Supreme Court Reduces Murder Conviction to Culpable Homicide: Nankaunoo vs. State of U.P. (2016)

Can a conviction for murder be reduced to culpable homicide if the injury, though fatal, was inflicted on a non-vital part of the body? The Supreme Court of India addressed this question in the case of Nankaunoo vs. State of U.P.. The court modified the conviction from murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I of the IPC. This decision hinged on the nature and location of the injury sustained by the victim.

This judgment was delivered by a three-judge bench comprising Chief Justice T.S. Thakur, Justice A.K. Sikri, and Justice R. Banumathi, with Justice R. Banumathi authoring the opinion.

Case Background

The case revolves around an incident that occurred on February 18, 1981, in Kurari Khurd Market. The deceased, Chhedi Lal, operated a barber shop. The appellant, Nankaunoo, visited Chhedi Lal’s shop for a haircut. An argument ensued when Nankaunoo demanded preferential treatment over other customers. Chhedi Lal refused, which led to Nankaunoo feeling insulted and leaving the shop with threats.

Later that day, around 6:00 PM, Chhedi Lal went to a canal to relieve himself. Nankaunoo appeared with a pistol and confronted Chhedi Lal, stating he would not spare him for the earlier insult. As Chhedi Lal tried to escape, Nankaunoo fired, hitting him on his left thigh. The incident was witnessed by Janoo (PW2), Udan (PW3), and Muneshwar. Kishore (PW1), the deceased’s father, and Ram Pal, his son, also saw the incident while returning from their field.

Chhedi Lal was taken home and then to the police station, where a First Information Report (FIR) was registered under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). He was then taken to Achal Ganj Hospital and then referred to District Hospital Unnao. Unfortunately, Chhedi Lal died on the way to the hospital. Consequently, the FIR was altered to Section 302 of the IPC, and further investigation was conducted.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The Sessions Judge, Unnao, found Nankaunoo guilty under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Nankaunoo appealed to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, which upheld the trial court’s decision.

Legal Framework

The case primarily involves the interpretation of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which defines murder. Specifically, the third clause of Section 300 is relevant. This clause states that culpable homicide is murder if the person causing the injury knows that the injury is likely to cause death, or if the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

Section 302 of the IPC prescribes the punishment for murder, while Section 304 of the IPC deals with culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

The third clause of Section 300 of the IPC consists of two parts. The first part requires proof that there was an intention to inflict the injury. The second part requires proof that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) defines murder as follows:

“Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or—Secondly.—If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or—Thirdly.—If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or—Fourthly.—If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.”

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments:

• The appellant argued that the prosecution’s case relied on the testimony of interested and inimical witnesses. PW-1, the father of the deceased, was an interested witness, and PWs 2 and 3 were inimical witnesses.
• The appellant contended that the alleged murder weapon, a country-made pistol, was never recovered. Therefore, there was no clear connection between the weapon and the resultant injury.
• The appellant argued that the gunshot injury was on the lower part of the left thigh, a non-vital organ. It could not be concluded that the appellant intended to cause death, so the conviction under Section 302 of the IPC was not sustainable.

Respondent’s Arguments:

• The respondent argued that the witnesses consistently stated that the appellant threatened the deceased and then shot him with a pistol.
• The respondent contended that the medical evidence corroborated the eye-witness accounts. The courts below were correct in convicting the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC.

Submissions of Parties

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court considered the following issues:

1. Whether the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC is sustainable.
2. Whether the non-recovery of the weapon affects the prosecution’s case, given the consistent eyewitness testimony and medical evidence.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• The Court relied on Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465* to explain the principles for applying the third clause of Section 300 of the IPC.
• The Court also relied on Jai Prakash v. State (Delhi Administration), (1991) 2 SCC 32* to reiterate the principles in Virsa Singh and clarify the two parts of the third clause of Section 300 IPC.
• The Court also relied on Jagrup Singh v. State of Haryana, (1981) 3 SCC 616* to reiterate the principles in Virsa Singh.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision to modify the conviction from Section 302 to Section 304 Part I of the IPC was primarily influenced by the nature and location of the injury. The court emphasized that while the appellant intended to cause the injury, the prosecution failed to prove that the injury on the inner part of the left thigh was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The court noted that the injury was on a non-vital organ and that there was no evidence from the doctor that the injury caused the rupture of any important blood vessel, which would have been sufficient to cause death.

The court also considered the fact that the weapon used was a country-made pistol, and the manner in which the attack was made indicated that the appellant intended to cause the injury. However, the lack of evidence regarding the severity of the injury and its likelihood to cause death led the court to conclude that the offense was culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

Logical Reasoning

The court considered alternative interpretations, such as whether the intention to cause injury was sufficient to constitute murder. However, it rejected this interpretation due to the lack of evidence that the specific injury was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. The court emphasized that the prosecution must prove both the intention to cause the injury and that the injury was sufficient to cause death.

The court held that the injury was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The court emphasized that the prosecution must prove both the intention to cause the injury and that the injury was sufficient to cause death.

The Supreme Court held that “…the sufficiency of injury to cause death must be proved and cannot be inferred from the fact that death has taken place.”

The Court stated that, “The emphasis in clause three of Section 300 IPC is on the sufficiency of the injury in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.”

The Court also observed that, “In a case of this nature, any omission on the part of the investigating officer cannot go against the prosecution case. Story of the prosecution is to be examined dehors such omission by the investigating agency. Otherwise, it would shake the confidence of the people not merely in the law enforcing agency but also in the administration of justice.”

The court did not have a dissenting opinion. All three judges were in agreement.

Key Takeaways

• ✓ A conviction for murder under Section 302 of the IPC can be modified to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I of the IPC if the injury, though fatal, was inflicted on a non-vital part of the body and the prosecution fails to prove that the injury was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.
• ✓ The prosecution must prove both the intention to cause the injury and that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death for a conviction under Section 302 of the IPC.
• ✓ The non-recovery of the weapon does not materially affect the prosecution’s case if there is unimpeachable oral evidence corroborated by medical evidence.
• ✓ Omissions by the investigating officer cannot go against the prosecution’s case if the prosecution’s story is credible.

Directions

The Supreme Court did not give any specific directions in this case.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that for a conviction under Section 302 of the IPC, the prosecution must prove both the intention to cause the injury and that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The court clarified that the sufficiency of the injury cannot be inferred from the fact that death has occurred. This case reinforces the principles laid down in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab and provides further clarity on the application of the third clause of Section 300 of the IPC.

Conclusion

In Nankaunoo vs. State of U.P., the Supreme Court modified the appellant’s conviction from murder under Section 302 of the IPC to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I of the IPC. The court held that while the appellant intended to cause the injury, the prosecution failed to prove that the injury on the inner part of the left thigh was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This decision highlights the importance of proving both the intention to cause the injury and the sufficiency of the injury to cause death for a conviction under Section 302 of the IPC.