Supreme Court Quashes Rape FIR in Consensual Relationship Case: Mahesh Damu Khare vs. State of Maharashtra (2024)

Date of the Judgment: 26 November 2024

Citation: 2024 INSC 897

Judges: B.V. Nagarathna, J., Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, J.

Can a sexual relationship, maintained for a prolonged period, be termed as rape if the woman alleges it was based on a false promise of marriage? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this critical question in a criminal appeal, examining the nuances of consent and deception in long-term relationships. The Court analyzed whether a relationship that lasted for nine years could be considered non-consensual based on the complainant’s claim of a false promise of marriage. This judgment clarifies the legal position on consent in such cases and the circumstances under which a sexual relationship can be considered rape. The bench comprised of Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, with the majority opinion authored by Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh.

Case Background

The appellant, Mahesh Damu Khare, claimed to be a social worker since 1985. In 2012, the complainant (Respondent no. 2) approached him for help regarding her kidnapped daughter. The appellant successfully resolved the issue. Subsequently, the complainant started assisting the appellant in his socio-political activities and received financial help from him for her children’s education. However, as the complainant continued to seek more financial assistance, the appellant helped her find employment. According to the appellant, the complainant then became aggressive when he tried to ignore her demands for more attention and money, leading to several complaints against her by the appellant’s wife.

The complainant filed a counter FIR on 15.08.2017, alleging that the appellant had sexually assaulted her under the false promise of marriage. She stated that she met the appellant in 2008 while looking for a job and started working at his house. She alleged that the appellant had sexual intercourse with her forcibly, and continued to do so for many years under the false promise of marriage. She also alleged that the appellant arranged rented rooms for her and continued the sexual relationship until March 2017. She further stated that the appellant ended the relationship and abused her when she asked for money. The complainant also alleged that the appellant’s first wife abused her over the phone.

Timeline:

Course of Proceedings

The appellant was granted anticipatory bail by the Sessions Court in both FIRs. The Sessions Court noted that the allegations were made belatedly, suggesting a consensual relationship. The appellant then approached the Bombay High Court seeking to quash the first FIR (CR No. 302 of 2017). The High Court dismissed the petition, stating that the offense under Section 376 of the IPC is against society and requires further investigation. The High Court also held that the facts of the present case were different from the case cited by the appellant, where the relationship was admitted to be consensual. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Legal Framework

The Supreme Court examined the scope of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), which deals with the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The Court also analyzed Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), which defines rape, particularly focusing on the aspects of consent and circumstances under which consent is not valid. Section 375 of the IPC states that a man commits rape if he engages in sexual intercourse without the woman’s consent, against her will, or under certain conditions, such as when consent is obtained by putting her in fear of death or hurt, or when her consent is given due to a misconception of fact.

Section 90 of the IPC was also considered, which states that consent is not valid if given under fear of injury or a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows or has reason to believe that the consent was given due to such fear or misconception. The Court also considered the concept of “misconception of fact” in relation to a promise of marriage, particularly focusing on whether a false promise of marriage vitiates consent for sexual intercourse.

Section 482 of CrPC: “Saving of inherent power of High Court. Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”

Section 375 of IPC: “Rape.—A man is said to commit “rape” if he — (a) penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (b) inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (c) manipulates any part of the body of a woman so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of such woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (d) applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person, under the circumstances falling under any of the following seven descriptions — First. —Against her will. Secondly. —Without her consent. Thirdly. —With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt. Fourthly. —With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married. Fifthly. —With her consent when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which sh e gives consent. Sixthly. —With or without her consent, when she is under eighteen years of age. Seventhly. —When she is unable to communicate consent .”

Section 90 of IPC: “Consent known to be given under fear or misconception. — A consent is not such a consent as it intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception; or …”

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments:

• The appellant argued that the High Court erred in not quashing the FIR, as the sexual relationship between the parties was consensual.
• The appellant contended that the complainant had admitted to being in a relationship with him since 2008, which continued until 2017.
• It was argued that it is inconceivable that the appellant would force himself on the complainant for so many years without any protest or complaint.
• The appellant submitted that the allegation of rape was concocted after he refused to provide further financial assistance and did not agree to marry her.
• The appellant relied on the fact that the complainant continued the relationship for nine years, which indicates that it was a consensual relationship.

State’s Arguments:

• The State argued that whether the relationship was consensual or not is a matter of fact that would be determined during the course of investigation and trial.
• The State contended that this was not a fit case for the Supreme Court to intervene and quash the criminal proceedings.
• The State submitted that the High Court’s decision to refuse to quash the FIR did not warrant interference.

Submissions Table:

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court did not explicitly frame issues in a separate section. However, the core issue that the court addressed was:

1. Whether a prolonged sexual relationship, based on a promise of marriage, can be considered rape if the promise is not fulfilled, and the woman alleges that her consent was based on a misconception of fact.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• The Court relied on State of Haryana and Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal and Ors. [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335]* to reiterate the principles for quashing an FIR under Section 482 of CrPC, stating that the Court can quash an FIR if the allegations do not constitute an offense or if the proceedings are malicious.
• The Court referred to R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [AIR 1960 SC 866]* to emphasize that the High Court should be cautious in interfering with criminal proceedings but can do so to prevent abuse of process.
• The Court cited Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [(2021) 19 SCC 401]* to reiterate the exceptions where the court can quash criminal proceedings, such as if there is a legal bar, the allegations do not constitute an offense, or there is no legal evidence.
• The Court used Shambhu Kharwar v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. [2022 SCC OnLine SC 1032]* to explain that consent must involve an active understanding of the circumstances, and a false promise to marry must be made with no intention to fulfill it.
• The Court referred to Niam Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2023 SCC OnLine SC 89]* to distinguish between a false promise and a breach of promise, stating that a false promise is made with no intention to marry from the beginning.
• The Court used Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana [(2013) 7 SCC 675]* to highlight the need to examine whether the accused had mala fide motives and made a false promise to satisfy lust, emphasizing that the court must examine whether the promise was made with the intention to deceive from the beginning.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the following considerations:

• Prolonged Consensual Relationship: The fact that the complainant engaged in a sexual relationship with the appellant for nine years without any protest or insistence on marriage was a significant factor. This indicated that the relationship was not solely based on a false promise of marriage.
• Lack of Initial Deception: The Court emphasized that for a promise to amount to a misconception of fact, it must be made with the intention to deceive from the very beginning. The long duration of the relationship made it difficult to infer that the appellant had such an intention.
• Timing of the Complaint: The Court noted that the complaint was filed after the appellant stopped providing financial support, suggesting that the complaint was triggered by the discontinuance of financial assistance rather than the alleged false promise.
• Mature Complainant: The Court considered that the complainant was a mature woman with grown-up children, capable of understanding the consequences of her actions. This made it less likely that she was deceived for such a long period.
• Abuse of Process: The Court was concerned that allowing criminal proceedings in such a case would be an abuse of the process of the court, potentially leading to the criminalization of sour relationships at a belated stage.

Sentiment Analysis of Reasons Given by the Supreme Court:

Fact:Law Ratio:

Logical Reasoning:

The Court considered the alternative interpretation that the complainant’s consent was based on a false promise of marriage. However, it rejected this interpretation because the prolonged nature of the relationship and the timing of the complaint indicated that the consent was not solely based on the promise. The Court emphasized that the promise must be made with the intention to deceive from the beginning, which was not evident in this case. The Court concluded that the relationship was consensual, and the allegations of rape were an abuse of the legal process.

The Court’s decision was based on the following reasons:

• The prolonged nature of the relationship indicated that it was consensual.
• The complainant did not protest or insist on marriage for nine years.
• The complaint was filed after the appellant stopped providing financial support.
• The complainant was a mature woman who understood the consequences of her actions.
• Allowing the criminal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of the court.

“In our view, if a man is accused of having sexual relationship by making a false promise of marriage and if he is to be held criminally liable, any such physical relationship must be traceable directly to the false promise made and not qualified by other circumstances or consideration.”

“In our opinion, the longer the duration of the physical relationship between the partners without protest and insistence by the female partner for marriage would be indicative of a consensual relationship rather than a relationship based on false promise of marriage by the male partner and thus, based on misconception of fact.”

“It will be very difficult to assume that the complainant who is otherwise a mature person with two grown up children, was unable to discover the deceitful behaviour of the appellant who continued to have sexual relationship with her for such a long period on the promise of marriage.”

There was no minority opinion in this case. Both judges concurred with the final decision.

The court analyzed the facts of the case, the legal provisions, and the precedents to conclude that the relationship was consensual and that the allegations of rape were an abuse of the legal process. The court’s interpretation of consent and false promise of marriage has significant implications for future cases involving similar circumstances.

The Court’s decision introduces a principle that prolonged consensual relationships, without protest or insistence on marriage, cannot be easily criminalized as rape based on a false promise of marriage. This principle emphasizes the need to examine the intention behind the promise and the circumstances of the relationship.

Key Takeaways

• A prolonged sexual relationship without protest or insistence on marriage is indicative of a consensual relationship.
• A false promise of marriage must be made with the intention to deceive from the beginning to vitiate consent.
• Criminal proceedings should not be used to settle sour relationships at a belated stage.
• The timing of a complaint can be an indicator of the true motive behind the allegations.
• Courts must be cautious in attributing criminal intent to what may be a disturbed civil relationship.

This judgment may have a significant impact on cases involving allegations of rape based on a false promise of marriage, particularly in situations where the relationship has been prolonged. It emphasizes the need to examine the circumstances of the relationship and the intention of the parties. This ruling could lead to a more nuanced approach in handling such cases in the future, preventing the misuse of criminal law in cases of consensual relationships that have turned sour.

Directions

The Supreme Court quashed the FIR being CR No. 302 of 2017 dated 15.08.2017 registered against the appellant with the Kharghar Police Station, Navi Mumbai under Sections 376, 420, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code. The Court also clarified that quashing the FIR would not bar the complainant from seeking any other remedy available under the law.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a prolonged sexual relationship, without any protest or insistence on marriage, indicates a consensual relationship and cannot be considered rape based on a false promise of marriage unless the promise was made with the intention to deceive from the beginning. This judgment clarifies that the mere breach of a promise to marry does not automatically amount to rape. It emphasizes that the intention behind the promise and the circumstances of the relationship must be considered. This case does not explicitly overrule any previous position of law but clarifies the application of existing principles to cases of prolonged relationships based on a promise of marriage.

Conclusion

In the case of Mahesh Damu Khare vs. The State of Maharashtra, the Supreme Court quashed the FIR against the appellant, holding that a prolonged sexual relationship without protest indicates a consensual relationship and cannot be considered rape based on a false promise of marriage, unless the promise was made with the intention to deceive from the beginning. The Court emphasized the need to examine the circumstances of the relationship and the intention of the parties, preventing the misuse of criminal law in cases of consensual relationships that have turned sour.