Supreme Court Quashes Complaint Against Police Officer for Lack of Sanction: D. Devaraja vs. Owais Sabeer Hussain (2020)

Date of the Judgment: June 18, 2020

Citation: (2020) INSC 458

Judges: R. Banumathi, J., Indira Banerjee, J.

Can a criminal complaint against a police officer be entertained without prior government sanction? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this crucial question in a case where a police officer was accused of excesses during an investigation. The court ultimately quashed the complaint, emphasizing the need for prior sanction to protect public servants from frivolous legal actions. The judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench of Justices R. Banumathi and Indira Banerjee, with Justice Indira Banerjee authoring the opinion.

Case Background

The case revolves around a criminal complaint filed against D. Devaraja, a police officer of the rank of Superintendent of Police, by Owais Sabeer Hussain. The complaint alleged that Devaraja and other police officials had committed excesses while Hussain was in police custody. The sequence of events began when a case (Crime No. 12/2012) was transferred to the Central Crime Branch, where Devaraja was the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Crime).

Following the transfer, the police investigated Hussain, who was subsequently arrested on February 27, 2013, in connection with Crime No. 12/2012. He was produced before the Magistrate on February 28, 2013, and remanded to police custody. During his time in custody, Hussain alleged ill-treatment by the police. His father filed a Habeas Corpus Petition in the Karnataka High Court, which was eventually dismissed. After being released from judicial custody, Hussain filed a private complaint against Devaraja and other police officers, alleging ill-treatment and police excesses. The Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate took cognizance of the complaint without prior government sanction, prompting Devaraja to appeal.

Timeline

Legal Framework

The Supreme Court considered the following legal provisions:

✓ Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act, 1963: This section states that no suit or prosecution can be entertained against a police officer for acts done under the color of duty without prior government sanction. The provision states:

“170. Suits or prosecutions in respect of acts done under colour of duty as aforesaid not to be entertained without sanction of Government. – (1) In any case of alleged offence by the Commissioner, a Magistrate, Police Officer or Reserve Police Officer or other person, or of a wrong alleged to have been done by such Commissioner, Magistrate, Police Officer or Reserve Police Officer or other person, by any act done under colour or in excess of any such duty or authority as aforesaid, or wherein it shall appear to the court that the offence or wrong if committed or done was of the character aforesaid, the prosecution or suit shall not be entertained except with the previous sanction of the Government.”

✓ Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: This section requires prior government sanction to prosecute a public servant for offenses committed while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duty. The provision states:

“197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants. (1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction- (a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State Government…”

The Court emphasized that these provisions are designed to protect public servants from harassment by frivolous or retaliatory criminal proceedings.

Arguments

Appellant’s (D. Devaraja’s) Submissions:

• The Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of the complaint without prior sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 read with Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act, 1963.
• There was no specific allegation against the appellant, who was not the Investigating Officer, but the Deputy Commissioner of Police.
• The respondent was arrested on 27.02.2013, produced before the Magistrate on 28.02.2013, and remanded to police custody with the finding that there was no ill-treatment by the police.
• The allegation of police excesses during the investigation has a reasonable nexus with the duty of the appellant as a police officer.
• Even if the act was in dereliction of duty or in excess of duty, it was still in exercise of authority as a police officer, in connection with investigation of an alleged crime.
• The criminal complaint should have been quashed under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code for want of sanction.

Respondent’s (Owais Sabeer Hussain’s) Submissions:

• Whether sanction was necessary had to be decided, keeping in mind the nature of the complaint, which was of physical torture and ill-treatment.
• Ill-treatment and torture could never be in exercise of official duty, or even under the color of official duty.
• Whether sanction was necessary or not, would have to be determined in course of the trial.
• An order of a Magistrate, taking cognizance of a complaint was not amenable to challenge under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
• The High Court rightly remanded the complaint to the Trial Court.

Submissions Categorized by Main Submissions:

Innovativeness of the Argument: The appellant’s argument that even acts in dereliction or excess of duty still require sanction if they are connected to official duties is a crucial point, highlighting the protection afforded to public servants. The respondent’s argument that torture can never be part of official duty is also significant, raising the question of where the line should be drawn.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed the following key issue:

1. Whether the learned Magistrate could have taken cognizance against the appellant in the private complaint in the absence of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act, 1963 and if not, whether the High Court should have quashed the impugned order of the Magistrate instead of remitting the complaint to the Magistrate and requiring the accused appellant to appear before him and file an application for discharge.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues

Authorities

The Supreme Court relied on the following authorities:

On the scope and object of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the need for sanction:

• Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari, AIR 1956 SC 44 – The Court held that public servants need protection from harassment in the discharge of official duties.
• Pukhraj v. State of Rajasthan and Another, (1973) 2 SCC 701 – The Court clarified that the section is intended to prevent public servants from being unnecessarily harassed and applies when an act is done in the execution of duty or purports to be so.
• Amrik Singh v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1955 SC 309 – The Court stated that sanction is necessary if the act complained of is directly concerned with official duties.
• State of Orissa v. Ganesh Chandra Jew, (2004) 8 SCC 40 – The Court emphasized that the protection is available when the alleged act is reasonably connected with the discharge of official duty.
• Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 287 – The Court explained that an official act can be performed in the discharge of official duty as well as in dereliction of it.
• P. Arulswami vs. State of Madras, AIR 1967 SC 776 – The Court held that the quality of the act is important, and if it falls within the scope of official duties, protection under Section 197 is attracted.
• B. Saha and Others v. M.S. Kochar, (1979) 4 SCC 177 – The Court stated that the offense must be committed by the public servant either in their official capacity or under the color of the office held by them.
• Om Prakash and others vs. State of Jharkhand and Anr., (2012) 12 SCC 72 – The Court held that the acts must be integrally connected with the official duty to attract the protection under Section 197.
• Sankaran Moitra v. Sadhna Das and Another, (2006) 4 SCC 584 – The Court held that if an act is done in the performance or purported performance of duty, Section 197(1) of the Code cannot be bypassed.
• K.K. Patel and Another vs. State of Gujarat and Anr., (2000) 6 SCC 195 – The Court stated that offenses could not have been committed without the color of the office or authority.
• D.T. Virupakshappa v. C. Subash, (2015) 12 SCC 231 – The Court held that the whole allegation of police excess in connection with the investigation was reasonably connected with the performance of the official duty of the appellant.

On the meaning of “under color of duty”:

• Virupaxappa Veerappa Kadampur v. State of Mysore, AIR 1963 SC 849 – The Court interpreted “under color of duty” to include acts done under the cloak of duty, even if not by virtue of the duty.

On the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code:

• State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Suppl. (1) SC 335 – The Court held that power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code ought to be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of Court.

Legal Provisions Considered:

• Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act, 1963 – The Court considered this provision regarding the requirement of sanction for prosecuting police officers.
• Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – The Court analyzed this section on the need for prior sanction to prosecute public servants.

Table of Authorities and Their Treatment:

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

The Court relied heavily on previous judgments to determine the scope of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act. The Court followed Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari [AIR 1956 SC 44]*, Pukhraj v. State of Rajasthan [ (1973) 2 SCC 701]*, and Amrik Singh v. State of Pepsu [AIR 1955 SC 309]* to establish that the purpose of sanction is to protect public servants from harassment. It also followed Virupaxappa Veerappa Kadampur v. State of Mysore [AIR 1963 SC 849]* to interpret “under color of duty”. The Court also relied on State of Orissa v. Ganesh Chandra Jew [(2004) 8 SCC 40]* and D.T. Virupakshappa v. C. Subash [(2015) 12 SCC 231]*, which held that if the act is connected to the discharge of official duty, the complaint should be quashed for want of sanction.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was heavily influenced by the need to protect public servants from frivolous or retaliatory criminal proceedings. The Court emphasized that if an act is reasonably connected to the discharge of official duty, it does not matter if the policeman has exceeded the scope of his powers. The court also noted that the complainant did not complain of ill-treatment when he was produced before the Magistrate, which reduced the credibility of the complaint. The court also noted that if the act is connected to official duty, the complaint should be quashed at the outset.

Fact:Law Ratio

Logical Reasoning:

The Supreme Court reasoned that the acts alleged in the complaint were related to the investigation of a criminal case, which falls under the ambit of official duty. The Court emphasized that the need for sanction is not limited to acts done in the strict discharge of official duty, but also includes acts purported to be done in such discharge or under the color of duty. The Court also noted that the complaint was filed after the dismissal of the Habeas Corpus petition, indicating a possible ulterior motive. The Court relied on several precedents to support its position that when the acts are reasonably connected to official duty, the complaint should be quashed if there is no sanction.

The Court considered the argument that ill-treatment and torture can never be part of official duty, but held that even if the act was in excess of duty, it was still connected to the official duty of investigation. The Court also rejected the argument that the need for sanction should be determined during the trial, holding that it can be raised at the outset. The Court also considered that the High Court erred in remitting the matter to the Magistrate to decide on the discharge application, instead of quashing the proceedings.

The Court’s decision was based on the principle that public servants should be protected from frivolous litigation when they are acting in the course of their official duties. The Court’s reasoning was also influenced by the fact that the complainant did not complain of ill-treatment when he was produced before the Magistrate, which undermined the credibility of the complaint. The Court held that the High Court should have exercised its power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the complaint for want of sanction.

The Court quoted the following from the judgment:

• “The object of sanction for prosecution, whether under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, or under Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act, is to protect a public servant/police officer discharging official duties and functions from harassment by initiation of frivolous retaliatory criminal proceedings.”
• “The language and tenor of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act makes it absolutely clear that sanction is required not only for acts done in discharge of official duty, it is also required for an act purported to be done in discharge of official duty and/or act done under colour of or in excess of such duty or authority.”
• “If the act alleged in a complaint purported to be filed against the policeman is reasonably connected to discharge of some official duty, cognizance thereof cannot be taken unless requisite sanction of the appropriate government is obtained under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and/or Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act.”

Key Takeaways

• Prior government sanction is mandatory to prosecute a police officer for acts reasonably connected to their official duty.
• The protection under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act is not limited to acts done in the strict discharge of duty, but also includes acts purported to be done in such discharge or under color of duty.
• Even if a police officer acts in excess of their powers, if the act is reasonably connected to their official duty, sanction is required.
• Courts can quash criminal proceedings at the outset under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code if the complaint is ex facie bad for want of sanction.
• The absence of a complaint of ill-treatment at the earliest opportunity can be a factor in determining the credibility of the complaint.

Potential Future Impact: This judgment reinforces the protection given to public servants, particularly police officers, in the discharge of their duties. It emphasizes the need for prior sanction to prevent misuse of the legal process by those seeking to harass or retaliate against public officials. This may lead to a stricter application of the sanction requirement in cases involving allegations against public servants.

Directions

The Supreme Court set aside the judgment and order of the Karnataka High Court and quashed the complaint for want of sanction.

Specific Amendments Analysis

There is no discussion of any specific amendment in the source.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that prior government sanction is mandatory to prosecute a police officer for acts reasonably connected to their official duty, and that the protection under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act is not limited to acts done in the strict discharge of duty, but also includes acts purported to be done in such discharge or under color of duty. This case reinforces the existing legal position on the need for sanction to prosecute public servants, particularly police officers, and provides clarity on the scope of protection under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act. This judgment does not introduce a new position of law, but rather reinforces the existing legal principles.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the criminal complaint against the police officer, D. Devaraja, for lack of prior government sanction. The Court emphasized that the alleged acts were related to the discharge of official duty, necessitating prior sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act. This judgment reinforces the protection afforded to public servants from frivolous legal actions and underscores the importance of obtaining prior sanction before initiating prosecution for acts connected to official duty.