Supreme Court refers questions on Section 17A of PC Act and Section 156(3) of CrPC to Larger Bench: B.S. Yeddyurappa vs A. Alam Pasha (21 April 2025)

Date of the Judgment: 21 April 2025
Citation: 2025 INSC 515
Judges: J.B. Pardiwala, J. and Manoj Misra, J.

When can a magistrate order a police investigation into corruption allegations against a public servant? The Supreme Court of India recently grappled with this question, specifically addressing the interplay between Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act) and Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). The court considered whether a prior approval is needed before initiating any inquiry or investigation against a public servant accused of corruption.

The bench, comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice Manoj Misra, ultimately decided to refer the matter to a larger bench due to conflicting precedents and the importance of the issues involved. This decision arose from a case involving B.S. Yeddyurappa, where allegations of corruption led to a complex legal battle involving questions of sanction and investigation powers.

Case Background

The case originated from a complaint filed on April 26, 2012, by A. Alam Pasha against B.S. Yeddyurappa and other government servants. The complaint alleged offences punishable under Section 13(1)(c) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. At the time of the alleged offences, Yeddyurappa was the Chief Minister of Karnataka, holding office from May 30, 2008, to July 31, 2011.

On May 21, 2012, a magistrate, acting under Section 156(3) of the CrPC, referred the complaint to the Lokayukta police for investigation. Subsequently, an FIR was registered, alleging offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), and the PC Act. Following the investigation, a final report was submitted, and cognizance was taken on June 24, 2013.

Yeddyurappa then approached the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC, seeking to quash the FIR and subsequent proceedings. He relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Anil Kumar vs. M.K. Aiyappa [(2013) 10 SCC 705], which held that a magistrate cannot order investigation against a public servant under Section 156(3) of the CrPC without prior sanction.

The High Court, on October 11, 2013, allowed Yeddyurappa’s petition and quashed the FIR and subsequent proceedings, citing the absence of sanction and relying on the Aiyappa judgment. This order attained finality.

However, on December 12, 2013, Pasha filed another complaint with almost identical allegations, adding that since the accused had ceased to hold office, sanction to prosecute them under Section 19 of the PC Act was not required. The trial court dismissed this second complaint on August 26, 2016, again citing the lack of sanction.

Pasha challenged the dismissal of the second complaint before the High Court, which allowed the petition on January 5, 2021. The High Court directed that PCR No.32/2014 be restored and proceed against the accused (except accused no.3, for whom sanction was denied) in accordance with the law.

Yeddyurappa then filed the present petition before the Supreme Court, contesting the High Court’s order.

Timeline:

Arguments

The petitioner, B.S. Yeddyurappa, argued that the second complaint was not maintainable and that sanction was required under the amended Section 19 and newly inserted Section 17A of the PC Act. He contended that the Aiyappa judgment was good law unless set aside by a larger bench.

The petitioner elaborated that the allegations in the complaint related to decisions taken by a public servant in the discharge of official functions. Therefore, the bar on investigation under Section 17A of the PC Act would apply, even if the magistrate does not take cognizance while passing an order under Section 156(3) of the CrPC.

Further, the petitioner argued that the amendment to Section 19 of the PC Act by Act 16 of 2018 provides protection regardless of whether the public servant continues in service, if the alleged offence relates to the period when the person was in service.

The respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the Aiyappa decision was inconsistent with a three-judge bench decision in R.R. Chari vs. State of Uttar Pradesh [AIR 1951 SC 207; 1951 SCC Online SC 22] and the settled position that a magistrate does not take cognizance of offences while exercising power under Section 156(3) of the CrPC; therefore, no sanction is required at that stage.

Regarding the bar on investigation under Section 17A, the respondents argued that it does not prevent a court from directing investigation under the CrPC and that it would not apply to court-directed investigations. They also relied on several decisions to argue that a second complaint is maintainable if the first complaint is rejected on technical grounds without addressing the merits.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

1. What are the relevant considerations as contemplated by Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, “the PC Act”) which the appropriate authority or government is expected to look into before the grant of approval for initiation of any enquiry, inquiry, or investigation by the police?
2. Whether the considerations which weigh with the appropriate authority or government while granting approval under Section 17A of the PC Act are fundamentally so different from the one that a Magistrate is ordinarily expected to apply while passing an order under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “the Cr.P.C.”) so as to preclude the Magistrate from fulfilling the object underlying Section 17A of the PC Act? In other words, whether the considerations under Section 17A of the PC Act are of such a nature that they are necessarily beyond the ambit or scope of consideration by a Magistrate while directing an investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C.?
3. As a natural corollary of the aforesaid, could it be said that once a Magistrate has applied his mind under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., the requirement of a prior approval under Section 17A of the PC Act is meaningless, redundant and no longer necessary? Could it be said that a police officer, despite a direction under Section 156(3) by a Magistrate, would remain inhibited from conducting any enquiry, inquiry, or investigation without prior approval as required by Section 17A? If yes, how does the standard of application of mind by the appropriate authority differ from that of the Magistrate?
4. In case of a private complaint, whether Section 19 of the PC Act, more particularly parts (i) and (ii) of the First Proviso therein contemplates that sanction would be required only after the Magistrate first completes the stage of examining the complainant and / or causing a magisterial inquiry wherever necessary in terms of Section(s) 200 and 202 of the Cr.P.C. respectively? In other words, whether the three conditions envisaged under the First Proviso, namely that a complaint has been filed as per Part (i) and that the court has not only not dismissed such complaint but also explicitly directed the obtainment of sanction as per Part (ii), necessarily implies that it is open for the Magistrate to proceed in terms of Chapter XV more particularly under Section(s) 200, 202 and 203 even without the grant of sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act? If so, whether such an interpretation is limited only for the purpose of “cognizance” under Section 19 of the PC Act?
5. Whether, Part (ii) of the First Proviso to Section 19 of the PC Act, more particularly the expression “the court has not dismissed the complaint under section 203” necessarily envisages that the Magistrate ought to have first considered the statements of the complainant and the witnesses(s) and / or of any magisterial inquiry in terms of Section(s) 200 and 202 of the Cr.P.C.? In other words, could it be said that the Magistrate takes cognizance only after deciding not to dismiss the complaint under Section 203 especially in light of the decision in Legal Remembrancer v. Abani Kumar Banerji [1950 SCC OnLine Cal 49].
6. Whether it could be said that the First Proviso to Section 19 of the PC Act is detached from the substantive part contained in sub-section (1) of the said provision?
7. Whether the requirements introduced by Section 17A and the amended Section 19 of the PC Act could be said to be retrospectively applicable? Since the aforesaid procedural changes were brought in tandem with the substantive changes in the very offences itself as provided under Section(s) 7, 11, 13 and 15 respectively of the PC Act by way of the 2018 Amendment Act, whether the same necessarily implies that the introduction of Section 17A as-well as the amendment of Section 19 were not merely procedural but also substantive in nature, and thus, only ought to be applicable prospectively? In other words, whether the conspectus of amendments to the PC Act, i.e., Section(s) 7, 11, 13, 15, 17A and 19 respectively is so intrinsically intertwined with each other in such a manner that they can neither survive without each other nor can they be read in isolation from one another and thus can only be regarded as nothing but substantive in nature?

Treatment of the Issue by the Court: The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues

Authorities

The court considered the following authorities:

• Anil Kumar vs. M.K. Aiyappa [(2013) 10 SCC 705]: This case held that a magistrate cannot order investigation against a public servant under Section 156(3) of the CrPC without prior sanction. The correctness of this decision has been doubted and referred to a larger bench.
• R.R. Chari vs. State of Uttar Pradesh [AIR 1951 SC 207; 1951 SCC Online SC 22]: A three-judge bench decision that the respondents claimed was inconsistent with the Aiyappa decision.
• Manju Surana vs. Sunil Arora & Ors. [(2018) 5 SCC 557]: This case referred the question of whether a magistrate is applying his mind while directing an investigation under Section 156(3) of the CrPC to a larger bench.
• Nara Chandrababu Naidu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Another [(2024) SCC OnLine SC 47]: This case involved a split verdict on whether the protection of Section 17A would be available for offences committed prior to its insertion in the statute book, and the matter has been referred to a larger bench.
• Shamin Khan vs. Debashish Chakrabarty & Ors. [SLP (Crl) Nos.3567-3568/2017]: A coordinate bench of the Supreme Court refrained from proceeding further in deciding the underlying issue, which is under reference to a larger bench, and tagged the petitions with the referred matter “Manju Surana vs. Sunil Arora & Ors.”

Judgment

The Supreme Court noted that a coordinate bench had already refrained from deciding the issue under reference to a larger bench in Manju Surana vs. Sunil Arora & Ors. [(2018) 5 SCC 557]. Maintaining judicial discipline, the court deemed it appropriate to tag the present petitions with the referred matter.

Key Takeaways

• The Supreme Court has referred critical questions regarding the interpretation and application of Section 17A of the PC Act and Section 156(3) of the CrPC to a larger bench.
• The reference was prompted by conflicting precedents and the need for clarity on the requirement of prior sanction for investigating corruption allegations against public servants.
• The outcome of the larger bench decision will have significant implications for the process of initiating and conducting investigations into corruption cases involving public officials.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision to refer the matter to a larger bench underscores the complexity and importance of the issues involved. The resolution of these questions will significantly impact the legal framework for prosecuting corruption cases in India.