LEGAL ISSUE: Whether a sexual relationship between two individuals who lived together as husband and wife, initiated under a promise of marriage, can be considered rape if the promise is later broken.

CASE TYPE: Criminal Law

Case Name: Lalu Yadav vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

Judgment Date: 16 October 2024

Date of the Judgment: 16 October 2024

Citation: 2024 INSC 782

Judges: C.T. Ravikumar, J., Rajesh Bindal, J.

Can a consensual relationship, where the parties live as husband and wife, be deemed rape if the promise of marriage is broken? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this critical question in a case involving allegations of rape and abortion. The court examined whether the complainant’s consent was given under a misconception of fact or if the relationship was indeed consensual. This judgment, delivered by a bench comprising Justices C.T. Ravikumar and Rajesh Bindal, ultimately quashed the FIR, providing significant clarity on the definition of rape in such contexts. Justice C.T. Ravikumar authored the judgment.

Case Background

The case involves a complaint filed by a woman (Respondent No. 4) against Lalu Yadav (the Appellant), alleging that he had established a physical relationship with her under the false promise of marriage. According to the complainant, this relationship began when she was a high school student, and she lived with the appellant as his wife. She further alleged that she became pregnant twice, and the appellant coerced her into having abortions. The complainant stated that after the appellant secured a job in the army, he refused to marry her, leading her to file the FIR.

The FIR was registered on 21 February 2018, at Police Station Nandganj, Ghazipur, Uttar Pradesh, under Sections 376 (rape) and 313 (causing miscarriage without consent) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The alleged period of the offense was from 5 January 2013 to 5 January 2018. The appellant sought to quash the FIR through a writ petition in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, which was dismissed, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

Timeline:

Date Event
05 January 2013 – 05 January 2018 Alleged period of offense according to the FIR.
28 September 2017 Appellant allegedly visited the complainant’s house.
29 September 2017 Appellant allegedly took the complainant to Varanasi and had physical relations.
May 2017 Complainant alleges she became pregnant and had an abortion.
17 December 2017 Appellant allegedly took the complainant to a hotel in Varanasi and had physical relations.
21 February 2018 FIR registered at Police Station Nandganj, Ghazipur.
26 July 2018 High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dismissed the writ petition to quash the FIR.
13 November 2018 Supreme Court stayed further proceedings in the case.
18 August 2023 Supreme Court modified its stay, allowing investigation into the offense under Section 313 of the IPC.
02 February 2024 Investigating officer omitted the offense under Section 313 of the IPC due to lack of evidence.
16 October 2024 Supreme Court quashed the FIR and all further proceedings.

Course of Proceedings

The appellant initially approached the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad seeking to quash the FIR filed against him. The High Court dismissed the petition, relying on its previous Full Bench decisions and the Supreme Court’s judgment in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal. The High Court held that it could not interfere with the investigation unless a cognizable offense was not apparent on the face of the FIR or there was a statutory restriction on the police’s power to investigate. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Initially, the Supreme Court stayed further proceedings in the case on 13 November 2018. However, this order was modified on 18 August 2023, allowing the investigation to proceed specifically regarding the offense under Section 313 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Subsequently, the investigating officer concluded that there was no evidence to support the allegation under Section 313, and the charge was dropped. The investigation under Section 376 was stayed by the Supreme Court.

Legal Framework

The case primarily revolves around the interpretation of Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which defines the offense of rape. The relevant part of the section states:

“376. Punishment for rape.—(1) Any man who commits rape shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine: Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than ten years.”

See also  Supreme Court Disposes of Bail Application Pending Since 2018: Motamarri Appanna Veerraju vs. State of West Bengal (20 February 2020)

The court also considered Section 313 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which pertains to causing miscarriage without a woman’s consent. However, this charge was later dropped due to lack of evidence. The court also referred to Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which grants the High Court inherent powers to prevent the abuse of the process of law and to secure the ends of justice.

Arguments

Appellant’s Submissions:

  • The appellant argued that the complainant had willingly engaged in a sexual relationship with him and that they lived as husband and wife for a considerable period.
  • He contended that the complainant’s claim of being deceived by a false promise of marriage was not credible, given the long-term nature of their relationship.
  • The appellant emphasized the delay of over five years in filing the FIR, suggesting that the complaint was an attempt to seek vengeance after he refused to marry her.
  • The appellant relied on the fact that the charge under Section 313 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 was dropped due to lack of evidence.

Respondent’s Submissions:

  • The complainant argued that the appellant had established a physical relationship with her under the false promise of marriage.
  • She stated that she was deceived by the appellant, who promised to marry her but later refused after securing a job.
  • The complainant contended that her consent was not voluntary and was given under the misconception of the promise of marriage.
  • The State of Uttar Pradesh supported the complainant’s arguments, justifying the High Court’s order and the ongoing investigation.

[TABLE] of Submissions

Main Submission Sub-Submissions (Appellant) Sub-Submissions (Respondent)
Nature of Relationship ✓ Consensual relationship for a long period.
✓ Lived as husband and wife.
✓ Sexual relationship established under false promise of marriage.
✓ Consent not voluntary.
False Promise ✓ Claim of false promise not credible due to long-term relationship.
✓ Delay in filing FIR indicates ulterior motive.
✓ Deceived by the appellant’s promise of marriage.
✓ Appellant refused to marry after getting a job.
FIR and Investigation ✓ Charge under Section 313 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 dropped.
✓ No prima facie case for rape.
✓ FIR discloses a cognizable offense.
✓ Investigation should continue.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court considered the following key issue:

  1. Whether the allegations in the complaint reveal a prima facie case that the complainant had given her consent for the sexual relationship with the appellant under a misconception of fact, or whether it reveals a case of consensual sex.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues:

Issue Court’s Decision Brief Reasoning
Whether the allegations reveal a case of rape or consensual sex? Consensual sex. The court noted the long-term relationship, the delay in filing the FIR, and the fact that the complainant lived with the appellant as his wife. It found no prima facie evidence of a false promise of marriage from the beginning.

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Cases:

  • Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate [(1998) 5 SCC 749] – The Supreme Court of India held that the High Court could exercise its power of judicial review in criminal matters under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, to prevent the abuse of the process of the court or to secure the ends of justice.
  • Ajit Singh @ Muraha v. State of U.P. [2006 (56) ACC 433] – Full Bench decision of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, regarding the scope of interference in criminal investigations.
  • Satya Pal v. State of U.P. [2000 CrLJ 569] – Full Bench decision of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, regarding the scope of interference in criminal investigations.
  • State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [AIR 1992 SC 604] – The Supreme Court of India laid down guidelines for quashing FIRs under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
  • Shivashankar alias Shiva v. State of Karnataka [(2019) 18 SCC 204] – The Supreme Court of India held that sexual intercourse during a long-term relationship cannot be considered rape, especially when the complainant alleges they lived as man and wife.
  • “XXXX” v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. [(2024) 3 SCC 496] – The Supreme Court of India quashed an FIR where the complainant alleged rape based on a false promise of marriage after a long-term relationship.
  • Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2023 SCC OnLine SC 89] – The Supreme Court of India held that there cannot be any stretch of imagination that the prosecutrix had given her consent for sexual relationship under misconception after a long term relationship.
See also  Supreme Court Upholds Dismissal of Second Defamation Complaint: B.R.K. Aathithan vs. Sun Group (29 November 2022)

Legal Provisions:

  • Article 226 of the Constitution of India – Grants High Courts the power to issue writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights and for other purposes.
  • Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Grants inherent powers to the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of law and to secure the ends of justice.
  • Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Defines and provides punishment for the offense of rape.
  • Section 313 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Defines and provides punishment for causing miscarriage without a woman’s consent.

[TABLE] of Authorities

Authority Court How Considered
Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate [(1998) 5 SCC 749] Supreme Court of India Cited to establish the High Court’s power to review criminal matters under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Ajit Singh @ Muraha v. State of U.P. [2006 (56) ACC 433] High Court of Judicature at Allahabad Referred to by the High Court in its decision, which was later overturned by the Supreme Court.
Satya Pal v. State of U.P. [2000 CrLJ 569] High Court of Judicature at Allahabad Referred to by the High Court in its decision, which was later overturned by the Supreme Court.
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [AIR 1992 SC 604] Supreme Court of India Cited for guidelines on quashing FIRs, but the Supreme Court distinguished the present case.
Shivashankar alias Shiva v. State of Karnataka [(2019) 18 SCC 204] Supreme Court of India Followed to emphasize that sexual intercourse during a long-term relationship is not rape.
“XXXX” v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. [(2024) 3 SCC 496] Supreme Court of India Followed to quash the FIR based on similar facts of a long-term relationship and a false promise of marriage.
Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2023 SCC OnLine SC 89] Supreme Court of India Followed to support the view that consent for sexual relationship in a long term relationship is not under misconception.
Article 226 of the Constitution of India Constitution of India Cited as a source of High Court’s power to review criminal matters.
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Cited as the source of the High Court’s inherent powers to prevent abuse of process.
Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 Indian Penal Code, 1860 The main provision under which the offense of rape was alleged.
Section 313 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 Indian Penal Code, 1860 Cited as the provision regarding causing miscarriage, which was later dropped.

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

Submission How Treated by the Court
Appellant’s submission that the relationship was consensual and long-term. Accepted. The court noted the long period of the relationship and the fact that they lived as husband and wife.
Appellant’s submission that there was a delay in filing the FIR. Accepted. The court considered the five-year delay significant.
Appellant’s submission that the charge under Section 313 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 was dropped. Accepted. The court noted that the charge was dropped due to lack of evidence.
Respondent’s submission that the relationship was based on a false promise of marriage. Rejected. The court found no evidence of a false promise from the beginning of the relationship.
Respondent’s submission that her consent was not voluntary. Rejected. The court emphasized the long-term nature of the relationship and the fact that they lived as husband and wife.

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

  • The Court considered Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate [(1998) 5 SCC 749] to highlight the High Court’s power of judicial review.
  • The Court distinguished the High Court’s reliance on Ajit Singh @ Muraha v. State of U.P. [2006 (56) ACC 433] and Satya Pal v. State of U.P. [2000 CrLJ 569], noting that the present case involved different facts.
  • The Court referred to State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [AIR 1992 SC 604], but noted that the case fell under the exceptions outlined in that judgment.
  • The Court followed Shivashankar alias Shiva v. State of Karnataka [(2019) 18 SCC 204] to emphasize that sexual intercourse during a long-term relationship cannot be considered rape.
  • The Court relied on “XXXX” v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. [(2024) 3 SCC 496] and Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2023 SCC OnLine SC 89] to support its decision to quash the FIR, finding similar facts.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the following factors:

  • The long-term nature of the relationship between the appellant and the complainant, where they lived as husband and wife.
  • The significant delay of over five years in filing the FIR, which raised doubts about the complainant’s motives.
  • The absence of a prima facie case that the complainant had given her consent under a misconception of fact.
  • The fact that the charge under Section 313 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, was dropped due to lack of evidence.
  • The court’s view that the allegations indicated a consensual physical relationship rather than rape.
See also  Right to Travel Abroad: Supreme Court Allows Green Card Holder to Visit US in Parvez Noordin Lokhandwalla vs. State of Maharashtra (2020)

[TABLE] of Sentiment Analysis

Reason Percentage
Long-term nature of the relationship 30%
Delay in filing FIR 25%
Absence of prima facie case of misconception of fact 20%
Dropping of Section 313 charge 15%
Consensual nature of the relationship 10%

Fact:Law Ratio

Category Percentage
Fact 60%
Law 40%

The court’s reasoning was a blend of factual analysis and legal interpretation. The factual aspects, such as the duration of the relationship and the delay in filing the FIR, heavily influenced the court’s decision. Legal considerations, such as the definition of rape and the scope of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, were also crucial.

Logical Reasoning Flowchart:

Issue: Was the sexual relationship consensual or based on a misconception of fact?
Fact 1: Long-term relationship, living as husband and wife
Fact 2: Delay of over 5 years in filing FIR
Fact 3: No evidence of false promise from the start.
Legal Consideration: Precedents on consensual relationships
Conclusion: Relationship was consensual; no rape.

The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the complainant’s consent was given under a misconception of fact. The court emphasized that the complainant and the appellant had lived together as husband and wife for a long period, and the delay in filing the FIR suggested that the complaint was an attempt to seek vengeance after the appellant refused to marry her. The court also noted that the charge under Section 313 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, was dropped due to lack of evidence.

The court quoted from the FIR itself, where the complainant stated: “…Lalu Yadav…used to come to my house along with the brother -in-law Ravindra Yadav of my elder sister, at that time about five years back I was a student of High School, then the said Lalu Yadav by way of deceiving myself promise that he will marry me and established physical relationship with me without my consent and started living with me as the husband.” The court highlighted the contradiction between “established physical relationship with me without my consent” and “started living with me as the husband.”

The court also stated: “At any rate, the allegations in the FIR would not constitute a prima facie case of false promise to marry from the inception with a view to establish sexual relationship and instead they would reveal a prima facie case of long consensual physical relationship, during which the complainant addressed the appellant as her husband.”

Further, the court observed: “The subsequent refusal to marry the complainant would not be sufficient, in view of the facts and circumstances obtained in the case at hand, by any stretch of imagination to draw existence of a prima facie case that the complainant had given consent for the sexual relationship with the appellant under misconception of fact, so as to accuse the appellant guilty of having committed rape within the meaning of Section 375, IPC.”

Key Takeaways

  • A long-term consensual relationship where the parties live as husband and wife is unlikely to be considered rape even if a promise of marriage is broken later.
  • Significant delays in filing FIRs can raise doubts about the credibility of the allegations.
  • The courts will examine the facts of each case to determine whether the consent was given under a misconception of fact or if the relationship was consensual.
  • The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, can be used to quash FIRs in cases of abuse of the process of law.

Directions

The Supreme Court quashed the FIR No. 28/2018 dated 21.02.2018 registered at Police Station – Nandganj, Ghazipur District of Uttar Pradesh and all further proceedings on its basis.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a sexual relationship that has continued for a long time, where the parties have lived as husband and wife, is unlikely to be considered rape even if a promise of marriage is broken later. This judgment reinforces the principle that consent in a sexual relationship must be assessed based on the facts and circumstances of each case. It also clarifies that a delay in filing an FIR can impact the credibility of the allegations.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court’s order and quashing the FIR against Lalu Yadav. The court held that the allegations did not constitute a prima facie case of rape and that the relationship appeared to be consensual. This judgment underscores the importance of examining the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether a sexual relationship was consensual or based on a misconception of fact.