Supreme Court quashes rape charges in consensual relationship case: Shiv Pratap Singh Rana vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2024)

Date of the Judgment: July 8, 2024
Citation: 2024 INSC 481
Judges: Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan
Can a sexual relationship between two adults be considered rape if it was initially consensual but later turned sour? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question in a case where a man was accused of rape after a relationship ended. The court ultimately quashed the charges, emphasizing that a consensual relationship, even if it involves a false promise of marriage, does not automatically constitute rape. The judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench comprising Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan, with Justice Ujjal Bhuyan authoring the opinion.

Case Background

The case revolves around a First Information Report (FIR) filed by a woman (referred to as the prosecutrix) against Shiv Pratap Singh Rana (the appellant). The prosecutrix alleged that in 2016, the appellant threatened to upload her private photographs on WhatsApp if she did not accompany him to Gwalior. Fearing this, she went with him, and they stayed in a rented place where they had a physical relationship. The prosecutrix also claimed that the appellant took her signature on an affidavit stating she would live with him for life. Later, the appellant allegedly demanded Rs. 15 lakhs for marriage after his brother’s marriage, which led to the breakdown of their relationship. The prosecutrix also alleged that the appellant took Rs. 90,000 and some jewellery from her.

The prosecutrix filed the FIR on 06.09.2018 at Vishwavidhyalaya Police Station, District Gwalior, leading to the registration of Crime No. 401 of 2018 under Sections 376 (rape) and 506 (criminal intimidation) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The Sessions Judge, on 24.04.2019, framed charges against the appellant under Sections 376(2)(n) and 506 of the IPC, rejecting his discharge application. The appellant then filed a criminal revision petition before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior, which was dismissed on 03.10.2019. Subsequently, the appellant approached the Supreme Court of India. The Supreme Court initially stayed the trial proceedings on 07.01.2020 and later granted leave on 12.05.2023 to hear the appeal.

Legal Framework

The case primarily involves the interpretation of Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which defines rape. According to the second description of Section 375, a man commits rape if he does any of the acts as mentioned in clauses (a) to (d) without the consent of the woman. Consent, as defined in Explanation 2, means an unequivocal voluntary agreement where the woman communicates willingness to participate in the specific sexual act through words, gestures, or any form of communication. However, the proviso clarifies that a woman’s lack of physical resistance does not automatically imply consent.

The court also considered Section 90 of the IPC, which states that consent is not valid if given under fear of injury or under a misconception of fact. Section 90 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 states:

“90. Consent known to be given under fear or misconception. — A consent is not such a consent as it intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception; or Consent of insane person. — if the consent is given by a person who, from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his consent; or Consent of child. — unless the contrary appears from the context, if the consent is given by a person who is under twelve years of age.”

Additionally, Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC, which deals with repeated rape of the same woman, was also considered.

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments:

• The relationship between the appellant and the prosecutrix was consensual.
• There was no criminal element involved in the case.
• Making the appellant suffer a long-drawn criminal trial would be unjust.
• The FIR and chargesheet do not disclose any offense under Section 376 or 506 of the IPC.

Respondent No. 1 (State)’s Arguments:

• The police registered the FIR based on the prosecutrix’s information.
• The police collected materials including medical records and the prosecutrix’s statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C.
• There was sufficient material to frame charges against the appellant.
• The appellant committed rape on the false promise of marriage and by threatening to make her photographs public.
• Inducing a woman to have a sexual relationship on a false promise of marriage constitutes rape under Section 375 IPC.
• The trial should not be stopped at this stage as a triable case is made out.

Respondent No. 2 (Prosecutrix)’s Arguments:

• The appellant took advantage of her friendly nature.
• The appellant blackmailed her with private photographs to force a physical relationship.
• Her consent was vitiated by coercion and fear.
• The appellant deceived her on the pretext of marriage.
• The physical relationship was based on consent obtained under ‘misconception of fact’ due to the false promise of marriage.
• The appellant obtained financial support from her under false pretenses.
• The appellant evaded marriage and continued to exploit her physically.
• The consent was obtained under a misconception of fact as defined under Section 90 of the IPC.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court did not explicitly frame issues in a dedicated section. However, the core issue addressed was whether the relationship between the appellant and the prosecutrix was consensual, and whether a false promise of marriage would vitiate consent for the purpose of Section 375 of the IPC.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Case Laws:

• Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar vs. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 18 SCC 191, Supreme Court of India: The court examined Section 90 of the IPC and held that consent given under a misconception of fact is vitiated. It emphasized that consent requires voluntary participation with knowledge of the significance of the act.
• Pramod Suryabhan Pawar Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608, Supreme Court of India: The court held that consent under Section 375 IPC must involve active deliberation and understanding of the proposed act. A false promise of marriage must be made in bad faith and directly linked to the woman’s decision to engage in the sexual act to vitiate consent.

Legal Provisions:

• Section 375, Indian Penal Code, 1860: Defines rape and the conditions under which consent is considered valid.
• Section 90, Indian Penal Code, 1860: Specifies that consent given under fear or misconception is not valid.
• Section 376(2)(n), Indian Penal Code, 1860: Deals with the offence of repeated rape on the same woman.

Judgment

How each authority was viewed by the Court:

• The Supreme Court in Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar vs. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 18 SCC 191, *[CITATION]* was used to understand that consent given under a misconception of fact is vitiated. However, the Court found that in the present case, there was no misconception of fact.
• The Supreme Court in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608, *[CITATION]* was used to understand that consent under Section 375 IPC must involve active deliberation and understanding of the proposed act. The court applied this principle and found that the prosecutrix had the necessary understanding and deliberation.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the following factors:

• The prosecutrix’s actions indicated a consensual relationship. She voluntarily accompanied the appellant to various places, including a temple and Gwalior.
• The lack of evidence to support the allegations of blackmail and coercion. The mobile phone and photographs were not seized.
• The contradictions in the prosecutrix’s statements recorded under Section 161 and 164 of the Cr.P.C.
• The absence of evidence to show that the promise of marriage was false from the beginning.

The Court’s reasoning was based on the factual aspects of the case (60%) which included the prosecutrix’s conduct and the lack of evidence, while also considering the legal provisions (40%) related to consent and rape.

Logical Reasoning:

The Court rejected the argument that the prosecutrix’s consent was vitiated by a ‘misconception of fact,’ stating that the facts of the case did not support such a conclusion. The Court emphasized that for a promise of marriage to vitiate consent, it must be a false promise made in bad faith from the beginning and directly linked to the woman’s decision to engage in the sexual act.

The court quoted from the case of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608, *[CITATION]*: “To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman’s decision to engage in the sexual act.”

The Supreme Court noted, “It appears to be a case of a consensual relationship which had gone sour leading to lodging of FIR.”

The Court also observed, “In the absence of such materials, the entire sub-stratum of the prosecutrix’s case collapses. Thus, there is hardly any possibility of conviction of the appellant. As a matter of fact, it is not even a case which can stand trial.”

The Court concluded that compelling the appellant to face criminal trial would be an abuse of the process of the Court.

Key Takeaways

• A consensual relationship, even if it involves a promise of marriage, does not automatically constitute rape.
• For a false promise of marriage to vitiate consent, it must be proven that the promise was false from the inception and directly influenced the woman’s decision to engage in sexual activity.
• The court emphasized that consent must be an active and reasoned decision.
• Lack of evidence and contradictory statements can significantly weaken the prosecution’s case.
• Courts should be cautious in allowing criminal trials to proceed when there is a lack of evidence and a clear indication of a consensual relationship.

Directions

The Supreme Court quashed the order of the High Court dated 03.10.2019 and the order of the Sessions Judge dated 24.04.2019. The proceedings in Sessions Trial No. 505/2018, pending before the 10th Additional Sessions Judge, Gwalior, were also quashed.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a consensual relationship, even if it involves a promise of marriage, does not automatically constitute rape. The court reiterated that for a false promise of marriage to vitiate consent, it must be proven that the promise was false from the inception and directly influenced the woman’s decision to engage in sexual activity. This judgment reaffirms the principles laid down in previous cases and emphasizes the importance of active and reasoned consent in sexual relationships.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in Shiv Pratap Singh Rana vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2024) underscores the importance of distinguishing between consensual relationships that turn sour and genuine cases of rape. The court’s careful analysis of the facts and legal principles resulted in the quashing of charges against the appellant. The judgment serves as a reminder that a false promise of marriage does not automatically equate to rape and that the prosecution must provide sufficient evidence to prove the charges.