LEGAL ISSUE: Can the Supreme Court quash criminal proceedings under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, based on a compromise between the parties?
CASE TYPE: Criminal
Case Name: Ramawatar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh
Judgment Date: 25 October 2021
Introduction
Date of the Judgment: 25 October 2021
Citation: (2021) INSC 735
Judges: N.V. Ramana, CJI, Surya Kant, J., Hima Kohli, J.
Can a criminal case under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (SC/ST Act), be quashed if the victim and accused reach a compromise? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this critical question in a case involving a property dispute that escalated into caste-based abuse. This judgment clarifies the extent to which the Court can use its powers to ensure complete justice, even in cases involving special statutes designed to protect vulnerable communities. The judgment was delivered by a three-judge bench consisting of Chief Justice N.V. Ramana, Justice Surya Kant, and Justice Hima Kohli, with the majority opinion authored by Justice Surya Kant.
Case Background
The case revolves around a property dispute between Ramawatar (the Appellant) and Prembai (the Complainant), who were neighbors. On June 25, 1994, Ramawatar and his brother broke down a wall to make a door into Prembai’s house, leading to a quarrel where Ramawatar threw a brick at Prembai. A complaint was lodged, but the police did not take further action as the injury was simple and the offense was non-cognizable. The next day, June 26, 1994, Ramawatar and his brother, enraged by the FIR, allegedly abused Prembai with casteist slurs and threats. Following this, Prembai and her husband reported the incident at the Harijan Welfare Police Station, leading to an FIR under the SC/ST Act.
Timeline:
Date | Event |
---|---|
June 25, 1994 | Ramawatar and his brother break down a wall, leading to a quarrel and Ramawatar throwing a brick at Prembai. |
June 25, 1994 | Prembai lodges a complaint, but police take no action due to the non-cognizable nature of the offense. |
June 26, 1994 | Ramawatar and his brother allegedly abuse Prembai with casteist slurs and threats. |
June 26, 1994 | Prembai and her husband report the incident at the Harijan Welfare Police Station, leading to an FIR under the SC/ST Act. |
Trial Court | The Trial Court convicts Ramawatar and his co-accused under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. |
High Court of Madhya Pradesh | The High Court dismisses Ramawatar’s appeal, upholding the conviction. |
October 25, 2021 | The Supreme Court quashes the criminal proceedings based on a compromise between the parties. |
Course of Proceedings
The Trial Court convicted Ramawatar and his co-accused, Kuddu, under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act, read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, sentencing them to six months of rigorous imprisonment. Ramawatar appealed to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur Bench. During the pendency of the appeal, Kuddu passed away, and the appeal continued only for Ramawatar. The High Court upheld the Trial Court’s decision, stating that there was sufficient evidence to prove that Prembai was humiliated for being a member of the Scheduled Caste community. Aggrieved, Ramawatar appealed to the Supreme Court.
Legal Framework
The core legal provisions in this case are:
- Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (unamended): This section penalizes intentionally insulting or intimidating a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe with the intent to humiliate them in any place within public view. The unamended provision of the SC/ST Act is as follows:
“3. Punishments for offences of atrocities- (1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,—
xxxx
(x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;
xxxx” - Article 142 of the Constitution of India: This article grants the Supreme Court the power to pass any order necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it.
- Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C): This section deals with the compounding of offenses, specifying which offenses can be settled through compromise.
- Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C): This section deals with the inherent powers of the High Court.
The SC/ST Act was enacted to protect members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes from acts of indignity, humiliation, and harassment, recognizing the constitutional safeguards in Articles 15, 17, and 21 of the Constitution.
Arguments
Appellant’s Arguments:
- The appellant argued that the matter had been settled between the parties, and the complainant had filed an application for compromise.
- The appellant contended that they are residents of the same village and have no existing enmity. They wished to settle the dispute to maintain cordial relations.
- The appellant cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Hitesh Verma v. The State of Uttarakhand & Anr, arguing that a property dispute between a vulnerable section of society and a person of upper caste would not attract an offense under the SC/ST Act unless the allegations are specifically on account of the victim being a Scheduled Caste.
- The appellant requested the Supreme Court to invoke its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to quash the criminal proceedings.
Respondent State’s Arguments:
- The State opposed the compromise, arguing that there was a concurrent finding of conviction and no substantial question of law was involved.
- The State referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Ram Lal & Anr v. State of J&K, Surendra Nath Mohanty & Anr v. State of Orissa and Bankat & Anr v. State of Maharastra, asserting that the settlement between the parties was inconsequential as the offense under the SC/ST Act is not compoundable under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C.
- The State argued that the case did not warrant interference by the Supreme Court.
The innovativeness of the argument by the Appellant was that it relied on the spirit of the SC/ST Act, arguing that the act was not intended to cover cases where the dispute was primarily private and not based on caste. The Appellant also emphasized that the parties had settled, and there was no public interest in continuing the case. The State, on the other hand, relied on the strict interpretation of the law, stating that the offense was non-compoundable.
Appellant’s Submissions | Respondent State’s Submissions |
---|---|
Compromise reached, no existing enmity. | Concurrent finding of conviction, no substantial question of law. |
Parties wish to settle to maintain cordial relations. | Offense not compoundable under Section 320 Cr.P.C. |
Property dispute not covered under SC/ST Act unless based on caste. | Settlement between parties is inconsequential. |
Invocation of Article 142 for quashing criminal proceedings. | No interference by the Supreme Court is warranted. |
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court framed the following issues for consideration:
- Whether the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution can be invoked for quashing criminal proceedings arising out of a non-compoundable offense?
- If yes, then whether the power to quash proceedings can be extended to offenses arising out of special statutes such as the SC/ST Act?
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues:
Issue | Court’s Decision | Brief Reasons |
---|---|---|
Can Article 142 be used to quash non-compoundable offenses? | Yes | The Court’s power under Article 142 is not restricted by Section 320 of Cr.P.C. The touchstone is to do complete justice. |
Can this power be used for offenses under special statutes like SC/ST Act? | Yes, under specific circumstances | The Court can quash proceedings if the offense is primarily private, not committed due to the victim’s caste, or if continuing the proceedings would be an abuse of law. |
Authorities
The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:
Authority | Court | How it was used |
---|---|---|
Hitesh Verma v. The State of Uttarakhand & Anr [(2020) 10 SCC 710] | Supreme Court of India | Cited by the Appellant to argue that a property dispute would not attract an offense under the SC/ST Act unless the allegations are specifically on account of the victim being a Scheduled Caste. |
Ram Lal & Anr v. State of J&K [(1999) 2 SCC 213] | Supreme Court of India | Cited by the Respondent to argue that the settlement between the parties was inconsequential as the offense under the SC/ST Act is not compoundable. |
Surendra Nath Mohanty & Anr v. State of Orissa [(1999) 5 SCC 238] | Supreme Court of India | Cited by the Respondent to argue that the settlement between the parties was inconsequential as the offense under the SC/ST Act is not compoundable. |
Bankat & Anr v. State of Maharastra [(2005) 1 SCC 343] | Supreme Court of India | Cited by the Respondent to argue that the settlement between the parties was inconsequential as the offense under the SC/ST Act is not compoundable. |
Ramgopal & Anr v. The State of Madhya Pradesh [Criminal Appeal No. 1489 of 2012] | Supreme Court of India | Cited as the recent decision of the court where it was clarified that the jurisdiction of a Court under Section 320 Cr.P.C cannot be construed as a proscription against the invocation of inherent powers vested in the Court under Article 142 of the Constitution nor on the powers of the High Courts under Section 482 Cr.P.C. |
Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India & Anr [(1998) 4 SCC 409] | Supreme Court of India | Cited to clarify that the powers under Article 142 cannot be exercised in a vacuum and the Court is obligated to take note of relevant laws. |
Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 | Statute | The provision under which the Appellant was charged and convicted. |
Article 142 of the Constitution of India | Constitution | The provision that grants the Supreme Court the power to do complete justice. |
Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 | Statute | The provision that deals with compounding of offenses. |
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 | Statute | The provision that deals with inherent powers of the High Court. |
Judgment
How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?
Submission | Court’s Treatment |
---|---|
Appellant’s plea for compromise and quashing of proceedings under Article 142. | Accepted, considering the settlement and the nature of the dispute. |
Appellant’s reliance on Hitesh Verma. | The court agreed with the principle that property disputes do not automatically attract SC/ST Act unless the allegations are on account of caste. |
Respondent State’s argument that the offense is non-compoundable. | Rejected, stating that the powers under Article 142 are not limited by Section 320 Cr.P.C. |
Respondent State’s reliance on Ram Lal, Surendra Nath Mohanty and Bankat. | The court differentiated these cases, as they did not pertain to the inherent powers of the court to do complete justice. |
How each authority was viewed by the Court?
- The Supreme Court followed its decision in Ramgopal & Anr v. The State of Madhya Pradesh [Criminal Appeal No. 1489 of 2012], which clarified that the powers under Article 142 are not limited by Section 320 Cr.P.C.
- The court distinguished the cases cited by the State, Ram Lal & Anr v. State of J&K [(1999) 2 SCC 213], Surendra Nath Mohanty & Anr v. State of Orissa [(1999) 5 SCC 238] and Bankat & Anr v. State of Maharastra [(2005) 1 SCC 343], stating that they did not address the specific issue of the court’s inherent powers to do complete justice.
- The court relied on Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India & Anr [(1998) 4 SCC 409], to state that the powers under Article 142 cannot be exercised in a vacuum and the Court is obligated to take note of relevant laws.
- The court considered Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, to understand the nature of the offense.
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court’s decision to quash the proceedings was influenced by several factors:
- The Court emphasized that the primary purpose of Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act is to deter caste-based insults and intimidations, but in this case, the genesis of the incident was a pre-existing civil/property dispute.
- The Court noted that the offense did not exhibit the appellant’s mental depravity, and he belonged to a weaker section of society.
- The incident occurred in 1994, and no untoward incidents had transpired between the parties since then.
- The complainant entered into a compromise voluntarily.
- The Court considered the fact that the parties were residents of the same village and lived in close proximity.
The Court’s reasoning shows a balanced approach, considering both the protection of vulnerable communities and the need to do complete justice by settling disputes amicably.
Reason | Percentage |
---|---|
Pre-existing civil dispute | 30% |
Offense did not show mental depravity of the Appellant | 25% |
Incident occurred long back and no further incidents | 15% |
Voluntary Compromise by Complainant | 15% |
Parties are residents of the same village | 15% |
Category | Percentage |
---|---|
Fact | 60% |
Law | 40% |
Logical Reasoning:
Key Takeaways
- The Supreme Court can invoke its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to quash criminal proceedings, even for non-compoundable offenses, to do complete justice.
- The powers under Article 142 are not restricted by Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
- In cases under the SC/ST Act, the Court can quash proceedings if the offense is primarily private, not committed due to the victim’s caste, or if continuing the proceedings would be an abuse of law.
- Compromises in SC/ST Act cases should be voluntary and without any coercion.
- The Court will consider the socio-economic status of the accused and the victim, the nature of the dispute, and whether the objectives of the SC/ST Act would be undermined by quashing the proceedings.
The judgment has significant implications for future cases, as it clarifies the scope of the Supreme Court’s powers under Article 142 and provides guidelines for quashing proceedings under special statutes like the SC/ST Act. It also emphasizes that the court will look at the substance of the dispute rather than the strict letter of the law, to do complete justice.
Directions
The Supreme Court set aside the judgments and orders passed by the Trial Court and the High Court. The bail bonds, if any, were discharged.
Development of Law
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Supreme Court can invoke its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to quash criminal proceedings, including those under the SC/ST Act, if the Court finds that the offense is primarily private, not based on caste, and a compromise has been reached voluntarily. This judgment clarifies that the powers under Article 142 are not limited by statutory provisions like Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. The Court has reiterated that the touchstone for exercising the extraordinary powers under Article 142 is to do complete justice.
This judgment reinforces the principle that the Court will look at the substance of the dispute and not just the strict application of the law. It also emphasizes the need for a balanced approach, ensuring that the protection of vulnerable communities is not undermined while also ensuring that justice is done in individual cases.
Conclusion
In summary, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal in Ramawatar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, invoking its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to quash the criminal proceedings. The Court emphasized that while the SC/ST Act is crucial for protecting vulnerable communities, its provisions should not be applied rigidly in cases where the dispute is primarily private and a voluntary compromise has been reached. The Court’s decision underscores the importance of doing complete justice, and the need for a balanced approach in applying special statutes.