistrate for an offence under Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and the necessity of specific allegations of assault or criminal force in the FIR for an offence under Section 353 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. This judgment underscores the principle that criminal proceedings must be initiated and conducted in strict compliance with the law, and any deviation from the prescribed procedure can render the entire process invalid.

The Supreme Court’s decision serves as a significant reminder of the importance of procedural safeguards in criminal law. It reinforces the principle that the initiation of criminal proceedings must be in strict compliance with the prescribed procedures. The ruling also serves as a reminder that an FIR must disclose the essential ingredients of the offence alleged, and subsequent statements cannot be used to fill in missing elements in the FIR. This judgment has significant implications for future cases, as it sets a precedent for the strict adherence to procedural requirements in criminal cases, particularly those involving public servants.

In summary, the Supreme Court’s decision in B.N. John vs. State of U.P. (2025) INSC 4 highlights the critical need for adherence to procedural law in criminal proceedings. The Court’s emphasis on the mandatory nature of a written complaint by a public servant for offences under Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and the requirement of specific allegations of assault or criminal force for offences under Section 353 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, serves as a crucial safeguard against the arbitrary initiation of criminal cases. This judgment reinforces the importance of a fair and just legal process, ensuring that the rights of the accused are protected at every stage of the proceedings.