Supreme Court Refuses to Compound Section 326 IPC Offence Despite Compromise: Bhagwan Narayan Gaikwad vs. State of Maharashtra (20 September 2021)

LEGAL ISSUE: Whether an offense under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) can be compounded based on a compromise between the victim and the accused, especially when the offense involves grievous hurt.

CASE TYPE: Criminal Appeal

Case Name: Bhagwan Narayan Gaikwad vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

[Judgment Date]: 20 September 2021

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: 20 September 2021
Citation: Criminal Appeal No(s). 1039 of 2021 (Arising out of SLP(Criminal) No(s). 7001 of 2021) (Diary No. 14956/2021)
Judges: Justice Ajay Rastogi and Justice Abhay S. Oka. The judgment was authored by Justice Rastogi.

Can a compromise between an accused and a victim lead to the quashing of a conviction for a serious offense like causing grievous hurt? The Supreme Court of India recently tackled this question in a case where the accused sought to compound an offense under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) based on a compromise with the victim. The core issue was whether such a compromise could override the severity of the crime and the public interest in maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice system.

The Supreme Court, in this case, examined whether a compromise reached between the victim and the accused after a conviction for grievous hurt under Section 326 of the IPC could be a sufficient ground to reduce the sentence. The Court considered the nature of the offense, the extent of the injuries, and the principles of criminal justice while deciding on the matter.

Case Background

On December 13, 1993, at approximately 5:30 PM, Subhash Yadavrao Patil (the victim) was returning home on his bicycle when he was attacked by several individuals, including Bhagwan Narayan Gaikwad (the appellant). The attackers, who arrived in a tractor, began pelting stones at the victim. One of the accused struck the victim’s leg with a ‘Satur’ (a sharp weapon), and the appellant then inflicted a severe blow with a sword on the victim’s right leg below the knee.

The brutal attack resulted in the near mutilation of the victim’s right leg. As the victim tried to shield himself, his right arm below the elbow was also severed. The victim suffered profuse bleeding and was immediately taken to the hospital. Dr. Vijay Shivram Upase (PW 8), who examined the victim, stated that the victim’s lower right leg below the knee was completely detached, and his right arm below the elbow was hanging by the skin. The doctor confirmed that the injuries were life-threatening, and without immediate medical intervention, the victim would have died.

Initially, 12 accused persons were convicted by the trial court under Section 326 read with Section 149 of the IPC. However, on appeal, the High Court of Bombay, in its judgment dated 10th June 2021, upheld the conviction of only five accused, including the present appellant (A1). The other accused were acquitted due to a lack of sufficient evidence. The appeals of four of the convicted accused abated.

The appellant, Bhagwan Narayan Gaikwad, was sentenced to five years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 10,000, along with a compensation of Rs. 2 lakhs to the victim under Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). After the High Court upheld his conviction, the appellant sought to reduce his sentence by presenting a compromise affidavit from the victim, stating that the victim had no desire to see the appellant serve the remaining sentence.

Timeline:

Course of Proceedings

The trial court convicted 12 accused persons for the offense punishable under Section 326 read with Section 149 of the IPC, sentencing each to 7 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1000. On appeal, the High Court of Bombay, in its judgment dated 10th June, 2021, upheld the conviction of the appellant and four other accused, sentencing them to 5 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 10,000 each, along with a compensation of Rs. 2 lakhs to the victim under Section 357 of the CrPC. The High Court acquitted the remaining accused due to lack of evidence.

The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court, primarily seeking a reduction in sentence based on a compromise affidavit filed by the victim. The appellant argued that the families had reconciled and that the victim did not wish to see him serve the remaining sentence. However, the Supreme Court did not find this compromise sufficient to reduce the sentence.

Legal Framework

The primary legal provision at issue in this case is Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which deals with voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means. It states,
“Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance, or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”

The Court also considered Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), which lists the offenses that are compoundable, meaning they can be settled out of court by the parties involved. Section 326 of the IPC is not listed as a compoundable offense under Section 320 of the CrPC. The relevant part of Section 320 of the CrPC states:
“320. Compounding of offences.—(1) The offences punishable under the sections of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) specified in the first two columns of the table next following may be compounded by the persons mentioned in the third column of that table:
[TABLE OMITTED]
(2) The offences punishable under the sections of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) specified in the first two columns of the table next following may, with the permission of the Court before which any prosecution for such offence is pending, be compounded by the persons mentioned in the third column of that table:
[TABLE OMITTED]”

The Supreme Court highlighted that the ultimate object of the criminal justice system is to protect society and to deter criminals. The sentencing process should reflect the conscience of society, and the courts should impose sentences that are appropriate for the crime committed.

Arguments

The appellant, represented by Mr. Mahesh Jethmalani, argued that a compromise had been reached between him and the victim. The victim, in his affidavit dated 13th July, 2021, stated that the incident occurred due to a misunderstanding and that the families now had cordial relations, including matrimonial ties. The victim also stated that he did not wish to see the appellant serve the remaining sentence. The appellant relied on the judgments in *Ram Pujan and Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh* and *Murali vs. State represented by Inspector of Police*, to argue that the compromise should be a mitigating factor.

The appellant further submitted that the incident occurred in 1993, and he had been on bail during the trial and appeal. He argued that reverting him to serve the substantive sentence after 28 years would be unjustified. The appellant requested the Court to consider the compromise and release him based on the sentence already undergone.

The counsel for the complainant also supported the appellant’s plea, stating that the parties had restored cordial relations and that the victim had instructed him to inform the Court that he did not wish for the appellant to serve the remaining sentence.

The State, represented by Mr. Sachin Patil, opposed the request, arguing that the compromise was obtained after the High Court upheld the conviction under Section 326 of the IPC and sentenced the appellant to 5 years of rigorous imprisonment. The State contended that such a compromise, after 28 years of the incident, was likely obtained by coercion or inducement and undermined the criminal justice system and public confidence in the efficacy of law.

The State further argued that both the trial court and the High Court had taken note of the nature of the incident and its related factors while imposing the sentence. The State maintained that the sentencing was balanced and should not be interfered with based on a compromise obtained after the conviction. The State emphasized the permanent disability suffered by the victim and the brutality of the crime.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The main issue before the Supreme Court was whether the compromise entered into between the appellant and the victim, after the conviction under Section 326 of the IPC, could be a sufficient ground to reduce the sentence awarded by the High Court.

The Court also examined the validity of the compromise, specifically whether it was genuine, voluntary, and not obtained through coercion or inducement.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

• Ram Pujan and Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh [1973(2) SCC 456] – Supreme Court of India

  
  The Court noted that in this case, a three-judge bench had recorded its satisfaction that the compromise was not obtained out of coercion or inducement and was entered with free will. The Court held that such a compromise could be a mitigating factor for altering the sentence.

• Murali vs. State represented by Inspector of Police [2021(1) SCC 726] – Supreme Court of India

  
  The Court observed that in this case, the Court had taken into consideration not only the compromise but also other aggravating and mitigating circumstances, including the fact that the accused had undergone more than half of the sentence. The Court had then interfered and molded the sentence.

• Mohd. Ibrahim vs. State of Karnataka and Others (Criminal Appeal No. 825 of 2018) – Supreme Court of India

  
  The Court noted that the contents of the compromise affidavit in the present case appeared to be copied from paragraph 6 of this judgment, which raised concerns about the genuineness of the compromise.

The Court also considered the following legal provisions:

• Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC)

  
  This section defines the offense of voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means. The Court noted that this offense is non-compoundable.

• Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC)

  
  This section lists the offenses that are compoundable, and the Court noted that Section 326 of the IPC is not included in this list.

Judgment

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision and refused to interfere with the sentence awarded to the appellant. The Court emphasized that the offense under Section 326 of the IPC is a serious crime, and the compromise, in this case, was not genuine and appeared to be a mechanical statement obtained after the conviction.

The Court noted that the compromise was obtained after the High Court upheld the conviction and that the victim had suffered severe injuries, resulting in permanent disability. The Court also highlighted that the act was not only against the individual but also against society, and such brutality could not be ignored.

The Court stated that while a compromise can be one of the factors in interfering with the sentence, it cannot be the sole basis, especially in cases of serious offenses. The Court emphasized that the sentencing must be balanced and reflect the severity of the crime, the permanent disability suffered by the victim, and the need to maintain the integrity of the criminal justice system.

The Court highlighted that the compromise appeared to be a stereotyped statement, lacking details about the earlier relations and the circumstances under which the cordial relations developed. The Court observed that the contents of the compromise affidavit were copied from a previous judgment of the Court, further raising concerns about its genuineness.

The Supreme Court concluded that the compromise was not sufficient to reduce the sentence and dismissed the appeal.

The Court extracted para 3 of the compromise affidavit filed by the victim dated 13th July, 2021, as follows:

“3. That the deponent further submits that the incident in question took place on 13/12/1993 i.e., almost before 28 years due to misunderstanding and in the spur of moment. The petitioner and the deponent to the same clan and they all have in same Village and with passage of time, the relations between the petitioner and the deponent have become very cordial. The petitioner and the deponent are now very closely related and are having matrimonial relations with each other family. The petitioner’s and deponent’s families participate in the functions of each other’s. With the huge time gap, the grudges amongst each other have vanished away and have taken a shape of friendship. The petitioner is 65 year old person suffering from heart disease and requires medical help and attention regularly. They have old age parents wife and children to look after, their entire family would suffer irreparable loss if the petitioner go behind the bars at this stage. The petitioner has suffered imprisonment at the time of trial as well as after conviction till the time bail was granted to him by the trial court and high court. The deponent does not have a slightest desire to make the petitioner undergo the remaining sentence. Therefore, in the interest of both the parties and so also in the interest of the peace and harmony between both the families, the complainant has filed this affidavit permission to compound the offence.”

The Court observed that the statement of fact in the compromise affidavit was completely superfluous in the mechanical form and did not elicit any details about the earlier relations or how such cordial relations were developed. It noted that the contents appeared to be copied from a previous judgment of the Court.

The Court stated that the compromise cannot be taken to be a solitary basis for altering the sentence unless the other aggravating and mitigating factors also support and are favorable to the accused.

The Court emphasized the sufferings of the victim, who was crippled for life and had lost vital organs of the body. The Court deemed the act of the appellant as unpardonable.

The Court also quoted from the High Court’s judgment, stating that it was a pre-meditated attempt of the appellant, who assaulted the victim with a sword and chopped off his right leg below the knee and right forearm below the elbow, and the brutality was apparent on the face of the record.

The Court highlighted that the victim had been fighting for life since the incident and was pursuing his daily chores with a prosthetic arm and leg.

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court held that a compromise between the accused and the victim cannot be the sole basis for reducing a sentence, especially when the offense involves grievous hurt under Section 326 of the IPC. The Court emphasized that such a compromise must be genuine, voluntary, and not obtained through coercion or inducement.

The Court reiterated that the criminal justice system aims to protect society and deter criminals, and that sentencing should reflect the severity of the crime and the conscience of society. The Court also emphasized that the sentencing process should not be undermined by compromises obtained after conviction, especially in cases involving serious offenses.

The Court stated that Section 326 of the IPC is a non-compoundable offense, and the compromise alone cannot override the statutory provisions and the public interest in maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice system.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in *Bhagwan Narayan Gaikwad vs. The State of Maharashtra* reinforces the principle that serious offenses, such as causing grievous hurt under Section 326 of the IPC, cannot be compounded based solely on a compromise between the parties. The Court emphasized that while a compromise can be a mitigating factor, it cannot be the sole basis for altering the sentence, especially in cases of serious offenses.

The Court’s judgment highlights the importance of maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice system and ensuring that sentencing reflects the severity of the crime, the permanent disability suffered by the victim, and the need to deter such crimes. The Court also emphasized that compromises obtained after conviction, especially in serious offenses, must be scrutinized carefully to ensure they are genuine, voluntary, and not obtained through coercion or inducement.

This case serves as a reminder that the criminal justice system is not merely a private matter between the victim and the accused, but also a matter of public interest. The Court’s decision underscores that the severity of the crime, the permanent disability suffered by the victim, and the need to maintain public confidence in the efficacy of law cannot be undermined by compromises obtained after conviction.

The Supreme Court’s refusal to reduce the sentence underscores the importance of upholding the rule of law and ensuring that justice is served, even when there is a compromise between the parties. The judgment emphasizes that the criminal justice system must protect society and deter criminals, and that sentencing should reflect the conscience of society.