Supreme Court Refuses Divorce Despite Irretrievable Breakdown: Dr. Nirmal Singh Panesar vs. Mrs. Paramjit Kaur Panesar (2023)

Date of the Judgment: October 10, 2023
Citation: 2023 INSC 896
Judges: Aniruddha Bose, J., Bela M. Trivedi, J.
Can a marriage be dissolved solely based on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown, even if it’s not a recognized ground for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this critical question in a case where a husband sought divorce, arguing that his marriage had irretrievably broken down. The Court, however, declined to grant the divorce, emphasizing the importance of the institution of marriage and the need for complete justice, especially considering the sentiments of the wife who did not want a divorce. The judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench comprising Justice Aniruddha Bose and Justice Bela M. Trivedi, with Justice Bela M. Trivedi authoring the opinion.

Case Background

The appellant, Dr. Nirmal Singh Panesar, a retired Air Force officer, married the respondent, Mrs. Paramjit Kaur Panesar, a retired teacher, on March 10, 1963, according to Sikh rites. They had three children. The appellant filed for divorce on March 12, 1996, citing cruelty and desertion under Section 13(1)(ia) and 13(1)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The appellant claimed that the relationship soured when the respondent did not join him after his transfer to Madras in January 1984, and that she did not take care of him despite his heart condition. The District Court initially granted the divorce, but the High Court reversed this decision, which led to the current appeal.

Timeline:

Course of Proceedings

The District Court initially granted the divorce decree in favor of the appellant. However, the Single Bench of the High Court reversed this decision, stating that the appellant had failed to prove cruelty or desertion. The Division Bench of the High Court upheld the Single Bench’s decision, leading the appellant to appeal to the Supreme Court. The High Court observed that the wife had lived with the husband for 21 years and that her not joining him in Madras did not constitute cruelty or desertion. The High Court also noted that the wife had continued to look after the children and arrange their marriages, while the husband made no effort to join her.

Legal Framework

The case primarily revolves around Section 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, which outlines the grounds for divorce, including cruelty and desertion. The Supreme Court referred to the definition of “cruelty” as a course of conduct that adversely affects the other spouse, which can be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. The Court also discussed the concept of “desertion,” emphasizing that it requires the intentional abandonment of one spouse by the other without consent or reasonable cause. The explanation to Section 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, defines desertion as “the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage.” The Court also considered Article 142 of the Constitution of India, which grants the Supreme Court the power to pass any order necessary to do complete justice.

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments:

• The appellant argued that the High Court erred in reversing the District Court’s decree of divorce.
• He contended that the respondent’s refusal to join him in Madras, her failure to care for him during his heart condition, and her complaints to Air Force authorities constituted cruelty.
• He cited Naveen Kohli vs. Neelu Kohli to support his argument on cruelty.
• Alternatively, the appellant argued that the marriage had irretrievably broken down, and the Court should exercise its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to grant a divorce, relying on Shilpa Sailesh vs. Varun Sreenivasan.

Respondent’s Arguments:

• The respondent argued that she did not want to die with the stigma of being a “divorcee.”
• She maintained that she had always respected the marital relationship and was willing to care for the appellant with her son’s help.
• The respondent contended that a long period of separation does not automatically equate to an irretrievable breakdown of marriage.
• She argued that the appellant had failed to prove either cruelty or desertion, and therefore, the High Court’s decision should not be interfered with.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

• “Should the irretrievable breakdown of marriage necessarily result in the dissolution of marriage in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, when such is not a ground for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act 1955?”

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court’s decision. The Court held that the appellant failed to prove cruelty or desertion as grounds for divorce under Section 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. While acknowledging the power of the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution to dissolve a marriage on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown, the Court emphasized that this power should be exercised with great care and caution. It noted that the institution of marriage is still considered sacred in Indian society and that the respondent, an 82-year-old woman, did not want a divorce. The Court concluded that granting a divorce in this case would not do “complete justice” to the parties, especially considering the wife’s sentiments.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was heavily influenced by the following factors:

• The advanced age of both parties (appellant 89, respondent 82).
• The respondent’s lifelong commitment to the marriage since 1963.
• The respondent’s willingness to continue caring for the appellant.
• The respondent’s strong desire to not be labeled a “divorcee.”
• The Court’s emphasis on the importance of the institution of marriage in Indian society.
• The need to ensure “complete justice,” which, in this case, meant respecting the respondent’s sentiments.

The Court’s reasoning was primarily based on the legal principles related to cruelty and desertion, as well as the discretionary power under Article 142 of the Constitution. The Court also considered the specific facts of the case, including the advanced age of the parties and the respondent’s sentiments. The Court emphasized that while it has the power to grant divorce based on irretrievable breakdown, this power must be exercised judiciously, especially when one party opposes the divorce.

Logical Reasoning

The Court considered the argument that the marriage had irretrievably broken down, but it rejected this argument in the specific context of this case. The Court emphasized that the power to grant divorce under Article 142 should be exercised with great care and caution, and not as a matter of routine. The Court also considered the sentiments of the respondent, who did not want a divorce, and concluded that granting a divorce in this case would not be in the interest of “complete justice.”

The Court quoted from the judgment:

• “The principles of law which have been crystallised by a series of judgments of this Court are recapitulated as under…”
• “The reasons for a dispute between husband and wife are always very complex. Every matrimonial dispute is different from another.”
• “In view of the afore -stated decision of the Constitution Bench, there remains no shadow of doubt that this Court can depart from the procedure as well as the substantive la ws, and exercise its discretion under Article 142 for dissolving the marriage between the parties by balancing out the equities between the conflicting cla ims of the parties , however, such discretion should be exercised with great care and caution.”

There was no minority opinion in this case. The judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench, with Justice Bela M. Trivedi authoring the opinion.

The judgment implies that while the Supreme Court has the power to grant divorce based on the irretrievable breakdown of marriage, it will not do so routinely. The Court will consider the specific facts of each case, including the sentiments of the parties and the broader social context. This decision reinforces the importance of the institution of marriage in Indian society and the need to ensure “complete justice” in each case.

Key Takeaways

• The Supreme Court will not automatically grant a divorce based on the irretrievable breakdown of marriage, even under Article 142 of the Constitution.
• The Court will consider the specific facts of each case, including the sentiments of the parties.
• The institution of marriage is still considered sacred in Indian society, and the Court will not lightly dissolve a marriage.
• The Court will prioritize “complete justice,” which may mean respecting the wishes of a spouse who does not want a divorce.

Directions

No specific directions were given by the Supreme Court in this judgment.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Supreme Court will not automatically grant a divorce based on the irretrievable breakdown of marriage, even when exercising its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution. The Court will consider the specific facts of each case, including the sentiments of the parties and the broader social context. This judgment reinforces the importance of the institution of marriage in Indian society and the need to ensure “complete justice” in each case. There is no change in the previous position of law, but the judgment clarifies the cautious approach the Supreme Court will take while exercising its powers under Article 142.

Conclusion

In the case of Dr. Nirmal Singh Panesar vs. Mrs. Paramjit Kaur Panesar, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, refusing to grant a divorce despite the appellant’s claim that the marriage had irretrievably broken down. The Court emphasized the importance of the institution of marriage, the need for complete justice, and the sentiments of the respondent, who did not wish to be divorced. This judgment highlights the Court’s cautious approach to dissolving marriages, even when exercising its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution.