Supreme Court quashes Jharkhand High Court’s 50% aggregate marks criteria for District Judge Selection

Date of the Judgment: 1st February 2024

Citation: 2024 INSC 97

Judges: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Aniruddha Bose and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Kumar

Can a High Court change the rules of the game mid-selection process? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this critical question in a case concerning the appointment of District Judges in Jharkhand. The core issue was whether the High Court could introduce a new criterion of 50% aggregate marks after the selection process had begun and the results were declared. This judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench comprising Justice Aniruddha Bose and Justice Sanjay Kumar.

Case Background

The case revolves around the selection process for District Judge positions in Jharkhand, initiated in 2022. An advertisement (No. 01/2022) was published on March 24, 2022, announcing 22 vacancies. The selection process was governed by the Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service (Recruitment, Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2001, and the Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service (Recruitment, Appointment and Conditions of Service) Regulation, 2017. Initially, a select list of 66 candidates was prepared based on a 1:3 ratio, as per the rules. However, the High Court, on its administrative side, recommended only 13 candidates for appointment, introducing a new criterion of securing at least 50% aggregate marks in the main examination and viva-voce, which was not part of the original advertisement or rules.

Timeline:

Course of Proceedings

The judgment does not specify any lower court proceedings. The matter directly reached the Supreme Court through writ petitions challenging the High Court’s administrative decision.

Legal Framework

The selection process was governed by the following:

• The Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service (Recruitment, Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2001 (‘the 2001 Rules’): These rules outline the procedure for recruitment, appointment, and conditions of service for the Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service. Key rules include:
  • Rule 14: “Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing Rule, it shall be open to the High Court to require the candidate at any stage of the selection process or thereafter, to furnish any such additional proof or to produce any document with respect to any matter relating to his suitability and/or eligibility as the High Court may deem necessary.” This rule allows the High Court to seek additional proof or documents from candidates.
  • Rule 18: “Before the start of the examination, the High Court may fix the minimum qualifying marks in the Preliminary Written Entrance Test and thereafter minimum qualifying marks in the main examination. Based on such minimum qualifying marks, the High Court may decide to call for viva-voce such number of candidates, in order of merit in written examination, depending upon the number of vacancies available as it may appropriately decide…” This rule empowers the High Court to set minimum qualifying marks before the examination.
  • Rule 21: “A candidate, irrespective of the marks obtained by him in the Preliminary Written Entrance Examination and/or the Main Written Examination shall not be qualified to be appointed unless he obtains a minimum of 30% marks in the viva-voce test. The marks obtained at the viva voce test shall then be added to the marks obtained by the candidate at the main written examination. The names of the candidates will then be tabulated and arranged in order of merit.” This rule specifies that the merit list is to be prepared based on the aggregate of main exam and viva-voce marks.
  • Rule 22: “From out of the aforesaid select list, depending upon the number of vacancies available or those required to be filled up, the High Court shall recommend to the Government the names for appointment as Additional District Judge.” This rule states that the High Court will recommend names from the select list based on the number of vacancies.
• The Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service (Recruitment, Appointment and Conditions of Service) Regulation, 2017 (‘the 2017 Regulation’): This regulation was framed in terms of Rule 11 and Rule 30 of the 2001 Rules.
  • Paragraph 12: “(12)No candidate irrespective of the marks obtained by him in the Main Examination, shall be eligible for selection for appointment, if he obtains less than 20 marks out of aggregate of 40 in the Viva-Voce Test.” This paragraph specifies the minimum marks required in the viva-voce test.

Arguments

Petitioners’ Arguments:

• The petitioners argued that the Full Court’s decision to introduce a 50% aggregate marks criterion after the selection process was underway was illegal and contrary to the established rules, regulations, and the terms of the advertisement.
• They contended that once the performance of each candidate was known, it was impermissible for the High Court administration to introduce fresh cut-off marks.
• The petitioners relied on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Sivanandan C.T. & Ors. vs. High Court of Kerala [(2023) INSC 709], which held that it is unlawful to change the selection criteria mid-process.
• They also cited K. Manjusree vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. [(2008) 3 SCC 512], which held that changing recruitment criteria mid-selection is not permissible.

High Court’s Arguments:

• The High Court argued that the decision to set a 50% aggregate marks criterion was to maintain high standards for the Superior Judicial Services, given the responsibilities of District Judges.
• The High Court contended that the judgments relied upon by the petitioners were not applicable as those cases pertained to the marking in viva-voce, whereas in the present case, the aggregate marking was the subject of dispute.
• The High Court relied on State of Haryana vs. Subash Chander Marwaha & Ors. [(1974) 3 SCC 220] and Ram Sharan Maurya and Ors. vs. State of U.P. and Ors. [(2021) 15 SCC 401] to argue that it has the power to fix a higher score for selection to maintain standards.
• The High Court argued that Rule 14 of the 2001 Rules allows it to alter the selection criteria even after the selection process is concluded.

The innovativeness of the argument by the High Court was that it sought to distinguish the present case from the previous authorities by contending that the previous authorities deal with the change in the marking of the viva-voce and not the aggregate marks.

Submissions Table

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court addressed the following issue:

1. Whether the decision of the Full Court on the administrative side goes contrary to the Recruitment Rules, Regulations, and the Terms contained in the advertisement?

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

• On the principle of “no change in the rule midway”:
  • K. Manjusree vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. [(2008) 3 SCC 512]: The Supreme Court of India held that changing the rules of the game after the game has started is impermissible.
  • Hemani Malhotra vs. High Court of Delhi [(2008) 7 SCC 11]: The Supreme Court reiterated the principle that selection criteria cannot be altered mid-process.
  • Sivanandan C.T. & Ors. vs. High Court of Kerala [(2023) INSC 709]: The Supreme Court held that it is unlawful to change the selection criteria mid-process. The court specifically held that the High Court was expected to draw up the merit list of selected candidates based on the aggregate marks secured by the candidates in the written examination and the viva voce, without any requirement of a minimum cut-off for the viva voce. The decision of the Administrative Committee to depart from the expected course of preparing the merit list of the selected candidates is contrary to the unamended 1961 Rules.
• On the power to fix higher standards:
  • State of Haryana vs. Subash Chander Marwaha & Ors. [(1974) 3 SCC 220]: The Supreme Court held that the State Government is entitled to fix a higher score of marks for the purpose of selection, to maintain high standards of competence.
  • Ram Sharan Maurya and Ors. vs. State of U.P. and Ors. [(2021) 15 SCC 401]: The Supreme Court held that the Government has the power to fix minimum qualifying marks even after the examination is over, provided it is not actuated by malice and is in furtherance of the object of finding the best available talent.
• On the interpretation of Rules:
  • Tej Prakash Pathak & Ors. vs. Rajasthan High Court and Others [(2013) 4 SCC 540]: A three-judge bench expressed a view different from K. Manjusree (supra) and referred the matter to a larger bench, but no decision has been made by a larger bench yet.

Authority Analysis

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• The Court followed the ratio of K. Manjusree vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. [(2008) 3 SCC 512]* and Hemani Malhotra vs. High Court of Delhi [(2008) 7 SCC 11]*, holding that the selection criteria cannot be changed mid-process.
• The Court also followed the ratio of Sivanandan C.T. & Ors. vs. High Court of Kerala [(2023) INSC 709]*, which held that it is unlawful to change the selection criteria mid-process.
• The Court distinguished the judgments in State of Haryana vs. Subash Chander Marwaha & Ors. [(1974) 3 SCC 220]* and Ram Sharan Maurya and Ors. vs. State of U.P. and Ors. [(2021) 15 SCC 401]*, stating that those cases did not apply to the present situation.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the principle that the rules of the game cannot be changed after the game has begun. The court emphasized that the High Court’s decision to introduce a 50% aggregate marks criterion after the selection process was underway was a violation of established rules and principles of fairness. The Court also noted that the High Court’s argument that it has the power to set higher standards for selection was not applicable in this context, as the rules of the selection process did not permit such changes mid-way.

Fact:Law Ratio

The court’s reasoning was heavily based on legal principles and precedents, with a lesser emphasis on the specific facts of the case. The court primarily focused on the legal issue of whether the High Court could change the selection criteria mid-process, rather than the factual aspects of the selection process itself.

Logical Reasoning

Judgment Analysis

The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s decision to introduce a 50% aggregate marks criterion after the selection process had commenced was illegal. The court reasoned that the rules of the game cannot be changed mid-way, and the High Court’s action violated the principles of fairness and consistency. The court relied heavily on its previous judgments in K. Manjusree vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. [(2008) 3 SCC 512], Hemani Malhotra vs. High Court of Delhi [(2008) 7 SCC 11] and Sivanandan C.T. & Ors. vs. High Court of Kerala [(2023) INSC 709], which established the principle that selection criteria cannot be altered mid-process. The court distinguished the cases cited by the High Court, such as State of Haryana vs. Subash Chander Marwaha & Ors. [(1974) 3 SCC 220] and Ram Sharan Maurya and Ors. vs. State of U.P. and Ors. [(2021) 15 SCC 401], stating that those cases were not applicable to the present situation. The court also clarified that Rule 14 of the 2001 Rules does not allow the High Court to make a blanket decision to depart from the selection criteria but only to reassess the suitability and eligibility of a candidate in a special situation by calling for additional documents.

The court quoted from the judgment in Sivanandan C.T. & Ors. vs. High Court of Kerala [(2023) INSC 709]:

“The decision of the High Court to prescribe a cut-off for the viva-voce examination was taken by the Administrative Committee on 27 February 2017 after the viva-voce was conducted between 16 and 24 January 2017. The process which has been adopted by the High Court suffers from several infirmities. Firstly, the decision of the High Court was contrary to Rule 2(c)(iii) which stipulated that the merit list would be drawn up on the basis of the marks obtained in the aggregate in the written examination and the viva-voce; secondly, the scheme which was notified by the High Court on 13 December 2012 clearly specified that there would be no cut off marks in respect of the viva-voce; thirdly, the notification of the High Court dated 30 September 2015 clarified that the process of short listing which would be carried out would be only on the basis of the length of practice of the members of the Bar, should the number of candidates be unduly large; and fourthly, the decision to prescribe cut off marks for the viva-voce was taken much after the viva-voce tests were conducted in the month of January 2017.”

The court further quoted:

“For the above reasons, we have come to the conclusion that the broader constitutional issue which has been referred in Tej Prakash Pathak (supra) would not merit decision on the facts of the present case. Clearly, the decision which was taken by the High Court was ultra vires Rule 2(c)(iii) as it stands. As a matter of fact, during the course of the hearing we have been apprised of the fact that the Rules have been subsequently amended in 2017 so as to prescribe a cut off of 35% marks in the viva-voce examination which however was not the prevailing legal position when the present process of selection was initiated on 30 September 2015. The Administrative Committee of the High Court decided to impose a cut off for the viva-voce examination actuated by the bona fide reason of ensuring that candidates with requisite personality assume judicial office. However laudable that approach of the Administrative Committee may have been, such a change would be required to be brought in by a substantive amendment to the Rules which came in much later as noticed above. This is not a case where the rules or the scheme of the High Court were silent. Where the statutory rules are silent, they can be supplemented in a manner consistent with the object and spirit of the Rules by an administrative order.”

The court also observed, “The very expression “aggregate” means combination of two or more processes and in the event the procedure for arriving at the aggregate has been laid down in the applicable Rules, a separate criteria cannot be carved out to enable change in the manner of making the aggregate marks.”

The Court held that the High Court’s decision was a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution as it was arbitrary and unfair to the candidates who had been selected as per the original rules. The court emphasized that while the High Court has the authority to select suitable candidates, it must do so within the framework of the established rules and regulations. The court also noted that the High Court’s reasoning for the change was to find better candidates, which is different from finding a candidate unsuitable, and that such a reason cannot be a ground to exclude candidates who were otherwise eligible as per the rules.

Key Takeaways

• Selection criteria for government jobs cannot be altered mid-process.
• High Courts must adhere to the rules and regulations governing the selection process.
• The principle of “no change in the rule midway” is an integral part of service jurisprudence.
• Administrative decisions must be consistent with statutory rules and principles of fairness.
• The power to reassess the suitability and eligibility of a candidate cannot be used to make a blanket decision to depart from the selection criteria.

Directions

The Supreme Court directed the High Court to recommend the names of those candidates who were successful as per the merit or select list, for filling up the subsisting notified vacancies, without applying the Full Court Resolution that required each candidate to get 50% aggregate marks. The part of the Full Court Resolution of the Jharkhand High Court dated 23.03.2023 by which it was decided that only those candidates who have secured at least 50% marks in aggregate shall be qualified for appointment to the post of District Judge was quashed.

Specific Amendments Analysis

Not Applicable.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a High Court cannot change the selection criteria for appointments after the selection process has commenced and the marks have been disclosed. The Supreme Court reiterated the principle of “no change in the rule midway” and held that any such change is a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. This judgment reinforces the principle that administrative decisions must be consistent with statutory rules and principles of fairness, and that the rules of the game cannot be changed after the game has begun.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Sushil Kumar Pandey & Ors. vs. The High Court of Jharkhand & Anr. quashed the Jharkhand High Court’s decision to introduce a 50% aggregate marks criterion for District Judge appointments after the selection process had commenced. The court emphasized the principle that selection criteria cannot be altered mid-process and directed the High Court to recommend candidates based on the original rules. This judgment reinforces the importance of adhering to established rules and principles of fairness in government job selections.

Category:

Parent Category: Service Law

Child Category: Recruitment Rules

Child Category: Judicial Appointments

Parent Category: Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service (Recruitment, Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2001

Child Category: Rule 14, Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service (Recruitment, Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2001

Child Category: Rule 18, Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service (Recruitment, Appointment and Conditions of Service)Rules, 2001

Child Category: Rule 21, Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service (Recruitment, Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2001

Child Category: Rule 22, Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service (Recruitment, Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2001

Parent Category: Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service (Recruitment, Appointment and Conditions of Service) Regulation, 2017

Child Category: Paragraph 12, Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service (Recruitment, Appointment and Conditions of Service) Regulation, 2017

Parent Category: Supreme Court of India

Child Category: 2024 INSC 97

Child Category: Justice Aniruddha Bose

Child Category: Justice Sanjay Kumar

Parent Category: Constitution of India

Child Category: Article 14, Constitution of India