Date of the Judgment: February 7, 2020
Citation: 2020 INSC 123
Judges: Justice Navin Sinha and Justice Krishna Murari
Can a person be tried twice for the same offense? The Supreme Court of India addressed this crucial question in a case where an individual was accused of forging a power of attorney. The court examined whether a second FIR could be filed on the same facts after an acquittal in the first instance. This judgment clarifies the application of Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) regarding double jeopardy. The bench comprised of Justice Navin Sinha and Justice Krishna Murari, with the judgment authored by Justice Navin Sinha.
Case Background
The case revolves around a dispute between Prem Chand Singh (the appellant) and the State of Uttar Pradesh along with another respondent. The respondent had allegedly given a general power of attorney to the appellant on May 2, 1985. Based on this power of attorney, the appellant sold some of the respondent’s land. In 1989, the respondent lodged an FIR (FIR No. 160 of 1989) claiming that he had never given any power of attorney to the appellant and that the appellant had forged it to sell his lands illegally. The appellant was acquitted in this case. Later, the respondent filed a civil suit in 2007 to cancel the power of attorney. Subsequently, in 2008, the respondent filed another application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., which led to a second FIR (FIR No. 114 of 2008) alleging the same forgery and illegal sale of land by the appellant.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| May 2, 1985 | Respondent allegedly gives general power of attorney to the appellant. |
| 1989 | Respondent lodges FIR No. 160 of 1989, alleging forgery of power of attorney. |
| August 7, 1998 | Appellant acquitted in FIR No. 160 of 1989. |
| 2007 | Respondent files Civil Suit No. 353 of 2007 to cancel the general power of attorney. |
| October 9, 2008 | Respondent files application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., leading to FIR No. 114 of 2008. |
| December 18, 2015 | Appellant’s application for discharge rejected. |
| May 31, 2016 | Revision against rejection of discharge application dismissed. |
| February 7, 2020 | Supreme Court sets aside the second FIR and allows the appeal. |
Course of Proceedings
The appellant filed an application for discharge, citing his acquittal in the 1989 case and arguing that he could not be tried twice for the same offense. The Judicial Magistrate Class II, Gonda, rejected the discharge application, stating that the acquittal order was not on record. A revision against this order was also dismissed, with the court stating that the grounds could be raised during the framing of charges. The appellant then approached the Supreme Court, challenging the rejection of his discharge application and the subsequent dismissal of the revision.
Legal Framework
The primary legal provision in question is Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.), which deals with the principle of double jeopardy. Section 300 of the Cr.P.C. states:
“300. Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence.
(1) A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under sub-Section (1) of Section 221, or for which he might have been convicted under sub-Section (2) thereof.”
This section essentially prevents a person from being tried again for the same offense if they have already been acquitted or convicted by a competent court. The provision aims to protect individuals from repeated prosecutions for the same actions, ensuring finality in legal proceedings.
Arguments
Appellant’s Arguments:
- The appellant argued that the second FIR was based on the same general power of attorney that was the subject of the first FIR, in which he was acquitted.
- The appellant contended that the respondent concealed the fact of his acquittal in the first case when filing the second FIR.
- The appellant relied on Section 300 of the Cr.P.C. to argue that he could not be tried again for the same offense.
- The appellant argued that the institution of the second FIR long after the execution of the power of attorney was an abuse of the process of law.
- The appellant pointed out that the respondent’s filing of a civil suit to cancel the power of attorney after the acquittal acknowledged the genuineness of the power of attorney.
Respondent’s Arguments:
- The respondent argued that the two FIRs had different ingredients. The first FIR was under Section 419 or 420 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), while the second was under Sections 467, 468, and 471 of the IPC.
- The respondent claimed that the second FIR included additional allegations, such as the appellant using an imposter to execute the sale deed.
- The respondent contended that the second FIR was based on different materials, allegations, and grounds, justifying a separate trial.
Submissions Table
| Main Submission | Sub-Submission | Party |
|---|---|---|
| Double Jeopardy | Second FIR based on same power of attorney as the first FIR | Appellant |
| Concealment of acquittal in the first case when filing the second FIR | Appellant | |
| Section 300 Cr.P.C. bars second trial for same offense | Appellant | |
| Difference in FIRs | First FIR under Section 419 or 420 IPC, second under Sections 467, 468, and 471 IPC | Respondent |
| Second FIR includes new allegations of using an imposter | Respondent | |
| Second FIR based on different materials, allegations, and grounds | Respondent | |
| Abuse of Process | Institution of second FIR long after execution of power of attorney | Appellant |
| Filing of civil suit to cancel power of attorney after acquittal acknowledges its genuineness | Appellant |
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court did not explicitly frame issues in a separate section. However, the core issue the Court addressed was:
- Whether the second FIR (FIR No. 114 of 2008) was maintainable in light of the appellant’s acquittal in the first FIR (FIR No. 160 of 1989), considering the provisions of Section 300 of the Cr.P.C.
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues
| Issue | Court’s Decision | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| Whether the second FIR (FIR No. 114 of 2008) was maintainable in light of the appellant’s acquittal in the first FIR (FIR No. 160 of 1989), considering the provisions of Section 300 of the Cr.P.C. | Not Maintainable | The substratum of both FIRs was the same general power of attorney and the sales made in pursuance of it. The mere addition of Sections 467, 468, and 471 in the second FIR does not justify a second prosecution. Section 300 of Cr.P.C. bars a second trial for the same offense. |
Authorities
The Supreme Court considered the following legal provisions:
- Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.): This section prevents a person from being tried again for the same offense if they have already been acquitted or convicted.
- Sections 419, 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC): These sections deal with offences related to cheating, forgery and using forged documents.
Authorities Table
| Authority | Court | How it was used |
|---|---|---|
| Section 300, Cr.P.C. | Statute | The Court relied on this provision to determine that the appellant could not be tried again for the same offense after his acquittal. |
| Sections 419, 420, 467, 468 and 471, IPC | Statute | The Court analysed these provisions in relation to the facts of the case to determine whether the second FIR was maintainable. |
Judgment
How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?
| Submission | Party | Court’s Treatment |
|---|---|---|
| Second FIR based on same power of attorney as the first FIR | Appellant | Accepted. The Court found that the core issue in both FIRs was the same general power of attorney. |
| Concealment of acquittal in the first case when filing the second FIR | Appellant | Accepted. The Court noted that the second FIR concealed the fact of the appellant’s acquittal. |
| Section 300 Cr.P.C. bars second trial for same offense | Appellant | Accepted. The Court held that Section 300 of Cr.P.C. applied, barring a second trial. |
| First FIR under Section 419 or 420 IPC, second under Sections 467, 468, and 471 IPC | Respondent | Rejected. The Court stated that the addition of different sections did not change the core issue of the case. |
| Second FIR includes new allegations of using an imposter | Respondent | Rejected. The Court found that the allegations were still based on the same power of attorney. |
| Second FIR based on different materials, allegations, and grounds | Respondent | Rejected. The Court held that the substratum of both FIRs was the same. |
| Institution of second FIR long after execution of power of attorney | Appellant | Accepted. The Court implied that the delay was a factor in determining the abuse of process. |
| Filing of civil suit to cancel power of attorney after acquittal acknowledges its genuineness | Appellant | Accepted. The Court viewed this action as an acknowledgment of the power of attorney’s validity. |
How each authority was viewed by the Court?
- Section 300, Cr.P.C.*: The Court relied on this section to conclude that the second FIR was not maintainable, as it violated the principle of double jeopardy.
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the principle of double jeopardy, as enshrined in Section 300 of the Cr.P.C. The Court emphasized that the core issue in both FIRs was the same: the alleged forgery of the general power of attorney and the subsequent sale of land. The Court also noted that the respondent had concealed the fact of the appellant’s acquittal in the first case when filing the second FIR, which further weighed against the maintainability of the second FIR. The Court also considered the fact that the respondent had filed a civil suit to cancel the power of attorney after the acquittal, which the Court interpreted as an acknowledgment of the power of attorney’s validity. The Court was also of the view that the delay in filing the second FIR was an abuse of the process of law.
| Sentiment | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Double Jeopardy | 40% |
| Concealment of Acquittal | 25% |
| Same Substratum of FIRs | 20% |
| Abuse of Process | 15% |
Fact:Law Ratio
| Category | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Fact | 30% |
| Law | 70% |
Logical Reasoning:
Issue: Maintainability of Second FIR
Question: Are the substratum of the two FIRs the same?
Finding: Yes, both FIRs concern the same general power of attorney and the sales made under it.
Question: Does Section 300 Cr.P.C. apply?
Finding: Yes, the appellant was acquitted in the first FIR, barring a second trial for the same offense.
Conclusion: Second FIR is not maintainable.
The Court’s reasoning was based on the fact that the two FIRs were based on the same set of facts and the same general power of attorney. The Court held that the addition of different sections of the IPC in the second FIR did not change the fact that the core issue was the same. The Court also emphasized that the appellant had already been acquitted in the first FIR, and therefore, a second trial for the same offense was barred by Section 300 of the Cr.P.C.
The Court stated, “It is, therefore, apparent that the subject matter of both the FIRs is the same general power of attorney dated 02.05.1985 and the sales made by the appellant in pursuance of the same.”
The Court also noted, “If the substratum of the two FIRs are common, the mere addition of Sections 467, 468 and 471 in the subsequent FIR cannot be considered as different ingredients to justify the latter FIR as being based on different materials, allegations and grounds.”
The Court further stated, “In view of the conclusion that the substratum of the two FIRs are the same and that the appellant has already stood acquitted on 07.08.1998 of the charge with regard to forging any general power of attorney of the respondent, we are of the considered opinion that the subsequent prosecution of the appellant in FIR No. 114 of 2008 dated 09.10.2008 is completely unsustainable.”
Key Takeaways
- A person cannot be tried twice for the same offense if they have been acquitted in the first trial.
- The principle of double jeopardy, as enshrined in Section 300 of the Cr.P.C., protects individuals from repeated prosecutions for the same actions.
- The substratum of the two FIRs must be different for a second FIR to be maintainable. The mere addition of different sections of the IPC does not justify a second FIR if the core issue remains the same.
- Concealing the fact of an acquittal in a previous case while filing a new FIR is an abuse of the process of law.
Directions
The Supreme Court set aside the second FIR (FIR No. 114 of 2008) and the orders of the lower courts rejecting the appellant’s discharge application. The appeal was allowed.
Development of Law
The ratio decidendi of this case is that a second FIR based on the same substratum of facts as a previous FIR in which the accused was acquitted is not maintainable. This case reinforces the principle of double jeopardy under Section 300 of the Cr.P.C. and clarifies that the mere addition of different sections of the IPC does not justify a second prosecution if the core issue remains the same. This judgment upholds the legal principle that an accused cannot be tried twice for the same offense.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s judgment in Prem Chand Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh is a significant reaffirmation of the principle of double jeopardy. The Court held that a second FIR based on the same facts as a previous case in which the accused was acquitted is not maintainable, even if different sections of the IPC are invoked. This decision protects individuals from repeated prosecutions for the same actions and ensures finality in legal proceedings. The Court’s emphasis on the substratum of the FIRs being the same is a crucial point for future cases.